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Urban neighbourhood renewal and regeneration have a long history in Western 
industrialised societies like Britain. The renewal or regeneration strategies, visions, 
approaches and implementations often reflect the particular political, economic, social 
and cultural contexts of each development period. There are abundant research 
literatures on the theoretical and practical elements of neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration in the UK, which provide valuable references and lessons to the 
industrialising countries. In rapidly urbanising countries like China, traditional urban 
neighbourhoods are redeveloped at an unprecedented scale. Urban renewal and 
redevelopment projects have affected the life of a large number of urban residents. The 
renewal process, the mechanism and its social and economic effects were, however, 
understudied.  
 
This research aims to evaluate the evolution, achievements and problems of 
neighbourhood renewal process in Chinese cities, by following a cross-national 
approach. It reviews the evolution of urban renewal and regeneration theories and 
practice in Britain: the earliest industralised country in the world. Based on the findings, 
an analytical framework is established which is then used to examine and evaluate the 
recent urban redevelopment practice in Chinese cities. The research is based on both 
quantitative and qualitative data and information collected in the two countries through 
literature and policy reviews, fieldworks, key player interviews and a household survey 
in the two case study neighbourhoods: Shichahai and Jinyuchi in the inner city area of 
Beijing. 
 
The research found that the developments of British and Chinese neighbourhood 
renewal share a similar “zigzag” trajectory in which the renewal strategies focus either 
on economic or social objectives alternatively. Especially in recent years, urban renewal 
and regeneration challenges in Britain and China became more similar. Disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods in both countries face problems of multi-dimensional deprivation 
across the areas of housing, employment, education, healthcare, safety and others. This 
means that the British regeneration strategies and approaches could be more valuable to 
Chinese policy-makers and practitioners. In China, neighbourhood renewal projects 
always bear the influence from the West, but for the different national contexts, renewal 
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projects in every period only targeted at one or several particular aspects of the “urban 
problems” at the time. The positive effects of renewal projects were often very limited 
while the negative impacts led to the emergence of unexpected new problems. Since 
2000 some experimental renewal projects have a much wider remits than before, but 
they still focus on the “visible” problems only. The improvement of local housing 
condition and physical environment was very obvious and dramatic. The achievements 
were however cutback by the process of gentrification and population replacement. 
Although the new renewal mechanisms emphasised multi-sectoral cooperation, the 
operational and administrative structures were still far from the ideal partnership, 
particularly in relation to the rights of original residents. Based on the findings, a series 
of recommendations have been developed to improve the neighbourhood renewal 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
 
1.1.1 Neighbourhood renewal and regeneration 
 
Urban neighbourhoods are dynamic systems which change constantly to serve the 
requirements of a continually evolving modern society. Older neighbourhoods may 
become outdated and dilapidated, and are no longer suitable for modern life. New social 
and economic functions require different urban spaces from those created and used by 
earlier generations of residents or developers. The application of modern technologies 
also results in the development of better built environments. In urban studies, the 
process of making essential changes to previously developed urban neighbourhoods is 
referred to as “neighbourhood renewal” or “neighbourhood regeneration”. Renewal or 
regeneration activities involve many different issues across spatial, economic, social and 
political arenas and processes. Because of their close linkages to the changing living 
conditions of many urban residents, neighbourhood renewal and regeneration policies 
and their effectiveness have become the hot topics among policy-makers and 
researchers in almost every country over recent decades. 
 
The practice of neighbourhood renewal/regeneration has a long history in most Western 
developed countries. Britain can be the most typical representative. The Industrial 
Revolution led to the formation of modern cities by a rapid concentration of capital, 
consumption, and also the population from the countryside. Private developers invested 
through the capitalist system to construct new industrial factories, modern transport 
facilities and compact dwellings for the working classes, which reshaped the traditional 
neighbourhoods in many medieval towns over a very short period. This is the root of the 
practice of neighbourhood renewal and regeneration. The urban landscape and buildings 
associated with early industrialisation brought great assets of British cities over a 
century ago, but also created new social problems and become the subjects for renewal 
or regeneration in later years. 
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The pace of neighbourhood renewal accelerated in Britain in the 20th century, 
especially in the post-war years. Influenced by the ideas of Keynesianism, 
non-market-oriented state intervention became stronger and played a more significant 
role in neighbourhood renewal, while the roles of market and private developers were 
restrained. The public-led slum clearance and reconstruction projects of city centres 
dominated the neighbourhood renewal practice especially during the 1950s and 1960s, 
when the spatial changes of renewed areas reached the highest speed of change. In later 
years, public authorities and agencies kept control of neighbourhood renewal projects, 
but physical changes have become less important and more consideration has been 
given to solving the decline of the specific inner-city areas. After the state-led 
neighbourhood renewal process, many of the social problems caused by war and 
failure(s) of the markets in the past, such as serious housing shortages for the working 
classes were tackled effectively; however the dependence on the top-down system and 
the exclusion of the market left many new problems, particularly since the 1970s when 
the national socio-economic context restructured. 
 
As the response since the 1980s, the neighbourhood renewal/regeneration process has 
experienced another shift. New policies and approaches tried to re-explore the potential 
of the market and to stimulate private investment for the economic renaissance in the 
declining inner-city areas. Central government formed a union with private capital to 
initiate the renewal/regeneration projects, and the new practice soon produced 
significant prosperity in some waterfront areas or city centres. However, the 
achievements of the economic renaissance in some specific areas did not spread to 
wider areas, and most other declining neighbourhoods were left untouched. A great 
number of vulnerable populations were still left in the declining neighbourhoods, 
suffering homelessness or poor living conditions, as well as high crime, long-term 
unemployment and low-quality social service (Murie, 1990). In the 1990s, the gap 
between “good” and “bad” communities in living conditions actually increased, and 
became a new problem that could not be ignored by the consequent government (SEU, 
1998). 
 
After the New Labour Party came to power in 1997, the neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration followed a new lasting strategy to seek “prosperous and cohesive 
communities, offering a safe, healthy and sustainable environment for all” (DCLG, 2006: 
p. 1). Compared with previous initiatives, the new strategy emphasised the visions and 
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actions for integrated and sustained local actions, especially in the area of social 
well-being. More stakeholders, including not only central, regional and local 
governments, but also private developers, voluntary groups and particularly local 
communities, were involved in the process. Decision making and implementation were 
largely devolved to neighbourhood level, and central government would provide only 
the strategic priorities for the process. Many new deals were conducted to cover 
wider-ranged problems than before. Several years on, some official reports have 
revealed quite positive changes caused by the new-style neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration policy and practice (DCLG, 2007; NRU, 2005a, 2005b). 
 
The evolution of neighbourhood renewal/regeneration ideas, policies, and practice in 
Western countries represented by Britain has provided great knowledge assets for 
contemporary urban studies. Plenty of research achievements on this topic, from either 
an official or academic perspective, have provided in-depth analysis of the nature of the 
neighbourhood renewal/regeneration process, and also useful criteria by which one can 
evaluate the various renewal/regenratio practice.  
 
1.1.2 Neighbourhood renewal in China 
 
Nowadays neighbourhood renewal or regeneration is an important research area of 
urban studies not only in British or European context, but also internationally. In the fast 
urbanising countries, the scale and speed of the neighbourhood renewal projects could 
be much larger and faster than what had happened in the developed countries. The 
situation in China is a typical example of this. Almost all cities of this most populous 
country in the world are now experiencing urban changes with a shocking speed: every 
day, thousands of old houses are demolished and new buildings are completed or under 
construction, in order to fulfil the requirements of the increasing urban population and 
the eager desire for local development. 
 
In China, the renewal or redevelopment of old urban neighbourhoods was not a new 
topic either. As early as the time of the arrival of Western colonists, modern industrial 
development began to emerge in Chinese cities, and the neighbourhood renewal projects 
frequently occurred together with the early industrialisation process. However, the pace 
of industrialisation and urbanisation in China then were very slow, and the renewal 
projects were in very limited scale and concentrated in some large coastal cities only. 
  4
Since 1949, when the Communist Party came to power and established the Socialist 
state, the mechanism of neighbourhood renewal has changed to the top-down public-led 
model. In practice, the shift was more or less similar to the changes when Social 
Democratic politicians enhanced the power of public authorities in Britain at the same 
period. The decision-makers of the new Chinese government proposed very ambitious 
plans to set up larger-scale urban neighbourhood renewal schemes in order to eliminate 
the image of the old society in a revolutionary way. However, owing to insufficient 
public expenditure, only some of projects were put into practice. Most of the completed 
projects were associated with the construction of modern industrial factories and new 
administrative districts. Only in some large cities were there small scales of slum 
clearance and rehabilitation projects in the most disadvantaged residential 
neighbourhoods. 
 
Since the 1980s, at the same time as the Thatcherite reform in Britain, the Chinese 
government has launched the new national strategy of “Reform and Opening up”. In 
urban development, the role of private investment and power of market was encouraged 
and central control was reduced (Wu, 1997; 1998; Yeh and Wu, 1999). This led to a 
sustained boom in urban economy and a faster rate of urbanisation. Larger scale 
neighbourhood renewal projects (including slum clearance) were carried out in every 
city and town. More and more projects were undertaken by private developers but also 
with the strong support of local governments through a series of interventional 
approaches (Beijing Municipal Government, 1994). The pace of the renewal process 
was accelerated dramatically (Wu, 2000, 2002; Zhu, 2000; Wei, 1998). 
 
Similar to these problems observed in Britain, recent large-scale neighbourhood renewal 
projects in China sought to bring wealth into old and poor areas through the extension 
of consumer choice and investment of financial capital. Most of the projects succeeded 
in renewing the physical fabric and infrastructure, creating more commercial profits, but 
failed to improve the real living conditions for all local residents (Zhang, 2002; Ke, 
1999; He and Wu, 2005; 2007). While some urban residents benefited from the boon of 
the local economy, a large proportion of poor residents gained little, and had to lose 
their original homes and communities. Many of them had to be “forced relocated” 
which resulted in the concentration of new urban poverty and vulnerable people in some 
declining neighbourhoods (Wang and Murie, 2000). This redevelopment process has 
created serious tensions between different population groups in cities (Wang, 2004a; Wu, 
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2004; Gugler, 1997; Wu and Li, 2002). 
 
The neighbourhood renewal movement has moved forward at high speed since 2000. 
Many local governments still regarded the process as an effective way to modernise the 
economic structure and images of their cities, but by drawing on lessons of early 
practice, more emphasis was given to social equality and to ensuring that urban renewal 
projects would indeed provide better living condition for millions of urban residents 
“living with difficulties”. Thus some recent experimental renewal projects with 
innovative approaches have been launched: public financial supports are used again to 
enhance the social objectives, but the market and private investment still play important 
roles in keeping the economic viability of these projects. 
 
Very few researchers have systematically studied the long evolution of the 
neighbourhood renewal policy and practice in Chinese cities. In particular, after the shift 
of the target, approaches and mechanisms of some experimental renewal projects since 
2000, the whole process and its efforts were seldom examined despite its having 
affected the lives of millions of people in Chinese cities. The existing literature focuses 
largely on the physical design or land use aspects, while only very little is concerned 
with the socio-economic impacts (Fang and Zhang, 2003; Wang, 2002; Wu and He, 
2005). International comparison between China and other countries is even rarer, 
although the development of the urban neighbourhood renewal/regeneration process in 
Chinese cities is sharing some common features with those in other industrialised 
countries like Britain, and the regeneration and renewal policy and practice in both 
countries have faced very similar challenges over the recent years. Therefore, the 
experiences and lessons learnt in British cities in particular will be useful for China. 
Drawing on the valuable British experience and lessons will definitely help the Chinese 
policy-makers to avoid unnecessary tests and experiments in searching for ideal policies 
and principles for future development in neighbourhood renewal and regeneration. 
 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
1.2.1 Research aim and question 
 
This research aims to develop an analytical framework based on knowledge about the 
neighbourhood renewal/regeneration policies and practice in British cities, then use it to 
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review the evolution, and evaluate the achievements and problems of neighbourhood 
renewal process in Chinese cities. The study on most recent Chinese policies and 
projects will focus on the ongoing experimental projects in Beijing City. Through both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, this research will answer the following key 
questions: 
 
How are old and declining neighbourhoods renewed in Chinese cities and what are 
the main features of the urban neighbourhood renewal and regeneration process? 
Judging from the experiences and lessons learnt from the renewal and regeneration 
of declining neighbourhoods in British cities, what are the achievements and 
shortcomings of the recently completed renewal and regeneration projects in Chinese 
cities? 
 
Based on the main findings of this study, I will make some suggestions and 
recommendations for Chinese policy-makers and researchers for improving the renewal 
strategies and approaches. These conclusions and recommendations will also provide 
valuable references to policy makers and researchers in other rapidly urbanising 
countries. 
 
1.2.2 Research objectives 
 
In order to achieve the above aim, this research has the following specific objectives: 
 
• To review the evolution of neighbourhood renewal/regeneration policy and practice 
in British cities, including the context, objectives, strategies, approaches, 
mechanism and effects, and to summarise the development trajectories during 
different eras; 
• To develop an analytical framework based on comprehensive understanding of 
neighbourhood renewal/regeneration process in the UK;  
• To examine and analyse the evolution of neighbourhood renewal in Chinese cities, 
including its context, objectives, strategies, approaches, mechanism and effects; 
• To investigate, using the analytical framework mentioned above, the effects, 
achievements and problems of Chinese neighbourhood renewal, particularly the 
most recent renewal projects through detailed case studies of two inner city 
neighbourhoods in Beijing City; 
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• To provide recommendations for the future development of the neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration policy and practice in Chinese cities. 
 
1.3 Research Design 
 
1.3.1 A cross-national comparative perspective 
 
This research uses a cross-national perspective to review and analyse neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration in Britain and China comparatively. In recent years, the value of 
international comparison in research has been recognised by many researchers. The 
economic, political and cultural globalisation is leading toward convergence in social 
policies and practice, and eroding local distinctiveness. Ideas and approaches in urban 
development in one country could have important values to others (Cooke, 1989; 
Harvey, 1989; Wild and Jones, 1991; Cherry, 1984; Alterman, 1995). Following a 
cross-national perspective in research can facilitate a better and more thorough 
understanding of the subjects under study (Oyen, 1990), help to identify knowledge 
gaps, and point to possible directions that could be followed, and of which researchers 
and policy makers in one country may not previously have been aware (Hantrais and 
Mangen, 1996). 
 
Since the middle of the 19th century, the pattern of Chinese urban development has been 
under the significant influence of Western countries. In every period thereafter, urban 
development in China has been shaped one way or another by the process of 
industrialisation. International investment into China has also brought the Western 
influences on urban development. Chinese policy-makers have been learning the 
Western-style policy and practice in this area for years persistently. It is not difficult to 
identify similarities between Chinese cities and Western cities in urban changes, 
problems and responses. In a historical prespective, many of the Western urban 
problems of early periods have been repeated in Chinese cities in later years, or will 
emerge in future. The challenges, targets, approaches and the mechanism of 
neighbourhood renewal in Chinese cities should not be studied in isolation. A 
comparison with that in Britain is not only possible, but also essential. 
 
Through the cross-national comparative approach, the research work across the two 
countries will be put together: a thorough review of policies, theories and other 
  8
literature on the British experiences will bring a sound understanding of the urban 
neighbourhood renewal and regeneration process; the experiences will be used to define 
an analytical framework which will be used as a benchmark to review, analyse and 
evaluate the Chinese renewal policy and practice. 
 
1.3.2 The structure of the analytical framework 
 
Moore and Spires (2000) set out a general cycle for urban neighbourhood regeneration 
process (Figure 1-1). 
 
Figure 1-1 A cycle of the process of urban regeneration 
Source: Moore and Spires, 2000 
 
This general process has been adopted by many mainstream researchers in 
understanding regeneration issues in almost all countries. Normally, the 
renewal/regeneration process has been initiated by the background knowledge of the 
declining urban areas. The first step involves the identification of the challenges and 
problems in the areas through an in-depth understanding of the areas of decline: not 
only the phenomenon itself, but also the internal causes behind it. The understanding of 
these issues is often closely associated with the options of political ideologies. The 
second essential step is to set up the overall “aims, targets and tasks” of the 
renewal/regeneration process. The next step is to make the detailed “plan, policy, 
strategy” for the renewal or regeneration; this is followed by “Implementation”, 
including all practical actions to generate the essential changes involved in the 
renewal/regeneration programmes. In many research projects, the two steps are usually 
discussed together, but in some of the most recent projects, emphasis is given not only 
Identification of 
challenges and problems 
Aims, targets and tasks 








to the outputs caused by the process, but also the mechanism used to operate or direct 
the whole process. Thus additionally, “Measuring, Monitoring and Evaluation” is seen 
as an important step which provides feedback to all other steps in the process. In this 
research, this general classic cycle will be further extended to form an analytical 
framework suitable for this cross-national comparative investigation. The study of each 
country will follow the general process; the “measuring, monitoring and evaluation” 
will form a common thread between the two countries (Figure 1-2).  
 
 
Figure 1-2 The double cycle for this cross-national research 
 
1.3.3 A case study approach 
 
China is a huge country with several hundred large cities. The recent economic reform 
has decentralised the decision-making power to local levels, and urban renewal 
strategies and approaches vary from city to city. In coastal large cities with a very fast 
increase of urban population and urgent demand for housing and infrastructure, 
neighbourhood renewal projects are all carried out on a larger scale. Innovative ideas 
and approaches are applied here first. In Beijing, the national capital and one of the 
Identification of 
challenges and problems 
Aims, targets and tasks 









challenges and problems 
Research aim/question 
Aims, targets and tasks 
Plan, policy and strategy 
Implementation 
 
Research in Britain 
 





largest and fast changing Chinese cities, many rounds of experimental renewal projects 
have been completed. The experiences and lessons learnt from “successful” projects 
were applied consequently in other cities. Therefore, for this research, Beijing has been 
selected as the case-study city, from which an in-depth understanding of the 
development of the neighbourhood renewal process at local level will be gained. Also, 
the evaluation of the experience and lessons of the pioneering renewal projects in 
Beijing will provide valuable suggestions to the central decision making process on the 
design of future renewal and regeneration policies and practice. 
 
1.4 Research Methods 
 
This research employs both qualitative and quantitative research methods, and involves 
the collection and analysis of both primary and secondary data and information, 
collected in both Britain and China through different techniques, including a review of 
the literature and data, fieldwork, interviews, seminars and so on. The methodology is 




Figure 1-3 Research methodology 
 
1.4.1 Literature review 
 
This research starts with a thorough review of the existing rich literature on British 
neighbourhood renewal/regeneration. Much of the first academic year (2005-2006) was 
spent on this. The review focused on the following topics: 
 
1) Information on the socio-economic, political and administrative changes in Britain 
over the long urban history since industrialisation and urbanisation; 
2) The ideological and theoretical shifts in urban policies and programmes as the 
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Review of literature and data on: 
● Urbanisation and urban changes 
● Evolution of neighbourhood 
renewal policy and implementation 
● In-depth investigation on current 
policy and implementation 
● Official and academic reports on 
recent projects 
In-depth individual interviews with 
local researchers, officials and 
developers: 
● Interpretation of current policy and 
comments to project implementation 
● Evaluation to the renewal efforts 
● Books and Journal articles 
● Official policy documents 
● National and local statistics 
● Online documents 
● Unpublished or internal 
materials 
● Newspaper articles 
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● Seminars and informal discussions 
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● Household visits 
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responses to the “urban problems”; 
3) The institutional features and the operators of neighbourhood renewal; 
4) The positive outputs and problems of neighbourhood renewal policy and practice, 
especially in the most recent period; 
5) The principles and methods of cross-national urban studies 
 
The review covered a variety of literature resources. The libraries at Heriot-Watt 
University and Edinburgh city provide the best locations for academic journal articles, 
books, PhD and MSc theses, and some of the official research reports published by UK 
central or local governments. These sources were supplemented by national statistical 
databases, online official documents, working papers, papers published in the 
proceedings of international conferences and also course materials produced by staff at 
Heriot-Watt University. Some of these were collected through internet searching and 
attending national and international conferences and seminars while others were 
provided by colleagues from Heriot-Watt University. Some local materials were 
collected during site visits to typical renewed or regenerated neighbourhoods. 
 
Regarding the research work on China, another round of literature search and review 
was carried out. The review topics almost correspond with those identified from the 
English literature. The existing international literature in Chinese urban neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration is very limited, so most of the literature identified came from local 
Chinese sources. In order to access all possible valuable literature, the same approach as 
that applied to Britain was used. The libraries of Tsinghua University and Peking 
University – the top two universities in Beijing – and the national library were the main 
sources. In China, the discipline of urban studies is less developed, with a smaller 
number of valuable publications in comparison to that in Britain, Thus during the 
research more valuable materials with existing research findings were sought from other 
subject areas, such as the work done by architectural designers, geographers and real 
estate market analysts. In China, most government documents have not yet been 
published online for open access, so policy documents have to be found from the 
unpublished “internal” document collections. Some of these “internal” documents were 




1.4.2 Site visits and informal interviews 
 
During the research process, site visits were frequently used to gain first-hand 
information about the areas under renewal or regeneration. The most frequent site visits 
in Britain were to the typical long-term declining neighbourhoods, including 
Craigmillar in East Edinburgh, Wester Hailes in West Edinburgh, and Castlemilk in 
South Glasgow. Between 2006 and 2008, more study trips were made to visit similar 
neighbourhoods in England, Northern Ireland and the Netherlands, including Newham 
in London, Park Hill and London road in Sheffield, Shankill Road in Belfast, 
Bijlmermeer in Southeast Amsterdam. During most of these visits, the researcher was 
accompanied by local researchers or officials. Informal interviews with local officials 
and residents were carried out during the visits. 
 
In China, site visits were all in Beijing; the fieldwork was done in two stages. The first 
trip was carried out in the summer of 2006 (July to September), and the second was 
completed in the winter of 2007-2008 (October to January). The visit destinations 
included both the neighbourhoods that were just being renewed and those which were to 
be renewed in the near future. The pre-renewal areas visited include Chaonei, 
Nanluoguxiang and Sanlihe, in the inner city or near peripheral areas of Beijing. The 
renewed estates include Haiyuncang, Dongnanyuan, Niujie and Tiantongyuan. The first 
three are all located in the inner city, but the last one is a very large-scale new high-rise 
housing estate in the remote periphery; it accommodated many of the relocated residents 
from the demolished inner city neighbourhoods. During the site visits, informal 
conversations were conducted with local residents to obtain more valuable information 
about the city-wide renewal plan or the process. By comparing the pre-renewal situation 
and the after renewal estates, the visits and informal interviews helped to provide a 
strategic understanding of the real effects caused by the most recent renewal process. 
 
1.4.3 Selection of case study neighbourhoods in Beijing 
 
A general literature review and site visits provided important background information 
on the renewal and regeneration process. However, detailed in-depth understanding can 
be achieved only through local case studies. The importance in using the case study as a 
research strategy in urban studies, especially the projects in the context of developing 
countries, has been emphasised by many experienced international researchers (Rakodi 
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and Romaya, 1996; Casley and Lury, 1987; Hameed, 2000). 
 
After the general site visit referred to above, consultation was carried out with local 
researchers from the School of Architecture and Urban Planning Institute at Tsinghua 
University, to identify suitable case study neighbourhoods. After various evaluations, 
Shichahai（什刹海）  and Jinyuchi（金鱼池）were selected as the two case 
neighbourhoods which best represent the most recent renewal projects. Shichahai is a 
typical pre-renewal traditional neighbourhood, while Jinyuchi is a representative of the 
recently renewed neighbourhoods. 
 
Shichahai: This neighbourhood is very close to Beijing’s traditional city centre. A great 
number of houses here are low-rise and have a very long history of over 100 years. 
Because of the aging infrastructures and very high population density, local living 
conditions have been reduced to a level much lower than the city’s average, with most 
of the households belonging to the low-income group. Housing tenure is mixed, with 
some private ownerships, some public houses owned by the local government and some 
private rental houses. There have already been several proposals to renew or redevelop 
the whole or part of this neighbourhood, but for many reasons the majority of the 
buildings here are still unchanged up to now. 
 
Jinyuchi: This area is also very close to the traditional commercial centre of Beijing’s 
old town. In a long history, this area is the neighbourhood which has the poorest 
households in Beijing. In the early 1950s and 1960s, publicly sponsored renewal was 
carried out here twice. Some multi-storey flats were constructed, but the dwellings and 
infrastructure were still of a very low standard. By 2000, the local social profile and 
living conditions in this neighbourhood degenerated to a level similar to that in 
Shichahai. In 2001, another phase of renewal was carried out. Almost all older 
dwellings were demolished, and then new multi-storey flats were reconstructed on site 
to re-accommodate the local residents. However, the effects on local residents have not 





Figure 1-4 Typical traditional dwellings in 
Shichahai 
Figure 1-5 New flats in Jinyuchi 
 
These two cases provide very good examples of the dilapidated inner-city 
neighbourhoods BEFORE and AFTER the renewal process in Beijing. The different 
living conditions of the two cases could well reflect the real effects of the newest round 
of renewal projects in Beijing. 
 
 




1.4.4 Structured household interviews 
 
For each of the case studies, structured interviews were carried with selected households 
during the second fieldwork from November 2007 to January 2008. (This investigation 
was financially supported by School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University 
and also the Royal Geographical Society with Institute of British Geographers, as one of 
the two winner projects of Hong Kong Research Grant 2007. 11 local students from 
Tsinghua University were engaged to conduct the face-to-face structured interviews 
with local households.)  
 
The interview questions cover issues in 8 areas: the demographic profiles of the 
households; housing conditions and cost (current and past); employment; education; 
medical or health care of all family members; local safety and social orders; other 
service facilities; and local community cohesion. All the information covers almost the 
similar domains of the neighbourhood statistics to measure the deprivation and 
development of British communities. However, owing to the difficulty in accessing 
some data and different local context, the survey had to be based on a simplified 
framework, which cannot be compared with the systematically organised evaluation 
framework in Britain with over 100 indicators. Also, most of the data collected in 
Shichahai and Jinyuchi were more about the subjective feelings of the interviewees 
rather than the descriptive facts. The structures of the interviews in Shichahai and 
Jinyuchi have been attached as Appendices A and B respectively at the end of this thesis.  
This could make the evaluation not so exact and ignore some detailed findings, but 
because of the lack of previous research findings on the multi-dimensional decline of 
Chinese old neighbourhoods, this may better concentrate on the strategic understanding 
of the real local problems and needs. 
 
In each neighbourhood, households were selected based on their addresses, using a 
fixed interval approach. In this way, the interviewees in Shichahai were from every 
countyard and in Jinyuchi from every flat building. There is also a balanced coverage of 
the local population given in terms of age, gender and occupation. It also ensured that, 
in Jinyuchi, the data are from both the returning households and the new incomers 
living in the new housing estates after the renewal project. In order to ensure the data 
from the two cases were comparable, the issues of questions to every interviewee were 
also the same. The only difference of the survey between the two cases was that there 
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was more information from the renewed Jinyushi. In many aspects, the answers of 
interviewees, if they were returning households, talked about not only their current 
living conditions, but also the situations before the renewal project. 
 
Rather than distributing some questionnaires and collecting them later, face-to-face 
structured interviews were used to collect these primary data. Each interview lasted 
approximately 20-30 minutes. This allowed the interviewer time to explain the purpose 
of the interview. The residents were given time to reflect on their own feelings about 
problems of the neighbourhoods now and in the past, or any other issues associated with 
the renewal initiatives. In practice, access to the interviewees was not easy. Since all the 
interviews were completed in the winter months, the cold weather increased the 
difficulties of the outdoor interviews. In some cases, the local neighbourhood committee 
members helped the work by introducing interviewers to the residents. Because of 
access difficulties, the total number of interviews achieved is not as large as planned: 56 
and 55 valid interviews were achieved in the two case study areas respectively. 
However, the weather also helped the interviewer to understand some of the difficulties 
faced by these residents, such as the poor housing conditions, the inadequate provision 
of indoor heating, and the lack of accessibility to hospitals or other facilities in the days 




Figures 1-7 Household interviews in the two case communities 
 
Through the primary data, the analysis aims to identify the major changes brought about 
by the renewal projects in all domains of local living conditions. 
 
1.4.5 Interviews with stakeholders 
 
In addition, during the two-stage fieldwork, some individual interviews or discussions 
were also conducted with local researchers, developers and officials in order to gain 
some understanding of the opinions and attitudes of different stakeholders. Interviews 
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with local planners and researchers were extremely beneficial to establish the overall 
picture of the Chinese urban neighbourhood renewal process. Interviews with 
government officials and developers helped in exploring the background ideas and 
thoughts of the renewal policy and practice which could not be found in official 
documents. As so many projects had been carried out under strong state intervention, 
the attitudes and targets set by the governmental agencies are really important. During 
these interviews, many internal unpublished reports and documents related to this 
research topic were provided by the interviewees. 28 interviews in total were conducted; 
these covered different governmental departments, research and design institutes, and 
real estate development companies (Table 1-1). Appendix C lists the main questions for 
different interviewees. Appendix D gives detailed information about all the 
interviewees. 
 








Beijing Municipal Construction Committee and its 
district-level divisions 
3 
Office of Neighbourhood Renewal, Chongwen District 1 
Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning and its 
district-level divisions 
4 
Neighbourhood Committee of Shichahai and Jinyuchi 2 
Developers (5) 
R & F Properties 1 
Wantong 1 
Vanke Co. Ltd 3 
Planners and local 
researchers (13) 
School of Architecture, Tsinghua University 4 
School of Urban & Environment, Peking University 1 
Institute of Housing Studies, Urban Planning and Design 
Institute of Tsinghua University (THUPDI) 
2 
Department of Sociology, Tsinghua University 1 
China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (CAUPD) 1 
Beijing Municipal Institute of City Planning and Design 
(BMICPD) 2 
Institute of Geographic Science and Natural Resources 




1.4.6 Data analysis 
 
Most data collected are of a qualitative nature. The official documents provide sufficient 
evidence to give a general picture of the renewal/regeneration process in both countries, 
and the academic publications and the transcripts of individual interviews provide many 
of the background details, theoretical thoughts and institutional features behind the 
renewal and regeneration process. These qualitative discussions and analysis helped to 
form the analytical framework. The quantitative data, including the primary data 
collected by fieldwork and from secondary materials, were analysed using the Excel 
spreadsheet package. The data from two Chinese cases are compared to show the 
multi-dimensional differences caused by the renewal projects.  
 
1.5 Structure of this Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into four parts.  The first part consists of this introduction 
chapter.  
 
The second part consists of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 which examine the renewal and 
regeneration experience in Britain. Chapter 2 provides a review of the development of 
neighbourhood renewal/regeneration ideas, policies and practice in British cities from 
the Industrial Revolution - the starting point of modern British urban history, to the 
mid-1990s - just before the most recent shifts of the whole development trajectory. 
Chapters 3 and 4 continue with the historical review, and provide detailed explanations 
of the most recent policy and practice since New Labour came to power in 1997. In 
Chapter 3, a series of debates are made about the most recent shift of mainstream 
political ideology and its interpretation in urban studies to understand the problems 
which must be solved in the target neighbourhoods to be renewed in a new context. In 
Chapter 4, the most recent neighbourhood renewal/regeneration policy and programmes 
are introduced in detail, with the typical case of Craigmillar in the city of Edinburgh. 
Chapter 5 concludes this part with two major findings: the first is the summary of the 
development trajectory of all policies and projects involved in the term of 
neighbourhood renewal/regeneration; the second generates a strategic analytical 
framework to understand and evaluate the regeneration process, based on the reviews of 
existing research achievements in this area.  
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The third part consists of Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 which examine the urban renewal 
and regeneration experience in Chinese cities. Chapter 6 sets the background 
information about China’s national context of rapid urbanisation and urban changes 
which are closely related to neighbourhood renewal. Chapter 7 reviews the evolution 
and shifts of neighbourhood renewal ideas, policy and practice in previous periods, 
corresponding with Chapter 2. Chapters 8 and 9 focus on the most recent 
neighbourhood renewal policies and projects with case studies in Beijing. The “urban 
problems” in the face of the policy-makers or practitioners and the operation of the 
practical actions are understood and analysed, by following the same ideological and 
theoretical perspectives of Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 10, the effects of the most 
recent renewal projects are evaluated by using the integrated analytical framework 
proposed in Chapter 5. 
 
The last part is Chapter 11 - the conclusion of the whole research. Major findings will 
be summarised to provide answers to the major research questions. They will also 
provide valuable ideas for policy-makers and practitioners in China and other fast 
urbanising countries to better understand and operate the neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration process. 
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Chapter 2 Development of Neighbourhood Renewal and Regeneration 
before the 1990s 
 
This chapter will offer a historical overview of the development of neighbourhood 
renewal or regeneration ideas, policies and its implementation in British cities before 
the 1990s. For the very early industrialisation and urbanisation, in Britain most urban 
neighbourhoods have experienced several rounds of renewal and regeneration practice. 
Nevertheless, the processes might differ greatly. From the Industrial Revolution to very 
recent years, the way of British neighbourhood renewal has experienced several 
revolutionary shifts in accordance with the restructuring mainstream socio-economic 
and political context. The first turning point was at the end of Second World War when 
the era of laissez-faire was replaced by social democracy, and the other was at the end 
of the 1970s, when the reforms of the Thatcher era began. Usually the shifts include not 
only the strategies and approaches, but also the institutional framework to operate the 
neighbourhood renewal campaigns. Thus in every specific context, the renewal process 
was always with definite objectives, involvement, approaches, outputs and 
consequences. This chapter aims to draw on an outline of the development of 
mainstream British neighbourhood renewal/regeneration ideas, policies and practice 
from a historical perspective. It will in turn answer the following questions for every 
period:  
• In what cases did the neighbourhood renewal projects/programmes emerge?  
• What were the major objectives for the renewal/regeneration initiatives?  
• Who were involved in the changing process and what were their roles?  
• What approaches were applied during the renewal/regeneration process?  
• What were the outputs and effects caused by the practice?  
All the answers will be fundamental to finding out the strategic development trajectory 
of neighbourhood renewal in British cities, which can then be helpful in understanding 







2.1 Early Practice 
 
2.1.1 Socio-economic and political context 
 
Great changes began to occur in almost all aspects throughout the British society since 
the Industrial Revolution, which initiated the earliest “industrial urbanisation” process 
in the world. Normally, the origin of the “machine-manufacturing period” in Britain, 
which displaced the manual labour industry, is regarded as having commenced 
approximately during the last four decades of the 18th century. The consequences of the 
great leap in technology were plenty: they included not only the mass demographic 
movement from the countryside to industrial towns and the boom in industrial products, 
but also the rapid transformation in political-economic values, social order and structure 
in British society. 
 
The economic circumstances in Britain then strictly followed the classic laissez-faire 
mode. The increasing products of booming manufacturing and mining enterprises were 
circulated in the larger free market through modern transportation systems, and the 
market was then greatly enlarged to a worldwide trade network accompanied by the 
spread of colonialism (Foster, 1977; Mellor, 1982; Hague, 1984). Private capital 
investment gained higher profits than in any other period in history, and the 
newly-emerging rich industrialists and merchants replaced the feudal monarchs or 
nobles as the dominant figures in the political system who tried their best to maintain 
the dominance of the free market in the long term. There was hardly any restriction 
against the profit-oriented economic activities, and what the governments did was only 
to maintain the basic commercial rules and the circumstances for free competition 
between private enterprises. The only effective power for the most “ideal” allocation of 
social resources was widely believed as the “invisible hand” of market force indicated 
by Adam Smith (1776，re-printed in 1977).  
 
The significant social changes occurred almost synchronically to the technological 
revolution and sudden economic growth (Hobsbawn, 1968). The British Agricultural 
Revolution started prior to the Industrial Revolution and lasted for almost a century. 
This saw a massive increase in agricultural productivity and net output, and in turn 
supported unprecedented population growth, freeing up a significant percentage of the 
workforce, and thereby helped drive the Industrial Revolution. Meanwhile, the vast 
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numbers of cottagers became landless and were obliged to sell their labour to survive. 
As a consequence, millions of rural labourers moved from their hometowns to the new 
industrial towns, residing and getting jobs in the industrial enterprises (Ashton, 1972). 
In towns, the populations were sorted again by their new roles in this productive 
mechanism. There emerged parallel booms of the new “middle class” and “working 
class” in British cities. Most of the ordinary working class people were employed in the 
manufacturing and mining industries, working as labour forces under dirty and damp 
conditions with long hours of labour dominated by a pace set by machines (Hartwell, 
1971). In many places, the incomes of the working class were at the level as low as 
possible for the fierce competition of the surplus labour forces. Millions of working 
class families, in the most advanced industrial technologies, had to bear the worst and 
cruellest working or living conditions in the world (Hall, 1988, p. 14). The societal 
services were also underdeveloped and almost never promoted together with the 
productive technologies. However, the upper and middle classes, represented by 
industrialists and businessmen, gained the majority of the sudden profits and became 
richer and richer. In the classical capitalist society, the rich people tended to use their 
profits to re-invest in new projects for a return of money flow, not to support the 
non-for-profit public service for the poor working class. The distinctiveness of such two 
social groups was quite clear, and there was a wide/considerable gap between the public 
interests of these groups. 
 
The powers of both central and local governments were very weak in intervening in or 
controlling the private-led industrial boom. Although many pioneer Socialists strongly 
suggested that the interests of working class, as the majority of the population, should 
be the concerns of the public authorities, the ideas were seldom turned into reality, 
because of the weak political influence of the working class in these regimes. In the late 
19th century, the working class gradually gained equal voting rights and their 
representatives occupied more seats in parliaments. Thus in some local authorities, the 
earliest interventional attempts were launched in an attempt to benefit the working class 
in some aspects. However, most of the attempts were of a limited scale and influence to 





2.1.2 Changes of urban form 
 
Prior to the 19th century, the major role of limited British cities such as London and 
Edinburgh was to be the hub of domestic and international trade, as well as the centres 
of financial service. However, since the technological revolution, the new industrial or 
port cities like Manchester, Glasgow, Sheffield and Liverpool, as manufacturing and 
mining bases, grew at unbelievable high speed. Many of them were developed from 
small towns or villages. Some medieval towns or cities were also reshaped by the 
development of new industrial estates and constant incoming migrates. As Hall (2002) 
noted, the population in London doubled between 1801 and 1851 and kept increasing 
rapidly in the following 50 years. By 1920, over 80% British people lived in urban 
neighbourhoods (Lees, 1985). The physical scale of cities boomed at the same time. 
Nevertheless, usually the expansion of industrial cities was uneven between places. At 
first, the industrial estates were usually developed near raw materials and energy, but 
then, accompanied by the improvement of transport technologies, they were located in 
areas with convenient transport connection, for example the waterfront areas near ports 
or the areas near road intersections or railways. The tall chimneys, workshops and 
warehouses then quickly reshaped the cityscapes of most British towns and cities. As 
the result of the rapid industrial-led urbanisation in the 18th and 19th century, the 
economic outputs of British cities kept booming, based on the private-led industrial 
development, and Britain became the leading nation in the competition of world trade, 
with the name of “workshop of the world”. 
 
Meanwhile, this nation also had the worst slums in the world (Malpass and Murie, 1999; 
Hall, 1988; George, 1911). The expanding compactly-arrayed, usually low-quality 
dwelling houses for the low-income working class quickly surrounded the factories. In 
most cases then, the nature of housing development was absolutely the same as the 
development of industrial and commercial estates, and was just a vehicle to accumulate 
profit through the land speculation. Also, housing development needed to compete with 
other development projects to occupy the limited availability of “profitable” land. 
Inevitably, the property developers certainly would have liked to accommodate more 
tenants on less land, and the quality of the homes for poor working class was extremely 
low. In most industrial cities, working class dwellings were always overcrowded and 
had nearly no open space. Thus the majority of urban households had to live in 
dwellings alongside cramped streets, with a scarcity of fresh air, sunlight and sanitary 
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facilities, and at the risk of damp (Engels, 1872; Tarn-Lund, 1971). Some degree of 
spatial segregation emerged. The working class had to live near the workplaces while 
the better off bankers, entrepreneurs or landowners usually lived further inland or at the 
top of the slopes where the air and views were likely to be superior. 
 
2.1.3 Neighbourhood renewal initiatives 
 
During the rapid urbanisation process, the geographic size of urban areas did not 
increase as fast as the population. In some cases, especially in the areas with high land 
price, the economic efficiency in the land use of existing urban neighbourhoods with 
traditional low-rise medieval buildings and outdated functions was definitely lower. 
This was seen even then as a significant “urban problem”. Usually most of the old 
neighbourhoods were demolished and quickly replaced by new industrial, commercial 
and housing estates. The process to reshape medieval towns can be seen as the earliest 
“neighbourhood renewal practice” in modern cities. Private developers or developer 
groups were the major operators of such projects. The objective of the practice was very 
simple: to seek a higher return from the new property development and the following 
economic activities. However, the approaches to lift the economic efficiency of land use 
varied. Couch (1990) generalised three major approaches of the private-led renewal 
practice in British cities then as below (Table 2-1), which led to various changes of 
urban form. 
 








Competition for the 
best-located sites  
increasing price of land  
higher density of land use   
clearance and rebuilding 
Manufacturing  Expansion of 
the service sectors (for banking 
facilities, insurance, 
transportations, agencies etc.)  
Offices or shops (with very high 
levels of profit per unit of area 
and request of best location)  
replacement 
Construction of railway (or 
other communication) facilities 
 Change of land price (higher 
in the regions near the station; 
lower in the areas away from 
the railway)  New land use 
Source: according to Couch, 1990 and Cherry, 1972 
 
All the three approaches reflected a successful commercial cycle as 
“investment-development-profit-reinvestment”. The private developers controlled the 
right to decide when, where and how the projects were initiated; there was almost never 
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any intervention by the public authorities or other non-for-profit organisations. No 
doubt the desire to pursue more profits was not only the prime objective but also the 
nature of the renewal initiatives (Marx, 1973). Meanwhile, the neighbourhood renewal 
process was also the vehicle to facilitate constant industrial development, which actually 
created miraculous economic growth as well as increased job opportunities (Clapman, 
1930; Hague, 1984). 
 
However, the public had recognised that there emerged some other important “urban 
problems” which might be more severe than the improvement of land use efficiency: the 
urgent demands of decent dwelling houses for the poor working class. The uncontrolled 
private-led renewal projects did provide quite a number of new urban houses to 
accommodate the booming working class, but the general housing quality could hardly 
have been worse. The cause was very clear: the huge gap between the cost of decent 
homes (if they were constructed by private developers) and the poor economic 
capability of the working class to afford good housing (if without external aid). “The 
working class lived in slums because they could afford nothing else” (Merrett, 1979). 
The housing issue well reflected the extent of social polarisation in British cities under 
the laissez-faire system. 
 
After the mid-19th century, more and more people realised that the government should 
be responsible for the answer to the severe shortage of decent working-class housing. 
The earliest housing Acts, including the Housing Act 1848, the Dwelling Acts in 1868 
(Torrens Act), 1875 (Cross Act) and 1890 (Housing of the Working Classes Act) were 
the earliest interventional attempts trying to improve the general living conditions of the 
working class. The change came based on two main reasons. The first one was the fear 
of epidemics; even the richest people could not escape from this; the second one was 
that the employers noticed how sickness amongst the labour force coming from a too 
poor living environment seriously held down productivity and profits. According to 
early acts, public authorities were empowered to force landlords to install piped water 
and sewage facilities for local working-class dwellings, and after that some authorities 
did make use of the powers available under other housing Acts to force through 
public-led slum clearance programmes. This could be seen as the origin of later mass 
public-led neighbourhood renewal campaigns.  
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Nevertheless, for historical reasons, the power of British local authorities was so weak 
that the public-led “neighbourhood renewal” proposals were able to be put into practice 
in just a few cities, such as Liverpool and Manchester (Lawton, 1982). Most other 
attempts targeting the “urban problems” from public views were still no more than ideas 
just discussed in parliamentary lobbies, and there was no achievement in practice before 
1914 (Malpass and Murie, 1999). Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that the real 
effects of them were not optimistic or likely to be reversed: many of the low-income 
tenants had to leave their homes because of higher costs and rents, and the forced 
demolitions even led to local rents being doubled (Burnett, 1978; Pugh, 1980). 
Therefore clearance alone, without subsidised rebuilding, would lead to a worsening of 
working class living conditions. Many critics said these so called “experimental initials” 
were not to benefit the working class, as Gaudie (1974, p. 267) wrote: “Their real 
intention was to make cities pleasanter in appearance by removing the worst eye-sores 
among the slums and safer for the middle classes to walk in”. In fact, these attempts 
were highly important for providing lessons for future policy-makers. Influenced by 
those, many town planning and housing acts were constituted as several milestones 
towards a new era, which provided real powers for authorities to restrain the private-led 
development and develop public-funded renewal projects later (Malpass and Murie, 
1999). 
 
2.2 State-led Renewal Movements 
 
2.2.1 Socio-economic and political shifts with the post-war consensus 
 
Some large disasters in the first half of 20th century, including the two World Wars and 
the Great Depression, caused a U-turn of the development of British society in later 
years. More people began to believe that the major cause of these disasters was the 
failure of the classic capitalist system, with an unregulated free market in dominance 
and very weak governmental power to support non-for-profit service to meet public 
interests. In practice, the capitalist free market governed only by price worked far from 
the optimisation of resource allocation, as classical economic theories announced. The 
conflicts between higher profits and public interest led to severe social inequality and 
unrest. The criticism of the free market from Keynesian perceptions began to be 
influential among British politicians, and after the Second World War it finally became 
the dominant, mainstream idea throughout British governments. The state itself was 
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then deemed as a significant economic unit in the market, and state interventionist 
schemes in various forms were widely accepted as necessary and important 
countermeasures to respond to the “failure of (the) free market” of the earlier era (Hall, 
2002; Taylor, 1998). Although different from the newly established Socialist countries 
in Eastern Europe, the role of the market was kept in the UK to a certain extent; the role 
of the public sectors in the economy was largely expanded by the universal application 
of interventionist instruments in overseeing and managing the market in order to 
achieve certain socially desirable goals of social justice (Taylor, 1998). The mixed 
economic model can be seen as a “middle way” between the classic capitalism and the 
Soviet-style state-socialism. That was the “post-war consensus on welfare state” which 
was dedicated to making sure that the state played an active role in establishing full 
employment, managing the economy, taking over ownership and responsibility for a 
number of important industries and providing social welfare (Richards and Smith, 2002, 
p. 70). This consensus emphasising the public responsibility was subsequently 
supported by most of the major British political bodies for more than 30 years, albeit to 
varying degrees.  
 
Table 2-2 The post-war consensus on welfare state 
 
1) Central government should provide a common safety net of a national minimum, to protect 
the poorest and weakest in society. Thus, the state must take on the responsibility of setting a 
national minimum wage and a certain standard of living for those unable to work. 
2) Equal and free access to health and education.  
3) A crucial role for the centre was that the central state needed to take on clear responsibilities 
for key areas of social policy, including social security, health, education and housing. 
4) Concerning state provision, not only should central government be given a large role in 
financing social service, but the services themselves should be placed in the hands of state 
agencies. 
5) The government should accept responsibility for the maintenance of a high and stable level of 
employment.  
6) The idea that the British state had particular responsibility for ensuring the welfare of 
children, the elderly and adolescents became institutionally entrenched; the diversity of forms 
amongst the nation states through which these services were delivered was considerable. 
Source: Richards and Smith, 2002; Ling, 1998 
 
In the post-war years, the power of public authorities increased radically in managing 
the national economic system. State interventional approaches, including the tariff 
control, progressive taxation to encourage domestic industrial recovery, the 
nationalisation of major industry, the plans for distribution of new industry, or financial 
aids or loans to specific programmes, such as the famous Marshall Plan for European 
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reconstruction, were widely put into practice to recover the urban economy damaged by 
war. Besides, the political commitment to develop a state-funded welfare system soon 
became a common idea. Just as in Scandinavian nations, in the UK the Labour 
government from 1945 to 1951 began to establish a series of systems of the “Welfare 
State” to provide wide-ranging welfare to all citizens “from the cradle to the grave”. 
This resulted in massive expenditure and a great widening of what was considered to be 
the state’s responsibility. In addition to the central services of Education, Health, 
Unemployment and Sickness Allowances and so on, the Welfare State also included the 
idea of increasing redistributive taxation, increasing regulation of industry food and 
housing. In all, the market force began to be sidelined in many of public resource 
distribution, and the role of public agencies, usually following a top-down model, 
became more crucial in influencing the social well-being of every family. 
 
2.2.2 Urban changes and challenges 
 
The rapid industrial-led urbanisation in Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries could be 
perceived as one of the largest wonders of human civilisation. However, since the first 
half of the 20th century, the early-developed urban neighbourhoods began to worsen the 
image of the “modern” cities: the smoking factories, old transport facilities and 
warehouses occupied most of the land and made the environment very repetitive, 
disordered and crowded. In almost all industrial cities, heavy pollution was everywhere. 
Some outdated estates were abandoned and the war damage had made the old 
neighbourhoods look very dilapidated. Living in such old urban neighbourhoods had 
become a very unwanted choice for almost every British family. 
 
More new estates - especially the higher-standard housing estates - began to be 
constructed in peripheral places around cities or even farther away, and with cheaper 
land prices. This was called the process of “urban sprawl” or “suburbanisation”. In this 
process, the physical size of urban neighbourhoods increased faster than the urban 
population. In 1939, the population of London was 8.5 million, 2 million more than it 
had been in 1914, whilst the built-up area had trebled in size (Hall, 2002). In other 
British cities, the urban areas were enlarged even ten or more times the size of that of 
the previous decades. This was usually a rapid and expansive growth around the 
previous metropolitan area, of the newly construction of low-density dwelling houses 
with gardens, very similar to the vision of Howard’s Garden City (Howard, 1902; Hall, 
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1988, p. 97). Thanks to the new technological innovations in transportation facilities, 
such as suburban railways and the later introduction of buses and private cars, it became 
possible to travel longer distances between jobs and homes for the richer white collar 
people. As a consequence, thousands of middle classes were happy to move to the 
countryside to low-density villas or cottages for a more comfortable living environment, 
escaping from the noisy and dirty British towns. 
 
Most of the suburbanised construction was undertaken by private developers as a 
profit-oriented process, for in building new estates in peripheral areas, the cost could be 
much lower than that of the renewal projects because of not only the cheap land price 
but also the avoidance of demolition compensation. Based on the good natural 
environment of countryside, the new houses were built of high quality to seek rich 
buyers and higher profits. The major reason for the white-collar families choosing the 
suburbanised homes was simple: they hoped to be far away from not only the bad 
environmental quality in cities, but also the concentrated lower-classes who were 
regarded as trouble makers and the instigators of many social conflicts. Table 2-3 shows 
the distinct features of the two groups. 
 
Table 2-3 Features of the inner-city working class and suburban middle class 
 
 Inner city working class Suburban middle class 
Mobility Inherent stability, more locally, 
proliferation of kinship ties within 
the area 




Long-term friendships with peers 
nearby 
Shorter-term local friendships, 
long-term kinship and peer group 




Damaging social effects on these 
communities and psychological 
effects upon individuals 
Less often affected and more able to 
cope with the enforced changes 
Social skills Weaker Greater 
Advantages Near working places, more access to 
public facilities 
Better environmental quality, out of 
social conflicts 
shortcomings High density living conditions, poor 
quality housing, social conflict, 
environmental problems 
A rise in the costs of housing and 
journeys to work 
Sources: based on the research by Young and Wilmott (1957); and Gans (1962; 1967) 
 
Nevertheless, the suburban housing estates did very little to improve the general living 
conditions for the low-income working classes who could not afford to live there. The 
majority of the working classes were left in the inner cities. For several decades, the 
  31
housing conditions were not improved; although the early council housing provision in 
inter-war years did create some decent new homes for them, the majority of blue-collar 
workers were still housed in the over-crowded slums, which were scattered in the gaps 
between industrial buildings. The “urban problems” concentrated in these old 
neighbourhoods were as serious as previously experienced: the urgent shortage of the 
housing being fitted to modern living standards for all and the outdated public 
infrastructure as well as the dilapidated city image. Meanwhile, the uncontrolled 
private-led urban sprawl just kept swallowing up the limited agricultural and natural 
land. Certainly, there should be enhanced public-led approaches to be applied to 
respond to these problems caused by uncontrolled property speculation. 
 
2.2.3 Emergence of public-led neighbourhood renewal 
 
Since the First World War, the public agencies began to take more significant 
responsibility in dealing with the control of urban land development and housing 
construction. The Housing and Town Planning Act (1919) for the first time introduced a 
clear responsibility of British local authorities for public housing provision, with 
financial support being provided by central government. In practice, the new public 
housing construction occurred usually together with the slum clearance, particularly 
since the 1930s the Housing Act (Greenwood Act) introduced an Exchequer subsidy 
specifically for slum clearance (Couch, 1990). This could have been the starting point of 
the nation-wide attempt to initiate public-led neighbourhood renewal projects. It was 
ever widely regarded as a temporary policy to eliminate the urgent housing shortage 
after the First World War, but was then retained by successive governments in practice 
as an effective way to solve the shortage of decent housing in inner-city neighbourhoods 
(Malpass and Murie, 1999). The public-led renewal practice really overcame the lessons 
of the unsuccessful pre-war practice: with mass demolition but no replacement (Burnett, 
1978). As a consequence, in the inter-war years local authorities had built over 1 million 
dwellings which fitted the modern living standards. 
 
Since the launch of Town Planning Act (1947), a series of measures such as 
development control was applied to restrict greatly the private property expansion. 
From then on, private developers were required to apply to the state (usually the local 
planning authorities) for planning permission for new development. In this way, the 
state was for the first time given powers (except during the war times in the past) to 
  32
oversee and regulate the capitalist land market (Taylor, 1998). Thereafter, the state 
began to allocate increasing financial support to accelerate many large-scale public-led 
renewal projects, especially the slum clearance schemes. In 1954, the law relating to 
clearance orders and the compulsory purchase of unfit houses was streamlined, and a 
new standard of fitness was introduced. Subsequently, a higher level of subsidy was 
introduced for encouraging the replacement of slums (Balchin, 1999). Meanwhile, the 
private-led renewal projects were restrained by a series of new regulations. The role of 
them in urban development became much more marginalised till 1979. This initiated a 
new era of urban housing and neighbourhood development in British cities. With the 
strong support of state planning and public funding, the public-led neighbourhood 
renewal projects were believed to be the most effective vehicle, not only for protecting 
the agricultural land from endless urban sprawl, but also to eliminate the current “urban 
problems” – the dilapidated city image and lack of modern housing supply and 
infrastructure – as quickly as possible. 
 
In the immediate post-war years, the basic principle of public-led renewal projects was 
clear-cut: to erase the slums and other unwanted old neighbourhoods entirely and 
completely rebuild large areas of the urban fabric to comply with modern standards. The 
large-scale projects with the “demolition-reconstruction” process started in the inner 
areas of all large cities. Countless “in-adequate” dwellings in slums were demolished in 
a very short time, and most of the low-income working classes were relocated in council 
housing estates in peripheries or New Towns (particularly in their high-rise form); these 
were constructed by following the detailed “blue-print” master-plans, rather than having 
the people staying in rehabilitated local communities (Couch, 2003; Cullingworth and 
Nadin, 2002; Meegan, 2003; Merrett, 1979). The process was encouraged by the wide 
application of modern construction technologies which made the production of the 
“uniform, larger, new and clean” housing units much easier and cheaper than before. 
The central areas of cities, filled with polluted industrial estates and slums in the past, 
were usually reconstructed into new parks, transportation hubs or commercial zones, 
also with detailed architectural and landscape designs (Hall, 2002; Couch, 1990; 2003).  
 
The social objectives of the state-led renewal process were given very high priority 
(Couch, 1990). In British policies, the amount of subsidy in slum clearance was related 
to the numbers of people displaced and rehoused, rather than the number of houses 
demolished (Burnett, 1978), which was undoubtedly one significant symbol to show 
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that the intention of these policies was to emphasise social needs but not the cost and 
output in economy. In the early post-war years, the public-led neighbourhood renewal 
campaign reached its summit, and made a major contribution towards eliminating the 
housing shortages and restructuring modern images in most British cities in those years. 
The non-for-profit projects significantly helped thousands of working class people and 
other groups who were placed at a disadvantaged position in the market to obtain a 
better living environment. By 1962, some 4.25 million new houses had been built, and 
nearly 500,000 slum houses cleared (DoE, 1980). Millions of residents who had 
previously lived in poor-quality privately rented dwellings were transferred to tenures of 
public rented dwellings. In 1949, the percentage of private renting in Great Britain was 
62 and that of public renting was 12, while in 1979 the former figure fell to 13.5 and the 
latter one became 31.9 (Malpass and Murie, 1999). The restructuring of the tenure 
system is obviously related to the products of large-scale state-led renewal projects. 
Although the clearance process has subsequently been much criticised because of the 
social disruption which it created, at that time it was broadly supported by the public - 
especially the lower-classes - for its significant physical improvement. 
 
In order to realise the achievements in a shorter time, the organisational structure of the 
decision-making and operating body was unavoidably simplified to be a top-down 
model. The public agencies, usually the local authorities as the leaders of the projects, 
were given very strong powers to control almost the entire process from the drafting 
proposal, master plan, housing design and construction to the allocation of new flats. 
These programmes proceeded according to the detailed master-plans, which were 
considered as a technical-physical approach, usually with a far greater emphasis upon 
urban design and aesthetic values. The fashionable pattern of renewed urban forms was 
copied from one case to another, which resulted in many end-products of the post-war 
schemes of housing renewal looking depressingly alike (Roberts, 2000). The private 
developers were usually excluded from the programmes and the local communities 
could also make little influence on the input and output during the top-down renewal 
process (Couch, 2003). 
 
2.2.4 Further development of public-led renewal practice 
 
Since the late 1960s, the public-led approaches to give help to the “problematic” 
neighbourhoods have changed considerably. The projects focusing on physical 
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improvement of old neighbourhoods still remained, but the large scale slum clearance 
movement was replaced by the slower, smaller-sized “gradual renewal” projects, such 
as housing rehabilitation or area improvement projects (Couch, 2003; DoE, 1980). The 
reasons for the change may come from three perspectives. First, the improvement is 
based on the result of rapid quantitative growth of public housing provision: after the 
years of large-scale reconstruction, the severe quantitative shortage of adequate 
dwellings had been greatly reduced and there were less physical-dilapidated slums left 
to clear. The second reason is the economic inflation that has emerged since the late 
1950s, which forced governments to reduce public expenditure to support 
public-subsidised housing renewal. The third derives from the results of criticism of 
many unsuccessful cases of the clearance programmes by conservationists and 
sociologists. The new urban fabric erected on previous slum areas was often of bad 
design quality and damaged local communities, which is far from an ideal new life for 
the inhabitants. A government housing review published in 1977 stated (DoE, 1977d): 
“We are no longer faced with massive areas of unfit housing,……, but if we are to 
prevent the emergence of a new generation of slum areas, housing policy will have to 
place growing emphasis on the repair, maintenance and effective use of the existing 
stock.” With such a changed circumstance, there was increasing evidence that 
rehabilitation was often far more cost effective than clearance and redevelopment 
(Balchin, 1999). 
 
Despite the earliest housing improvement grant being introduced in 1949, because of 
the weak public financial support, until the late 1960s, the rehabilitation and 
improvement of old dwellings were still mostly carried out through private-led 
initiatives. The Housing Act (1969) widened the scope of housing improvement grants 
and then improvement shortly took centre stage of the public-led projects. The new 
regulation re-emphasised the role of existing old housing stock in the housing system 
and gave local authorities discretionary power to declare “General Improvement Areas” 
(GIAs). In these areas, the grants covered most (up to 75%, according to the Housing 
Act of 1971) of the eligible expenses of housing improvement. The improvement grants 
were also made more generous and subject to easier conditions. The local authorities 
were given wider powers to assist and persuade owners to improve houses and to buy 
land and houses needed for area improvement. In some cases, local authorities also 
provided other aids, such as environmental works, available temporary accommodation 
for residents or somewhat relaxed planning control etc. The local residents were usually 
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also required to contribute some of the cost and undertake some self-help works for 
rehabilitation. In the early 1970s, the rate of grants increased sharply and reached its 
peak in 1973. Since then, it has steadily declined as a consequence of the success of the 
policy. The “gradual renewal” has been defined as a continuous process of minor 
rebuilding and renovation, sustaining and reinforcing the vitality of a neighbourhood in 
ways which are responsive to changing social and physical needs. It may be slow and 
time-consuming, but in the long term it is likely to have more lasting effects because it 
is more closely linked to the individual needs rather than attempting to apply uniform 
standards throughout the chosen area. However, criticisms of the process indicated that 
there was too much emphasis on house improvement and too little to socio-economic 
promotion; furthermore, many people did not have equal opportunities to obtain the aid 
because, for example, these poorer households were usually unable to afford their share 
of improvement costs. 
 
Also since the late 1960s, some other urban policies have become more aware of the 
social problems of the old neighbourhoods, besides the poor housing conditions. The 
Labour government then launched the Urban Programme (UP) (also referred to as the 
“Urban Aid Programme”) and Community Development Projects (CDPs) to resolve 
these specific problems, such as poverty and social unrest, in the disadvantaged 
geographic areas. The Local Government Grants (Social Needs) Act (1969) authorised 
the Urban Programme, which enabled local authorities to obtain 75% central 
government grants for various schemes in recognised neighbourhoods of urban unrest, 
such as Notting Hill in London (Ho, 2003; McCarthy, 2007). The Community 
Development Projects were launched one year later, but were essentially intended to 
focus limited resources on smaller neighbourhoods (with populations of 10,000-20,000). 
The Home Office was in charge of both the practical approaches. The local authorities 
in areas with “special social needs” could bid for both capital and revenue funds from 
central government to support social and community development projects. The 
voluntary organisations could also submit projects, but these should go through the local 
authorities (Edwards and Batley, 1978). In practice, local agencies usually used the 
funds to apply positive discrimination, for example educational priority in favour of 
selected areas. There was little central control to a variety of the projects. Actually, 
there was little guidance or definition of what the “special needs” comprised, and the 
objectives were just to deliver remedial measures, thus trying to release some urgent 
tension in the specific urban areas (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). 
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These initiatives could be seen as earliest experimental attempts to focus directly on the 
“invisible” social rather than the physical elements within some declining urban 
neighbourhoods. The resulting projects varied greatly, involving many innovative 
actions across social, economic and physical issues, and these were mostly implemented 
by local agencies. Owing to very little systematic setting of the objectives, it is very 
difficult to evaluate the effects of the programmes. However, one of the original 
objectives of the Home Office was to provide special aid to the disadvantaged groups in 
cities, for example the overseas immigration or minority racial people, while most 
practical attempts were area-based, probably because they were much easier to 
implement. Another problem is the poor return of the incoming funds with the lack of a 
market that could not essentially stop the “cycle of poverty or deprivation” (Couch, 
1990; Home, 1982). Since the mid-1970s, some new initiatives such as the 
Comprehensive Community Programme have emerged; these are trying to apply a 
larger range of approaches, but still in experimental mechanisms. These experiments 
finally ended or were revised by the political shift at the end of the 1970s. 
 
2.3 Property-led Redevelopment Practice 
 
2.3.1 Industrial decay, new social change and the emergence of New Right 
 
In the post-war years, the British economy at first experienced continuous growth under 
the strong influence of national plans, but then quickly fell into a long-term wave of 
sluggish growth since the late 1950s. The negative changes came from both external 
and internal causes. In a worldwide perspective, the world trade market was restructured 
after the war. The manufacturing, mining and other traditional industries in the early 
developed Western countries like Britain lost almost all of their advantages when 
competing with the industries of newly industrialised countries with plenteous cheap 
labour. For Britain, the industrial decay was speeded up for the collapse of the Great 
British Empire. The independence movement, together with the worldwide 
decolonisation was initiated in India in 1947, then in the Middle East, Africa, the 
Caribbean Islands and other British overseas territories. Although the organisation of 
Commonwealth retained the special political and economic relationships between the 
UK and the member states, all the traditional external market and low-cost supply of 
raw materials for the industrial giant had both been cut off to a great extent. On the 
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other hand, as the internal cause, the huge national welfare system has become a heavier 
burden to the national economic system. Public expenditure kept rising and led to 
higher levels of taxation. Meanwhile, according to Keynesian supporters, some major 
industries were nationalised, and these ran according to the top-down plans, which 
might be without enough flexibility and dynamics to capture the market demand in time, 
so the planned economy inevitable led to low efficiency. Actually, in the post-war years, 
both the Conservative and Labour governments frequently tried various ways to draft 
more “scientific” or “fitting” economic strategies to meet the market demand, but the 
changing external and internal circumstances, either in economics itself or other related 
aspects, went on always beyond the estimation of “state-led plans” by the Keynesian 
perception holders (Gamble and Walkland, 1984). In the 1970s, accompanied with the 
greater wave of the closure of the manufacturing and mining industries, the bad 
macro-economic situation reached its peak. When experiencing more serious depression, 
with a simultaneous rise in unemployment and inflation, the Keynesian or similar 
theories showed that there seemed to be no effective approach to apply by using the 
available resources of public sectors to reverse the downward trend within the national 
economy. Both the philosophic ideology and policy framework of the post-war British 
economy then had no choice but to reach their ends. 
 
From a societal aspect, the post-war welfare state system did improve the social 
well-being of the British society as a whole. In the earliest post-war years in particular, 
the poor working classes gained more benefits than ever in job opportunities, health 
care, education, pension schemes and housing provision from the newly established 
welfare state system. By the ways of egalitarian redistribution of the social wealth by 
the state, the levels of extreme poverty dropped quickly, and the average living 
conditions improved significantly. However, the desire to create a classless, egalitarian 
and homogenous society was soon proved to be unrealistic. The mainstream values and 
lifestyles of young generations changed very fast: the increase of average educational 
level, personal mobility and daily leisure time encouraged them to seek multi-cultural 
social circumstances, more individual freedom in their careers and more flexible or 
vibrant economic activities. That means too strong central control by state; whether in 
economic activities or social service, delivery had become the obstacle of the individual 
development of that era. 
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In the late 1970s, there was a time of intense debate about seeking the future political 
philosophy and socio-economic orders for a new British society. The previous 
mainstream ideas from Keynesianism were seriously questioned by the “New Right” 
owing to the failure of their practical economic policies. Finally after the General 
Election 1979, the new Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher almost 
totally abandoned the Keynesian paradigm and established a new framework of the 
national economic policy by following the ideology of the Neo-liberalism. They 
claimed the inefficient “bureaucratic” decision-making process before that, such as the 
control of monetary and land development for private enterprises, directly harmed 
flexibility and competitiveness when in the face of changing circumstances (Taylor, 
1998). In managing the economy, the new governmental agenda aimed to encourage 
privatisation, reduce public expenditure and deregulate the market. The new 
development programmes should be directed towards a greater reliance upon the free 
market. The government sold off most nationalised large facilities which had been in 
public ownership since the late 1940s. Other measures were applied in order to release 
the barriers for private capital in the operation of the market, and to eliminate direct 
intervention by public sectors. Regarding the social order, they placed greater emphasis 
on individual liberty which would be generally more creative, productive, dynamic, 
responsive to human needs, and with greater flexibility in the face of changing 
circumstances (Sorenson and Day, 1981). 
 
Differing from the classic Capitalist theories, the approaches of the New Right also 
mixed some principles from Social Democracy. The Conservative government kept the 
basic framework of the welfare state system but tried to cut its size and involvement. 
Through many ways, such as privatisation or cooperation with non-governmental 
organisations, the state released the burden in many public service sectors, and only 
maintained some core items such as education and health care. Meanwhile, the New 
Right politicians also accepted some “necessary” interventionist measures by the state, 
but they claimed that they should generally support or facilitate, and no longer act 
against the market-led development. To be specific, the state intervention should try to 
help the negative neighbourhood effects (by cutting off tax or deregulating the 
development plans), to ensure an equal market circumstance of development (for all 
areas and groups), rather than compensating “worsenment” by taxing “betterment” 
(Taylor, 1998). That is to say, since the 1980s, British private capital and political 
powers formed the union to overthrow the post-war state-led development paradigm. 
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The private investment and its new economic activities were greatly encouraged as an 
effective vehicle to overcome the economic downturn period (Johnson, 1991; Jackson, 
1992). 
 
2.3.2 “Inner-city problem” and the response 
 
In Britain, the “inner city problem” of economic difficulties and social unrest was first 
identified in the 1960s to describe some new problems in the disadvantaged inner-city 
neighbourhoods which further deteriorated in the 1970s. There was then a rapid 
concentrating process of the disadvantaged people in some inner city areas. For 
historical reasons, the traditional heavy industries in Britain, such as the manufacturing, 
mining and mechanical engineering plants, were highly concentrated in the so called 
“inner-city areas”, for example the city centres, the nearer peripheral and 
port/waterfront areas. These areas had always provided the major economic output and 
most jobs of the cities; however, since the serious industrial decay, the inner-city areas 
unavoidably suffered the dramatic decline, of not only the output of the production but 
also the opportunities of employment within these areas. Most traditional industrial jobs, 
particularly the unskilled positions, were relocated, largely internationally, or 
disappeared following local plant closures (Meegan, 1989; Hall, 2002). In London, the 
loss of unskilled jobs was disastrous (400,000 in 1961-1975; 800,000 in 1961-1984). 
The most significant consequence of the above was the loss of population at a massive 
rate. Nationwide, the typical inner-city areas lost 16-20 percent of their population in 
1961-75 (Hall, 2002), and the proportion of the major industrial cities, such as 
Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Newcastle, is much higher. Furthermore, many 
vulnerable groups, including the under-educated, broken-family, disabled, elderly or 
overseas immigrants, did not have the access to move away from decaying local 
neighbourhoods for new jobs and housing. They had to be concentrated in the 
dilapidated, dirty, unsafe and overcrowded inner-city dwellings or other public rental 
housing estates, isolated from the mainstream of social services (Shore, 1976). At the 
end of the 1970s, as Sir P. Hall described (2002, p.131), the geography of Britain was 
characterised by the “decaying conurbation cities, isolated manufacturing or mining 
towns, ……, the pockets of the middle-class (working for newly emerging service 
industry) life in some cities, ……, and some still prosperous suburbs and medium- or 
small-sized towns around rural areas”. The catastrophic inner city neighbourhoods then 
had to suffer not only the declining local economy, but also rising levels of riots and 
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crime. This formed increasing political pressure on British governments in the late 
1970s. 
 
The major intention to tackle these newly identified and severe problems was becoming 
a core task of the governmental agenda. Since the late 1960s, the introduction of some 
experimental programmes could be perceived as the earliest attempts to overcome the 
social crisis in the specific declined inner-city areas. However, owing to the lack of 
clear objectives and a well-organised operation body, attempts such as UP and CDPs 
cannot be regarded as effective, and they covered only very few of the decayed 
inner-city neighbourhoods. In 1977, the government White Paper, Policy for the Inner 
Cities (DoE, 1977d) was issued. It marked off the urban policy experiments of the 
previous decade from the new initiatives. As a conclusion to previous experiments, the 
report stated that “the decline in the economic fortunes of the inner areas often lies at 
the heart of the problem” (p. 2). It formally expressed the idea thus: “to stimulate 
investment by the private sector, by firms and by individuals, in industry, in commerce, 
and in housing”. It acknowledged that the key to regenerating depressed inner-city areas 
lay in economic renewal and development (Stewart, 1987, p. 133) to “improve the 
attractiveness of inner areas sites and to bring land into use” (DoE, 1977d, p. 4).  
 
2.3.3 New trends of urban and housing policies 
 
In the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act there was some detailed consideration of the 
response to the urgent “inner-city problems”, which included (1) cutting off the public 
expenditure, deregulating the central control and encouraging private investment in 
some defined deprived areas with subsidies; (2) establishment of partnerships for new 
developments (central and local authorities all included); and (3) distributing powers to 
local authorities to designate redevelopment programmes. In later decades, the first and 
second principles were maintained as the basic logic for the inner-city renaissance 
policies, but the third one was at least partially changed by the Conservative central 
government after 1979. Owing to the distrust of the Labour controlled local authorities, 
the role of local authorities was minimised. The partnership model was also shifted 
from being set among a central-local government relationship (in ideas of 1978 Act) to 
emphasising a public-private relationship (in later policy and practice). The central 
government, excluding local authorities in general, used its powers (such as 
deregulating the development control and creation of UDCs mentioned below) to 
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reactivate private investment as the main agent of inner-city regeneration directly. In 
many cases, the private sector was given the enhanced role of promoting the physical 
environment and infrastructure by the market-oriented redevelopment, which aimed to 
redistribute economic activity and more affluent socio-economic activity groups back to 
the “inner cities” (Deakin and Edwards, 1993; Couch, 1990; Stewart, 1987; Lawless, 
1996; Blackman, 1995; McCarthy, 2007). 
 
Housing policy and development also experienced a shift after 1979. Before that, the 
public-subsidised council housing construction, slum clearance and then housing 
improvement had addressed the severe post-war housing shortages. It provided the 
pre-condition of the following revolutionary changes of housing policy under  
Thatcherism in the 1980s. The key strategy of the Conservative government could be 
generalised as privatisation, deregulation and an anti-municipal approach. On one hand, 
the end of New Town schemes and major slum clearance had minimised the new public 
housing supply since the 1920s; on the other hand, some new legislative approaches 
(such as Housing Act and Tenants’ Rights 1980; Tenants’ Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act 
1980) introduced the “Right to Buy”1 and other deals (including the tenant’s charter, 
new housing subsidy system from brick subsidy to household subsidy and changes to 
rent acts etc.). Thus hundreds of thousands of public-owned social renting housing 
stocks were transferred to being owner-occupied or housing association-owned in the 
1980s (Malpass and Murie, 1999). At national level, the process of housing privatisation 
was going together with the privatisation wave of some nationalised industry and social 
service agencies. This means the government’s view of the nature of housing had 
changed: from emphasising it as a social good, a part of social service to a private good, 
a commodity in the market (Whitehead, 1993).  Also, housing provision (except the 
houses for special groups) was gradually excluded (at least partially) from the public 
funded welfare state system. The dramatic decline of the public housing stock sidelined 
the local authorities from the housing system, and instead central government became 
more influential in supporting the private developers and housing associations for new 
housing development schemes. The tenure transfer was regarded by the policy-makers 
as an effective way of improving the local housing conditions: clearly, the private 
owners should provide better maintenance services than the bureaucratic, inefficient 
                                                        
1
 A scheme according to the Housing Act 1980, which encourages the sitting tenants of council housing 
to purchase their own homes at discounted prices. 
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public agencies with difficult local public finance. Also, the house-owners should be 
more motivated in promoting local public security and service delivery. 
 
2.3.4 Property-led redevelopment projects 
 
In the New Right years, the neighbourhood renewal was usually also called 
“property-led redevelopment” initiatives. With the same changing trend of urban and 
housing policy, the new projects were launched with enhanced objectives for local 
economic renaissance. A combination of land and financial subsidies from central level 
was used to entice private developers’ initiatives to reuse inner-city or derelict land for 
commercial estate development. The well-researched practices of Urban Development 
Corporations (UDCs) and Enterprise Zones (EZs) were the best interpretation of the 
Conservative approaches. The very clear objectives of the establishment of UDCs were 
described in The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980: “to secure the 
regeneration of its area… by bringing land and buildings into effective use, 
encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, creating and 
attractive environment, and ensuring that housing and social facilities are available to 
encourage people to live and work in the area.” The ideas of EZs were similar: 
“Fast-track planning and financial incentives for developers and occupiers willing to 
take the risk on unpopular commercial locations” (Urban Task Force, 1999). The 
implementation of these ideas was usually based on an independent institutional 
structure, out of the control of local authorities. UDCs and EZs had extraordinary 
powers of land acquisition, and allowed public sector land to be transferred to the 
corporation by means of a vesting order. In designated zones (except in few cases such 
as UDCs in Wales), the land occupiers and developers benefited from certain tax 
concessions and a relaxed planning regime. Furthermore, UDCs were run by boards of 
directors drawn primarily from business; they were held responsible to central 
government through the Secretary of State, but not elected by local public. In early 
years, they sometimes even ignored existing approved development plans and thereby 
generated great conflict with local authorities (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2002). The 
Conservative central government was seeking to create some “special zones” to give 
more opportunities to regenerate the decayed areas by new economic activities. This 
idea regarded the “economically-beneficial” and “area-based” concepts as the primary 
objectives of the inner-city redevelopment practice by neo-liberalists. They also claimed 
that the general promotion of local economy would generate consequent “trickle-down” 
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benefits to all. Therefore, the approaches to cover many social needs of local people 
directly, such as job creation, skill-training, provision of affordable housing or social 
facilities, were relatively marginalised (Couch, 1990). 
In practice, the most successful examples of UDCs, EZs and other following similar 
initiatives were located at previously industrial or waterfront land. In many “flagship” 
programmes, such as London Dockland, Tyneside area of Newcastle and Merseyside of 
Liverpool, old industrial or port buildings were refurbished or revitalised into new-style 
flats, offices or commercial estates. Within the ambitious redevelopment visions, the 
advantaged location, attractive physical environment and modernised facilities brought 
great potential in real-estate development on site, so the luxury quayside or city-centre 
houses for sale (or to let) were usually much more expensive than the surrounding 
housing market. Some new generation of the white-collar workers - mostly young, rich, 
single and highly-educated - moved back to the renewed inner-city neighbourhoods to 
enjoy the refurnished urban life. Their return also re-stimulated the local consumption 
and other economic activities (Cameron, 1992; Wood, 1991). Also, in most cases, the 
original residents of the redeveloped areas could not afford the “gentrified” new life and 
had to be relocated to other places. Of course, there were still some new buildings of 
low-cost housing which could be afforded by at least some local residents, especially on 
the land owned by local authorities, but these programmes were really out of the 
mainstream strategy which emphasised commercial development (Cameron and 
Thornton, 1986; Cameron, 1992). This meant that during the property-led 
redevelopment process, the new changes could be very successful in achieving local 
economic renaissance, but failed to secure “trickle-down” benefits to many of the most 
disadvantaged groups (Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Malpass and Murie, 1999; Meegan, 
2003; McCarthy and Pollock, 1997). This resulted in a sustained critique against the 
extreme neo-liberal experimental projects prevalent in the 1980s (Moore, 1992; Robson 




This chapter summarised the evolution of British neighbourhood renewal/regeneration 
in three historical periods. From a strategic perspective, the development of the 
renewal/regeneration ideas, policies and practice was always changed in accordance 
with the shifts of economic, social, political and other contexts, which the requirement 
of market force and social objectives alternatively took the dominant role. In the 
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laissez-faire era, almost all neighbourhood renewal projects were launched as a vehicle 
to accelerate the pace of industrialisation and technological innovations. Almost all 
projects were initiated by private developers and most of medieval neighbourhoods 
were physically restructured. The desire of returning profit from free market was almost 
the only objective to achieve. The role of public authorities and the influence of social 
objectives were very limited in this process. This led to significant growth of 
productivity of British cities and very poor living condition for working class. In the 
Social Democratic era in order to tackle the social problems in the industrial cities, the 
renewal practice experienced an almost 180-degree turn. Public authorities became to 
control and almost to be the only operator of the process. Social objectives were given 
higher priority. Most renewal objectives were realised through significant physical 
changes of the old neighbourhoods but in later years some positive discrimination was 
applied as well. This process soon created modernised image of British cities but the 
products were monotonous and lack of local diversities. Then when neo-liberalists came 
to power, the neighbourhood renewal projects began to follow the “property-led” model 
and as the answer to the economic declines in inner-city areas. Economic renaissance 
was then at the central of the objectives for another round of neighbourhood renewal 
projects. Although the desire to fit public interests was not totally ignored, in practice 
the social objectives were put far behind the economic concerns. Public-private 
partnerships were widely used to operate the new projects, while the local authorities 
and communities were sidelined in decision-making and implementation. As the result, 
economic renaissance in the renewed areas were very significant while the positive 
changes were never widespread to wider areas. In all, the entire historical review 
showed the zigzag evolution. It provides sufficient background knowledge to 
understanding and analysing the most recent neighbourhood renewal initiatives, 
described in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 The Making of Recent Ideology 
 
In more recent decades, British cities, like those in the rest of the world, experienced 
many new changes. Economic globalisation and deregulation, social transformation, 
cultural diversity, ecological crisis and new international political orders are the most 
frequently discussed issues. All the changes bring to urban neighbourhoods new 
challenges and problems which differ significantly from the “urban problems” in earlier 
periods. Since the early 1980s, the neo-liberal governments have been introducing a 
series of reforms to initiate property-led redevelopment projects in an effort to tackle the 
challenges of the economic renaissance. The following practice, however, showed the 
limitation of the neo-liberalist ideas which made positive changes in some specific areas 
and for some specific groups only. It is argued that the neo-liberal vision and strategies 
of neighbourhood renewal are no longer appropriate to respond to the new challenges. It 
really is the time for an innovative perspective to understand the new generation of 
“urban problems”. In practice, with the returning of the Labour Party to power, “The 
Third Way” as a revised theory of Social Democracy has become the mainstream 
ideology to influence the decision making of social policies. This chapter will give a 
brief introduction to the theoretical ideas, and will use them to understand the most 
recent “urban problems” in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods in British cities. The 
following questions will be answered:  
• Within what context was the theory of “The Third Way” developed and 
widespread? 
• What are the nature and key idea of “The Third Way”?  
• What were the essential policy changes brought by the arrival of “The Third Way” 
and the New Labour government after 1997 in responding to pressing problems in 
British society?  
Answers to these questions will provide a valuable theoretical background for 
policy-makers to understand the current “urban problems” in a new context. This has a 
potential to have crucial influence in the policy-making and implementation of 





3.1 A Changing Context of Contemporary Britain 
 
3.1.1 Economic context 
 
Nowadays economic globalisation is discussed in governmental and academic 
publications as frequently as perhaps thousands of times, compared with 20 years ago. 
Tele-communication and inter-continental transportation technologies have achieved 
revolutionary improvements. They are usually widely applied to support longer-distance 
or larger-scale business activities. Because of the economic reform of many ex-Socialist 
states, the formation of the WTO, the expansion of world financial market and 
increasing international cooperation, the institutional barriers of world trade are going to 
be removed. The volume of international trade and the magnitude of cross-border 
capital flows now have reached historically high levels. The global-scale, complex and 
unitary international production networks are coming into being, which are restructuring 
the domestic economic system of not only developing countries, but also the early 
developed Western countries like Great Britain (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 1). 
 
The new freer global marketplace in the last decades of the 20th century provides 
simultaneously more opportunities and challenges to the British economy than before. 
The enhancement of competitiveness of industries has become more vital and essential 
than ever, which is driving the economic restructuring in Britain to go further. The 
decline of traditional manufacturing and mining industries has continued or has even 
been accelerated; the rate of the job loss and firm closure in Britain is higher than in any 
other Western industrial countries as the result of its earliest industrialisation. In 
contrast, the rapid boom of the high technology and service industries does provide new 
chances for future growth. But this does not mean the employees of traditional jobs 
would automatically be transferred to employment by new industries. In practice, the 
job opportunities suitable to the low-educated, unskilled people, just like the previous 
blue-collar jobs, have constantly shrunk while the highly-educated skilled workers 
would have more job opportunities. Meanwhile, in the face of the unpredictable changes 
of the global marketplace, the requirements of newly-emerging jobs are much more 
flexible, usually with various or frequently changing working styles, working venues 
and working times. For instance, some large cities like London have become more 
prominent as business and finance centres on a global or regional scale, sharing the 
24-hour business day to control or influence world business. Statistics show that in 
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Britain the numbers of self-employment, part-time and short-term jobs have all 
continuously increased in recent years (UTF, 1999). 
 
The process of economic change confirmed the key role of market forces and private 
capital in current national and international economic system. The old left-wing 
economic ideology, relying on closed domestic economy and top-down national 
economic plans, was suitable for the context 50 years before, but the old system must be 
removed in the face of the new challenges. The fiercer international competition, 
characters of new industries and the post-modern life style have overthrown the 
foundation of the Keynesian perception. In recognising this context, the economic 
reforms initiated by neo-liberal politicians were extremely effective. Public sectors 
retreated from some traditional social service sectors, with action such as the reduction 
of council housing supply and direct financial aid to the of jobless, and the new demand 
of other social service may be undertaken by other (private or voluntary) agencies in 
more flexible ways. In this way the heavy burden of government public expenditure 
could be greatly reduced to avoid high levels of taxation, which affects significantly the 
competitiveness of local enterprises. In practice, the outputs of the neo-liberal’s 
marketing strategy of encouraging private investment and deregulation were 
significantly gratified. Many new opportunities of economic globalisation were seized 
so that British economy has achieved very distinct revival since the mid-1980s.  
 
In addition, in order to achieve the sustainable development of national economy in the 
market-oriented system, the contribution of private investment only was not adequate. 
In the new era, the prospective economic growth has relied more and more on the 
knowledge-based industries, and local human and intellectual capital is becoming the 
key element to maintaining local competitiveness (Driver and Martell, 1998; Blair, 
1998a, p. 10). It requires a more important role to be played by public agencies and 
service in local economic promotion, including the provision of education, training, 
healthcare, infrastructure and so on. Hence the enhancement of public resource delivery 
to all should have the same priority as the encouragement of private investment. The 
public sectors, private capital and other available resources now need to work together 
as partnerships by negotiation and cooperation, sharing the responsibilities and benefits 
of the promotion of local competitiveness. A flexible framework is necessary for the 
partnership working to better respond to the various local circumstances and fast 
changing external context. 
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3.1.2 Social context 
 
In additional to the economic issues, the social structure in contemporary Britain also 
changed significantly but the consequences were more negative. Many signs show that 
under the marketing strategy in the neo-liberal years, social inequality was constantly 
rising. Although the economic revival came strongly, real benefits of the economic 
renaissance failed to be distributed to all areas or social groups. The vast group of 
unskilled workers employed by manufacturing and mining industries in the past, which 
used to be one of the mainstream social groups, have gradually disappeared as a result 
of the industrial restructuring. Some of them were successful in obtaining new jobs in 
new industries, and earned better salaries during the new round of economic prosperity, 
but the overall unemployment in Britain has remained high. The reduction of welfare 
provision increased everyone’s personal living costs, so the proportion of people in 
economic difficulties became higher than before. Both the extreme poor and rich groups 
in Britain increased. The official figures show that between 1979 and 1994-95, the 
poorest 10% suffered a cut of 8% in their real income (after housing costs) compared 
with a 68% increase for the top 10% and average increase of 42% (Lister, 1998). The 
rising inequality gradually led to new serious social unrest in British society. After the 
mid-1990s, the crisis in social aspects may have overshadowed the economic 
achievements. 
 
The mass change of demographic structure towards diversity makes problems more 
severe. The percentage of lone parent, one person and multi-person families, or the 
minority immigration, disabled or elderly families is much higher than decades ago 
compared with the decrease of traditional “core families”: employed married couples 
with young children (The Housing Research Foundation, 1998). Unlike the traditional 
low-income “core families”, the living difficulties that the present vulnerable groups 
have to face are highly diverse, differing from case to case. Most of them rely more on 
aid from public agencies, but their needs are various and continuously changing in the 
dynamic market-oriented circumstances. This means the egalitarian and standardised 
aids from the old-style welfare system, controlled by a top-down system, could 
mismatch the real needs of the vulnerable groups. Thus, it is a crucial time to reform: 
neither just entirely conserve nor abolish the entire national welfare system across 
Britain. The new generation of the system should still be a major responsibility of 
government, but it should be operated in more flexible ways to meet different demands. 
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In addition, it should work in conjunction with the non-returnable market-oriented 
strategy, which means the importance of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
public-funded services to keep public expenditure and taxation low. Moreover, the 
system should be easily transformed to fit future unpredictable socio-economic changes. 
 
3.1.3 Cultural context 
 
There have also been substantial cultural changes accompanying the economic and 
social restructuring. It is obvious that many traditional social values and lifestyles have 
no longer been representing the mainstream. The new generation of lifestyle requires 
that the time of working and parenting takes up smaller proportions of people’s lives, 
and increasing time to leisure, social communication and whole-life learning (UTF, 
2005). Thus the new life expectations become more and more difficult to be identified 
or summarised because of the diversity. 
 
Many have claimed the growth of individualism since the late 1970s. That has become a 
significant sector of social values without any doubt, although usually it is difficult to be 
quantified. In many cases, people would like to seek more on the feelings of 
self-expression, individual independency or personal safety, rather than the need of 
economic rewards (Bean and Papadakis, 1997). Many politicians, from both left and 
right parties, are worrying about the so-called traditional moral decay or the emergence 
of the “me-first” society. But surveys show the young generation actually still carries 
great concerns about social morality; however the youth do not want to accept some 
moral values from authority or regulations (Wilkinson and Mulgan, 1995). They would 
like to create their moral standards from their own life experience of participation in 
public affairs and the influence of local surroundings. 
 
Some more investigations of contemporary society have shown that there are actually 
increasing issues of public interests (Giddens, 1998a). The most frequently discussed 
topics include ecological values, cultural heritage conservation, human rights and sexual 
freedom and so on. Compared with the past social consensus, the concerns of public 
affairs are not only in new areas, but also with more features of their ambiguity and 
flexibility. At one specific time or location, one issue may be given priority to others but 
on other occasions it may be the opposite. Not only personal decision but also the 
“public interest” usually shares the same features. In all, it is not appropriate to regard 
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present society as the era of moral decay. Alternatively, it is just a shift time of some 
social values from which individualism has gradually emerged over the concerns of 
solidarity. In public affairs, there should be a new balance between individual and 
collective responsibilities (Giddens, 1998a). 
 
Thus the changes of cultural context together with those of the macro-scale 
socio-economic context should be considered as pre-conditions rather than 
consequences of the changing political ideologies and the decision-making mechanism 
of the public policies of the new era. As Anthony Giddens indicated, “with some 
oversimplification, it could be said that classical social democracy was most successful 
and best developed in smaller countries, or countries with homogeneous national 
cultures.” (Giddens, 1998a, p. 34) Many others have also argued that, in the 
multi-cultural post-modern society of Britain, the “state” and its top-down bureaucratic 
system may no longer be the appropriate decision-maker or provider of many public 
services to satisfy the diverse public needs in the multi-cultural post-modern society of 
Britain. There should be a renewal of the ideology to help understanding the “public 
interest”, and also a reform of the decision-making and implementation model in 
responding to all the challenges of the new era. 
 
3.2 Ideology of “The Third Way” 
 
3.2.1 Emergence of “The Third Way” 
 
The term “The Third Way” is currently used to capture the new political ideology of 
New Labour2 Party who secured the central power of Britain following the 1997 
General Election. The term was used to mark out New Labour’s departure from both the 
post-war social democratic (old left) and then neo-liberal (new right) political ideologies. 
                                                        
2
 “New Labour” is an alternative branding for the Labour Party dating from a conference slogan first 
used by the Labour Party in 1994 which was later seen in a draft manifesto published by the party in 1996, 
called New Labour, New Life for Britain. It was presented by Labour as being the brand of the new 
reformed party that had in 1995 altered Clause IV and reduced the Trade Union vote in the electoral 
college used to elect the leader and deputy leader to have equal weighting with other individual parts of 
the electoral college. 
The name is primarily used by the party itself in its literature, but is also sometimes used by political 
commentators and the wider media. The rise of the name coincided with a rightwards shift of the British 
political spectrum; for Labour, this was a continuation of the trend that had begun under the leadership of 
Neil Kinnock. “Old Labour” is sometimes used by commentators to describe the older, more left-wing 
members of the party, or those with strong Trade Union connections. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labour_Party_(UK) 
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The Third Way emerged corresponding to some ideas by Clinton’s Democratic 
government in US, and also some political debates in continental Europe about the 
future of social democratic parties (Clinton, 1996; Newman, 2001, p. 40). All of them 
could be perceived as positive responses to the changing context discussed above by 
central left politicians and the ideas interacted by each other internationally. 
The Third Way thoughts made very significant theoretical progress by the 
reconfiguration of relationships between market and welfare, public and private, 
individualism and collectivism (Mullard, 2000). It is clear that the mutual relationship 
between families/individuals and the society is no longer like the simple assumption of 
the social-democratic model: the fully employed workers contribute to the state in their 
work-place and benefit from national welfare provision. That could easily reach the 
balance between the in-ward and out-ward wealth of both sides in a homogeneous 
industrial society. In this model, the state granted a series of rights to people, but did not 
demand responsibilities (Driver and Martell, 1998; 2000). The coming of the 
post-industrial society quickly broke the old-style balance. In a macro-scale, the boom 
of the aging population, lengthening periods of education and the increasing 
unemployment caused by industrial decay produced heavy burdens to the welfare 
system that public expenditure can no longer afford to pay for. Certainly, the old style 
individual-state relationship has become a major obstacle to achieving economic 
renaissance in a new competitive global market circumstance.  
 
Neo-liberal politicians have recognised the dilemma, and prompted the revolutionary 
attempts to change the whole system. Through a series of reforms, they finally 
transformed the traditional individual-state relationship into an individual-market 
relationship; here everyone should take more personal responsibility and gain most 
social well-being from the market rather than rights to require welfare provision from 
the state. This neo-liberal model is usually flexible in reaching the new balance in a 
macro-scale. However, the rising social problems show that it is still far from being an 
optimistic balance. There are at least two things to be noted. First a variety of status 
(family structure, education level, health, race, social networking etc.) of current 
families/individuals creates great differences among their capabilities of contribution 
and the demands of benefits. Second, the surroundings of people in various regions are 
also quite different, and many official statistics has shown the larger regional gaps in 
Britain (Hall, 2002). But the social features and regional inequality can never be 
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addressed by a unitary marketplace. Therefore social inequality and polarisation are 
inevitable in the contemporary British context. 
 
Thereby The Third Way finally became the mainstream answer to overcoming all the 
challenges unsolved by the neo-liberalists. Actually, this political ideology was not very 
fresh. Its origin can be traced back to many political philosophies proposed in the early 
20th century (Macmillan, 1978). However, since the mid-1990s it has become much 
more influential than ever. More active interventional approaches have been suggested, 
but all of them should cover the pre-conditions decided by the whole new economic, 
social and cultural context: the interventional approaches should be effective in 
promoting social justice but not against the market-oriented economic circumstance in 
the globalised era; the public interests should be protected but the individual options for 
personal development should also be highly respected; the public aid should be 
sufficiently flexible to fit diverse and changing local needs (Blair, 1999). In all, the new 
ideology should be “pragmatic” enough to ensure that all approaches, whether 
innovative or not, can be “workable” in the current context. 
 
3.2.2 The nature of “The Third Way” 
 
The Third Way ideology features in many of documents as a new way “beyond Old Left 
and New Right” (Labour Party, 1997; Miliband, 1994; Blair, 1998a; Blair and 
Schroeder, 1999; Brown, 1999; Darling, 1999), which is - above all - an endeavour to 
respond to the post-war social democratic state and the Conservative government’s 
series of reforms on the state (Driver and Martell, 2000). In front of the contemporary 
challenges from economic, social, cultural and other aspects, The Third Way idea tries 
to absorb or combine the ideas from both Old Left and New Right, in order to tackle the 
social problems in more pragmatic ways. The eclectic mix of political ideology accepts 
essential roles of both the global markets and the desire for social well-being in 
contemporary British society (Freeden, 1998). 
 
The key principles of this new political ideology have been broadly agreed by most 
writers (Giddens, 1998a; Brown, 1999; White, 1998; Hargreaves and Christie, 1998; Le 
Grand, 1998; Driven and Martell, 2000). The Third Way politics now seeks to resolve 
the core ideological tension of the past two centuries: the controversy and opposition 
between socialism and liberalism. It believes that the ethical foundations of socialism - 
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fraternity and equality - can coexist with the freedoms of liberalised markets and liberal 
democracy. To be specific, Tony Blair (1998a) identified them by four principles in his 
third way pamphlet for the Fabian Society: “equal worth”; “opportunity for all”; 
“responsibility” and “community.” Although the interpretations of these basic values 
and the extent to which are still being debated, these values are undoubtedly producing 
a profound effect on contemporary British politics. 
 
The first, “equal worth”, obviously comes from the legacy of the traditional left-wing 
political concern that human beings should be treated equally and not discriminated 
against. However, just as discussed above, The Third Way politics does not expect any 
unrealistic visions for the egalitarian outcomes for all. Blair (1998a) suggested that the 
current core task for pursuing equality is to get rid of existing obstacles to equality, 
which might include “gross inequality,……, handed down from generation to 
generation”. The second principle, “opportunity for all”, does absorb the opinion from 
new right which emphasised “equal opportunities”, but really has gone beyond it. The 
Third Way idea seeks the substantive (or positive) freedom by which individuals have 
sufficient resources to develop their talents and exercise the liberty, rather than the 
negative freedom which only guarantees legal conditions for free individual lives 
(Driver and Martell, 2000). 
 
The third principle, “responsibility”, is closely linked to the fourth “community”. That 
differs greatly from both the Old Left and New Right rules. The Third Way idea aims to 
re-establish the individual-state relationship, with emphasis on both rights and 
responsibilities to individuals. The increasing rights come from the enhanced public 
agencies who provide necessary non-profit aid to vulnerable groups or anybody who 
needs it, in order to give everybody more equal opportunities for personal development. 
The responsibility means that the benefits provided by the public sector to everybody 
are no longer guaranteed. The individuals must be involved in the competition in a 
market circumstance. Today, the impacts of economic globalisation, together with the 
revolutionary improvements of information and knowledge communication, have 
provided individuals with more resources, options and potential capabilities for personal 
development. Our state should follow or facilitate the trend rather than resist it. Giving 
increasing rights and responsibilities to individuals should be an essential factor in 
reaching a new stable, dynamic and diverse society. The Third Way politics hence gives 
more trust to civil society. Local people are now empowered or involved more in the 
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decision making of many - especially the localised - public affairs, and higher-level 
public agencies coordinate and provide help to initiate the “local-centred” or 
“community-centred” mechanism. 
 
In Table 3-1 some features of The Third Way ideology have been listed, to show the 
comparison between the old left and new right. 
 
Table 3-1 Comparative features of three political ideologies 
 
Dimension Old Left The Third Way New Right 
Nature Class politics by left Post-class politics, political 
pragmatism 




Social justice and wealth 
redistribution 
Both Competitiveness and 
wealth creation 
Citizenship Rights Both Responsibilities 
Economic 
structure 
Old mixed economy: 
Corporatism 





State over private and 
citizen society: plans, 









protecting from “cradle 
to grave” 
Social investment state Welfare safety-net 
Institutional Leveller Public as investor and 
coordinator 
Deregulator 
Source: Giddens, 1998b; Powell, 2000 
 
3.3 New Labour Government and The Third Way 
 
3.3.1 Pragmatic policy shift 
 
The New Labour Party’s victory in the 1997 General Election, marking The Third Way 
ideology, has become the mainstream political thought in Britain from then on. The 
transformation, however, was not very sudden, but has been following a gradual and 
pragmatic way. Although most key members of New Labour Government since 1997 
have been founders or firm supporters of The Third Way ideology, the legacy of 
previous politicians was not immediately eliminated. In responding to the specific 
challenges in a new context, the New Labour government tried to absorb all valuable 
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ideas “beyond left and right” (Blackman and Palmer, 1999; Glennerster, 1999). In 
practice, many previous left- or right-wing ideas, especially the effective neo-liberalist 
ideas to facilitate economic prosperity, remained and were involved in the interpretation 
of The Third Way ideas by New Labour. For example, the application of “public-private 
partnership” were in fact significant features of the previous Conservative 
administration, but New Labour is now continuing with such attempts and is expanding 
its involvement with new labels. 
 
Table 3-2 lists some of the flagship policies or programmes of New Labour. In this table, 
the major objectives of the approaches in the right column are to maintain the efficiency 
of the market economy, and those in the left column aim to enhance social justice and 
cohesion. Clearly in almost all areas, the ideas from both old left and new right were 
drawn simultaneously from a pragmatic way to re-establish or renew the relationships 
between individual and state, public and private, welfare and market. 
 
Table 3-2 Major case policies or programmes by New Labour government 
 
Ideas leant from old left Ideas learnt from new right 
Introducing a minimum wage Cutting corporation tax 
Developing programmes of welfare to work Giving Bank of England independence 
Tough policies on juvenile crime Education reforms 
Introducing power devolution Giving central government “greater strategic 
capacity” 
Increasing  financial support to health and 
education 
Tight limits to the overall level of government 
spending 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the New Labour government is reforming or adjusting the 
Conservative political strategies very carefully, trying to avoid revolutionary attempts in 
most cases (Powell, 1999). Most policy changes are actually not based on a clear new 
ideological framework or a single “big idea”, like the old left or the new right: their big 
idea is that there is not a single big idea, but they are just concerned with finding out the 
real “appropriate”, “workable” and “of the time” alternative visions and actions 
(Halpern and Mososz, 1998). Usually, the innovative policies or schemes were initiated 
as being problem-oriented, and were quickly put into application by combining many 
eclectic and pragmatic methods. Sometimes they appear based on an “emergent 




In practice, one of the most significant policy shifts brought about by the New Labour 
government was the re-emphasis of social justice and equity (Commission on Social 
Justice, 1994; Anderson and Mann, 1997; Pierson, 1998; Powell, 2000). That was the 
response to unacceptable social inequality and polarisation in the Conservative years, 
which reached its peak in the mid-1990s and threatened greatly the sustainability of 
economic prosperity. A series of strong approaches was launched based on the 
redefinition of social justice, equality and the role of welfare state. The ideas of The 
Third Way were well reflected in this area, and will be discussed in following sections. 
 
3.3.2 From equality to social inclusion 
 
Social justice and equity are common features of political ideology, and are always 
accompanied with controversial explanations by different political theories. In a very 
long period after the war, the view from social democrats was very dominant in practice: 
it tried to place the desire of egalitarian distribution of wealth as the goal of social 
justice. The state expanded the role of public sectors in the national economic system, 
and established the unitary welfare system primarily to achieve this objective. However, 
this then proved unrealistic when the national economic difficulties arose. Also, the 
top-down distribution of welfare frequently mismatched real local needs. Thus in later 
years the neo-liberal’s perception became the mainstream. It claimed that the desire of 
egalitarian income equality was then replaced by the notion of “equality of 
opportunities”. Neo-liberalists thought that the role of public economy and welfare 
system should be minimised, but instead the private economy and market force came to 
centre stage for the distribution of social resources. They believed that this should be a 
system to give every individual more freedom and personal choice and development so 
that the achievements of the economic revival would create a “trickle down” of wealth 
and benefits into local communities (DoE, 1985). However, when this was put into 
practice by the Conservative government, the result was far from the optimistic 
predictions: many statistics and reports revealed how the growth of wealth from 
economic renaissance had never been widespread, but distributed very unequally 
(Gordon et al., 2000). This rendered the idea of “equality of opportunities” questionable. 
Critics pointed out that “equal opportunities” must exist with a condition as some 
“starting-gate” equality; as Vincent said: “Without a basic minimum of educational, 
health and welfare conditions as a point of departure, individuals cannot develop their 
potentialities and powers.” (Vincent, 1995, p. 103) In the 1990s, it was a common truth 
  57
that a large number of the lower-level population in British cities could not have equal 
accessibility to many social resources, compared with the mainstream groups. The 
lower quality of education, weak social networking and lack of access to other social 
resources meant they were unable to get opportunities equal to those of others when in 
the face of social competition. The children and young people of the poorest families in 
particular even have to stay at a very disadvantaged position in the competitive society 
from birth. That could be the real root of inequality or injustice in today’s British cities. 
 
In a market-oriented society, meritocracy and the ‘winner-take-all’ phenomenon are 
usually taken for granted. Social inequality will inevitably become inter-generational, 
and once most social sources for personal development are allocated by a free market, it 
could accelerate this process. The old-style social democratic approaches tried to 
reverse the process through wealth redistribution, but finally found that external aid can 
never fill the endless gaps caused by the market-forced polarisation. The neo-liberal 
politics ignored the threats of increasing inequality until the social crises across many 
aspects rapidly emerged. The Third Way proposed an innovative view to manage this 
tough job after reviewing the failures of both old left and new right. It should well fit 
the context of the era, such as diversity, not stand in its way. Finally, New Labour 
rejected both an unrealisable equality of outcome and a narrow view of equality of 
opportunity, but tried to concern positive assistance, not just a benefit payment to the 
disadvantaged (DSS, 1998). The terms of “inclusion” and “exclusion” are widely used 
by the New Labour government to define or measure the extent of inequality of British 
society (Le Grand, 1998; White, 1998; Daniel, 1998). This could be seen as progress in 
understanding the nature of social inequality, focusing not only on the phenomenon, but 
also the roots or causes of it. Many have claimed this is an important paradigm shift in 
values related to British public policies (Lister, 1998; Powell, 2000). 
 
The origin of the notion of “social exclusion” was widely acknowledged in France 
during the 1970s (Silver, 1994; Martin, 1996; Re’vauger, 1997; Spicker, 1997). By the 
1980s, social exclusion was increasingly seen as a consequence with its roots in wider 
economic restructuring and societal changes in many Western industrialised countries. 
In particular, following the impacts of economic restructuring and deregulation of 
housing market, the disadvantaged groups were concentrating on specific spatial areas, 
and the problems became much more complex than previous income poverty (Paugam, 
1995; 1996; Drewe, 2000). Here the New Labour government set up the 
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cross-departmental Social Exclusion Unit specifically in charge of responding with 
policies and approaches to such challenges. The official definition of “social exclusion” 
by them is a reflection of the comprehensive understanding to the challenges, which 
was described as follows: 
 
Social exclusion is about more than income poverty. It is a short-hand term for what 
can happen when people or areas have a combination of linked problems, such as 
unemployment, discrimination, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime and 
family breakdown (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001a, p. 1). 
 
This official definition not only includes the problems of poverty and low-income, but 
also addresses the disadvantages of other aspects. It tends to focus more on the primary 
inequality as downward social trends rather than secondary inequality as the negative 
consequences (Oppenheim, 1997; Powell, 2000). Within it, the key point of exclusion is 
perceived as a “process” rather than a “state” of the marginalisation of specific 
vulnerable groups apart from the mainstream society. Those “excluded people” do not 
have the means, materials and otherwise to participate in or share social, economic, 
political and cultural life with wider-ranged groups. Many researchers understand social 
exclusion as lack or denial of access for these people to this or that kind of social 
relations, social customs and activities in which the great majority of people in British 
society engage (Gordon et al., 2000; Levitas, R, 1999; Silver, 1994; Figueiredo, 1996; 
Room, 1995; Lee and Murie, 1999). This is a deliberately flexible definition, and the 
problems listed are only examples. Many other dimensions of exclusion could be added 
in different cases. 
 
Social exclusion, now understood as the marginalisation process from the mainstream, 
used to come from different kinds of discrimination, such as ethnic origin, disability, 
religion or sexuality. These discriminations may have been quite serious in the 1960s or 
earlier years, but today British parliaments and governments have applied a series of 
laws or regulations to abolish almost all kinds of institutional discrimination (O’Conner 
and Lewis, 1999). However, since the 1980s, the exclusion process could be mostly 
ascribed to stratification by the changing labour market and welfare reform. The 
economic restructuring reshaped the social profiles of many people and their families, 
and the non-employed or the extreme lowest-level ones are gradually losing a wide 
range of access to marketised distribution of social service and other resources, and then 
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excluded from the mainstream. This process is becoming inter-generational in current 
British society.  
 
The exclusion process can be generally measured by Gordon et al. (2000) by four 
dimensions as follows:  
(1) Exclusion from adequate income or resources: primarily poverty 
(2) Labour market exclusion 
(3) Service exclusion 
(4) Exclusion from social relations: 
• Non-participation in common social activities 
• Isolation 




From Hind, Pickering and Park (2000), there is an additional dimension of “attitudes 
and aspirations”, which can influence both networking and productive activity through 
generations. Other researchers (Madanipour et al., 1998; Vincent, 2003) would like to 
use broader or narrower scope to describe the multi-dimensional problem. Many 
researchers have indicated that the most important characteristic of social exclusion is 
that the problems of these dimensions are linked and mutually reinforcing, and can 
combine to create a complex and fast-moving vicious cycle (Carley, 2002). The SEU 
has indicated that “Only when this process is properly understood and addressed will 
policies really be effective” (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001a). 
 
The New Labour government has been convinced of the great social cost incurred by 
the exclusion process. The existence of the increasing number of excluded social groups 
could produce not only great threats to social cohesion, but also the upward pressures on 
public spending for the endless anti-poverty schemes. Also, the excluded groups were 
also a potential area of economic renaissance and prosperity in many areas: the 
concentration of excluded people usually represents a lack of skilled employees, a lack 
of customers and a lack of entrepreneurs and so on (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001a). No 
doubt, nowadays addressing the problems of social exclusion has become the core task 
in promoting social justice by the New Labour government. 
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3.3.3 Inclusion and social investment 
 
The term “inclusion” is therefore used to identify the visions and approaches to address 
the multi-dimensional problem. Obviously, the process towards inclusion must not be 
simply or narrowly defined. Integrated interventional approaches are needed, and it is 
unrealistic to expect that the objectives of inclusion can be accomplished in a single 
action. To every dimension of exclusion, there must be effective corresponding actions 
simultaneously operated, and the overall strategy in relation to the inter-departmental 
cooperation is also critical. The New Labour government did adopt many experiments 
to develop the ways of promoting social inclusion. These experimental programmes 
now no longer concentrate on “income exclusion”, but try more innovative ways in 
relation to other aspects as: paid work, social service delivery - especially education; 
some other attempts are the central weapons in the government’s planned attack on the 
exclusion of labour market, of social service and social relations/networking 
(Mandelson, 1997; White, 1998; Brown, 1999). The specific strategies are summarised 
as follows: 
 
Making work pay 
 
One central concern by New Labour is to break the barriers of the excluded groups to 
access the mainstream labour market. Opportunities of work, more specifically of paid 
work, must be equally distributed to all people, and is the central objective of the new 
government projects (Driver and Martell, 1998; Jordan, 1998; Stepney et al., 1999; 
McLaughlin et al, 1999). These new projects were seen as the new generation of the 
welfare treatment of contemporary British society, or the “core of welfare state reform”. 
In practice, a series of new projects of “making work pay” or “welfare to work” as the 
crucial approaches to eliminate social exclusion can also contribute much to facilitate 
local economic success; as Miliband (1994, p. 88) claimed: “the most potent social 
policy is also a successful economic policy”. By such ways, these new welfare 
treatments have become preventive ways against social exclusion and its consequent 
inequality, rather than remedial ways to pull the disadvantaged people from their tough 
lives. 
 
To be specific, the target of “make work pay” was realised through the following typical 
approaches (Table 3-3): 
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Table 3-3 Typical approaches of “make work pay” by New Labour 
 
1. Minimum wage, a partial fusing of the tax and benefit system. It aims to ensure that 
people who move to workplace from welfare should be financially better off. 
2. Working families Tax Credit scheme. This offers more generous support to working 
families with children. 
3. Child-care tax credit. This may cover 70% or so child-care costs for low or middle income 
families. 
4. New financial penalties against the “work-shy”. This will punish the people who are 
capable of working but would like to stay at home all day. 
 
The details of these approaches are usually updated year by year, and some alternative 
ways are also applied in different areas to better fit the specific local context. Among 
them, the most effective approaches are usually initiated combined with other actions, 
under a clear long-term strategy and operated by a flexible framework. 
 
Enhancing social service delivery 
 
Another series of approaches has been applied to address the exclusion in social service 
sectors. The service is very wide ranging, and the most important elements should 
include the following: affordable housing, public security and anti-crime, education and 
training, health care, and other types of social work such as childcare, disability services 
or violence prevention (Gordon et al., 2000; Scottish Executive, 2002; SEU, 2001a). In 
some cases, the retail and entertainment units are also included as social service 
providers. Most items of the service mentioned above were previously operated by the 
welfare system or other public agencies, and some, such as health care, were highlighted 
as the key of governmental responsibility. Since the new right started the welfare reform, 
more and more service provision has been transferred to the private and voluntary 
sectors, and is no longer distributed in egalitarian ways to the excluded groups. New 
Labour policies reinforced the recognition of the significant role of social service 
delivery in inclusion and the economic sustainability.  
 
The enhancement of the social service delivery is more than the general improvement of 
its provision; it also focuses on equal accessibility to all, particularly the vulnerable 
groups. Thus all kinds of barriers should be removed for every person to reach the 
service provision. The barriers usually include not only the physical distance, but also 
the less visible barriers, for example economic affordability, some institutional 
separation and additionally, perhaps the mentality or attitudes of both sides. It has been 
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claimed that the Conservative years provided very unequal accessibility to social 
services, and challenged the basic precondition of “equal opportunities for personal 
development” to these excluded people. Therefore, the New Labour approaches towards 
inclusion must now work effectively against all the barriers. 
 
The state, now as the new style welfare provider, seeks ways to “enable” the excluded 
ones to overcome the barriers that prevent them from becoming like the rest of society 
(Clarke and Newman, 1998). Within the barriers, “Education” was placed as the first 
priority of all. Here education in schools and the long-life education are both included in 
governments’ agendas. The latter focused on many types of professional training, 
especially to the low-educated groups who were excluded from the labour market. 
Through many projects, the trainees should become more competitive, with stronger 
confidence and skills to start their own personal development in the labour market. 
Health care, public security and other social aid are also regarded as key elements to 
enhance the competitiveness of individuals or social groups. The discrimination to 
minority ethnic people, to females and to disabled people will be further addressed by 
other initiatives. Therefore, the key of the process towards inclusion is to reinforce the 
“indirect” help to the disadvantaged people so that society becomes more equal and 




This is another innovative attempt related to establish the new generation of welfare 
state by New Labour. The reform of its institutional structure of the new welfare system 
started together with the alternative outcomes of “positive assistance” to disadvantaged 
people (Dwyer, 1998). In initiating most schemes towards social inclusion, the targets, 
priorities and approaches no longer follow the plans proposed by the top-down 
bureaucratic system or any other single stakeholder, but are decided by more 
stakeholders at the neighbourhood level. The involvement of local communities has 
become much more significant than ever, which means local people themselves now 
have more opportunities in influencing the decisions to set up the targets or priorities for 
these approaches. This new institutional structure aims to eliminate all non-localised 
“inadequate decisions” caused by the previous top-down bureaucratic system, and to 
encourage more localised ways to promote inclusion effectively. Normally, the role of 
central or higher level government now focuses only on the strategic framework to 
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direct a variety of local actions, and coordinate them at a regional or national level. 
 
There are many reasons to support the community-led approaches by New Labour. 
Generally speaking, it is only the community itself or community-based organisations 
who can fully explore the potential of local social and economic capital for a long-term 
sustainable development towards inclusion. The detailed explanation may include the 
following: 
 
1. It is a necessary approach to better understand the local conditions, and helpful 
to make the most appropriate response. 
2. It is beneficial to collect available resources as much as possible to encourage 
local communities to become full participants. 
3. It is aimed to ensure the equal distribution of the positive effects by the 
projects. 
4. It is a process to provide local people with more options for their personal 
development. 
5. It is designed to help them to access more resources, such as enlarged social 
networking, to “enable” them in future. 
 
In practice based on the new institutional structure, most action plans to promote social 
inclusion are now made by full negotiation and cooperation among as many 
stakeholders as possible. The stakeholders usually include not only public agencies and 
private investors just like before, but also voluntary groups and local communities 
themselves. Actually in some schemes to encourage local employment or enhance social 
service delivery, the tasks are jointly undertaken by all stakeholders. Thus the increasing 
influence by local communities may be derived from many ways. In many schemes, 
local communities or community organisations are empowered with not only the right to 
be informed or consulted, but also the right to elect representatives to participate in the 
decision-making process. The steering or coordinating committees formed by 
representatives from all stakeholders are widely applied in implementing the schemes 
towards inclusion, but there is not a recommended universal structure of the 
decision-making body (Carley, 2002). The structure itself may frequently change to 




In all, the reform of the institutional structure of “power devolution to neighbourhood 
level” and “community engagement” successfully demonstrates the process of further 
democratisation of the existing political system. It effectively minimises the depth of 
stratification around class, gender, religion and ethnicity, and also rhetorically brings 
about the “classless society”, whilst discussions around poverty and inequality are 
replaced with the term “social exclusion” (Rose, 1999; Lister, 1998). By this way the 
state successfully devolves more “rights and responsibility” to civic society in order to 
better maintain the micro-scale balance in the dynamic, diverse and developing society. 
Furthermore, the concept of “community engagement” is just a strategic idea rather than 
an applicable plan. The ways, principles and effects of community engagement in the 




This chapter first analysed the changing economic, social and cultural context of British 
society in most recent decades. In the face of the economic globalisation, the active role 
of private capital and market force should continue to be confirmed, but there needs to 
be awareness of the increasing influence of public agencies for sustainable economic 
growth. The traditional social structure has changed but social inequality has emerged 
again in other ways. Emerging individualism led to more diverse and dynamic needs in 
everyone’s social life, but public interest is still a concern for many of the population. 
Therefore, a new political ideology is certainly needed to re-establish the relationships 
between the individual, the state and the market. 
 
Here the ideology of The Third Way emerged as the key political thought of the New 
Labour government after 1997. This ideology recommends an eclectic and pragmatic 
way in political decision by combining many valuable legacies from both old left and 
new right. The market-oriented economic system and the promotion of social justice 
were both emphasised. 
 
The most significant influence by The Third Way in New Labour years was the 
redefinition of social equity and further reform of the welfare system. By keeping the 
market-oriented circumstances, many interventional approaches were applied to 
eliminate “social exclusion” by providing job opportunities and social service in a more 
equal way to all so that the “equal opportunities” could be definitely achieved. These 
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approaches are now largely operated at neighbourhood level, jointly decided and 




Chapter 4 Policy and Practice of Recent British Regeneration 
Programmes 
 
The triumph of the New Labour party in the General Election of 1997 is a landmark of 
political restructuring similar to the successes of neo-liberalism in 1979 and social 
democracy in 1945. Correspondingly, a new generation of neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration policies and programmes was launched, and given high priority in 
the new government’s agenda. After drawing on valuable experience and lessons from 
the controversial property-led redevelopment movement, the perspective of “The Third 
Way” was now used to understand and analyse the remaining problems of the declining 
neighbourhoods. National strategies have been published to form a basic framework to 
direct consequent practical programmes. More long-term, wide-ranged and interacting 
approaches have been put into practice, and they are intended to operate in more 
flexible ways to better respond to the “local problems and needs”. In this chapter, the 
most recent changes will be introduced and analysed. It will answer the following 
questions in turn:  
• How does one understand the new “urban problems” that the new programmes need 
to solve?  
• What are the new strategies and approaches for the new generation of programmes?  
• What is the new mechanism that will be used to operate the initiatives?  
The ongoing programmes in Craigmillar at Edinburgh will be referred to as being 
typical, in order to provide more detailed information for the answers. 
 
4.1 New “Urban Problems” 
 
Some official documents published immediately after the New Labour came to power 
provided the overall understanding of current “urban problems”. As the consequences of 
previous socio-economic and cultural changes and the widespread property-led projects 
since the 1980s, despite some positive outputs, such as the revitalised urban image, the 
rekindled civic pride and successful practice of public-private partnerships, most of the 
significant new crises highlighted by the reports concentrated on the social aspect. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair described his concern about the formation of isolated social 
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groups in British cities which had the potential to generate the new rounds of social 
unrest as follows: 
 
“Over the last two decades the gap between these “worst estates” and the rest of the 
country has grown…. It shames us as a nation, it wastes lives and we all have to pay the 
costs of dependency and social division.” (Blair, 1998b, p. 1) 
 
The major causes of the social failures were then analysed by both the official reports 
and other research projects initiated by academicians. The significant socio-economic 
changes in recent decades are significant external factors which have caused these 
failures, but by analysing past governmental policies and their implementation, more 
valuable lessons may be learned. These include housing policies, planning regulations, 
local economy strategies and the reform of welfare system, etc. The consequences of the 
policy shifts imposed heavy burdens on vulnerable groups. For example, when the 
housing market became less regulated, the specific vulnerable groups were then 
concentrated in unpopular neighbourhoods, with worse and worse living conditions. 
Clearly, just like the process mentioned in the last chapter, they then had to suffer 
multi-dimensional exclusion with the vicious circle of “marginalisation-deprivation” for 
generations. At neighbourhood level, the cycle of multi-dimensional exclusion was also 
renamed “multiple deprivation” by many official reports. Many previous 
renewal/redevelopment or regeneration projects frequently aimed to help target 
neighbourhoods escaping the cycle but, as a result, the aims were almost never reached 
at all. 
 
4.1.1 Severe multi-dimensional exclusion 
 
In the 1980s, under the city marketing strategy, many derelict and under-utilised 
industrial areas near city centres and in waterfront areas lands were transformed into 
commercial centres, office estates or leisure parks. Redevelopment projects brought not 
only refurbished or newly erected buildings with well-designated landscaping, but also 
distinct economic growth and job opportunities. Many figures showed that more people 
had started to move back into the inner cities for working and living: in 1990 there were 
only 90 people living in the heart of Manchester, in 2005 there were 25,000 residents; 
over the same period the population of central Liverpool increased fourfold (Urban Task 
Force, 2005, p. 2). The redeveloped areas used to be the worst “problematic” 
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neighbourhoods in British cities one or two decades ago, but have now become the new 
powerhouses of prosperous urban economy. 
 
However, the promotion of these specific areas did not necessarily benefit the wider 
area. One result was that, although the population and job losses slowed down or even 
reversed in the specific redeveloped areas, these have done little to reduce the overall 
level of unemployment in many cities (Hall, 2002). For example, the project of 
“merchant city” to redevelop Glasgow city centre has been very successful in both 
generating wealth and creating job opportunities in the city centre, but in the area of the 
whole of Glasgow City, the unemployment rate in 1989 was 15.8%, which was even 
higher than that in 1980, at 15.1%. The rate was then going on to increase with effects 
of the inflation and recession between 1990 and 1992 (Paddison, 1993). Compared with 
the areas having experienced the local promotion, some of the worst-hit areas or sectors 
(for example, most peripheral social housing estates) were never involved in the 
market-oriented redevelopment projects. In these “abandoned” neighbourhoods, there 
was always very little investment from private sectors, mostly on account of less 
potential for economic return (Robson et al., 1994; Scottish Executive, 2006; McCarthy, 
2007).  
 
The retreat of most public investment in some cases speeded up the decline of the 
general living conditions of these communities. Thus usually the declining areas with 
concentration of vulnerable groups were falling deeply into multi-dimensional exclusion: 
not only with inadequate job opportunities, but also very low levels of public services, 
including transport, health, child care, schools and access to many mainstream social 
events (Power and Mumford, 1999; Pierson and Worley, 2005). Although the detailed 
situation varies from case to case, the common feature is that the “local problems” all 
have wide coverage and they interact with each other. Some problems are visible, 
characterised by the marked increase of homelessness, poorer housing or environmental 
conditions, street begging, etc. Some others are invisible, including the higher level of 
long-term unemployment, the rising levels of crime and drug abuse, closure of shops, 
banks, and other vital services, bad quality of local education and so on (Oatley, 1995; 
Blair, 1998b).  
 
Craigmillar is one of the most typical examples of the neighbourhoods suffering 
long-term depression but not experiencing significant promotion during the neo-liberal 
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years. This large housing estate is located on the south-eastern periphery of Edinburgh, 
the capital city of Scotland, and the distance to the city centre is approximately 5 km 




Figure 4-1 The location of Craigmillar 
 
The residential history of Craigmillar can be traced back to at least the 12th century. 
From the middle age years to the 19th century, two powerful families dominated the land 
around Craigmillar. Craigmillar Castle was the home of one of them for hundreds of 
years, despite many periods of reconstruction. The industry of coal extraction started in 
the 14th century and, after the Industrial Revolution, the brewing and manufacturing of 
margarine developed very fast in Craigmillar. At the beginning of the 20th century, there 
were seven breweries, two coal mines, and the Creamery in this area. 
 
In 1928, following the partial closure of the coal mines, the private land-owners sold the 
land and estate to Edinburgh Town Council. Two years later, the first round of 
construction of public housing projects started in order to re-house the homeless or 
outward population from the slum clearance in the inner city. In the following decades, 
the council housing estates expanded in neighbouring areas, as they were close to 
employment in the local mines, breweries and manufacturing industries. Until the 1960s, 
Craigmillar was made up from twelve areas of housing: Niddrie Mains, Niddrie 
Marischal, Niddrie House, Niddrie Mill, the Peffers, Peffermill, The Thistle, 
Greendykes, Bingham, Magdalene, Cleekim, and Newcraighall Village (The Living 
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Craigmillar Archives, 2000). The housing styles were diverse and reflected the different 
projects: some were designed as traditional low-rise detached houses; a few were 
semi-detached houses while the latest projects created some high-rise flats. The highest 
two blocks have 14 storeys (Pawson et al., 2000).  
 
After the large-scale housing construction, the total population in Craigmillar reached 
17,000, the size of a small town. However, in this public housing area, despite its size 
there were very few shops and other facilities. The lack of a wide range of services and 
the distance from the city centre made the area less popular to potential tenants and the 
local living conditions never had a high reputation. In the following two and three 
decades, poverty and job losses in Craigmillar became more and more prevalent:  
 
“The first rumblings came with the run-down of the coal-mines and breweries and the 
closure of the Creamery. This left Craigmillar largely a dormitory area. The resulting 
mass unemployment was to dog the area for decades to come, bringing with it all the 
festering social ills of 20th century urban living.”(The Living Craigmillar Archives, 
2000) 
 
The decay of the area became apparent in almost all aspects and they reinforced each 
other. The historic statistics reveal the decreasing population, rising crime rates, poverty 
and concentration of low-income people, together with the physical decay. Rounds of 
public funding were devoted to reducing the social problems in this or that single issue, 
while the process seemed like a never-ending task without reward. After the “Right to 
Buy” schemes and the reform of other welfare provision in particular, the gap between 
Craigmillar and other Scottish neighbourhoods became larger than ever: the better-off 
residents moved away while families considered to be problem families from all parts of 
the city were re-located to the area. According to Scottish Government statistics, it is 
now considered to be the fourth most deprived area in Scotland (4th out of 1222 areas) 
and the No. 1 deprived area in the City of Edinburgh. 
 
4.1.2 Impacts of previous renewal/redevelopment practice 
 
Many British neighbourhoods have experienced one or many rounds of 
renewal/regeneration projects, but the effects of previous practice were seldom 
successful in escaping the exclusion process. In those areas which had experienced 
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property-led redevelopment, although some stakeholders did gain many benefits from 
the process, the promotion of the places did not usually fully capture the real needs of 
all local residents. In practice, the variety of disadvantaged groups, including 
low-educated or low-skilled labour, immigrants, elderly, disabled or single-parent 
families, were greatly marginalised from the local promotion process. The updating of 
industries, beautification of the local physical environment and the incoming flow of a 
richer population simultaneously brought rising housing prices and increased the daily 
cost of living to the local community. Most of the poor tenants who used to live in 
dilapidated conditions, could no longer afford the local cost of living after the 
redevelopment projects. The result was that they had to be relocated out of the 
“redeveloped, promoted or gentrified” neighbourhoods. Since the late 1980s, because of 
the deregulation of the housing market, the people evicted by the property-led 
redevelopment projects were sent to be concentrated in some specific geographic areas 
together with other losers of the socio-economic restructuring. That means that the 
majority of people suffering intolerable living conditions were not eliminated at all but 
were only relocated and concentrated in some more “invisible” neighbourhoods in cities. 
Most of these areas are the residual public housing estates on the peripheries of cities, 
which were mostly inheritance of the large scale “demolition and relocation” movement 
of the 1950s and 1960s, and then excluded by the property-led redevelopment projects 
in the 1980s (Forrest and Murie, 1983). 
 
In addition to the property-led redevelopment projects, in past decades there were also 
some regeneration projects which targeted more the promotion of social well-being 
rather than economic renaissance. They were either supported by public aid or based on 
self-organised community activities. These initiatives were usually carried out on a very 
limited scale and focused only on this or that specific problem, or return the exclusion 
in one or two aspects of the deprived urban neighbourhoods. However, the effects of 
these attempts were very similar to the over-marketised property-led redevelopment 
process: the approaches in this or that single domain might achieve short-term success, 
but this did little to help stop the decline in other aspects. Therefore, the vicious circle 
of “marginalisation-exclusion-decline” still occurred in these neighbourhoods. 
 
In the case of Craigmillar, several rounds of regeneration initiatives have already been 
launched in the past thirty years. Among them, the ideas and approaches of the 
self-organised “cultural-led regeneration” must be marked, which is closely linked to 
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the Craigmillar Festival Committee (called the Craigmillar Festival Society after 1970). 
The community-based organisation launched frequent community activities, pulling out 
local talent and staging a People’s Festival of music, drama, and the arts. Besides, many 
artists, politicians and researchers were attracted by the community arts; they soon 
formed a powerful partnership with local communities, and became dedicated to 
fighting to address the decline of local social well-being. As a result of this work, the 
area has gained some of the missing facilities and opportunities to enhance local 
services. Also, the activities enhanced the self-confidence of the people suffering 
deprivation, by encouraging them to undertake some public service themselves. The 
activities also encouraged local people who were trying to re-discover their lost local 
identity and spirituality, most of which was then transferred into useful 
recommendations for improving the quality of life in Craigmillar. 
 
However, the achievements of the community-based initiatives were still quite limited. 
Despite the high passion of self-driven social improvement movements, some 
fundamental problems of the multiple deprivations, such as unemployment, education, 
health and crime, could not really be solved by the community themselves. Many of the 
above problems were not new but longstanding and interactive. Many young people had 
to face this unequal treatment as soon as they were born in the community. After more 
than ten years of neo-liberal reform with the retreat of public services, the problem has 
become more significant. 
 
In earlier official documents produced by the New Labour government, as well as in 
some research reports by academicians (SEU, 1998; Carley, 2000), the tremendous 
costs of unsuccessful previous regeneration policy and practice around Britain have 
been described as follows: 
 
 “The failure to get to grips with the problems of the poorest neighbourhoods 
represents a costly policy failure. Public money has been wasted on programmes that 
were never going to work and generations of people living in poor neighbourhoods 
have grown up with the odds stacked against them. We are all paying for this failure, 
whether through the direct cost of benefits and crime, or the indirect costs of social 
division and low achievement.” (SEU, 1998, p. 5) 
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Furthermore, the following official documents (SEU, 2001b) summarised some 
significant lessons which should be learnt from the reasons behind the failures, as the 
follows: 
 
“Too much reliance was put on short-term regeneration initiatives in a handful of areas 
and too little was done about the failure of mainstream public services in hundreds of 
neighbourhoods. There was too little attention to the problems of worklessness, crime, 
and poor education and health services. Government failed to harness the knowledge 
and energy of local people, or empower them to develop their own solutions. There was 
a lack of leadership, and a failure to spread what works and encourage innovation.” 
(SEU, 2001b, p. 7) 
 
The critical overview of previous practice did provide some possible positive changes to 
the later new style of regeneration policy and practice in the New Labour era for the 
most deprived areas like Craigmillar. First, the new regeneration strategy with 
longer-term, holistic, mixed targets (across economic, social and other areas) must be 
carefully proposed. Second, the barriers between governmental departments should be 
broken. Also, the role of the local community in both decision making and 
implementation need to be further emphasised and the self-organised activities should 
be coordinated with the aid of incoming public funding and private capital from outside. 
 
4.2 New National Strategies 
 
Since New Labour came to power in 1997, regenerating the large number of 
neighbourhoods suffering multi-dimensional exclusion/deprivation has been regarded as 
one of the most significant topics of social policy. Hence, the new round of 
neighbourhood renewal (in England and Northern Ireland) policies and programmes 
was prepared. In Scotland and Wales, similar initiatives were named ‘community 
regeneration’ (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2001; Carley, 2002; DCLG, 2006; Scottish 
Executive, 2002, 2006). Based on previous experience and lessons, the new 
programmes were operated in more flexible ways. The objectives, involvement and 
mechanism of every programme varied from case to case. Central government also 
provided national frameworks to regulate all the schemes. 
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4.2.1 Deprivation indices 
 
In recent years, the UK government set up a series of official “deprivation indices” in 
order to measure rationally the extent of multiple deprivations (in a given area at a given 
time). They reflected the wide-range of “urban problems” currently found at the 
neighbourhood level. These are also used as references and a baseline to help selecting 
targeted neighbourhoods in future regeneration programmes, and to assess their 
effectiveness later. The indices cover several dimensions of deprivation, and each 
domain consists of a number of indicators. On 28 March, 2008, the DCLG published the 
newest version of English Indices of Deprivation 2007, which contains seven domains 
of deprivation as follows: 
• Income deprivation 
• Employment deprivation 
• Health deprivation and disability 
• Education, skills and training deprivation 
• Barriers to housing and services 
• Living environment deprivation 
• Crime 
 
In the 7 domains, 38 quantitative indicators have been selected to assess the multiple 
deprivations. Many of the indicators are very carefully issued from the perspective of 
“The Third Way”: trying to find out the “real” problems or difficulties that cause the 
deprivations rather than the consequences of the declines. For example, these data 
concern the equivalised income (excluding housing benefits) rather than the gross 
income to measure the income deprivation. The indicators used to measure health 
deprivation include the proportions of people with both physiological and psychological 
illnesses. Also, there are different indicators to measure the education and skill 
deprivation for both children/youth and the adults of working age respectively. 
 
In Scotland, the devolved government issued the Scottish Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation (SIMD) in 2004 and revised it in 2006. The domains and indicators to 
measure multiple deprivations are very similar to those of the English version, and the 
detailed indicators differ owing to the special circumstances, the various sizes of the 
neighbourhoods, or the availability of some data. Scotland is divided into 6,505 data 
zones, of which the total population ranges from 800 to 1000. With reference to the 
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indicators in each domain, there will be a score for each data zone and then a combined 
score will be calculated so that a rank for the 6,505 data zones will be obtained from the 
most deprived neighbourhood to the least. In Wales and Northern Ireland, the devolved 
governments have also published the corresponding indices suitable for their own 
national contexts. In general, all these British indices have only slight differences 
among each other. There are also different ways of combining the “overall deprivation 
scores” between them, but the basic idea of the evaluation process is the same: to make 
more integrated results. From Table 4-1 it is easy to find many similarities and 
differences. 
 
Table 4-1 The domains and percentage weights applied for the indices across the UK 
 
 England Northern Ireland Scotland Wales 
Income 22.5 25 28 25 
Employment 22.5 25 28 25 
Health 13.5 15 14 15 
Education 13.5 15 14 15 
Barriers to housing and services 9.3 - - 10 
Proximity to services - 10 - - 
Geographic access - - 9 - 
Housing - - 2 5 
Living environment 9.3 5 - - 
Physical environment - - - 5 




From the use of these indices, the complex “urban problems” now can be explored from 
a wider perspective than ever before. Also, the contents of the indicators and domains 
are usually revised every few years so that the quantitative data can better explore the 
most recent declines in the dynamic British context. Apart from the domains and 
indicators, some other factors potentially influence local living conditions but are not 
included. For example, the measurements of the cultural circumstances, the social 
networking of local residents, the community cohesion and so on are not usually listed, 
mainly because they are very difficult to assess in a quantitative way. However, it is 
very helpful to use them to capture real “local needs” for future regeneration 
programmes at a strategic level, and the missed issues of “local needs” could be 
remedied by other ways, for example, local participation and inter-sectoral cooperation. 
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In the case of Craigmillar, the multi-dimensional declines can be clearly shown by 
comparing the local data and those of other Scottish neighbourhoods according to the 
SIMD 2006 background data. As a very large-scale peripheral housing estate, 
Craigmillar contains 10 data zones, as shown in Figure 4-2. There is a rank for every 
data zone in each of the domains. Rank 1 means this is the most deprived (worst) data 
zone among the 6,505 cases around Scotland, while the larger number of the rank means 
a better result. The most recent result is listed in Table 4-2. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 The boundary of Craigmillar and the data zones 
Source: Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics (http://www.sns.gov.uk/) 
 
Table 4-2 The domain and overall ranking of data zones in Craigmillar 
 
















S01001906 804 2 1 1 118 1350 4371 18 4 
S01001935 762 61 34 20 132 1432 3584 1279 39 
S01001948 782 59 45 99 176 650 4532 270 54 
S01001956 778 937 745 827 650 1089 4901 3094 862 
S01001957 748 90 195 66 228 748 6044 279 103 
S01001966 827 137 267 186 85 675 5230 305 129 
S01001978 1058 74 298 233 186 1506 5301 2194 177 
S01001982 321 265 553 956 41 395 5054 1118 329 
S01002017 1106 134 91 131 91 837 4767 472 82 
S01002044 682 228 519 525 147 607 5510 3159 346 
Data source: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/SIMD/simdbackgrounddata2simd06 
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Table 4-3 below shows how large the gaps in these domains are between Craigmillar 
and the average level of the whole Edinburgh city and around Scotland, although some 
data could not be collected on the domains of health and crime. 
 
Table 4-3 Deprivation indicators comparison: Craigmillar, Edinburgh and Scotland 
 




All persons (2001) 7933 449020 5064200 
Child Population % (2001) 24.44 16.31 19.16 
Working Population % (2001) 59.79 65.94 62.20 
Pensionable Population % (2001) 15.77 17.75 18.64 
Economic Activity, Benefits and Tax Credits 
Percentage of total population who are income 
deprived: (2002) 53.1 11.8 15.0 
Percentage of working age population who are 
employment deprived (2002) 38.8 9.7 13.8 
Health 
Low weight live singleton birth rate per 1000 live 
singleton births (2000-2002) 42.37 21.68 24.39 
Percentage of children breastfeeding at the 6 to 8 week 
review (2004) 20.63 55.95 35.76 
Education, Skills and Training 
Average tariff score of Male pupils on the S4 roll 
(2004) 
120 166 162 
Average tariff score of Female pupils on the S4 roll 
(2004) 99 171 178 
Average tariff score of all pupils on the S4 roll (2004) 92 166 168 
Housing 
Percentage of dwellings in Council Tax band A (2003) 53.85 11.14 24.73 
Percentage of dwellings in Council Tax bands A to C 
(2003) 97.33 50.30 65.02 
Percentage of dwellings in Council Tax bands F to H 
(2003) 0.43 19.42 10.69 
Total number of dwellings per hectare (2003) 7.15 8.28 0.30 
Physical Environment 
Percentage of people within 0-500 metres of any 
Derelict Site (2004) 4.0 5.9 27.4 
Air Quality - Nitrogen Dioxide concentration - 
Population weighted (2002-2004) 18.2 21.8 - 
Air Quality - PM10 concentration - Population 
weighted (2002-2004) 13.9 14.4 - 
Data source: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/SIMD/simdbackgrounddata2simd06 
 
The data reveals the severe multiple deprivations in the Craigmillar area, where almost 
all data zones (except the zone of S01001956, narrowly missed) have fallen into the 
10% of the most deprived zones in Scotland. Although the data are quite new, some 
historic archives can also provide similar evidence that the linked socio-economic 
problems in Craigmillar have existed for several decades (The Living Craigmillar 
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Archives, 2000). Previous housing renewal projects have involved demolishing many 
unpopular high-rise blocks and refurbishing or reconstructing the lower-rise flats. Thus 
it can be seen from this table that the deterioration of housing and physical environment 
is not the most serious local problem, while the deprivations of income, employment, 
health and crime should be given higher priority. 
 
4.2.2 Regeneration visions and targets 
 
In the face of the severe multiple deprivations, the following neighbourhood 
regeneration initiatives were proposed which had clearer visions and targets than ever 
before. This is in order to fill previous “absence of effective national policies to deal 
with the structural causes of decline” (SEU, 1998), which was agreed as one essential 
lesson from past failures. 
 
At national level, the visions and targets are based on the commitments to respond to 
the deprivations in the several domains mentioned above. The only exception is that 
they do not include direct responses to the “income deprivation”. Actually the income 
issues in declined urban neighbourhoods were frequently over-emphasised in initiatives 
of past decades. The existing policies have successfully addressed the income exclusion 
in many ways, e.g. pension credits or income credit schemes. Thus, the new integrated 
targets in most national wide regeneration programmes do not include the direct 
economic aid to poverty but rather try to promote inclusion across all other domains of 
the multiple deprivations. 
 
In 2001, the SEU together with NRU published “A New Commitment to Neighbourhood 
Renewal: National Strategy Action Plan”, which indicated many details of the 
combined targets in proposed Neighbourhood Renewal programmes in England, as 
follows: 
 
Tackling worklessness and supporting weaker economies 
 
The major target in this domain is to present the national-wide “welfare to work” 
strategy through a series of policies, funding and programmes. The detailed objectives 
of the strategy consist of the following: enhancing regional economies; reducing tax of 
working households; encouraging local financial service and shops; application of 
  79
National Minimum Wage; further eliminating racial and sexual discrimination in the 
labour market; providing free childcare service (for working parents); and improvement 
of traffic (to access jobs). For all measurements, the key idea is to ensure that people 
who have the capability to work would be better off in employment rather than relying 




In order to create safer neighbourhoods in the long term, the regeneration targets must 
not only cut off the criminal or anti-social behaviour themselves, but also tackle the 
causes leading to social unrest. For example, in some specific programmes to address 
the severe threats of drug or alcohol abuse, more attention has been paid to events which 
educate the public, especially youth groups, rather than punishing the offenders. 
Meanwhile, more proposed attempts are not only being tackled by police forces, but 
also by community and voluntary groups working together. One typical example is the 
newly launched Neighbourhood Wardens schemes, in which local communities are 
encouraged to take more responsibility for keeping social order and enhancing cohesion 




The concept of “skills” here means lifelong learning across all areas and for all people 
in need of them. Besides the attempts to tackle under-achievement in schools, the 
programmes also address adult education and wider skills training. For children, the 
major objective is to ensure decent health and early learning service or financial aid to 
families with children in poverty. The regeneration approaches may cooperate with or 
be involved in the Sure Start programmes. For young people, returning to some form of 
bad behaviour, such as teenage pregnancy or student drop-out, has become the major 
objective, and for adults of working age, the series of training schemes has been applied 
to improve skills in favour of seeking for jobs, and also for personal intellect to be better 
involved in modern society. That may include the skills of using the internet, electronic 




Tackling poor health 
 
The most direct target is to keep improving the whole NHS system, especially in the 
deprived neighbourhoods. Besides, the further target is the encouragement of healthy 
lifestyles. Some attempts towards the latter objective have been made through 
community-led activities. The important cases include the Smoking-cessation services, 
National School Fruit Scheme, and also the free and nationally available translation and 
interpretation service which will be beneficial to many minor ethnic groups. 
 
Tackling poor housing and physical environment 
 
The schemes of housing and physical improvement may no longer be placed in very 
central roles as before. However, this is usually also very significant in local promotion, 
for the housing or physical changes may affect the living conditions in many other 
aspects. In recent years, the large scale physical renewal projects have gradually been 
displaced by smaller scale betterment approaches. Moreover, the improvement of the 
physical environment is not only restricted to aesthetic design, but also involves more 
consideration of ecological issues such as air quality, wildlife, waste and pollution, etc. 
 
In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the devolved governments have also published 
their own national visions corresponding to the English version. The majority of the 
contents are quite similar to the English strategy, and the slight differences show their 
unique national contexts (Table 4-4). 
 








1. Building strong, safe and attractive 
communities: preventing crime, 
reducing the fear of crime, reducing 
financial exclusion and multiple debts 
2. Getting people back into work: 
increasing employment 
3. Improving health 
4. Raising educational attainment: 
improving the confidence and skills 
5. Engaging young people 
1. Job and business 
2. Education and 
training 
3. Environment 
4. Health and well 
being 
5. Active community 
(empowerment) 







5. Physical environment 
including housing 
6. Community/recreation 
Source: Scottish Executive, 2004; Welsh Assembly Government, 2007; DSD (N Ireland), 2006 
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At local level, the regeneration visions and targets are certainly much more flexible, but 
almost all of them are not different from the nation-wide vision. In the case of 
Craigmillar, the overall regeneration targets were officially issued very late there being 
a number of separate regeneration programmes over the years. In 2005, the local 
regeneration outcome agreement was finally published, and indicated the major targets 
to be covered by the regeneration approaches in the following three years. The 
outcomes meet all of the 5 national priorities suggested by Scottish Executive, and 
added community engagement and capacity building as separate priorities to meet the 
specific local context. Table 4-5 below shows more details about the local targets 
according to the six strategic priorities. 
 
Table 4-5 Regeneration targets of Craigmillar (2005-2008) 
 
Strategic priorities Detailed local targets 
Priority 1  
Building strong, safe and 
attractive communities 
• New housing units are built that meet housing needs, ensure a diverse 
tenure mix and provide a high quality of environmental amenity. 
• Reduction in incidents of crime, the fear of crime and the effects of 
anti-social behaviour. 
Priority 2 
Getting people back into 
work 
• More unemployed and people ‘far from labour market’ come off benefits 
and into jobs. 
• A sustainable local economy is developed 
• Expansion of retail, office, business and work space 
Priority 3 
Improving health 
• More people experience physical wellbeing 




• Schools, parents and carers work together to ensure the attainment level 
of all learners continuously improves. 
• More people participate in adult learning courses and classes and receive 
effective educational guidance 
Priority 5  
Engaging young people 
• Significant increase in young people, especially socially excluded, 
accessing mainstream resources, community based learning opportunities 
and intercultural exchanges 
• All young people are supported in making the transition from school into 
FE, HE or work 
Priority 6 
Community engagement 
and capacity building 
• Having strong, effective local forums for special interest groups and 
community representation 
• Building strong, effective community organizations 
• The whole community is fully informed about local issues and 
participates in local decision making 





4.2.3 Institutional innovations and local community engagement 
 
In the New Labour era, some institutional changes have been innovatively created for 
the better operation of the new regeneration initiatives. The changes try to break the 
bureaucratic and fragmented system in charge of public service provision and previous 
neighbourhood renewal projects. In the immediate post-war years, the large-scale 
slum-clearance projects in British cities were normally undertaken by the housing 
executives of local authorities. In the 1960s, the Urban Programmes and other initiatives 
targeting social unrest were the responsibility of the Home Office and then the 
Department of Environment. In the 1980s, public-private partnerships became widely 
used to operate the property-led redevelopment initiatives, such as UDCs to enlarge and 
enhance cooperation among different stakeholders, but the involvement was still limited 
and local authorities and community were greatly sidelined from the system. Nowadays, 
it is clear that, in order to stop the multi-faced decay across so many aspects, the new 
programmes should be operated based on enhanced parallel cross-departmental 
coordination, and also vertical cooperation between central, regional and local levels. 
 
Thus in central government, the New Labour politicians decided to set up the 
cross-departmental unit to take charge of the wide-ranging regeneration issues. In 
England, almost all proposed new regeneration initiatives came under the direction of 
the “Social Exclusion Unit” (SEU). This unit was launched in December 1997 to 
provide joined-up solutions to multiple deprivation. It is set in the Cabinet Office and 
operates under the direct leadership of the Prime Minister. The aim was to break down 
the bureaucratic barriers among governmental departments and deliver the joined-up 
thinking for national-wide regeneration strategies. In May 2002, this unit was reset as a 
part of the newly established Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) and then 
Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Since 2001, the SEU had 
started working cooperatively with the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU), which is 
another part of ODPM/DCLG and responsible for overseeing central government’s 
comprehensive neighbourhood renewal strategy. Over the years, a series of official 
reports has been completed and issued by them as official statements to demonstrate the 
understanding, the policy priority and practical guidance of the new generation of 
national-wide regeneration programmes. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
following devolution, the new governments also established specific agencies and 
issued similar documents to direct the new regeneration programmes within their own 
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boundaries, sooner or later. 
 
At a local level, in almost all disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the setting up of the 
widely-involved local partnerships was encouraged, in order to deal with most of the 
affairs associated with area-based regeneration initiatives. Although there is not a 
universal recommended structure of the partnerships, the involvement of local 
partnerships is usually much wider than before. Normally, public agencies, including all 
relative governmental departments at central, regional and local levels, and private 
developers, as well as other local voluntary organisations and representatives of local 
communities, together form committees to decide the overall strategy for local 
regeneration and a series of the following detailed approaches. The partnership should 
exist in the long term, remaining in charge of monitoring, evaluating and revising the 
strategy regularly. Every stakeholder should have an equal right in the decision making 
and work together to operate the proposed approaches through cooperation and 
negotiation. Every local regeneration partnership could also cooperate with other 
partnerships in other areas or on larger scales. 
 
In Craigmillar, the first such partnership was established in 1996 when the first local 
regeneration project beyond housing renewal (“Priority Partnership Area”) was started. 
In April 2000, the involvement of the partnership was enlarged and the organisation was 
renamed the ‘Craigmillar Partnership’, which began independently to take more 
responsibility in the setting up of the overall strategy for regeneration. Besides 
promoting the strategic visions for future regeneration outcomes, the daily work of the 
Craigmillar Partnership is to get all the public, private and voluntary participants 
working together by negotiation in regular board meetings. Currently, the members of 
the Board of Directors are representatives of the following different groups: 
• Local council (chair) 
• City of Edinburgh Council 
• Four community representatives 
• Scottish Enterprise, Edinburgh and Lothian 
• NHS Lothian 
• South East Edinburgh Local Health Care Co-op 
• Private Sector 
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The Board sets out the main priorities of the long-term complex regeneration process. 
Day-to-day work is carried out through a series of sub groups and supporting teams. 
Through the partnership organisation, all stakeholders can hereby have equal access to 
relevant information about the regeneration process. In 2003/04, 35% of those attending 
sub-groups were from the voluntary sector, 38% from City of Edinburgh Council and 
other statutory bodies, and 20% were community representatives, with another 7% from 
the private sector (Craigmillar Partnership, 2005a). 
 
Besides, the partnership also set out a series of targets to further encourage community 
engagement in Craigmillar. The outcomes may include the following: 
 
• Having strong and effective community representation: to ensure community 
representatives having consulting and voting rights on local decision-making 
bodies for any strategic thinking and proposal applications. 
• Having significant influence on local issues: to ensure that effective consultation 
takes place with the community on important local affairs, and people should 
say they think their views have been taken into account by post-consultation 
surveys. 
• The community is fully informed about local issues: to ensure that a high 
percentage of local people read the Craigmillar Chronicle regularly, and they are 
informed and aware of resources available in time, in various ways. 
• Having strong, effective local forums for special interest groups: public support 
will be provided in forming these organisations, especially the vulnerable 
groups. 
• Encouraging individuals to attend community activities and voluntary work: 
tailored, off-the-shelf training courses and workshops will be set up to help local 
people to improve their relevant skills in order to participate in these activities. 
• Enhancing local people’s communication and influence to outsiders: to 
encourage local people to attend or participate in city-wide and national 
meetings and networks. 
 
Many existing research reports have shown very positive records of the successful 
community engagement in Craigmillar (Pawson et al., 2000; Fioretti, 2007). The 
community representatives and other local organisations, such as the Craigmillar 
Regeneration Forum and the Craigmillar District Business Association, have truly been 
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actively involved in the consultation and decision-making process for some important 
action plans, for example the Craigmillar Urban Design Framework completed in 2004 
(Davies, 2004). Many innovative suggestions from representatives’ own perspectives 
have been taken into account in helping to reach the regeneration targets by the most 
“appropriate” ways. The successes may have benefited from the tradition of its long 
history of community spirit within the activities of the arts. However, the engagement 
and influence of the local community in the regeneration process sometimes appears 
“slower than ideal” (Craigmillar Partnership, 2005b). It seems the fragmentation of 
ownership of propery is threatening the incisiveness of tenants’ participation, which 
may mean that they are not as involved as much as they should be and this could lead to 
problems in the future (Fioretti, 2007). 
 
4.3 New Deals and Programmes 
 
A series of new deals and programmes has been put into practice to embrace the 
national regeneration commitments. In England, the list of the relative programmes is 
very long: New Deal for Communities, Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders, 
coalfield regeneration, Health Action Zones, community cohesion initiatives, Housing 
Market Renewal Pathfinders, Crime and Disorder Partnerships, Neighbourhood Warden 
Schemes, Sure Start programmes for children under five years old and some other 
smaller sports and arts schemes also with regenerative objectives. All the programmes 
clearly show the application of the New Labour ideologies against the 
multi-dimensional exclusion, and well reflect the true scale of how the problems are 
being addressed: “…not the tens but the hundreds of severely deprived 
neighbourhoods …; not just on housing and the physical fabric of neighbourhoods, but 
the fundamental problems of worklessness, crime and poor public services – poor 
schools, too few GPs and policing …; hundreds of billions of pounds spent by the key 
Government departments (in a longer term), rather than relying on one-off regeneration 
spending (for a short term).” (Blair, 2001, p. 5)  
 
4.3.1 Nation-wide deals 
 
Although almost every nation-wide programme now strictly follows its national 
regeneration strategy, it does not mean that all the new initiatives will be operated by 
following an invariable model. It is expected that the launch of a universal strategy will 
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just present the general ideas, or propose some possible or optional approaches, as a 
reference in coordination of a variety of single programmes in regeneration areas. In 
practice, following a universal framework the strategic approaches can be interpreted 
into very detailed actions to match the local context. The programmes of the “New Deal 
for Communities” (NDC) in England are a typical example of this. 
 
The NDC now is widely regarded as the most significant “flagship programme” to push 
the new style regeneration process by New Labour’s ideologies. The NDC programme 
covers 39 neighbourhoods with an average population of 4000, and each of those can 
receive approximately £50 million guaranteed funding for (at least) ten years. The 
resources allocated to the deprived communities are greater than those of the most 
previous single regeneration programmes. Although a recent report (CRESR, 2005) 
showed that the NDC programme could “never make a major dent in neighbourhood 
deprivation across the country” because only 1/20 people living in deprived areas are 
involved in this programme, it still can be regarded, however, as pilot approaches, since 
too few lessons have actually been learned during previous programmes. 
 
One significant feature of the NDC programmes is the longer-term commitment to 
deliver real transformative changes to disadvantaged communities. This reflects the 
acceptance that the poorest areas are facing multiple deprivations and entrenching the 
combination of social and economic problems. The NDC programme no longer aims to 
provide public aid in the traditional way, but provides opportunities to improve the 
capability of the communities (i.e. enabling people to do more for themselves). Thus the 
longer-term commitment and stable funding for ten years (total cost of £2 billion of 
each) may be a realistic cycle to achieve the in-depth changes. 
 
The anticipated outcomes are spread across a wide range of themes, including: 
reduction in crime, raising the level of educational achievement, improvement of health, 
promotion of housing and physical environment, and actions to increase employment 
opportunities. Although housing improvement should still hold a central role in the 
delivery plans of the NDC, it was actually put down behind the other issues. This may 
be in order to return the strategies which over-emphasised the housing-dominated 
programmes and the logic of “place-based” initiatives.  
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A series of practical approaches in the five areas has been outlined in the delivery plans 
for every year, and covered a very wide range of local problems. The major projects 
may include the following (Table 4-6): 
 
Table 4-6 The practical projects of NDC programmes 
 
Projects for Housing and Physical Environmental Improvement 
• Environmental improvement project 
• Physical redevelopment 
• Green, open spaces and parks 
• Housing maintenance, redevelopment and new 
builds  
• Transport – public, community and related  
• Play grounds/areas 
• Housing management/services 
• Neighbourhood management and/or centre 
• Community facility 
• Master plan 
• Property acquisition and demolition 
• Road improvements and safety 
Projects for Employment, Finance and Enterprise 
• Business support and development 
• New businesses/self employment 
• Training scheme/support 
• Advice, support or information and/or centres 
• Childcare related project 
• ILM project 
• Skills training programme 
• Vocational training/support 
• ICT strategy/project 
• Construction industry related 
project/initiative 
Projects for Health 
• Leisure, sport or exercise project/facility 
• Health improvement/promotion activities 
• Drug/ alcohol abuse project/worker/services 
• Health services availability/accessibility 
• Theme development/staff 
• Mental health project 
• Food & nutrition project 
• Older people’s project 
• Family support 
• Healthy Living Centre and related 
• Alternative and complementary medicine 
• Teenage pregnancy project 
Projects for Crime and Disorder 
• Police increase numbers & activity 
• Wardens/street concierge service 
• CCTV 
• Safety project 
• Domestic violence worker/project 
• Drug/alcohol abuse project/worker/services 
• Security project – domestic 
• Youth Inclusion Programme 
• Street lighting 
• Environmental improvement project 
• Security project – non-domestic 
Projects for Education 
• Educational support 
• Educational attainment project 
• Family learning/support project 
• After school/early morning/holiday clubs 
• ICT strategy/project 
• School maintenance, new builds and extensions 
• Early learning/pre-school learning and Sure 
Start 
• Theme development/staff 
• Educational facility 
• Other 
• School and related support programme or 
project 
• Pupil support 
• Transition support project 
Source: CRESR, 2005 
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4.3.2 Local actions 
 
In practice, many programmes in accordance of the national regeneration strategy had 
already begun and had operated for many years before the publication of the national 
strategy. In most British neighbourhoods, besides those programmes initiated by central 
government, more regeneration actions have been launched by local authorities, 
voluntary organisations, enterprises, communities, or all of them jointly. But now the 
launch of the national strategy really emphasises better coordination among the actions 
at “neighbourhood” level. Here the concept of “neighbourhood” is pragmatic in 
definition but at the same time also a proxy for “community”. Usually a 
“neighbourhood” should have such boundaries established by roads, changes in housing 
tenure or design, catchment areas for primary schools and shops, or areas defined by 
transport links (SEU, 2001b, p. 13); each of these neighbourhoods normally contains 
several thousand people. The reasons for the selected scale are two folds: first, such a 
“neighbourhood” could well correspond to electoral wards where both statistical 
information and local political support can be more readily supplied; and second, on 
such a scale, many behavioural programmes would be easier to offer, including the job 
training for adults and school leavers, the improvement of school education, and the 
approaches to diminish the number of crimes and level of anti-social behaviour (Pierson 
and Worley, 2005). 
 
Since Craigmillar is one of the most typical Scottish neighbourhoods to suffer the 
multiple deprivations, all the recent regeneration approaches have also been summarised 
in the published Regeneration Outcome Agreement by the local partnership (Table 4-7). 
These actions have covered all the regeneration priorities proposed by Scottish national 











Table 4-7 Regeneration approaches of Craigmillar (2005-2008) 
 
Strategic priorities Detailed local targets 
Priority 1 
Building strong, safe 
and attractive 
communities 
• Re-build Wauchope Square, Niddrie Mains and Greendykes  
• Use and maintain green spaces well 
• Community Concierges continue to cover neighbourhoods of Niddrie Mains, 
Niddrie Marischal and Niddrie House 
• 6 Police Officers continue to be deployed in Safer Communities Unit 
• Anti-social Behaviour Neighbourhood Agreement launched and regularly 
monitored by landlord and tenant signatories 
Priority 2 
Getting people back 
into work 
• Employment access advice to: 1) 500 clients per year; 2) 300 new clients per 
year; 3) Place 184 clients into work; 4) Provide 20 pre-vocational and 
vocational courses per year; 5) Provide 350 affordable childcare places. 
• Business development support to start-ups and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) and encouragement to local employment 
• Build new supermarket, office block, business centre and work space units 
Priority 3  
Improving health 
• Healthy eating food stalls, cafes and classes 
• Physical activity programmes 
• Smoking cessation services 
• Alcohol reduction services 
• Sexual health programmes 
• Providing social, lunch and day clubs for 65 older people and 60 children 
with special needs or learning disabilities 
• Phone 180 elderly and people with mental health problems every morning 
and evening 
• 480 counselling sessions per year for women 




• Regular information and action meetings with parents  
• Implement Curriculum developments 
• Use facilities and expertise of others to support a wide-ranging curriculum 
• Increase number of staff with guidance skills 
• Programmes to remove barriers to learning 
• More people participate in adult learning courses and classes and receive 
effective educational guidance 
Priority 5 
Engaging young people 
• Change existing services to remove barriers to access  
• Provide outreach and streetwork 
• Exchanges and study visits 
• Programmes for School to FE transition 





• Using staff and resources to support the start-up and maintenance of local 
forum, networks and representative bodies 
• Providing training for local volunteers and staff 
• Wide use of different media for informing community 
Source: Craigmillar Partnership, 2005a 
 
Some of the above programmes can be seen as the continuity of early regeneration 
projects, especially the work on housing redevelopment, refurbishment and physical 
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improvement. For example, the refurbishment projects of council housing funded by 
City Council of Edinburgh started in the 1980s, and since the 1990s more private 
investments and the funds from central government have been involved. The major 
changes of housing conditions in Craigmillar can now be summarised as follows: 
 
• Housing density reduction: through the demolition of some unpopular tower and 
multi-storey blocks, and redevelop the lower-rise blocks. 
• Tenure transformation and diversification: a proportion of the public housing stocks 
were transferred to privately owned or housing association units. 
• Refurbishment and improvement: some old housing buildings were then updated in 
both the images and the indoor and outdoor facilities. 
• Mixed new development: the newly-developed housing units are mostly constructed 
with other facilities such as shops or entertainment units, and many of the new 
housing units are for rent. 
 
Another factor to be noted is that many approaches listed above are linked to the 
relocation project of Edinburgh Royal Infirmary. The new construction at Little France, 
just neighbouring the area of Craigmillar, not only hosts the largest hospital in 
Edinburgh (previously located in the city centre) but also includes the development of 
the healthcare academy, the adjacent bio-medical research centre, the provision of 
high-quality parkland and the physical road linking to the hospital. That brings a great 
number of job opportunities to local residents, and also promotes the new housing 
development in Craigmillar. The residents of Craigmillar can also benefit from the 




This chapter introduced and analysed in details the most recent British neighbourhood 
regeneration initiatives. Compared with previous practice, the most recent regeneration 
process is really characterised by many new features. Almost all of the new features are 
closely associated with the new understanding of current “urban problems” from the 
perspective of “The Third Way”. Thus, the new regeneration initiatives now directly 
target the multiple deprivations in the declining neighbourhoods which were not 
eliminated by previous projects. A series of deprivation indices were officially issued to 
measure in a more rational and comprehensive way the extent of the deprivation in 
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several domains. Based on that, the targets were then proposed to reduce the 
deprivations in every domain, one by one, in a very pragmatic way. Most new changes 
were expected to be achieved through active and long-term interventional approaches. 
In order to implement the new-style regeneration programmes more smoothly, some 
institutional changes have been created to facilitate the vertical and parallel cooperation 
and community engagement. The practice in the following years shows that the new 
generation of regeneration process now truly covers a very wide range of issues and is 
operated in a very flexible way. 
 
  92
Chapter 5 British Experiences and Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter aims to summarise valuable research findings on neighbourhood renewal 
or regeneration in British cities. As the discussion in chapters 2 to 4 showed, the ideas, 
policy, and initiatives of neighbourhood renewal/regeneration have experienced a long 
history of development. In every historical period, the objectives, approaches, 
mechanisms and effects of the projects or programmes differ, but the historical legacy 
was a valuable experience which provided lessons for later development. In most recent 
years, some new changes have reflected the re-examination of previous policy and 
practice. With the support of new political ideologies, such as “The Third Way”, a new 
national strategy was launched together with a series of institutional innovations. New 
programmes now aim to achieve integrated, long-term improvement of the 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The practice in Craigmillar is one typical case. Based 
on such a historical overview, this chapter will conclude the findings on the British 
experience, including: 1) an overall development trajectory of the evolution, in an 
attempt to highlight the essential elements of neighbourhood renewal process in any 
period; 2) universal criteria to evaluate rationally the neighbourhood renewal process. 
This means the following questions will be answered in turn:  
• What is the changing trend of neighbourhood renewal idea, policy and practice 
in British cities?  
• What were/are the effects of the neighbourhood renewal projects/programmes? 
• What are the nature and essential elements of the neighbourhood renewal 
process? 
• How can one evaluate the process in different contexts? 
The answers to the three questions will form the analytical framework to review and 
evaluate the renewal practice in China in the following chapters. 
 
5.1 Development Trajectory of Neighbourhood Renewal in Britain 
 
In most developed Western countries like Britain, the majority of the population have 
resided in urban neighbourhoods since the years soon after the Industrial Revolution. 
The urban areas became dynamic. Spatial, economic, social and other changes were 
significantly accelerated and the changes occurred together and interactively. The sum 
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of all the changes can be regarded as the “neighbourhood renewal” process. But the 
involvement of this term may be very uncertain and diverse in different historical and 
local contexts. From a macro-scale perspective, the policy and practice associated with 
the renewal process in Britain have always shifted with the alternative socio-economic 
circumstances and the mainstream political ideologies. Therefore, the historical review 
of the progressive development trajectory of British renewal/regeneration policy and 
practice can be divided into four eras: 1) the early Capitalist (laissez-faire) era, which 
began after the Industrial Revolution, reached its peak in the mid-19th century and ended 
in the first half of the 20th century; 2) the social-democratic era, which emerged in the 
early 20th century, was politically established after the Second World War and ended in 
the late 1970s; 3) the neo-liberal era, which began in the early 1980s and then was 
gradually replaced by a series of changes towards the renewal of social democracy; 4) 
the New Labour era, formally started after the 1997 General Election. 
 
In the existing research about neighbourhood renewal/regeneration in British cities, 
there are fewer references to the practice in the early Capitalist era. This is because 
during this period, almost none of the initiatives was led by the government and the 
approaches were not interventional, which is very different from the practice in the later 
eras. However, in this period, the urban changes were quite extensive and the 
consequences were that the typical Victorian industrial cities which eventually resulted 
in dirty, crowded neighbourhoods with a range of social problems, became the most 
significant problems which the renewal projects in following years aimed to eliminate. 
Therefore the close linkage between the early and later initiatives should not be ignored, 
and they should be discussed together. 
 
In the early Capitalist era, the significant changes in the built environment alongside 
with the high-speed development of the profit-led growth projects emerged based on 
two major pre-conditions: 1) The sanctity of private real property was strictly protected 
by law so usually what any landowner or landlord chose to do with their properties 
tended to be regarded as a private matter. There were few interventions from the public 
authorities to restrict any private-initiated renewal projects in British cities, unless the 
projects affected other private properties. 2) In the 18th and 19th centuries, when the 
Industrial Revolution brought massive growth of urban-based industries, the economic 
potential of urban land or properties increased greatly. Thus many of the existing urban 
neighbourhoods with low construction density or outdated functional buildings became 
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less profitable. This is why they were seen as the target neighbourhoods with “urban 
problems”, and required to be renewed. Almost all the renewal projects then were 
private-led. The new construction greatly increased local density to gain quantitative 
growth of properties in old neighbourhoods, and in later years most of the renewal 
process was linked with technological revolution or industry restructuring. For example, 
some traditional residential neighbourhoods were transformed to industrial estates, and 
then to retailing units and offices when the profit obtainable per unit kept rising. Also, 
the value of most properties increased significantly, with the improvement of local 
accessibility to modern transport networking. As a result, the economic efficiency of 
land use and property development increased greatly in the market. The profit came not 
only from the wealth of local properties, but also the increased revenue brought by the 
goods and service created in the renewed neighbourhoods. The neighbourhood renewal 
became a process for accumulating wealth for the private landlords and developers. 
During the process, most of the public interests, for example the promotion of public 
health or general housing conditions to the working classes, were usually sidelined. 
Although some possible approaches to improve social well-being had been proposed, 
they were usually excluded in the market-led practice. 
 
In the social democratic era, almost all neighbourhood renewal initiatives were 
promoted by the public sector. The market-dominated renewal model and uncontrolled 
expansion of industrial use in the laissez-faire era was criticised and seen as the cause of 
the problems. The “urban problems” were re-defined, and the causes were related to the 
lack of state intervention to target the poor housing, the unbalanced demand and supply 
of the property market and the lack of non-for-profit public infrastructure. In theory, the 
identification of the “urban problems” should have been very wide-ranging, but only the 
“most visible problems” were emphasised in practice, which included the shortage of 
affordable dwellings with modern facilities for the working classes, a dilapidated city 
image with war damage in immediate post-war years, and social unrest in later decades. 
More neighbourhood renewal projects then were operated directly by the 
newly-strengthened public authorities, in an effort to provide quicker and more effective 
measurements to address the severe “urban problems”. During this process, the decision 
making was usually highly controlled by governmental agencies, and the 
implementation strictly followed a top-down bureaucratic way, with only very limited 
local participation and accountability. The role of private developers and others was 
restricted to a great extent in this era. 
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In the late 1970s, the focus of “urban problems” was turned to economic issues, 
including the industrial decline, depopulation of inner-city areas and redistribution of 
economic activities rather than environmental and social concerns. It could be argued 
that the causes behind the decline were closely associated with the too strong state 
intervention in urban economy, which led to the rapid increase of public expenditure 
and the delay of industrial restructuring. Hence a series of new policies and approaches 
was launched to focus on the economic renaissance and promote development in 
specific geographic areas. The roles of private capital and the free market were 
re-emphasised. Many new attempts for economic deregulation and re-stimulating 
private investment were combined with new neighbourhood renewal projects, for 
example encouragement of new property development in city centres and waterfront 
areas. The interventional approaches continued to exist, but their aims experienced a 
U-turn: from restricting private-led development to facilitating it. In many cases, the 
local authorities were excluded from the renewal process, while central government and 
private capital formed a union through the public-private partnership. Public subsidies 
came directly from central level to private developers. Tax breaks and the reduction in 
planning and other regulatory controls were also used to encourage private developers 
to invest in the economically disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods. As the result, 
economic renaissance was promoted through the property-led redevelopment process. 
The promotion of social well-being was also involved in the targets of most projects, 
but in practice was given less priority than economic regeneration. 
 
In the most recent era, the neighbourhood renewal practice became a more complex 
process. Although the market-oriented projects in the previous period did create 
economic prosperity in some specific locations, the costs in social polarisation were 
great, both nationwide and for individual cases. The benefits of the economic 
renaissance were often restricted to ‘trickle-down’ impacts. Many urban 
neighbourhoods still experienced a self-sustaining downward spiral of decline, and did 
not benefit from economic growth. The instances of economic, social and physical 
decay interacted with each other, so rounds of single regeneration approaches failed to 
halt this downward cycle. Therefore, the new generation of policy-makers had to rethink 
and redefine the real “urban problems” as multiple deprivation resulting in social 
exclusion, based on the updated central-left political notions – The Third Way. The 
terms ‘multiple deprivation’ and ‘social exclusion’ are very broad, and their local 
interpretations could vary a lot. This means that t
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process are sufficiently varied and flexible to cover the diverse problems. There was 
also a shift away from short-term projects to longer term programmes of regeneration. 
Thus the newest regeneration programmes were all under a comprehensive national 
strategy with integrated objectives, but the detailed targets and plans relied on local 
decision. Also, the regeneration process was encouraged to be under the governance of 
wide-ranged partnerships with more stakeholders. The increased involvement of 
stakeholders, especially the enhanced role of local communities, together with better 
cooperation and coordination among all sectors, are seen as an effective way to ensure 
that the decision-making and implementation could achieve the real integrated approach 
to locally identified problems. 
 
In historical terms, the development trajectory of neighbourhood renewal/regeneration 
in Britain has experienced several ideological shifts. The mainstream ideas always alter 
between left-wing and right-wing opinions, just as in the 1st (the laissez-faire era) and 
3rd (neo-liberalist era) era, discussed above, the economic prosperity was given higher 
priority, but in the 2nd (social democratic era) and 4th (New Labour era) era the emphasis 
on social justice was reinforced. This does not imply that the history repeats itself, but 
takes a progressive spiral upward. In practice, by drawing on the lessons learned in the 
eras before, the new approaches should learn a valuable legacy from the past and 
eliminate the shortcomings of previous attempts. In every new shift towards either right 
or left ideologies, the new ideas always try not to follow the past or pursue extreme 
policies like before. Finally, the most recent ideas and approaches aim to maintain a 
better balance among different issues in such a complex process, so as to reflect the 
dynamic process in multi-faceted urban development, and sustain improvement in the 
future. 
 
5.2 Evaluation of Neighbourhood Renewal in Britain 
 
5.2.1 Early capitalist era 
 
As the beginning era of the long evolution of urban neighbourhood renewal in Britain, 
the renewal process in the early Capitalist era followed a very simple logic. The 
objective of the renewal initiatives was just to serve the interest of private developers to 
increase profits, nothing more. Thus the criteria to measure the “successful” practice 
could also be very simple: just to assess the ratio of profit to its investment for 
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developers. In practice, in order to maximise the profit, the renewal process usually 
developed together with the technological revolution or industry restructuring, which 
could bring very comprehensive updating and promotion of the old neighbourhoods. 
Thus, after several rounds of urban development initiated by private investments, by the 
mid 19th century, British cities occupied the leading position in industrial technologies 
in the world, and gained tremendous wealth from the long-term prosperous national 
economy. After more than a century of market-led development, the less economical 
land use, which had been defined as the previous “urban problems”, had virtually 
disappeared. This should at least be attributed partially to the efforts of the market-led 
renewal process. 
 
However, the product of renewal projects also reflected the negative subsequence of 
fierce competition in the market in the early Capitalist era. The gap between the 
demands of private capital and public social needs increased greatly. In the mid 19th 
century, just when the British cities dominated the world economic system, they also 
had the worst slums in the world (Hall, 2002). As a result of new industrial cities like 
Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Sheffield and Newcastle, in many working class 
neighbourhoods the market-led renewal from medieval neighbourhoods provided only 
highly crowded housing units for the majority of ordinary urban residents, with a 
scarcity of fresh air, sunlight and sanitary facilities (Engels, 1872; Tarn-Lund, 1971). It 
could be argued that the market-led uncontrolled renewal projects resulted in more 
negative than positive effects for most urban residents. Gaudie (1974) put forward the 
major reasons for the emergence of the new problems: 1) low level of knowledge of the 
industrial-led urbanisation and its potential problems by public and governments; 2) the 
over-dominant economic philosophy of minimum state intervention; 3) poor political 
power of the working classes who suffered the most problems and 4) limited duty and 
available resources of public authorities.  
 
Since the mid 19th century, many pioneer socialists have been aware of the emergence 
of new “urban problems” in the developed industrial cities in Britain, including the lack 
of “decent” housing stock which threatened public health, as well as the poor physical 
environment and absence of non-for-profit infrastructures or other public facilities. 
However, these ideas were seldom widespread and the following effective 
countermeasures in practice were very limited (Couch, 1990; Sutcliffe, 1974; Burnett, 
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1978). This meant that the complex nature of “urban problems” was just beginning to be 
understood. 
 
5.2.2 Social-democratic era 
 
In the first half of the 20th century, the poor living conditions of most urban residents 
and the disordered physical appearance of industrial cities, which initially emerged as 
the mainstream “urban problems” of the mid 19th century, became more widely 
recognised. The situation was worsened by war damage and the economic recession. 
There was therefore strong impetus for the public-led programmes to replace the 
market-led model as the mainstream mechanism for neighbourhood renewal in British 
cities.  
 
With strong state intervention, the public authorities worked effectively to achieve 
positive changes in a short period of time. Within decades, the public-led renewal 
projects had brought a significant increase of housing provision to eliminate housing 
shortage, with the improvement of urban infrastructure and modernisation of many 
public facilities. Also, the promoted social improvements were more equally distributed 
to everyone in the nation. Most researchers sang high praise about the process for its 
very significant positive changes to address the urgent “urban problems” in the post-war 
British cities (Hall, 2002; Couch, 2003; Dunleavy, 1981). 
 
However, the short-term success was contrasted with serious cost in later long-term 
development programmes or projects. With the changing socio-economic circumstances 
and the newly emerged “inner city problems”, there came more and more critical 
comments from researchers, planners, officials and residents to the “direct 
interventionist renewal” (Lawless, 1979; 1988; DoE, 1977a; 1977b; 1977c). In the years 
after the 1960s, it became difficult for the public-led schemes to continue to meet the 
increasing social needs as a result of the depressed national economy. The potential 
ability in urban development by private developers, other organisations and individuals, 
was ignored or marginalised for a number of years. Also, the top-down approaches, 
with increasingly centralised decision making and limited local participation, seemed no 
longer able to work effectively to meet the real local needs in a fast changing society 
displaying greater diversity. Social democracy’s intention of “benefits to people” in 
urban policies should have been supported by “power to people”, but on many 
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occasions, with the top-down model it could become “power over people, power to 
state” (Thatcher, 1986). Many real social needs, especially some newly-emerging 
problems such as the economic depression and declining population in the decayed 
communities, were still far from being eradicated. That is to say, the great achievements 
in improvement of the “visible” living conditions, mostly associated with physical 
changes, were only in appearance, whilst many other social and economic problems, 
such as unemployment, crime and poverty which might be hidden behind the physical 
problems but were significant to individuals’ lives, were only transferred from previous 
slums to the renewed neighbourhoods, with altered manifestation (Roberts and Sykes, 
2000; Jacobs, 1961; Gibson and Langstaff, 1982). 
 
In the later years of the social-democratic era, some specific schemes to address these 
social or economic problems were launched as early experiments. However, under the 
same top-down structure and without clear strategies, the real effects of the fragmented 
approaches, some with substantial support from public expenditure, were extremely 
limited (Loney, 1983). In all, during the whole of the social democratic era, the 
understanding of “urban problems” then was still simplified and unilateral, but in later 
years it developed to focus on wider-ranged problems, particularly those that were 
“invisible” or “non-physical” but very significant. However, the mechanism to operate 
the problem-solving approaches was still associated with the simplified top-down 
bureaucratic system, and usually failed to cover the diverse and dynamic local needs in 
post-modern British society. 
 
5.2.3 Neo-liberal era 
 
The series of new attempts, as the “property-led redevelopment process” initiated by 
private developers in collaboration of central government in the 1980s, replaced the 
public-led, top-down controlled renewal model. The “redevelopment” initiatives placed 
economic renaissance as the prime target. This reflected the lack of investment, and 
depression of the local economy had been recognised as a cause of the “urban 
problems” in this new era. This means that the policy makers had been aware of some 
of the “invisible” causes behind the urban decay. The other problems in environmental 
and social aspects were also noticed, but they were not considered as crucial by the 
Conservative government, who argued that successful economic revival would create a 
“trickle-down” of wealth into local communities and that all would benefit (DoE, 1985). 
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In practice, the series of property-led redevelopment or similar schemes, such as UDCs, 
EZs and City Challenges, did successfully promote positive changes: almost all 
academic and official evaluation admitted that the Thatcherite approaches had truly 
rediscovered the great potential of the market to deliver new economic growth, and it 
was argued that this was more crucial for the neighbourhood renaissance but had been 
ignored by the social democratic approach. Several years later, some new 
redevelopment projects did bring “new life” into the selected urban neighbourhoods, 
mostly in inner-city areas. The evidence of the success included not only the recreation 
of polished urban appearance, but also the strong reviving of the urban economics since 
the middle of the 1980s. Such great achievements as the consequence of more than ten 
years of new right-wing urban policies and practice ensured that the voice of market 
could not be minimised again. Most of the innovative approaches applied during the 
period, such as the reduction of public subsidies, tax breaks and deregulation of 
development control, have been retained by the present government. 
 
Another legacy of Thatcherism is the successful application of the “public-private 
partnership”. The Thatcherite government had overseen the massive restructuring of 
British public authorities, thus breaking the post-war social democratic consensus as 
machines to restrict the private development, and fundamentally altered them to 
facilitate economic growth by private investments in the market (Allmendinger and 
Tewdwr-Jones, 1997). The new-style interventionist approaches could offer aid to 
market in both the supply and demand sides, which avoided the failure of either the 
classical-capitalist or the social democratic models. Many research reports had revealed 
the integrated benefits from the cooperative development which could not be brought 
from either the public or the private sector alone. 
 
However, the negative outputs of the property-led “place promotion” process are also 
well documented. Countless commentators have criticised the failure of the neo-liberal 
approaches in social development and the unequal distribution of the wealth created 
from redevelopment projects. Almost all of the new right’s policies and schemes 
focused on places and their development opportunity, not on the original local people 
who lived there. They believed the benefits of this growth would be shared by all local 
people (Deakin and Edwards, 1993), but ignored dynamic changes, such as population 
replacement and mismatch of employment opportunities caused by the redevelopment 
practice itself. In some official reports of the projects, it is easy to find many indicators 
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to evaluate the effects of the redevelopment process. For example, HMSO has 
investigated the six indicators to do so; they are the change of (1) unemployment rate; 
(2) long-term unemployment rate; (3) net job; (4) the number of small business; (5) 
house prices; (6) the number of 25-34 year olds population (Robson et al., 1994). Yet 
all of the figures measured the characteristics of the regenerated places only, not the 
impact on the original residents. To the further objectives of spreading the economic 
success and then to social promotion, in practice these approaches went far from the 
original objectives: the benefits offered by the local economic revival were seldom 
received by the most disadvantaged local groups; on the contrary, in the macro-scale 
area, the urban poverty, higher unemployment and serious social polarisation and 
segregation were never solved and the disadvantaged groups became more concentrated 
in some specific areas which the property-led redevelopment projects did not and would 
not cover. These people inevitably fell into the cycle of multiple deprivations which are 
more complex and harder to solve than the area-based economic depressions. 
 
In all, the property-led redevelopment process could be more successful in 
understanding and solving the complex “urban problems” than before, but it was still 
selective. The effective measures could only work in some specific areas, and the 
benefits were not distributed to those who necessarily needed them most. Also, the 
understanding of the “urban problems” failed to be aware of the possible new problems 
in following years – the negative consequences for deprived people caused by the 
welfare reform in the neo-liberal years – which became one of the major causes for 
increasing social inequality in the new century. 
 
5.2.4 New Labour era 
 
In the New Labour era, neighbourhood renewal became a more inclusive concept. The 
new generation of policy-makers began to use a multi-sectoral perspective to explore 
and analyse the current “urban problems” in a whole new context. Multiple deprivations 
- especially the issues associated with social exclusion - now define the target areas to 
be renewed. These issues include high unemployment rate, low skills, crime, poor 
health, low quality of housing or physical environments and so on. The problems are 
now recognised not just as the current gaps demonstrated by the indicators between the 
deprived areas and the general average level, but also the barriers for the people in the 
deprived areas in accessing “equal opportunities” to have normal-level living conditions. 
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In practice, the new approaches are widening the agenda involved in the neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration process. Many new deals have been launched with the aim of 
enhancing the wide-ranging investment in social capital for people in deprived areas so 
that they may access the “equal opportunities” to have normal-level living conditions 
and compete in the market economy. 
 
Because of the complexity of the process itself, it is very difficult to count or summarise 
all the outcomes of the new stage of neighbourhood renewal/regeneration. This is on 
one hand because of the very wide involvement of the current objectives across so many 
domains; on the other hand, many changes of the domains may not be so significant in 
the initial years of the long-term regeneration process. Fortunately, the official 
“deprivation indices” and other household statistics can be used to monitor and assess 
one by one the most direct efforts of the renewal/regeneration process in every 
individual domain or indicator. In most existing official assessment reports of the 
newest nationa-wide renewal/regeneration approaches (NRU, 2004; 2005a, 2005b; 
DCLG, 2007; Scottish Executive, 2006), current wider-ranging quantitative indicators 
were compared with previous data, so these could be seen as the direct effects achieved 
by the ongoing regeneration programmes. For most individual case areas, the changing 
indicators of the multiple deprivation can also clearly show the effects of the area-based 
regeneration process, although the data of some domains may be still absent. For 
example, the following Table 5-1 shows the changes in the Craigmillar case. 
 
Table 5-1 Comparative indicators of the changing multiple deprivations (Craigmillar) 
 
 Earlier Later/current 
Population (all) 7933 (2001) 7976 (2006) 
Percentage of working population (%) 59.79 (2001) 61.55 (2006) 
Percentage of pensionable population (%) 15.77 (2001) 15.06 (2006) 
Percentage of total population who are income deprived (%) 53.1 (2002) 46.3 (2005) 
Percentage of working age population who are employment 
deprived (%) 
38.8 (2002) 37.2 (2005) 
Average tariff score of all pupils on the S4 roll 92 (2001) 97 (2005) 






Percentage of dwellings in Council Tax band A (%) 53.85 (2003) 48.37 (2006) 
Percentage of dwellings in Council Tax bands A to C (%) 97.33 (2003) 95.30 (2006) 
Percentage of people within 0-500 metres of any Derelict Site 
(%) 
4.0 (2004) 8.8 (2006) 
Data source: Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics (http://www.sns.gov.uk/) 
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Just as in the Craigmillar case, in recent years most of the indicators for the nation-wide 
renewal/regeneration have shown positive changes to address the multiple deprivation 
in the target neighbourhoods. Some “basic-need” public resources in the form of 
welfare benefits are now more equally distributed to every individual, so more people 
can escape from social exclusion and the cycle of multiple deprivation, and then 
compete on equal terms in society. The opportunity gaps to reach decent living 
conditions between the people in deprived and normal neighbourhoods, or between the 
vulnerable groups and others, have reduced, or more people are now on the positive side 
of the gap. Of course, there are still a few changes going far from the optimistic 
expectation, or even seem to be making matters worse. However, with the help of such 
official assessment results, now the decision-making body, usually the local partnership 
board, can become aware of the unsuccessful effects in time, through the annual reports 
or regular meetings. Therefore, the visions for future regeneration process can be 
rethought and adjusted again and again to ensure that the improvement will be effective 
and sustainable in a longer term. In general terms, there has been sufficient evidence to 
show that the principle of social justice has now returned to central position during the 
renewal/regeneration process. The New Labour neighbourhood renewal/regeneration 
process can hereby be regarded as having achieved a more balanced promotion of urban 
neighbourhood, and the positive changes can be more sustainable in future. 
 
Besides the quantitative assessment of the outcomes against the multiple deprivation 
indicators, qualitative analyses on the regeneration mechanism itself in the new era have 
also been completed by a number of independent researchers. Such analysis mostly 
focuses on how to establish an ideal institutional mechanism to ensure that the process 
will go forward smoothly in the longer term. Coordinating the objectives and actions 
with multi-dimensional targets in the longer term and also reinforcing the role of 
“community” in partnership working have not been easy. Even the most optimistic 
conclusion admits that the lessons and unsolved problems are really ignorable. 
Although the problems vary from case to case, in general the most frequently criticised 
issues include: the unbalanced priority against the multiple deprivation still with 
overemphasis on physical problems; the lack of effective cooperation and coordination 
of the policies and actions across economic, social and environmental aspects; and the 
poor effectiveness and efficiency of the partnership. In all, most signs have indeed 
confirmed that the progress of the renewal/regeneration is not only further exploring the 
essence of current “urban problems”, but also more innovative approaches to the 
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effective and efficient delivery of regeneration. It has to be accepted that the job is not 
complete and further regeneration is required. 
 
5.3 Analytical Framework of Neighbourhood Renewal in Britain 
 
5.3.1 Nature of neighbourhood renewal 
 
In Britain, since New Labour emerged and came to power, the supporters of The Third 
Way have confirmed that a longer-term historical analysis should be the only reliable 
way to help understand the progressive trajectory of renewal/regeneration policy and 
practice. In every historical period, the contents of the mainstream renewal/regeneration 
practice vary: the uncontrolled private-led real estate development to reshape the 
medieval towns in the early Capitalist era; the public-led large-scale slum clearance 
movements in the immediate post-war years and the careful inner-city rehabilitation and 
betterment in the following one or two decades; the property-led projects emphasising 
economic renaissance initiated by public-private partnerships since the early 1980s; and 
the most recent wider-ranging programmes in order to realise “comprehensive local 
promotion” in the New Labour era. Obviously, for the countless renewal initiatives in 
every different period, scale and location, not only do almost all of their key factors 
keep changing the objectives and approaches, but the participators and mechanism also 
vary to a greater or lesser degree. 
 
Despite the different approaches and objectives, all such initiatives can be counted 
together as the “neighbourhood renewal practice” just because all of them are actual 
responses to tackle the “urban problems” of the most disadvantaged built-up areas. With 
such a long development trajectory, the essence of the process can be seen as unchanged. 
How the initiatives will/would be operated should always depend on the answers of the 
following two questions: 1) How does one understand the “urban problems”, including 
both the “declines” and their deeply rooted causes? 2) What do the initiatives do in 
responding to the problems, including not only the measures implemented but also the 
delivery mechanism? The answers to these questions have various interpretations. The 
table below (Table 5-2) has been developed to summarise the development trajectory of 
neighbourhood renewal practice since the rapid industrialisation of British cities. 
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Inefficiency of land use, limited urban containment and 
outdated urban functions without new industries 
Causes Lack of the market-oriented development mechanism 
Strategy and 
approaches 
Increasing density, updating urban function and transport 
intervention 






Shortage of decent dwellings for working class, 
dilapidated city image with war damage; social unrest in 
later decades 
Causes Lack of state intervention to overcome unbalanced 
demand and supply of non-profit public resources 
Strategy and 
approaches 
Slum clearance through relocation, beatification and 
modernization of city centre, housing rehabilitation, 
positive discrimination in specific zones 
Mechanism Public-led projects as the mainstream, usually through 





Economic decline and poor investment in inner-cities 




Deregulation and new deals to re-encourage private 
investment to accelerate economic restructuring, 
property-led redevelopment 
Mechanism Public-private partnerships, excluding local authorities 
and communities 




Cycle of declines in multiple aspects in specific areas, 
social exclusion and multiple deprivations 
Causes Continued economic and employment restructuring, 
welfare reform and selective redevelopment; 
the standard of remaining safety-net is too low 
Strategy and 
approaches 
Integrated long-term actions with multiple targets, 
focusing on social investment 
Mechanism Community-centred partnerships with wide involvement 
 
According to this table, the “neighbourhood renewal process” at any time, location or 
scale, should be regarded as a problem-oriented process. Four tasks form the basic 
structure of the process: to explore the decline; to analyse the causes; to set up targets 
and launch initiatives; and to create a mechanism for decision making and 
implementation. Therefore the overview and analysis on the neighbourhood renewal 
process should cover all of the four tasks and be aware of the different interpretations of 
them within their current local context. 
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5.3.2 Criteria of successful neighbourhood renewal policy and practice 
 
For researchers and policy-makers anywhere, identifying the “criteria” to evaluate 
rationally the success of the neighbourhood renewal/regeneration practice should be the 
major aim of their research, both at a strategic level and when specific projects are being 
designed and implemented (Moore and Spires, 2000). Owing to the changing contents 
of the neighbourhood renewal initiatives, particularly in most recent years when the 
practice has become more complex, a reliable evaluation framework and detailed 
criteria for them can never be simply structured. Also, any detailed criteria designated 
for a specific period cannot be reused in another circumstance. However, just in 
corresponding to the strategic analysis of the nature of neighbourhood renewal, the 
criteria of “success” should meet the two essential requirements: 1) understanding the 
“urban problems” exactly; and 2) appropriate response to the problems, including both 
the measures and the mechanism. In practice, the two criteria can have various 
interpretations according to the diverse circumstances. 
 
Understanding the “urban problems” 
 
The exact understanding of the “urban problems” should be the pre-condition of the 
next step of the renewal process – making the responding measurements and setting up 
a mechanism to direct them. In practice from the long historical review, there is a large 
number of examples in which almost all the wrong decisions and ineffective attempts 
for renewal practice were made as a result of the absence of an exact understanding of 
the on-site “urban problems” of the time. Also, any revision to previous failures must be 
based on “updated” understanding of the problems. 
 
The historical review has introduced the changing ideas in understanding the “urban 
problems” of the target neighbourhood to be renewed. From this trajectory, it is clear 
that, when the cities experienced the development from a pre-industrial, 
industrial-dominated to the post-industrial society, the “urban problems” altered to 
become more and more complex, and with increasing contents. In most recent years, 
owing to the influence of globalisation and technological innovations, as well as the 
unexpected consequences created by unsuccessful previous renewal practice, 
contemporary “urban problems” have become even more wide-ranging. In the 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the declines occur across economic, social, physical and 
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other respects. Any one of them might not be new, and constantly tackled by left-wing 
or right-wing approaches, but nowadays, they emerge synchronically and are linked 
closely together. Thus, the perspective to understand all of them should be innovative: a 
mixture between the traditional left and right, and also inclusive. At the moment, the 
ideas of The Third Way, as the emerging mainstream political ideas, provide several 
appropriate principles by which such a comprehensive overview of “the problems” may 
be conducted. The principles have been summarised as several “dos” and “don’ts” in the 
following (Table 5-3). 
 
Table 5-3 Principles in understanding current “urban problems” 
 
Dos Don'ts 
• Explore the problems comprehensively, across 
all aspects 
• Just narrowly define the problems in one or 
two aspects 
• Be aware of the linkages between the problems • Regard the problems separately or 
fragmentarily 
• Explore the causes of the problems in depth • Focus on the problematic outputs only 
• Be sensitive to the newest challenges and 
potential problems 
• Address the longstanding problems only 
• Keep good balance among the problems in 
different aspects 
• Give unbalanced priorities to the problems 
 
In most of the recent official reports analysing the urban decline, these principles were 
well reflected. Most researchers, officials and the public have recognised a universal 
commitment of the nationa-wide “urban problems” in the new century in Britain, which 
is: the multiple deprivation, particularly the issues associated with social exclusion 
(Pacione, 1997; McCarthy, 2007; SEU, 1998; 2001b; Scottish Executive, 2004). In a 
macro-scale, the problems identified by central governments should at least include the 
declines of: 1) local economy and employment; 2) housing and environment; 3) 
education and training; 4) health care; 5) safety and community cohesion. For some 
specific cases, the definition could be broader, for example leisure and sports; transport 
facilities and so on (Imrie and Raco, 2003). All the problems should be seen as being 
closely linked, interacting with and perhaps reinforced by each other. The root of the 
decline has also been explored, which is the unequal opportunities for individuals in 
personal development owing to the poor and unequal distribution of some basic-need 
public resources, including job opportunities, service, networking and others. Many of 
these problems have existed in the deprived neighbourhoods for many decades, but 
recently, the fast emerging threats concentrate on addressing social issues and 
environmental amenity. These problems will only get worse if not tackled now. In some 
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very typical cases of the British-style deprivation, unemployment might be the most 
significant issue, leading to a dependence on shrunken social welfare and poverty that 
was often accompanied by lack of self-esteem, poor health and potential social unrest. 
However, in more cases, it is really hard to identify what initiated the decline to cause 
the cycle of multiple deprivation. Hence, in these cases all the problems should be 
assigned a balanced priority in understanding the problems. In addition, certain specific 
social groups, for example the ethnic minorities, immigrants or disabled, may suffer the 
problems more than others and the problems can be concentrated. This reinforces the 
need for a detailed analysis of the “urban problems”. 
 
Evaluating the measurements and mechanisms 
 
Based on the understanding of the problems to be tackled, the evaluation of the 
renewal/regeneration measurements and mechanisms should follow a similar logic. The 
result should come from the answers to the following three questions: 1) Do the 
renewal/regeneration strategies exactly target the understanding of the “urban 
problems”? 2) Do the ongoing policies and actions produce enough positive effects in 
responding to the problems? 3) Is there an effective mechanism to ensure that the 
positive changes are sustainable, and the strategy and approaches are sufficiently 
flexible in case new challenges emerge in future? The three strategic principles should 
be interpreted into detailed criteria with various contents. In practice, from a historical 
perspective, the changes of the “criteria” just reflect the progressive trajectory in 
understanding the “current urban problems”. The evaluation framework also needs to 
take account of the understanding of the urban problems at that particular time in 
history to measure effectively the impact of the measures introduced. 
 
A series of recent official reports have undertaken a considerable amount of evaluation 
(NRU, 2005a; 2005b: Scottish Executive, 2006; DCLG, 2007) to give the overall 
assessment (at least as interim conclusions) of the newest round of regeneration 
initiatives, both nation- and region-wide. Reflecting New Labour’s approach to the 
evidence-based policy, this means that progress has also been made in the effective 
evaluation. In the past, there were at least two major barriers to evaluating the real 
effectiveness of the neighbourhood renewal programmes: the lack of primary agreement 
about the ideal urban vision of different contexts (Lawless, 1995); and the absence of a 
definitive conclusion based on reliable evidence to show the success of long-term 
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policies (Geddes and Martin, 1996). Nowadays the launch of a national strategy and the 
national indices of multiple deprivation have provided better indicators to cover these 
areas. In this context, most official assessment reports concentrate on the quantitative 
analysis about the most direct outcomes. However, more and more researchers and 
practitioners who have been involved in the complex process for many years have 
claimed that the funders’ requirements are really too narrow, and more qualitative 
approaches should be engaged with the complexities of the regeneration (Scottish Urban 
Regeneration Forum, 2006; McCarthy, 2007). 
 
In addition, the British Urban Regeneration Association has addressed this issue 
through the nomination of the annual BURA Best Practice Award in Regeneration. The 
most significant criteria used by the assessors to identify the “best” practice emphasises 
the following three significant features: the comprehensive and integrated identification 
of urban problems, especially the social exclusion; the strategic thinking for lasting, 
long-term solutions focusing on both people and places; and the broader involvement of 
the partnerships, especially for the community participation. These are now believed to 
be essential performance indicators to assess the complex problems in changing 
contemporary British cities. Also, they are believed to be the best interpretation of the 
three basic principles, and based on that, a series of very detailed and 
systematic-organised criteria have been listed as follows (Table 5-4). 
 
Table 5-4 Criteria for successful neighbourhood renewal/regeneration in the New Labour era 
 
Advocate Oppose 
Integrated strategy to the problems 
• Multi-dimensional inclusive targets, for both place 
and people problems 
• Simple or fragmented targets, for place 
or people promotion separately 
• Long-term target and consecutive actions • “One-off” or short-term projects/schemes 
Pragmatic positive effects in all respects 
• Prosperous and sustainable local economy with 
local benefits e.g. job opportunities 
• More equal and enhanced service delivery 
• Reduced fear of unsafe environment 
• Long-term recession or the economic 
renaissance without local benefits 
• Unequal or poor accessibility to service 
• High crime rate, anti-social behaviours 
and loss of community cohesion 
Capable mechanism to make effective changes 
• Partnership work with wider involvement • Unilateral or other simple structured 
bodies as operators 
• Vertical and horizontal cooperation between 
stakeholders 
• Fragmentation and contradiction between 
stakeholders 
• The bottom-up, community-led partnership 
working in both decision-making and 
implementation 
• The bureaucratic, top-down model in 
either decision-making or 
implementation 
  110
Based on such a framework, some key principles of the “successful” practice in New 
Labour era should be interpreted as follows: 1) The vision and practical approaches 
should be incorporated within a wide-ranging strategy to reverse the multiple 
deprivation indicators across employment and the local economy, housing and physical 
environment, health, education, and crime, especially the newly-emerging threats on 
social exclusion and environmental amenity. 2) The outcomes of the programmes 
should make enough positive changes according to the national indices of the multiple 
deprivation in expected periods. 3) The decision-making and implementation                                                                                                                                  
of the renewal initiatives should be conducted through local partnerships (mostly at 
neighbourhood level) with wide involvement (usually including public, private, local 
community, voluntary groups and others), community leadership and multiple-sector 
collaboration. 
 
Many international researchers and policy-makers are coming to agree with such or 
similar criteria in assessing the neighbourhood renewal/regeneration process occurring 
in different locations - not only in Britain - with different scales but with very similar 
objectives and outcomes. The results of the evaluation, no doubt, will also provide very 




In a historical perspective, the development of British neighbourhood renewal follows a 
zigzag trend: in different eras the private and public sector took a more active role 
alternatively, and correspondingly, significant economic and social achievements were 
created respectively but the problems were generated in other aspects. In all essentially, 
the neighbourhood renewal/regeneration process has always been initiated in order to 
tackle “urban problems” in a specific area and time, despite the understanding of “urban 
problems” and the policies and approaches used in response keep changing and 
developing in correspondence with the shifts in the external socio-economic, political 
and cultural context. More recently, the problems should be interpreted as the 
multi-dimensional exclusion and deprivations and the following cycle of declines. 
Moreover, the criteria to define “successful” neighbourhood renewal/regeneration 
process should evaluate the understanding of the “urban problems” themselves and the 
effectiveness of the responses. In this context, it is important to be aware of the 
coverage of the regeneration strategy and target, the substantial output and outcomes of 
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the regeneration process, and the mechanism of its operation. All of these findings, 
based on British practice, should be valuable references for international research, 
particularly in those countries which are experiencing socio-economic restructuring 




Chapter 6 Urban Development and Planning in China 
 
The theoretical developments and practical experiences of British neighbourhood 
renewal and regeneration have been discussed in the last four chapters. This chapter 
aims to provide a general introduction to Chinese urban development and changes in a 
long history, which is the necessary background for the next chapter to review the 
development of neighbourhood renewal in Chinese cities. The introduction will first 
conduct a historical review of Chinese urban development and changes. The historical 
review will be divided into three eras: the first is the pre-Socialist era before 1949, the 
second is the Socialist planned economy era from the 1950s to the end of 1970s, and the 
era after the economic reform since the early 1980s. After that, some of the most recent 
socio-economic changes and their impact on urban development will be discussed in 
detail. In all, the following sections will answer the following questions:  
• What was the general political, economic and social structure of China in every 
historic era?  
• What were the major changes in the cities?  
• What was the role of planning and policies in urban development?  
Thanks to the excellent existing research publications produced by scholars of different 
disciplines, the sections of this chapter are based on the findings of the existing 
literature published in both English and Chinese. 
 
6.1 Pre-Socialist Era (before 1949) 
 
6.1.1 Socio-economic and political context 
 
China is one of the largest countries in the world, located at the east end of the Asian 
continent with very far distances and great geographical barriers to most Western 
countries. In the huge area, only slightly smaller than the whole of Europe, the Chinese 
people created the earliest civilisations to form what used to be a leading nation in the 
world for several thousand years. Since the First Emperor (Qin Shi Huang) – who is 
often associated with the building of the Great Wall – established the first united, 
central-controlled state in 221 BC, the huge area was ruled as one nation in most 
periods. Through dynasty after dynasty, the history of Chinese imperial power lasted 
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over 2000 years with no great interruption to the continuity of its civilisation and 
administrative tradition, which is unlike the lost early civilisations in the Middle East, 
Mediterranean and America.  
 
The long-term unity and stability during almost all of the cultivated history of ancient 
China were based on the advanced agricultural production in the downriver areas of the 
Yellow and the Yangtze rivers. The national economic output was always greatly reliant 
on the yield from agriculture. The initial development of the handicraft industry, mining 
and commerce was also very early but then greatly restrained by national policy since 
the Qin Dynasty (356 BC). Hou (2008) explained that, by comparing the historic 
context then between China and European countries: in ancient Europe most nations 
were small and the competition between nations was fierce so the industrialists and 
businessmen could have more chances to collaborate with political regimes; however, in 
China, a huge and united nation, the political authorities could have stronger power over 
industrialists and businessmen with the support of stable agricultural output in a closed 
self-supporting domestic economy. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of 
the Chinese population were peasants. In most dynasties, the major industries such as 
mining, salt and wine were monopolised by the state. Private enterprises were 
developed slowly, always on a very small scale.  
 
The huge number of farmers supported a small number of land- and office-holding elite 
families who dominated the running of the society. Government officials were selected 
from those rural elites who had passed the state-organised examinations. They were 
directly appointed and paid by the emperor, and were required to be loyal to their senior 
level leaders rather than the people they ruled. This top-down political structure well 
reflected the social order and cultural values of the agrarian society then. There were at 
least two major explanations for the structure. First, compared with the diverse and 
dynamic pre-industrial European countries, the society of ancient China was highly 
stable and homogeneous (World Bank, 1984). Because of the lack of social mobility, 
usually “previous experience” was the best knowledge in dealing with most public 
affairs. Thus the respect for and obedience to “senior” people were highly emphasised 
and were the core of the prevalent ideology of Confucianism. In addition, the cultivated 
area per family in China was smaller than in other agricultural countries; the organised 
collective labour work was quite normal, especially when constructing the infrastructure 
of irrigation and participating in the campaigns against flood and other natural disasters 
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(which happened much more frequently in China than in many other ancient agricultural 
countries). Therefore, the strong and effective central control of the entire society was 
regarded as very necessary. After successive dynasties, the power of the Chinese 
government was expanded further. Usually in ancient China, the governmental officials 
were not only in charge of the allocation of public resources, but also responsible for the 
judiciary, for there was not an independent legislative system. The strong political 
power of the governmental system ensured that the interventional approaches were very 
effectively applied to govern the national economy. 
 
Being representative of Oriental civilisation, for many centuries the Chinese empire 
consistently outpaced the rest of the world in arts, sciences, military and technologies. 
Elvin (1975) and Riskin (1987) pointed out that the ancient China of around the 12th 
century had already possessed both the sufficient scientific knowledge and the 
mechanical ability to have experienced a fully-fledged industrial revolution some four 
centuries before it occurred in West Europe. However, for reasons not yet fully 
understood, technological improvement in production was slowed down in the last six 
centuries of the agrarian era. Between the 14th and 20th centuries, especially during the 
period between the 16th and 19th century, food production continued to increase, but the 
growth came largely from the increase in the size of population, the consequent increase 
in size of the agricultural labour forces, an expansion in the cultivated area and a 
gradual increase in intensity of cultivation, rather than from technological inventions 
(Perkins, 1969). By the mid-19th century, the population of China had reached about 
400 million, which was 6-7 times of that of six centuries previously, so the potential of 
the existing arable land for food production had been nearly completely used (Riskin, 
1987). 
 
In recent centuries, without the process corresponding to the Industrial Revolution in 
Western countries, the development of modern science and technologies in China had 
lagged far behind that of the industrialised Western countries. Compared with the 
industrialised Western countries, the agriculture-dominated national economy of this 
old empire had, in relative terms, a much lower level of productivity per capita. In the 
19th and early 20th centuries, the huge and less-industrialised empire was finally heavily 
affected by the great wave of world-wide colonisation. After 1840, the old empire was 
defeated by the armies from industrialised countries in Europe, North America and its 
neighbouring country, Japan. Then the whole country had to suffer the darkest age of its 
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history, which was characterised by frequent civil wars, foreign invasion and occupation, 
famines and extreme poverty. In many of the coastal areas, the Western colonists had 
occupied some small territories (like Hong Kong) or treaty ports (like Shanghai, Tianjin 
and so on). These areas were essentially out of the control of any Chinese governments. 
 
Nevertheless, as one of the limited examples among Asian, African and Latin American 
countries, China has never been entirely governed by foreigners, perhaps because of its 
huge size of area and population. In any period, there was always at least a nominal 
national government maintaining power to some extent. In 1911, the monarchy was 
ended and some native reformers then tried to establish a Western-style capitalist 
system, but for the civil wars and foreign invasion, the new system was never 
successfully operated nationwide. That means that, although the impact of the Western 
invaders had begun to change the traditional Chinese society, their influence was very 
limited before the middle of the 20th century, and generally not too far beyond some 
large cities in the coastal areas. In the vast inland and rural areas of China, the 
agriculturally dominant closed domestic market remained, preventing the impact of 
foreign industrial production to a greater or lesser extent. The majority of Chinese 
people still maintained their traditional ways of production, the social orders and 
cultural customs. Thus since the middle of the 20th century, the impact of the Western 
imperialism and colonisation to China was not as big as in other smaller developing 
countries. 
 
6.1.2 The development of traditional cities 
 
In the agriculture-based ancient China, the cities and towns had never contained more 
than 10% of the population (Jones et al., 1933). This judgment is based on 1) the fact 
that not until the end of the Qing Period (1644-1911AD) did China begin importing 
moderate quantities of foodstuffs from the outside world to help feed the population; 
and 2) the fact that the handicraft and commercial sectors never challenged agricultural 
dominance in the economy despite the symbiotic relationship between them. The 
majority of the urban populations were officials or staff employed by the government, 
but for most of them office-holding was not a lifetime career. They served a few tours 
and then returned to their rural hometowns, where their wealth, prestige, and network of 
official contacts made them dominant figures on the local scene. Thus, there is a long 
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tradition that every Chinese person is strongly connected with his / her local land and 
has seldom been relocated to other places (Fei, 1948). 
 
However, the role of cities or towns was very crucial in Chinese agrarian society. Some 
Chinese cities were constructed as military forts or developed as trade hubs which were 
similar to most European medieval towns.  However more of them, especially the 
larger ones, became administrative centres. Different from the situation in ancient 
European cities, in China the governance of rural and urban areas was never separated 
and always integrated into a unitary top-down system. Every town or city was normally 
the seat of a particular tier of local government which was also responsible for 
governing the surrounding rural area, large or small. That made the size of the 
bureaucratic system quite large. In most ancient Chinese cities, a great proportion of the 
residents were the most powerful elites, including officials, army men and the staff 
employed by the public sectors. They were also the major customers of the urban 
‘lower-class’, including businessmen, handicraft people or other service providers who 
were the remaining part of the urban population. Generally, the urban population was 
richer and better educated than the farmers in rural areas. Actually, many of these urban 
residents were promoted from rural elites who still held the agrarian land in the rural 
areas and who might go back to their villages when they finished their official careers. 
 
In more recent centuries, the private economy in the commercial and service industries 
began to increase significantly in Chinese cities. More and more landless farmers 
moved to reside in the self-built dwellings just outside the city walls and gates 
(normally called “Guan Xiang”关厢), so that most of them could find jobs in the 
booming commercial sectors. In Beijing, after the middle of the 16th century, the 
majority of the urban underclasses, including small merchants, servants, hand workers 
and unemployed labours, gradually became concentrated in the neighbourhoods in the 
“Outer city”, far from the Forbidden City and other “grand” spaces. The new areas were 
not under strict planning control by the authorities, and usually looked quite 
“disorganised” and very crowded. The infrastructure there was usually very poor, 
although sometimes the inhabitants might organise voluntary work amongst themselves 
to improve the conditions of the local road and other areas which required improvement. 
 
The arrival of Western imperial powers accelerated the growth of urban population in 
some Chinese coastal areas. Following the Opium War (1840 AD), a series of unequal 
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treaties were signed between China and Western countries. According to them, the 
Western people gained the right to establish their “concessions” in most Chinese large 
cities or treaty ports. These areas quickly became overseas trade hubs and developed 
rapidly. Later, some modern manufacturing industries emerged with the importing of 
some Western technologies. Fast industrialisation meant the high-speed growth of urban 
population in these Westernised cities. The most typical example is the development of 
Shanghai. This port city, located at the sea access of the Yangtze River, was developed 
from a compact fishing town surrounded by a wall, and in the 1840s had a population of 
around 500,000 people. However, once British people had established the trade properly 
and set up the consul here, the port city developed at a remarkable speed. For a long 
period of time, Shanghai dominated the treaty port system, accounting for almost 2/3 of 
China’s foreign trade in 1870 and almost half of direct foreign investment in 1931 
(Dernberger, 1975, p. 33). In 1936, Shanghai was ranked 6th largest city in the world 
and the largest and most prosperous city in the Far East (Yeung, 1996, p. 2). However, 
the industrial-led urbanisation process happened in only a small number of places in 
China along the coast and big rivers with significant Western influence, involving a 
very small proportion of the Chinese population. 
 
6.1.3 Urban planning and implementation  
 
The construction of Chinese traditional cities followed the distinguished pattern of 
development, similar to that of European medieval towns. To most of the cities, as 
national, regional or local political centres, their basic urban forms were built in a short 
time as a whole, rather than being developed step by step (Dong, 2004; Wang, 2005). 
When a new administrative centre was set up, or if the war had damaged the old 
generation of towns, the new large-scale construction usually began. The authorities, 
sometimes with the help of the army, were the major organisers and investors in 
conducting the major projects. Many agrarian labours were involved in the process, and 
their contribution could be counted as their tax payments to the authorities.  
 
The large-scale construction usually strictly followed the blue-print master-plan, where 
the geometrical patterns were widely used. Normally, the overall layout of the cities 
(with the exception of a few of the commercial or military towns) could be seen as good 
reflections of Confucian values which emphasised the centralised power structure (Zhu, 
2004): there was considerable specialisation in land use and function, where the palace 
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and offices of the bureaucrats were located in the central area, facing south (the 
direction of the sun) to show their authority, while the residential neighbourhoods 
(usually called “wards”) and markets were in the insignificant places. In the micro-scale 
spatial structure, a similar order remained as well: every family was housed in a 
courtyard dwelling and the senior man lived in the room at the central, dominant place 
of the whole family. Gender differences of use and privacy were also strong, with 
women largely confined to dwellings, although the restriction was not as strict as in 
most Islamic cultures.  
 
The borders of the cities were quite obvious, being mostly surrounded by city walls. 
The wards were all in low-rise buildings, and placed side by side compactly, with quite 
high density (up to 320 inhabitants per hectare in Beijing, the national capital of the 15th 
century) (Jenkins et al., 2007, p. 93). The public open spaces for ordinary citizens were 
few, and usually the major open spaces were only in front of the major governmental 
buildings to show the stateliness of the powerful administrative system (Dong, 2004; 
Wu, 1986). Under Confucian theory, the emperor and central government administered 
the whole empire, and public participation in politics was strictly forbidden. Therefore, 
citizens should not be offered open spaces for public assembly, just like the squares in 
front of City Halls in Europe, for that was thought very dangerous for keeping the 




1. A square shape 
2. A chessboard road system 
with straight north-south 
and east-west streets 
3. Imperial palace or 
administrative buildings in 
the centre 
4. No open space for citizens 
Figure 6-1 The ideal spatial layout of an ancient Chinese city 
Source: Wang, 2003, p. 42 
 
  119
Beijing old town could be the best example of ancient Chinese cities whose spatial 
layout was decided by traditional Chinese values and social structure. As the national 
capital of the last two Chinese monarchic dynasties, the city was initially built in 1417 
AD, with its size larger (urban area enclosed by the city is about 62 km2) than any other 
Chinese cities. Between 1450 and 1800, Beijing was also the most populous city in the 
world (except during 1650-1700, when it was 2nd, after Constantinople). The master 
plan of the city had a delicate design which was praised by Liang Sicheng (1952), 
“Father of Chinese Architecture”, as being an “incomparable masterpiece of city 
planning” (Figure 6-2). 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Map of Beijing old town (1553-1750AD) 
Source: Liu, 1980, p. 280 
 
Almost all Chinese traditional spatial rules were applied here to reflect the centralised 
power structure. The city had a profile of rectangular shape. Almost all major streets 
and minor aisles went either north-south or east-west, forming the chessboard-like road 
system and separating the rectangular neighbourhoods. The Forbidden City (the 
emperor’s palace) lay in the central area, with some important symbolic architecture 
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(for example, the Temple of Ancestor, the Altar of Land and Grain) and government 
ministries located in significant positions in the city. The homes of key officials and rich 
businessmen were located on two sides of the Forbidden City, near the administrative 
centre. The size and architectural style of their homes (normally formed by one or more 
courtyards) were decided strictly by the owner’s political status, and the courtyards had 
to be placed alongside the straight, chessboard-like road system. The streetscape was 
very monotonous, but it was good to enhance the impression of the grand architecture 
which represented the strong state power over the citizens. 
 
After the middle of the 19th century, Western colonists began to construct some modern 
industrial or commercial neighbourhoods in China’s coastal cities. Chinese 
governments no longer had strong administrative control on these cities, and some areas 
were even entirely directly governed by Western colonists. Certainly, the spatial layout 
of the industrial-led urban construction was essentially no longer under the influence of 
Chinese traditional values. Foreign developers from different countries had the right to 
construct in their own ways. Some new functional buildings or estates emerged, 
including flats, parks, churches, schools, colleges, hotels, sporting clubs, hospitals, 
banks, and even railway stations. In some areas, all of the urban areas were 
well-planned and had modern infrastructure, including paved roads, piped water and 
electricity supply. In the first half of the 20th century, many newly-born Western 
planning ideas were imported and implemented in different concessions of the new 
Chinese cities like Shanghai. But in a city-wide perspective, the planning ideas were 
very fragmented, and the modern neighbourhoods were never constructed with strategic 
coordination. Moreover, most of these modern neighbourhoods were constructed on 
empty land or based in a small town or village, not on the sites of previous large 
traditional Chinese cities. There is no doubt that the Westernised new construction 
seldom made major changes to the old urban neighbourhoods in Chinese cities. 
 
6.2 Socialist Planned-Economy Era (1949-1978) 
 
6.2.1 Socio-economic and political context 
 
The year of 1949 was a new starting point of China’s national history. In this year the 
Communist authority led by Mao Zedong gained the state power and established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC): the first Socialist state governing all of mainland 
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China (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau). After decades of disasters by civil 
wars, foreign colonisation and succession of weak or incompetent governments, only 
then was the new unified Chinese government able to assume effective nation-wide 
administrative control. However, the problems confronting China’s new government 
were formidable: in one of the best known passages, Mao Zedong characterised the 
Chinese society at that time as “both poor and blank” (Yi Qiong Er Bai). The statement 
explained at least two of the urgent tasks for the government then: first, to recover the 
poor national economy affected by the long-term wars and lagging behind 
industrialisation. In 1950, the GDP (PPP) of China was only 4.5% of that of the world3. 
Industrial production in 1949 was only 56% of its pre-war peak level and food output 
was estimated to be 70-75% of its pre-war peak (Riskin, 1987, p. 33). Second, there 
must be an effective system for the new government to regulate and facilitate 
nation-wide economic development as well as social well-being. By following the 
Party’s ideological beliefs and after considering the new post-war world political orders 
(Cold War) and the regional conflicts (the Korean War), the leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) chose to copy directly the well-known experience of the Soviet 
Union (mostly from the 1930s to 1950s) with the Stalinist central-controlled 
political-economic model as a whole. The central government was extremely strong in 
controlling the allocation of all public resources and the decision-making in dealing 
with all public affairs. The local governments were more like agents of the central 
government at local level, rather than independent political regimes. With a leveller 
structure with many tiers, every local government had to follow the orders of 
upper-level government in policy making and resource allocation. The choice might 
also reflect the legacy of the dynasties of traditional administrative control in Chinese 
agrarian society: after several thousand of agrarian society living with a top-down 
system, most Chinese people had taken the highly centralised administrative model for 
granted. In the consequent thirty years (the well-known Maoist period), the power of the 
authorities was very strong in implementing central control and state interventions in 
both the economic and social development of society as a whole. 
 
After the 1950s, the newly-established national economic system strictly followed the 
Soviet model based on a planned economy. The Communist leaders expected to draw 
on the “successful experience” of the industrialised Soviet Union in accelerating GDP 
growth through the state-led rapid industrialisation, as well as the external assistance 
                                                        
3
 Data from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_by_past_GDP_%28PPP%29 
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from this Socialist ally. This Soviet-model economic strategy emphasised the fast GDP 
growth by the strongest state intervention upon a “closed economy” (Jenkins et al., 
2007). The imports and exports were also controlled by the state, and most economic 
resources (also including the capital and labour force) had to be collected and allocated 
by the state, while the market force and private capital were cut down most (Sun, 1992; 
Zhao, 1988). In this model, as well as the centralised financial system, most of the 
prices of commodities, the salaries of employment and cost of raw materials are all 
decided by the state, and the state-owned enterprises must hand in most of their profits 
to the national financial system (Sun, 1992). In the 1950s, governments applied 
financial pressures and inducements to persuade the owners of private, modern firms to 
sell them to the state or convert them into joint public-private enterprises under state 
control. By 1957, the proportion of privately-owned industry in the gross value of the 
industry output was below 0.1% (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1984, p. 194). 
Thus the government could then essentially control the national economic system and 
allocate the investments and other resources by strictly following the economic plans. 
Although in fact the strategy was altered frequently on several occasions in response to 
the major ideological changes of national leaders, this basic framework dominated the 
socio-economic development until the late 1970s. 
 
Under the centrally controlled development strategy, the government can effectively 
control the national economic system and then give more priority to investment and 
resource allocation to establish a “modern industrial system”, according to the ideas of 
Marxian economy (Zhang and Wang, 2001). To reach the target, most investment went 
to the sector of industry - especially heavy industry (for example in the First Five Year 
Plan of 1953-1957, the proportion is 52.4%, in which 88.8% in heavy industry) - while 
investment in the non-production sector was cut down to fit the “basic need” in daily 
life (Zhao, 1988). This accelerated the process of industrialisation throughout China 
considerably, and in the stable political environment of the period between 1953 and 
1958, the increase of industry was considerable (18.4% annual average) (Sun, 1992). 
However, in later years, the development strategy with priorities in heavy industry was 
removed by the impacts of some major political campaigns, including the “The Great 
Leap Forward” (1958-1960) and “Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976). In the following 
years, the overall national economic output continued to grow together with the constant 
state-led industrialisation, while the capital-output ratios declined. The GDP (PPP) of 
China still maintained almost the same level of its proportion of world economy (4.6% 
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of the world, 1973) 4 . In agriculture in particular, the efficiency was greatly 
under-estimated and the per capita output in 1977 was no higher than that of 1957. At 
the end of such a planned economy period in the late 1970s, the population in extreme 
poverty in China (at least 250 million, mostly in rural areas) was greater than that of any 
other country in the world (Cai and Lin, 2003; Chen and Ravallion, 2004). China then 
had to suffer serious economic difficulties similar to those of the Soviet Union and other 
Socialist countries in Eastern Europe during the same period: the lack of market power 
reduced the motivation of employees, depressed the social need and meanwhile, the 
restriction of private and external investment led to a serious shortage of capital. 
Furthermore, to China, one specific point is that the strategy of heavy-industrial priority 
did not explore the potential of the huge number of labour forces (Cai and Lin, 2003), 
which would become the most significant comparative advantage within an open 
international market in the following period. 
 
Analogously, the formation of the social structure was also determined by the national 
economic plans. The economic reward of the state-allocated jobs for everyone was 
always as low as a token payment, but individuals could make a living mostly by the 
redistribution process. The housing, education and health services was provided for 
everybody by public agencies, and the supply of low-cost food, clothing and some 
industrial production was restricted under a standardised quantity per head. The 
Communist politicians initially hoped that the strong state intervention, by 100% 
public-funded social welfare treatments, could be beneficial towards eliminating the 
social inequality of the past. Furthermore, the national economic plans could hereby be 
operated smoothly, based within a stable, predictable context. 
 
Many researchers did think that the social development of Socialist China in the 
planned-economy era was a process of de-stratification and with egalitarian ideas of 
income distribution (Guan, 2001; Lin et al., 1999). By the calculation of some 
researchers, the Gini coefficient of urban China in the 1970s was only 0.2 (Bian, 1999). 
But the above analysis of the economic data was rather superficial and without the 
in-depth investigation into the institutional inequality of welfare distribution. Compared 
with the pre-Socialist China before 1949, the previous social stratification relating to 
different income levels had been broken down, but the new social stratification was 
established in another pattern. Although the universal “equal” society is one of the 
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essential targets of the Socialist ideology, it did not become reality in China (Chen, 
2004). The too low level of economic condition and the strong desire for rapid 
development finally removed, or at least partially altered, the Utopian thought. In order 
to follow strictly the national economic strategy, the whole society was divided into 
various groups according to their roles in the whole economic system; sometimes these 
were linked with their original “political status” (Wang and Murie, 1999).  
 
First of all, the nation-wide “Residency Permit system (Hukou)”, which originated in 
1958, divided this country into urban society and rural society. This is quite a unique 
phenomenon, found only in China, and it means even more strict demographic control 
than that of the Soviet Union and East European countries (see 6.2.2). By law, only the 
“registered” urban population could have valid access to allocated jobs, along with 
state-provided income, food, housing, health service and other essential consumer 
products in the “planned” society; while the majority of the population in rural areas 
were excluded from the “plans” but had the right to cultivate in an allocated agrarian 
slot. The objective was directly to ensure enough labour forces working in agriculture 
and restrict migrants from the countryside to work in urban industry so that the state 
could save the cost on infrastructure as a result of the urban expansion, and then have 
more investment for industrialisation. Moreover, even in urban areas, every urban 
population was also categorised with the title of “worker”, “cadre”, “soldier” or other. 
The labour forces, capital and other economic resources (such as use right of land) were 
prohibited from being transferred between sectors, so that the economic and social 
activities would be ensured following the “plans”. Therefore, the urban society ran as 
fragments and its structure was a reflection of the categories of all employers of the 
urban population, according to their various roles in the “planned society”.  
 
According to the economic plans, the income distribution did not show as huge gaps 
between higher and lower income groups as those of a market-oriented economy; 
however, most of the personal needs affecting their life quality had to depend on the 
public-allocated provision of welfare. In practice, during these decades, almost all of the 
financial support of the welfare provision to individuals/families had to come from the 
employers they worked for (Work Units or Danwei), and usually the standards were 
related to the job levels and the social categories to which they belonged. Thus the gaps 
of living standard were greatly enlarged between social categories by many of the 
“invisible benefits”. For example, in 1978, the average income of the urban population 
  125 
was 2.36 times that of the rural population (the gap had been increasing since 1949), but 
the benefits from many welfare treatments allocated only for the urban population, such 
as the provision of public housing, higher-level school education, qualified health 
service and others, were never included in the calculation (Chen, 2004). Even for the 
urban population, the inequality of the “invisible benefits” among Work Units was 
essentially unavoidable, because of either the imbalance of the plans themselves, or the 
differences of historical and geographical contexts (Li and Li, 2000; Li and Wang, 
1992). 
 
In addition, this “institutional isolation” (also called “institutional segregation”) nearly 
eliminated the chances of mobility from one social group to another. Some titles 
representing the social status of everyone (for example “worker”, “cadre”, “peasant”) 
were given at birth (usually the children inherited some titles of identity from their 
parents), and then the personal career option and social service might be with great 
differences. In theory, everyone could move from one social group to another; for 
instance the son of peasants could apply to join the “registered” urban population and be 
allocated a job if he/she had graduated from a university/college, finished his/her 
service in the army or married an urban person. But every year, the number of the 
“permitted transfers” was limited and the waiting list was always very long, so in fact 
only very few of the population passed through the gaps of “institutional isolation”. If 
anyone hoped to transfer from “worker” to “cadre” or even from one Work Unit to 
another, the procedures were usually complex as well. In 1952, the “cadres” were 
0.64% of the whole urban jobs and in 1978 it was still only 1.21% (Lu, 2002). The 
increasing mobility of labour forces was deemed to produce unnecessary additional 
costs in the planned national economic development (Chen, 2004). Therefore, the urban 
society ran as fragments and its structure was a reflection of the categories of all Work 
Units, according to their various roles in the “planned society”. 
 
In short, unlike the social polarisation in Western world, the inequality in pre-reform 
China was essentially not caused by the competition in accordance with the market rules, 
but as the consequence of its fragmented institutional system. More, the appearances of 
the uniqueness were shown in different levels. In the macro-structure of social 
development, this isolation showed an even more serious imbalance among sectors: in 
1978, the output from agriculture was 28.4% of the GDP while the proportion of the 
“registered” rural population was 82.5% (Chen, 2004). However, in the micro-structure, 
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there was extremely high homogeneity in the same social group. The strict development 
plans and the lack of social mobility severely eliminated the diversity of each social 
group. The isolated and excluded groups or communities really enhanced the social 
stability of the pre-reform China, but also become one significant character of the social 
order which would be impacted upon drastically by the ensuing economic reform. The 
majority of the Chinese urban population still resided in the traditional cities as 
administrative centres, just as they had done before. 
 
6.2.2 Urbanisation and demographic control 
 
As discussed above, before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the 
agriculture-based Chinese society had experienced little change on a macro-scale. The 
mass rural-urban migration during the Industrial Revolution in Western countries never 
took place in China. In 1949, when the Socialist state had just been established, the 
urban population was around 12% of the total population (He, 1989; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2004). 
 
In the first few years of the Socialist state, rural residents were allowed to move into 
urban areas without any formal restriction. Alongside the national allocated investment 
concentrated in industrial development in urban areas, millions of rural labourers rushed 
to the cities, seeking job opportunities. The population in some industrial cities doubled 
in a very short period (Day and Xia, 1994). However, the number of uncontrolled 
migrants quickly went beyond the job supply of the new industries. It also brought great 
pressures on urban infrastructures, such as severe shortage of housing supply and even 
food supply in some cities. As a response, in 1958 the “Hukou” control was introduced 
to halt the rapid urbanisation. According to a series of regulations, the migrants from 
rural to urban areas had to be approved by the authorities. The purpose was to anchor 
the farmers on land as the stone to kill two birds: reducing the population and job 
pressure in cities and also ensuring a sufficient labour force in agricultural production to 
support urban industry. 
 
The strict demographic control by the Hukou system might be the most distinctive 
feature associated with Chinese urban development in that era, even when compared 
with that of the Soviet Union and East European socialist countries. As a consequence, 
the pace of urbanisation was very slow during the 1960s and 1970s. By 1978, still only 
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18% of Chinese people were registered as “urban population” (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2003), which means that, although the changes of Chinese cities 
were so great in many areas during the Maoist period, their physical size had enlarged to 
a lesser degree. 
 
6.2.3 Urban planning and implementation 
 
In the era of planned economy, the communist government emphasised that all urban 
construction projects should be under the strict control of urban planning, which was 
seen as the spatial reflection of national or local economic plans (Zou, 2003; 2005). The 
major task of urban planning is to set up blue-print master plans to allocate the 
construction projects spatially. Almost 100% projects were initiated and invested by 
public agencies. Some large-scale “key” projects (the majority of them related to heavy 
industries) received direct investment from the central government, and the construction 
usually strictly followed the blue-print plans. However, other construction projects were 
usually completed in a more flexible way: the local authorities or Work Units, as 
holders of land development rights, could launch the development schemes on their own 
sites. These projects were usually self-invested, and the construction followed the 
instruction of the master plans and with the permission of the planning authorities. 
 
The public-dominated urban construction tried to keep a more balanced development in 
cities. In many of the master plans of Chinese cities immediately after 1949, improving 
the living conditions of people was given the same priority as new industry 
development, but in practice the over-ambitious and comprehensive objectives were 
always hard to achieve because of difficult public finance procedures. As a result, 
housing and other infrastructure construction had to give way to industry. In a very long 
period, only very limited financial support was used to develop the “non-productive 
projects”, which included housing, social service facilities and general infrastructure 
(Zhang and Wang, 2001). This reflected the unbalanced urban development during the 
era of the planned economy under the strategy of “production first, livelihood later” 
across China. During the years of the insufficient support of public finance, urban 
development very frequently lagged behind the original plans. 
 
Post-war urban development, especially the “key” projects, shared some similar spatial 
features to the European public-led projects in the same period, in both Socialist East 
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Europe and Social-democratic West Europe. The new industrial estates were 
concentrated in peripheral areas, together with the surrounding affiliated housing and 
service buildings. All of the projects had separate functional zones, wide use of public 
transportation and egalitarian-standard housing estates. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
characters were also obvious As observed by Gaubatz (1995, 1999), excluding some 
very large “key” projects, the Chinese-style Work Unit-led construction projects were 
usually organised in smaller sizes and scattered in different part of the cities, unlike the 
European cases, where public housing estates were usually very large in size and 
concentrated mainly in one location. Each of the Work Unit-led projects would form a 
closed urban neighbourhood which was designated as self-sufficient, offering the 
residents almost all functions in housing, working and social service provision. Every 
city would consist of many such closed neighbourhoods, all relatively indistinguishable 
from one another. The Work Unit-led development provided great convenience, by 
creating a short distance between living and working places for the urban workforce and 
an easy way to provide and manage welfare services, which is really a very ideal urban 
model in a society without many private cars (Wang, 2004a). 
 
Many “key” urban construction projects were placed in Beijing, the political centre of 
the Communist authority and the most important stage for showing the achievements of 
the Socialist state. In every version of its master plan, Beijing was defined as not only 
the political and cultural centre of China, but also a city with strong industrial 
production. The central and local governments hoped that the construction of new 
state-owned industrial estates could attract the unemployed labour forces, which 
reached 300,000 in 1949, as 40% of working age population (Dong, 2006). In the 1950s, 
four large new industrial districts were quickly set up in northeast, eastern, southern and 
western suburbs respectively, at a distance of about 10 km2 from the old town. Over 50 
large state-own firms were established, and new residential areas were constructed 
nearby to house the workforce. Meanwhile, in the Northwest periphery, several higher 
education and national research institutes were set up alongside two major roads, and 
the affiliated residential and service buildings were erected nearby as well. 
 
Besides, another major task was to plan the projects in such a way that they would 
accommodate the large-scale national administrative bureaux. The 1954 master plan 
confirmed that the old town should be continuously used as the national administrative 
centre. Thus the majority of national and local governmental offices were not far from 
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the old city centre. Some of the new offices were constructed in the nearest periphery 
just adjacent to the old town. Some others came from the renewal projects of the 
existing neighbourhoods in the old town. Also, some well-maintained private inner-city 
houses, usually following the traditional low-rise style with courtyards, were transferred 
to public-ownership, and used as offices of many governmental Work Units. In all, 
these new physical changes had begun to increase the construction density and affect 
the well-reserved traditional urban form of Beijing old town. 
 
6.3 Reform Era (since the 1980s) 
 
6.3.1 Socio-economic restructuring 
 
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the core of the second generation of China’s national leaders, 
along with his colleagues, finally ended the years of fierce battles of national leadership 
and fundamentally changed the development strategy of the late Maoist period. The new 
national strategy to start the economic reform was applied; it is now regarded as the 
break-off point of the well-known “Chinese Miracle” in economic growth in the 
following decades. After reassessing the performance of the highly central-controlled 
planned economy, with the priority of development of the industrial sector - especially 
the heavy industry, - a series of changes was introduced step by step. In the following 
years, the role of economic plans in resource allocation gradually gave way to the 
market force. The closed national economy system was going to merge into the global 
market. Private capital, including foreign investment, was then encouraged to be 
involved in initiating new economic activities. Some public-owned enterprises were 
closed or transferred to private or joint ownership. More and more industries were 
allowed to receive private investment and import of foreign technologies. The private 
industrial enterprises boomed very quickly and enhanced significantly the 
competitiveness of China’s national economy. The great potential and “comparative 
advantages” of China’s economy, especially the huge cheap labour force and large 
domestic market, were quickly explored (Cai and Lin, 2003). 
 
The speed of the economic growth has been remarkable. Throughout the reform period, 
China was the world’s fastest growing economy, with approximately 10% annual 
increasing rate in the most recent almost 30 consecutive years. Most of the evidence and 
statistics clearly demonstrate that great changes had occurred. In 1998, China’s GDP 
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(PPP) had occupied 11.5% of the total volume of the world5. By the end of 2006, 
China’s GDP (nominal) had reached 2,644 billion US Dollars and ranked fourth in the 
world (World Bank, 2008). At the same time, there have been tremendous 
improvements in the living standards of most population: the Engel coefficient (the 
proportion of food expenses of total consumer spending) of urban residents decreased 
from 57.5 percent in 1978 to 36.3 percent in 2007; and that of rural residents dropped 
from 67.7 percent to 43.1 in the same period (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2008). Moreover, by 2001, there were over 400 million fewer people living in extreme 
poverty than in the 1980s (Chen and Ravallion, 2004). In all, the achievements of 
China’s economic miracle are much greater than those of any other developing 
countries and former Socialist countries in the world. 
 
The economic reform also triggered the overall social restructuring in China. Alongside 
the establishment of the market-oriented economic system, people now have greater 
freedom of personal choice in many areas: job, lifestyle and mobility. The state no 
longer allocates guaranteed secure jobs to everyone, and employees can transfer from 
one job or sector to another much more freely. The wages of the labour forces now 
show their real personal contribution in workplaces. The income level has been quickly 
polarised. Capable people can earn several hundred times more than their previous 
income, but the salary of low-level labours has increased only slightly over many years. 
Meanwhile, many goods and social services are no longer provided by public agencies 
only, but are available from the market. As a result, the fragmented social structure in 
previous decades has been greatly overwhelmed. The life quality of every Chinese 
urban person is less associated with his / her categorised “social status” of the past, and 
is a now reflection of his/her current income. This is more or less similar to the changes 
which occurred in Britain in the 1980s, when the new right-wing government greatly 
encouraged the return of market forces and the shrinking of the Welfare State. 
 
Unlike the fast changing socio-economic system, the administrative system in China did 
not experience major reforms during these years, for many reasons. The centrally 
controlled top-down governmental system, with many tiers, may have been weaker than 
before, but still very strong if compared with that in most other countries. The 
interventionist approaches are still frequently used by the public agencies to guide, 
facilitate or regulate the market forces when the government thinks necessary. In many 
                                                        
5 Data from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_by_past_GDP_%28PPP%29 
  131 
sectors, the old-style resource allocation or welfare provision (free or lower than market 
price) still coexisted with the marketised approaches during the transitional period. The 
Chinese government hoped to maintain both systems over quite a long period of time in 
order to ensure that the transitional process from planned to market economy would go 
smoothly and step by step. In addition, in practice the dual-track regulations are 
believed to be more beneficial to generating higher-speed development. In many cases, 
the private capital and governmental powers have formed a union by working together. 
For instance, many local governments would like to facilitate the private investors by 
providing cheaper land, improved infrastructure and lower tax rates, in order to 
accelerate the development of local industry. Sometimes, the legacy of the strong power 
of the previous local administrative system remains, so even some statutory regulations, 
including urban planning and environmental controls, can be bypassed or ignored for 
those development projects,. In all, the union between the two sides can easily remove 
the barriers against privately invested development, usually at very low cost. 
 
Both sides of the union can achieve effective benefits through this model: the investors 
can obtain more profits and rewards from the public aid, while the governments 
appreciate the achievements of fast GDP growth. Actually, this has been seen as a 
universal development model in China, especially since the mid 1990s, with the 
booming private economy and continuous strong state power.  
 
6.3.2 Rapid urbanisation and migration 
 
Recent economic growth in China has been accompanied by accelerated urbanisation. 
The newly-coming private and foreign investment set up countless new enterprises in 
Chinese cities in a very short period of time. Many of them were the labour-intense 
firms or service providers which required a large number of unskilled and cheap urban 
labourers. This started the large flow of migration from rural to urban areas, and the 
single-way demographic mobility has lasted over 20 years and is still going on. The size 
and the speed of the migration campaign is the largest in Chinese history, and that may 
be compared with what happened immediately after the Industrial Revolution in most 
European countries. 
 
Some policy shifts make the urbanisation process possible and speedy. Up to now the 
nation-wide “Hukou” system has continued to exist, but since the 1980s the strict 
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regulations to control rural-urban migrants have already been relaxed, in comparison 
with the past. At first, rural people were allowed to register as temporary population in 
urban areas and work and live there. They were permitted to run shops and set up stalls 
within some confines, or they participated in household domestic services. In later years, 
rural migrants were permitted to find jobs in more industrial sectors. After the 1990s in 
particular, large-scale property and infrastructure development in cities attracted many 
young people from the countryside to work on construction sites (Wang, 2004a; Chen 
and Chen, 1993; Shen, 2002). Meanwhile, the urban population, migrating from one 
city to another, no longer had as many restrictions as before. Corresponding with the 
pace of rural migrants, the prevalence of urban migrants from Western poor provinces 
to eastern coastal metropolitan towns and cities is also becoming more and more 
apparent. In all, the number of the incoming migration has been very large. It was 
reported that in 2003 Chinese cities had received 140 million migrants, which was over 
10% of the total national population. No doubt, the rural-urban migration has since 
become the most important cause for accelerating the fast urbanisation (Knight and 
Song, 1999; Liu and Liang, 1997). 
 
By 2006, there were already 577 million urban residents in China, 44% of the total 
population (compared with 18% in 1978). Although the general urbanisation rate is still 
much lower than that of most European countries, the remarkable factor is that distinct 
growth is taking place in such a short period. It took only around 25 years to increase 
the urbanisation rate from 18% to over 40%, while it took Britain 120 years, the US 80 
years, and Japan more than 30 years to accomplish this. In some early-developed coastal 
provinces, the mass of incoming migrants has impacted greatly on the original 
population structure. For example, in Guangdong province, over 30% of the people 
were not locally born, and in some cities, the proportion may be higher than 50% (Wang, 
2004a). 
 
6.3.3 Urban changes, planning and implementation 
 
Changes in the urban landscape in all Chinese cities were also striking. Built-up areas 
expanded at a much faster speed than ever. Almost every new urban area has been 
developing at a larger-scale, faster speed, higher density and with more advanced 
infrastructures. Many coastal cities and towns have in fact been turned into little more 
than huge construction sites. In Beijing, built-up areas have more than doubled in size 
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since the early 1980s. Expansion toward suburban areas is measured by the layers of 
new ring roads constructed. In the early 1980s, most parts of the built-up areas were 
enclosed by the 2nd ring road (33km), and few parts were beyond the 3rd ring road. Since 
2000, the booming new construction has used up most of the land within the 5th ring 
road (99km) and some new projects may reach the 6th ring road (200km). Even some of 
the land reserved as green belt land around the city has been occupied by new buildings. 
(Figure 6-3) These new projects consist of many new functional zones and districts, 
such as CBDs, high-tech science parks, special economic zones, high-rise housing 
estates, manufacturing estates, shopping centres, luxury hotels and tourist districts. The 
continued increase in spatial and functional specialisation in Chinese cities is strongly 
tied to increased autonomy and diversity in the social and economic spheres. Compared 
with the monotonous urban neighbourhoods of the pre-reform city, the new urban area 
is developing in a context of greater socio-economic and individual mobility and 
changing and increasingly complex economic organisation and urban form. (Gaubatz, 
1995, 1996) 
 
Figure 6-3 Expansion of the built-up area of Beijing City (1951-2000) 
Source: Wang, 2003,  p. 30-31 
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However, since the late 1990s, this land-consuming suburbanised development pattern 
has had to face greater resistance. The major resistance comes from the conflicts 
between the unstoppable expansion and the limited land resources in Chinese cities. 
Actually, in most coastal cities, like Beijing, the rapidly expanding urban construction 
has occupied nearly all available urban land for development. Many local governments 
have had to acquire neighbouring rural land for new projects. However, this is a very 
contentious process. According to Chinese law, in the case of the urban construction 
projects requiring the use of rural land, the local farmers must be well compensated 
before moving out. The compensation should include not only economic compensation, 
but also job distribution and urban welfare provision, because thereafter they will no 
longer hold the agrarian land and can never make their living from agricultural 
production. That is always a significant problem for local governments and the 
developers. In some cities, especially the highly expanding ones, local governments had 
successfully ‘urbanised’ a lot of agricultural land around their cities, but during the 
process a huge number of rural people were dissatisfied with the compensation they got 
and stirred some social unrest. That is a very negative sign for further sprawl. Other 
resistance comes from the environmental concerns. It is obvious that the increasing 
reliability on car traffic and reduced green land in an expanded city like Beijing has 
greatly worsened the air quality; this was especially the case when Beijing was 
preparing to host the 2008 Olympics. Certainly, in recent years, more and more 
researchers and officials have begun to question the effects of the fast expansion and 
think about the alternative ways for further urban development. As a result, the new 
versions of master plans in many cities have proposed the accelerated pace of urban 
renewal schemes so that the potential of existing built-up areas can be fully explored.  
Figure 6-4 shows how the complex spatial development trend in contemporary Chinese 
cities has been summarised by Wang (2004a), where the development pressure to both 
suburban and inner-city areas is indicated clearly. 
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Figure 6-4 Spatial developing trend in contemporary Chinese cities 
Source; Wang, 2004a, p. 44 
 
6.4 New Changes since the Mid-1990s 
 
6.4.1 Economic restructuring and social impacts 
 
Since the 1990s, the reform towards market economy in Chinese cities has been 
accelerated, especially in the large coastal cities like Beijing. Mass private and foreign 
investment flew into the cities and initiated new economic activities. By the influence of 
economic globalisation, the major function of large Chinese cities was re-defined. The 
investors would like to use them as new centres of service industry and hubs of logistics, 
rather than the manufacturing bases, as before (Gu and Shen, 2003). Table 6-1 shows 
the significant transition of urban economic restructuring in the case of Beijing city. 
 
Table 6-1 Percentage share of three industrial sectors in GDP in Beijing (1952-2000) (%) 
 
Industry 1952 1978 1990 2000 
Primary 22.2 5.2 8.8 2.5 
Secondary 38.7 71.1 52.4 32.7 
Tertiary 39.1 23.7 38.9 64.8 
Source: http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/ 
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The contribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been the fastest booming sector 
of the whole urban economic system. The growth of FDI in the large cities like Beijing 
has been faster than in many other cities. The majority of the inflow of FDI was utilised 
to develop the high-level service sector and high-tech industries, such as IT and 
financial service and modern logistics. As a result, the number of highly skilled and 
well-paid technical and managerial jobs has grown very fast. In contrast, some 
traditional industries, such as manufacturing, traditional wholesale and retailing, have 
shrunk dramatically. Most declined industries were controlled by state-owned and 
collective-owned enterprises which used to be the largest employers of the urban labour 
force, but most of them were privatised in the transitional years. In order to increase 
their competitiveness and economic efficiency in the market, they no longer provided 
unskilled jobs for the redundant as they had done in the planned economy era (Lu et al., 
2002). As a result, the growth of job opportunities was much slower than that of either 
the GDP, the fixed assets or the urban labour forces (Sun, 2004; Hu, 1999). In Beijing, 
the change of employment of three industrial sectors is shown as Table 6-2. Between 
1978 and 2000 the city-wide jobs increased to nearly 40%; however, the local GDP had 
grown over 20 times (http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/). Many statistics also show that the 
average wage of unskilled labourers increased much more slowly than that of the higher 
incomers in the same period. In all, the economic reform in Chinese cities certainly 
realised the idea of “allowing a part of people rich first”, but meanwhile it also caused 
the emergence of a huge number of vulnerable groups as the losers of the restructuring. 
 
Table 6-2 Employment growth in three sectors in Beijing (1978-2000) 
 
 








(thousand) %  % 
Primary 1259 28.3 907 14.5 729 11.8 -530 -42.1 
Secondary 1779 40.1 2816 44.9 2082 33.6 303 17.0 
Tertiary 1403 31.6 2548 40.6 3382 54.6 1979 141.1 
Total 4441  6271  6193  1752 39.5 
Source: http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/ 
 
As the result of the economic reform, the income differentiation has become a more 
decisive factor in the restructuring of the social groups in Chinese cities. Prior to the 
early 1990s, poverty was never a serious problem in the cities. In the planned economy 
system, the state allocated a secure job to almost every adult “valid” urban resident 
(with urban Hukou). The employees received egalitarian wages and also welfare 
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housing and other social services through their work units. Only very few urban 
residents were not employed by any work units and excluded from the state-funded 
safety net. They formed the “traditional urban poverty” groups, including the so-called 
“three no” persons (no ability to work, no source of income, and no relatives or 
dependents) and some others with very bad personal reputations (Fei, 1999; Guan, 
2000). Up to the end of the 1980s, the total number of the traditional urban poverty 
population was very small. Although there was not a universal nation-wide standard, it 
was believed that in 1990, the number of people experiencing poverty in Chinese cities 
was about 1.3 million, much less than 1% of total population (Cai, 2003). In the 1980s, 
during the early stage of the economic reform, the rise of private economy and more 
flexible employment (including the short-term, part-time or contract jobs) created more 
job opportunities and did help some traditional urban poor people to escape from 
hardship.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the private economy has replaced the state-owned Work Units as 
the major contributor of GDP and job opportunities. That means most of the former 
rules for income and welfare distribution under the planned economy had been broken. 
Some people gained a boon from the restructuring, but the number of losers during the 
process was not small. Many official and research reports revealed that despite rapid 
economic growth in Chinese cities having continued in recent years, the income 
inequality and polarisation quickly emerged as the negative impact of the radical 
economic and employment restructuring (Wu, 2003; Guan, 2000; Tang and Parish, 
2000; Zhou, 2000; Bian and Logan, 1996; Qian and Wong, 2000; Li, 2005a; 2005b; 
Khan and Riskin, 2001). In particular, after 1995, households at the lowest 5 percentile 
income distribution experienced an income reduction, while households at the top end 
of the distribution enjoyed accelerated income gains (Meng, 2004). There were also 
many ways to count the scale of the new urban poor or the groups “living with 
difficulties” (Hussain, 2003; Li, 2002; Guan, 2003; Solinger, 2001; Chen and Wang, 
2001; Fang et al., 2002; World Bank, 1993; Li, 2005a; Guan, 2000; 2003). The most 
frequently quoted number, “14-15 million”, is the estimate of the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, the National Statistics Bureau and All China Trade Union in the surveys carried 
out independently during 1999-2000 (Li, 2004, p. 10). 
 
Further, many researchers claimed that the more serious problems to the vulnerable 
groups were not only the income inequality, but a “marginalisation” process from 
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mainstream urban society (Li, 2002; Sun, 2002; Li, 2004; Tang, 2002). During the 
transitional period, millions of urban population lost their jobs and found it very 
difficult to access new jobs or start their own businesses to support decent living 
conditions. For those with poor education, long-term illness or disability, or broken 
families in particular, re-employment would become more difficult in the long term. 
Usually, all the losers of the restructuring period who had to suffer low living standards 
and employment exclusion were defined as the urban “underclass” (Wu, 2003, p. 412). 
 
6.4.2 Formation of new vulnerable groups 
 
In general, the new urban poverty and vulnerable groups could be classified into three 
main categories: the “laid-off” or unemployed former workers, pensioners, and the 
“floating population”, including all kinds of migrants without a local “Hukou”. The 
formation of the three categories will be discussed in turn as follows. 
 
 “Laid-off” workers 
 
In the years of planned-economy, public-owned enterprises were major employers of 
the urban population. With less emphasis on economic efficiency and more emphasis on 
full employment, most public sector enterprises and their affiliated organisations 
employed more people than they should have. Work that could be done easily by one 
person was handled by two or more, and overstaffing was a main feature of the socialist 
Work Unit system. After the 1980s, when the private economy was introduced, the 
redundant employees became one of the biggest weaknesses for public enterprises in the 
face of the fierce competition in a liberalised market. Actually, since the early 1980s, 
the economic output of public sector has begun to take less and less proportion of the 
national economy, and more employees had transferred from the public to the private 
sector. However, in order to accelerate such a process, in the late 1990s the government 
adopted tougher policies to reduce the redundant labour forces and increase efficiency 
in the state-owned enterprise sectors, particularly in the larger ones of heavy industries 
which usually displayed poor performance in the market. A great number of workers, 
especially the unskilled blue-collar workers with lower productivity, lost their jobs. 
Between 1996 and 2003, 64.4 million work posts were eliminated from the public sector 
(Zhou, 2003). In some cities, about 30% of all jobs in public-owned enterprises were cut 
(Zhu, 1998). Normally, those redundant employees were described as “laid-off” 
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workers, to differentiate them from the “unemployment” population. In theory, the 
laid-off workers were still in receipt of basic livelihood allowances from their previous 
employers or local government until they get new jobs. The government and employers 
set up various re-employment service centres to help the laid-off workers to find new 
jobs or to learn new skills. However, because of the huge size of “laid-off” groups 
increasing in such a short period, the rate of re-employment was not at all satisfactory. 
At the end of 1999, the re-employment rate was 42%, a drop of ten percentage points 
from the previous year. In later years, the rate plummeted rapidly to just 10% or lower 
(He, 2002; Zhu, 2002). Some of them had to become long-term or permanent 
unemployed people, because many small or poorly performing public enterprises could 
not afford to run the re-employment service centres or even pay the basic living 
allowances. For millions of laid-off families, the financial difficulties could soon 
become as bad as those experienced by the “traditional urban poverty” groups. Their 
incomes rely greatly on the basic livelihood allowances and other subsidies, but that 
was far from enough to sustain the normal standard of life. An official study discovered 
that, nationwide, 20 to 30 million urban-registered workers had fallen into poverty 
around the turn of the century, and with their family members, they added up to about 
40 to 50 million people altogether, or almost 13% of the urban population (Chinese 




The retired people with downward personal finance formed another group of the new 
urban poverty. In most Chinese cities, the ratio of pensioners to all employed people has 
increased significantly in recent decades. Official statistics show that the number was 
1:30 in 1978, and 1:7.5 in 1985, but in 2002, it reached a record high, around 1:3. There 
were over 42 million pensioners in cities and towns at the end of 2002, 13 times the 
figure for 1978 (3 million) (Ministry of Labour and Social Security and State Statistical 
Bureau, 2003). The rapid growth in the number of pensioners is not only the result of 
the longer average life-span, but is also associated with radical reform of public 
enterprises. In many Work Units of the public sector, some “unimportant” employees 
(usually the unskilled workers or low-level managers aged over 40 or 45) were 
encouraged to retire early, when they had not yet reached the official retirement age. 
This could be seen as a supplementary approach to help cut off the redundant employees 
of public sector. However, it soon led to severe financial difficulties for millions of 
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pensioners. First, the amount of pension they received was usually very small. As a 
legacy of the planned economy, every pensioner can receive a fixed monthly payment 
as a proportion of his/her wage before retirement. That ensured the pension payment 
was very poor, for in the past the wage was kept at a low level, just as a nominal reward 
for their work. The governments from time to time did increase the level of the fixed 
payment for pensioners, but the growth could never catch up the inflation. Moreover, 
pensions were normally paid by the employers, but many poor performing enterprises 
frequently deferred the payment because of financial difficulties. Actually, the wages to 
existing employees were already a great burden, so the pension payment had to be a 
lower priority. In practice, some younger early retired people did try to find new jobs, 
but only a few of them succeeded. Lack of skills and their age were big shortcomings 
for them in the competition for new jobs. Some old pensioners had to live together with 
their laid-off children so their lives might be more difficult. Recent pension reform has 
aimed to centralise pension management to municipal level and avoid the problems 
caused by bankruptcy enterprises. Nevertheless, the reform was still on the way and 




This category comprises many kinds of new urban residents who have migrated from 
other areas and who had no local “Hukou”. Those who may not stay in cities for too 
long or change their addresses very frequently are called the “floating population”. The 
majority of them came from rural areas and were referred to as rural migrant workers. In 
the early 1980s, “the household contract system” and advanced agricultural 
technologies (such as Hybrid Rice) were introduced into practice in rural China. The 
agricultural productivity increased significantly and more and more rural labour became 
surplus. New economic policies allow them to work and live in cities. The rural 
migrants quickly occupied most of the low-paid labour in urban areas. However, 
without an urban hukou, many of them had to suffer very poor working conditions, 
including overtime working, rigid workplace and delayed wages (Fan, 2001; Solinger, 
1999, 2006; Wang, 2004a). Also, most of their jobs were never secure and they were 
often excluded from many well-paid industries6. In recent years, people other than rural 
                                                        
6
 In almost every Chinese city, there are still some regulations to allow only a limited number of people 
without local Hukou to be employed in some “protected” industries, such as cashier and banking, post 
office, telephone switchboard, vehicle driver including taxi, ticket sales and collecting, nursery, shop 
assistant in department stores and so on. The unlimited jobs are usually hard, dangerous and dirty, 
physical, labour-intensive work. 
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migrants have also joined the category of “floating people”. Some of these new 
migrants may be better educated, young and unmarried. They have gone to large cities 
for more job opportunities, but in the face of fierce competition, most of them have to 
wait a long time for jobs, or get insecure low-paid jobs only. Some other farmers who 
had always lived on the periphery of large cities also joined the procession of rural 
workers from remote villages, for their agrarian land had been occupied by the recent 
urban sprawl. It is very hard to count the accurate number of all the “floating 
population” and the proportion of them varies from city to city, but it is estimated that, 
in some very large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the number of “non-registered” 
people is nearly 30% of the total population (Gu and Shen, 2003, p. 112). 
 
It is hard to know how many of the “floating people” have poor personal finance, but of 
course in the macro-scale their average income is significantly lower than that of the 
“registered” urban residents in any city. Moreover, the income of workers with low 
wages might be higher than that of the non-employed people, but in fact many of them 
always send their income to their rural homes to support their family members. As a 
result, they should be the group with lowest “real” income in cities, even excluding 
those subject to the frequently prevalent delayed wage payment. 
 
6.4.3 Welfare reform and its effects 
 
The rising unemployment rate and income poverty are not the only problems faced by 
the “new vulnerable groups”. Currently, in Chinese cities, many of the vulnerable 
families have to experience not only the poor income, but also the rising costs to 
support a decent living condition. Mostly, the major part of the increased cost is not for 
updated personal consumption, but for the marketisation of some public service 
provision. After years of economic reform, following the 1990s the Chinese government 
finally initiated the comprehensive welfare reform in many areas, trying to cancel or 
weaken the public-funded, wide-ranged and egalitarian welfare distribution system. 
Public funding is no longer the only financial support in most welfare or public service 
provision, and personal finance has to be involved to share the burden. Through the 
urban housing reform, the majority of urban housing stock has become privately owned. 
Some other important public service provision has become more reliable on the market. 
The public financial support to them has now been reduced to a very low level: for 
public security and relief, 3% of GDP; for education, only 2.9% of GDP and for 
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healthcare, only 2.0% of GDP (Guo, 2006). That is much lower than in most countries 
in the world. 
 
Urban housing reform 
 
The reform of the urban housing provision system in Chinese cities initially started in 
the late 1980s. Commercialisation and privatisation of the public housing provision 
system are the major themes of the reform process. At first, it was just seen as an 
alternative way to accelerate housing provision in responding to the urgent urban 
housing shortage then, but since the 1990s it has also become the most important 
element of the whole economic reform process (World Bank, 1992; Wang, 1992, 2000, 
2001, 2003, 2004a; Wang and Murie, 1996, 1999; Bian and Logan, 1993; Chen, 1996; 
Logan et al., 1999; Zhou and Logan, 1996; Wu, 1996; Lv and Shao, 2001), so after the 
mid-1990s the pace towards the market was drastically accelerated. The most important 
turning points of such a process are summarised in Table 6-3. 
 
The reform towards privatisation and marketisation in Chinese cities has led to great 
achievements in reducing the housing shortage to some extent and improving general 
living conditions for many urban people. During this period, an increasing number of 
urban families moved into the purpose-built flats. In 2003 in urban China, the average 
floor area per person reached over 20 m2, which is almost 4 times that of the early 
1980s (Wang, 2004a). The close linkage for housing provision between individuals and 
their Work Units was broken up, and the fragmented system was replaced by a new one 
with less institutional barriers: in theory, every urban family now has equal opportunity 
to find their homes from the market or local government. However, the real impact from 
housing reform and development on different social and economic groups varies. 
Obviously, rich people can easily obtain spacious and better condition housing units. 
The increase in housing prices also helps them to accumulate more wealth. While to 
most of the urban underclasses, the abolishment of public housing provision means they 
have lost the guaranteed low-cost dwellings. Owing to their poor personal finance, they 
cannot afford to buy the expensive commodity housing in market. Many of them are 
also excluded by the affordable housing provided by the government, because they do 
not have local “Hukou”, or the list of applicants for affordable housing is too long. The 
only option for them was to stay or move to the unwanted low-quality houses, many of 
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which have not yet experienced housing reform and are still publicly owned, although 
that may bring much inconvenience for their daily life. 
 
Table 6-3 Key steps of urban housing reform in Chinese cities 
 
Time Period Content Document 
1979-1985 Initial and 
piecemeal 
experiments 
Sale of new public housing at 
construction cost or discounted 







• Increasing rents in public 
sector housing to reflect 
market price 
• Introduction of housing 
subsidy in public sector 
• Promotion of sales of public 
housing to sitting tenants 
Implementation Plan for a 
Gradual Housing System 






of housing and  
private-led housing 
development 
• Formal establishment of real 
estate market 
• Emphasising the role of 
commodity housing in 
meeting urban housing 
demand 
Interim regulation for trade 
and letting of land ownership 
in cities and towns; 
Suggestions on Promoting 
All-Round Reform of the 
Housing System in Urban 
Areas (1991) 
1998 Further reform to 
establish urban 
housing market 
• Stop in-kind public housing 
distribution and construction 
• Enhance the role of 
commodity housing in 
housing provision system 
• Initiate public-aid affordable 
housing development for 
low-incomes (but in practice 
the provision is less than 
demand and only for 
registered urban residents) 
• Introduction of cash subsidies 
to all urban employees 
The notice on Further 
Reform of Urban Housing 
System and Speeding up 
Housing Development (1998) 
 
Reform of other social service provision 
 
In Chinese cities, other major social service provisions were made through a similar 
system to the housing provision in the planned economy era. Normally, Work Units 
took full responsibility for their employees in accessing all kinds of services provided 
by various public agencies. The government hope that the theoretical “full employment” 
in the Socialist planned economy can hereby guarantee all urban residents the same 
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opportunities to receive public services. However, in practice, the quality of the service 
provision for employees in different Work Units usually varies considerably. For 
example, public-funded compulsory schooling education has been applied for several 
decades in large cities like Beijing. In theory, every child can have equal opportunity to 
receive public education, but the teaching qualities of the public schools are not of the 
same level. Some elite schools were officially labelled as “key schools” to distinguish 
them from the “normal schools”. Certainly, the “key schools” can receive more public 
funding, have better teachers and advanced equipment. Of course, the “key schools” 
have a much better academic tradition, and every year a much higher proportion of their 
students can obtain qualification for further education in the high schools and then 
universities. Normally, only the elite children who achieve higher marks in the 
city-wide entrance exams can become the students of the “key schools”. However, some 
special Work Units - for example, the higher-level governmental or military bureaux or 
some famous universities with strong financial support - may set up their own 
high-quality “affiliated schools” to create more chances of better education for the 
children of their own employees. 
 
After the 1990s, a series of reforms to restructure the service provision system was 
applied by local governments in most cities, in an effort to solve the fragmented and 
unequal service provision system. The role of the Work Unit in service provision was 
weakened and gradually replaced by a universal system. The aim of the changes was 
also similar to the housing reform: to reduce the burdens of public finance. Also, the 
public resources were expected to be used in a more efficient way through the 
introduction of the market and the collapse of the institutional barriers associated with 
the old fragmented system. 
 
The reform of healthcare system, for example, was achieved through the introduction of 
the universal health insurance scheme at the end of the 1990s. The proportion of support 
from public sources to hospitals and other healthcare agencies declined, while the price 
of medical treatments and drugs was allowed to increase to reach or approach the 
market price so that the healthcare service provision agencies could be more 
independent. Private medical service providers were allowed to compete with the 
publicly owned hospitals. Meanwhile, the universal health insurance for all urban 
residents was introduced on a pay-as-you-go basis. Employees and the local 
government make a monthly contribution (usually with a fixed ratio) to the funds. When 
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the employee has to receive very expensive medical treatment, they can claim from the 
fund to pay a part or all of the cost. In some cities, local governments have also 
established special funds to provide aid to very low-income people who cannot afford 
the basic monthly payment for the insurance. However, the newly-established insurance 
systems have not worked very well up to now. With a short history of accumulation, 
everyone involved has to invest a lot but gets very limited help from it. Sometimes the 
help from Work Units was still very important in dealing with the increased service 
costs. However, the help from Work Units varies a lot. To most low-income people, the 
help is nearly nothing, either because of the poor financial capability of their employers 
with bad performance in the market, or because they do not have a secure, formal job 
contract from their employers. 
 
Increasing education costs is another heavy burden for most poor urban families. For a 
long time, with the implementation of the policy of “compulsory basic education”, the 
government provided funds to support low-cost school education for children aged 6-15; 
however, the tuition fee was not totally waived. There was not a universal fee standard 
so that in some poorer cities, when the public funding to the education bureaux was not 
sufficient, the tuition fee could be increased. In some richer cities like Beijing, the 
unequal quality of public schools became the most important problem. In some old 
neighbourhoods with a concentration of poor population, local children usually had to 
suffer unsatisfactory schooling.  
 
After the mid-1990s, some local governments - including Beijing - began to reform the 
“unequal” public education system associated with the fragmented Work Unit system. 
The titles of the “key schools” were removed and some of the badly performing schools 
were abolished or merged with other schools. All children with local “Hukou” aged 
6-15 could now go to the school of their catchment area or be randomly distributed to 
the local schools in their district by means of a ballot, so that every child could have 
equal opportunities for education. The government hoped to use such a policy to 
eliminate the inequalities between different public schools. Nevertheless, the legacy of 
the previous system still remained. The students of the traditional elite schools still 
show much better academic performance. However, money can now buy better 
education for children as some schools take on children from other areas with a fee. If 
some families are unsatisfied with the school allocated to their children by the ballot, 
they may try to seek additional positions in the good schools. This may cost a lot of 
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money, set as the “choosing school” fees. The fees are normally as high as the salary of 
a low-income job so the poor families can hardly afford that. 
 
Apart from schools, the cost of other education including college, university, 
kindergarten and nursery also increased very fast, although some of the institutions still 
receive public funding. After the mid-1990s, the size of almost all universities was 
increased and the universities were allowed to collect fees from students to support their 
expansion. That led to the University fees increasing out of proportion in relation to 
income increases in the country. A report showed that in Hubei Province, 22 percent of 
students (93 thousand) had problems with tuition fees and living costs in 2001. These 
students also had difficulty in paying for books and access to computers, which greatly 
affected their general academic performance (Hubei Province Urban Surveying and 
Research Team, 2002). Also, millions of students in poor families had to give up their 
opportunities for further education, even though their academic performance might be 
very good. 
 
The reform of the social service provision still does not break the institutional barriers 
between the “registered” urban residents and the “floating people”. Many of the 
non-registered people were excluded out of the insurance schemes or low-cost public 
education. The only way for them to obtain the equal service provision is to pay more 
money. Many statistics (Shao, 2005) show that to most urban low-income families, 
nowadays, the cost for health and education takes a much higher proportion of all daily 
costs than average, which means that in Chinese cities, the gap of living conditions 
between rich and poor social groups is actually greater than the difference of their 
unequal incomes. 
 
6.4.4 Marginalisation of old neighbourhoods with concentrated new urban poverty 
and vulnerable groups 
 
Although the comprehensive socio-economic restructuring and welfare reform have 
been in progress in most urban neighbourhoods, the changes in old neighbourhoods are 
often lagging behind. In recent years, urban economic development has become more 
and more dependent on private investment and privately initiated economic activities. 
With the economic globalisation and the formation of the global market, more 
investment and new economic activities are attracted in places as the modes of 
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information exchange. Meanwhile, in some large Chinese cities like Beijing, car and 
underground traffic has replaced bus, cycling or walking as the major way of mobility, 
and the recent construction of modern traffic infrastructure has greatly increased the 
accessibility of people from the new urban districts outside the old town. Moreover, the 
advanced telecommunication infrastructure is forming new urban districts in more 
favourable locations. In Beijing since the 1990s, the majority of local GDP and job 
opportunities have been created in the new business centres outside the old town; these 
include the IT industry centre in Zhongguancun, Central Business District in Chaoyang 
District, Olympic Park and so on (Gu and Shen, 2003, p. 110). In the old town, 
economic prosperity occurred in some special small areas only, including the traditional 
shopping areas such as Xidan, Wangfujing and Qianmen, and other areas along major 
roads, subway stations and nearby tourist attractions. In most of the remaining 
residential areas, the advantageous accessibility to the city centre and workplaces has 
become a less important factor. These traditional areas have become “peripheral” or 
marginal in the new urban business networking (Qv, 2004). In a market-oriented system, 
this marginalisation process actually means a declining local economy, shrinking of 
local job opportunities and greater difficulties in accessing public services. Moreover, 
the marginalisation also means these communities are losing their influence on urban 
policy-making. In the top-down decision-making model, policy-makers may neglect the 
requirement for improvement of these disadvantaged areas, because the development of 
these “few reached” neighbourhoods by outsiders may be less associated with the 
city-wide economic health and the enhancement of local competitiveness. One good 
example is the “face-lifting” scheme initiated by Beijing Municipal Government before 
the Beijing 2008 Olympics. In this scheme, a substantial amount of public funding was 
used to help renovate all the facades of traditional houses just along the main streets and 
aisles so that tourists could have a beautified urban image, but the funding could not be 
used to repair the invisible parts of these houses, although the conditions within these 
houses may be very bad. 
 
As a consequence of these complex development processes and economic forces, the 
decline of local living conditions in the traditional inner-city residential neighbourhoods 
became more obvious. The first sign of decline is the worsening quality of the housing. 
Almost all traditional and old housing was concentrated in these areas; there have been 
no large-scale public-funded repairs and maintenance for a long time. For the historical 
reasons discussed earlier, the self-organised small-scale renewal took place commonly 
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in the past several decades. Local residents put up low cost structures as additional 
bedrooms, kitchens or toilets. Almost all of these constructions were completed without 
professional guidance, and the building quality was extremely poor. These new 
constructions gradually occupied most of the open space of the courtyard in the 
traditional neighbourhoods, and the increasing urban population led to this never-ending 
infill and densification. This process has made the general living conditions worse year 
after year. In Beijing, several rounds of surveys were conducted in the early 1990s in 
the typical inner-city neighbourhoods. It was reported that in all, about 75% houses in 
these areas were lacking maintenance or repair, and over 50% were classified as 
‘unsuitable and unsafe’ for living (Fang, 2000; Zhang, 1996). At least 1 million people 
were housed in these poor-quality dwellings. It was very common to see the old 
draining and sewage system of 100 years still in use, and most rooms had no central 
heating and piped gas, and some families did not even have access to tap water. 
Obviously in contemporary Beijing, no well paid white-collar employees and rich 
families would tolerate such rough living conditions. 
 
The social structure of the residents in these declined old neighbourhoods changed a lot 
over the last two decades as well. In the planned-economy period, one of the most 
significant spatial features of Chinese cities was that most urban neighbourhoods had 
very fragmented structures. Separated compounds (Dayuan) of work units were located 
side by side, but isolated by walls. The layout or spatial order of these gated 
communities was quite similar. Together they formed many homogenous urban 
neighbourhoods. The mobility of urban residents in these gated communities was very 
little. Once a family resided in a gated community - the work unit - they seldom moved 
to another Dayuan. Thus, in the decades of the planned economy period, the 
homogenous spatial structure of most large Chinese cities remained very stable. 
 
This unique spatial order of Chinese cities changed drastically together with the 
marginalisation process of the old neighbourhoods. Urban housing reform towards 
further marketisation finally broke the strong linkage between the influence of the 
fragmented Work Unit system and the personal housing choices. As a result, a great 
number of urban families had moved to new homes. Some of them may have moved 
many times. The reasons for the frequent changes are many: they may have changed 
jobs, workplaces, family structures or personal preferences of their living environment; 
they may also have become richer and can afford better housing units in the new 
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peripheral housing estates. But for many poor people living in the traditional areas of 
the city, relocation and move may be a forced, negative moving process. To the 
emerging urban poverty and vulnerable groups discussed above, usually any relocation 
means a downward change of living conditions. When housing distribution relies 
mainly on market forces, urban poverty and vulnerable groups begin to concentrate in 
some specific areas in contemporary Chinese cities. 
 
Wang (2004a) indicated that four types of “disadvantaged neighbourhoods” could be 
identified with poor quality housing and concentration of urban underclasses in Chinese 
cities: traditional residential areas in the inner-cities, low-quality public housing estates 
associated with problematic public-owned enterprises, illegal dwellings in so-called 
“urban villages” and the dormitories in construction sites or other derelict land. All 
these “problematic” neighbourhoods were listed as target areas to be redeveloped. In the 
old cities like Beijing, the remaining old residential areas were still of quite a size, 
because many parts of them were preserved as unchangeable historic heritage over a 
long period of time. Thus, the population in these areas was much larger than in the 
other three types of “disadvantaged areas”. Many statistics have shown that, before the 
early 2000s, the old residential area of Beijing had become the most important container 




As an oriental nation with a long civilisation, China has its unique history of political, 
economic and social development, distinguishing it from Western countries. In ancient 
times, the central-controlled political system was established very early, and public 
authorities always had very strong power to control the national economy and social 
orders. The economic structure was dominated by agriculture. The social structure was 
highly homogenous and stable, always with a scarcity of dynamics and mobility. After 
the mid 19th century, some new changes occurred with the arrival of colonisation, but on 
a macro-scale the entire Chinese society was still running in traditional ways. In this 
context, urban development was happening at a very slow speed, more like a symbolic 
event trying to meet the requirement to show the virtual and political orders rather than 
economic and social needs. After 1840, in some foreign-controlled areas the urban 
development began to be driven by the Western-style industrialisation, but that took 
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place on a very limited scale only and had little impact on the traditional urban 
structure.  
 
In the socialist planned economic era, the Soviet-style political-economic model was 
applied nation wide. The power of the state was further enhanced to an extreme extent, 
and the national economy and social development were both under strict central control, 
in both the decision making of resource distribution and project implementation. Urban 
development was accelerated more than before, and urban-rural separation ensured that 
more public resources could be concentrated in the construction of “key” projects as 
industrial plants and administrative estates in large cities. However, the development of 
the “non-productive projects”, such as the construction of housing and infrastructure, 
usually lagged far behind. Almost all new development strictly followed the master 
plans which were regarded as a spatial reflection of the national economic plans. 
 
In the era after the economic reform, the socio-economic context was restructured 
greatly. The central control of the economic system was reduced gradually and 
significantly, as the role of private investment and market forces was re-introduced and 
enhanced. The social well-being of individuals was no longer closely linked with their 
political status but rather with their income, and the gap between the rich and poor has 
rapidly increased in recent years. Nevertheless, the political system still followed the 
top-down model, with few changes. Interventional approaches were still frequently used, 
but most of them were just applied to encourage and facilitate the private-led urban 
growth. Urban development in this period reached a very high speed, with the constant 
mass incoming of rural migrants. The expansion of built-up areas was extremely fast 
and it had by then used up almost all available land in many cities. Therefore, in most 
recent years, the renewal of existing urban neighbourhoods has been emphasised in 
future development through planning regulations. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the pace of economic reform has been accelerated to meet the 
requirements of economic globalisation. The GDP growth has sustained a high speed 
but the negative consequences in social aspects have emerged rapidly. Through the 
economic restructuring and reform of public-owned enterprises, most low-educated, 
elderly and other vulnerable groups have lost secure jobs, while the reform of urban and 
service provision has increased their cost of living so that the great majority of urban 
residents have had to live with difficulties. Meanwhile, the booming urban poverty and 
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vulnerable groups have become more and more concentrated in some specific locations. 
For many reasons, the old residential neighbourhoods in inner-cities became 
marginalised during the economic growth. In historic cities like Beijing, these old 
neighbourhoods had become the largest containers of the concentrated urban poverty 
and vulnerable groups. 
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Chapter 7 Urban Neighbourhood Renewal in Chinese Cities 
 
Following the general introduction about the urban development in China, this chapter 
continues the historical review and focuses on the development of neighbourhood 
renewal in China. In practice, the renewal of the old neighbourhood has been a 
long-standing issue in Chinese cities, but the process and mechanism varied between 
periods under different political and socio-economic contexts, with distinguished urban 
changes then. Therefore, the following discussion is organised around three separate 
eras and in turn answers the following questions for each:  
• What were the major objectives for the renewal practice?  
• Who were involved in the renewal process and what were their roles?  
• What approaches were applied during the renewal process?  
• What were the outputs and effects of the renewal practice?  
Answers to these questions will be fundamental to the understanding of the 
development trajectory of the neighbourhood renewal ideas and practice in Chinese 
cities which can be compared with the British development path discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
7.1 Pre-1949 Urban Renewal Practice 
 
7.1.1 Renewal practice in traditional cities 
 
The renewal and reconstruction practice of aging neighbourhoods was a 
well-established practice in ancient Chinese cities, but there is no universal record in the 
existing literature about the operation of the renewal activities in such a long period of 
time. The description of some cases in the large cities, especially the capital cities, can 
be found in some official archives (Dong, 2004; Zhang, 1982; Shen, 1983; Wan, 2007; 
Song et al., 1997). They show that the private-led and public-led renewal projects 
co-existed in almost all the periods. 
 
Private-led initiatives were usually carried out on a smaller scale, and the objective was 
to upgrade the aging private properties when the buildings became dilapidated. The 
whole process was self-funded, so the property owners were free to refurbish or 
reconstruct them at any time or for any reason without official permission; however, in 
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most cases the new buildings still had to follow the plans set by the authorities (also 
limited by the technology available at the time). This included the restrictions of the size, 
height, design features and the function of the private buildings. By this way, the 
traditional urban form could hereby be well preserved as it was just completed 
according to the blue-print master plan. However, in more recent centuries, public 
control became somehow more relaxed so that the private house-owners could gain 
more freedom in dealing with their own properties. Since the late Tang and early Song 
Dynasties (800-1000 AD), many buildings alongside the major streets which were often 
adjacent to the important public spaces, were allowed to be redeveloped as commercial 
properties (Li, 2007; Wu, 1986; He, 1996). In areas near city walls, small open spaces 
were used as expanded market or agora, as well as informal venues for ordinary 
citizens’ gatherings. In all, the expanding private-led renewal projects gradually 
increased the construction height and density of some urban neighbourhoods to a 
greater or lesser degree. The reconstruction process could also benefit from advanced 
building technologies, materials and facilities to provide better living conditions, but in 
the long agrarian era, the improvement was usually very piecemeal and incremental. 
From the macro-scale perspective, the physical changes caused by the private-led 
projects were fragmented and the scales could never be compared with the 
officially-designed constructions which still dominated the traditional urban form 
(Wang, 2005b). 
 
Some larger projects were usually organised by the authorities, funded by public finance 
and under stronger planning control to preserve the virtue-based urban spatial orders of 
traditional Chinese cities. The objectives of these public-led renewal projects were 
either the expansion of royal, governmental or military estates, or the installation or 
updating of the infrastructure and other public facilities. The operation of the public-led 
renewal projects was similar to the construction of new cities: the government provided 
most of the resources but the public contributed labour as tax payment. Almost all these 
large-scale public-led projects had priority in land use; therefore in the process many 
urban residents could be forced to relocate, usually with in-kind or cash compensation.  
 
In fact, the neighbourhood renewal practice, particularly the large-scale renewal 
schemes with household relocation, seldom happened in ancient Chinese cities. There 
were at least two major reasons. First of all, during the long stable agrarian society, 
urban economic activities were only of a very limited size and developed very slowly as 
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well as the urban population growth then, which could provide very little driving force 
for renewal activities. Moreover, urban developments were usually derived from 
expansion rather than the renewal projects. In many ancient Chinese cities, the scale of 
design for the cities was usually larger than was really required. The master plans of 
new cities were often very ambitious, occupying plenty of land. They were 
opportunities to show the powerful authority of the imperial government. That resulted 
in the large capital cities like Chang’an in Tang Dynasty and Beijing in Qing Dynasty; 
only some of the slots enclosed by the city wall were used for the construction of urban 
buildings, while others were always under-used or set aside as agricultural land, even 
after several hundred years of the original construction (Wang, 2006; Zhu, 2004) 
(Figure 7-1). Thus new development could easily be accommodated in the spare land 
rather than redeveloping the existing neighbourhoods and relocating the original 
households. In some other cases, if the urban population grew too large and the planned 
areas became too small, or the city was severely damaged by war, the authority would 
abandon the old city and organise the construction of a new city. The city relocation also 
reflected the shift of economic and political centres in the country. Environmental 
problems, especially contamination of underground water, were other reasons. 
 
  155 
 
Figure 7-1 Non-occupied area enclosed in city wall in Beijing (1911) 
Source: Zhu, 2004, p. 51 
 
7.1.2 Renewal under early industrialisation with Western influence 
 
The arrival of Western colonists and the establishment of some new cities constructed 
by foreigners brought lots of new ideas of urban planning and management. When the 
Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, the old-style feudal governmental system no longer 
worked, and in many large cities, local governments for the first time set up special 
agencies in charge of “urban affairs” in response to the increasing urban population and 
modern industries. Learning from relevant Western examples, Chinese governments 
began to issue new urban management regulations, which were often imported or 
copied from some Western approaches, to initiate practical schemes with the intention 
of creating modern Chinese cities. In Beijing, the earliest “urban planning bureau” (Jing 
Du Shi Zheng Gong Suo,京都市政公所) was established in June 1914. Its duties, 
confirmed by later regulations, included two major tasks: a) to initiate public-funded 
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schemes of infrastructure updating in the old town areas; and b) conduct a 
comprehensive survey about urban neighbourhoods (Shi, 1995). Under the leadership of 
the bureau, some public-led neighbourhood renewal projects were completed in 
following years; these included:  
 
1) Rehabilitation of some war-damaged major architectures, for example the 
Zhengyang Gate (South Gate of Beijing inner city);  
2) Installation of a local ring-railway;  
3) Extension and updating of pavements for major roads;  
4) New road and bridge connections to facilitate east-west traffic (this used to be 
isolated by the existence of the Forbidden City);  
5) Tree planting alongside major roads;  
6) Rehabilitation of royal palaces and gardens as public parks and museums;  
7) Demolishing some gates and making gaps in the city wall for auto-traffic or 
railway connection;  
8) City-wide dredging of waterways and sewage system (Wang, 2008a, 2008b; 
Wang, 2005a). 
 
From the 1920s onward, in several large cities (including Nanjing, the national capital 
between 1927 and 1949, Shanghai’s Chinese quarters as the most populous city, and 
also Beijing the previous national capital and largest city in the past), very ambitious 
city-wide master plans were produced in the years when the central or local 
governments were in good financial condition. This demonstrated the strong confidence 
of the officials and planners in these cities to create a new appearance of the existing 
neighbourhoods. As part of the plans, many public-led renewal/redevelopment schemes 
were proposed, including large-scale slum clearance, public housing estates, a modern 
road system, infrastructures as well as new schools, hospitals, colleges and 
governmental offices. However, most of the planned schemes for the benefit of normal 
urban residents were never put into practice, owing not only to the poor public finance 
then, but also the impact of the later Anti-Japanese Invasion War and the following civil 
war. A small number of projects were indeed launched on schedule, but they were 
mostly in very small areas, and the real effects were very limited. 
 
One such case project is the experimental redevelopment project in the Xiangchang area 
in the southwest part of Beijing’s old town (Zhang, 2004; 2006; Wang, 2008b). The 
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local government started this project in 1914 with the intention of creating a “flagship” 
model of the modern urban neighbourhoods. This area was selected not only because of 
its dilapidated appearance at that time, but also for the large amount of derelict land and 
few local residents. Thus in practice, the demolition work was limited and the new 
chessboard road system was set up very quickly. Private (including foreign) developers 
were allowed to buy or rent the land plots for development according to a master plan 
(Figure 7-2). Some modern infrastructures, such as telephone lines, road lighting, 
auto-traffic signals and car parks, were installed. With the support of the advanced 
infrastructure, modern housing and commercial estates were erected here in a very short 
time (Figure 7-3). This could be a revolutionary achievement of Beijing’s urban 
development, but it is pity that because of the restriction of public finance, the renewed 
area was very small (approximately 3ha). Also, in following years, following national 
political changes, the government gradually lost the power of local planning control. 
Local economy declined as a result of the competition from the newly-emerging 
commercial centres in inner-cities near the areas where rich and powerful people lived. 
The “flagship modern neighbourhood” was eventually turned into a disadvantaged area 
crowded with dwellings occupied by poor residents (Figure 7-4). 
 
 
Figure 7-2 The master plan of Xiangchang area 
Source: Jing Du Shi Zheng Gong Suo, 1919 
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Figure 7-3 Xiangchang in the 1920s Figure 7-4 Xiangchang in the 1950s 
Source: Qi, 2007, p. 49 Source: Qi, 2007, p. 48 
 
In all, although the public-led renewal practice with the import of Western ideas had led 
to the revolutionary restructuring of some small areas, they did not make any significant 
changes, either to the overall urban form of Chinese cities, or to the lives of the majority 
of urban residents.  
 
Some new styles of private-led redevelopment projects also occurred, including the 
emergence of modern industrial estates, shopping streets, new colleges and universities, 
hospitals, railway stations, churches, banks and so on. However, most of the large-scale 
projects (industrial firms, universities, large hospitals, etc.) were located outside the old 
town, and the construction inside the old town was scattered around in the city on a 
much smaller scale. In Beijing, as in many other cities, the small renewal projects 
re-used the traditional dwellings as new functions and caused only minor physical 
changes. Figure 7-5 clearly shows the limited physical changes caused by the renewal 
practice in the past century (1840s-1940s). 
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Figure 7-5 Major renewal projects in Beijing old town (1840s-1940s) 
 
As a result, in most Chinese cities like Beijing, urban neighbourhoods with the 
traditional appearance and living conditions of the pre-industrial era remained till the 
middle of the 20th century. 
 
7.2 State-led Renewal during Socialist Planned Economy Era 
 
After the Communists came to power in 1949, the neighbourhood renewal practice was 
given more priority in urban development, and the way was regulated in a 
central-controlled system. After the establishment of the Soviet-style top-down 
governmental system, the planning bureaux in almost all large cities produced new 
versions of master plans with very ambitious large-scale neighbourhood renewal 
schemes. Many of the schemes were really associated with high political importance: 
the party leaders as the ultimate decision-makers of urban development hoped the 
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renewal projects could bring revolutionary physical changes to erase the bad memory of 
the past and create the new appearance of “Socialist cities” in a short time. By this way, 
the great achievements and the superiority of the Socialist political regime could easily 
be seen by the public.  
 
There used to be many fierce debates among some officials and planners on the 
importance of renewal projects in urban development in the early 1950s. The story in 
Beijing could be the most typical example for its extraordinary political importance. As 
an old capital city, until the 1950s most urban neighbourhoods of Beijing’s old town 
were still well preserved in their traditional form. However, following its selection as 
the new national capital of the Socialist state, Beijing ought to have been the ideal city 
to pioneer the new “modernised” urban appearance. This caused controversy in drafting 
the master plan. Some planners represented by Professor Liang Sicheng (the most 
influential architecture and planner in China at that time) and C.K. Chen expressed 
cautious attitudes to neighbourhood renewal. They suggested the old town should be 
seen as very valuable legacy to be entirely preserved as a cultural heritage site to show 
the unique spatial orders of traditional Chinese town planning ideologies framed by the 
Chinese traditional philosophy. Meanwhile, the new city centre with modern housing, 
office and industrial estates should be constructed outside the old town, following the 
modern planning ideas such as the separation of functional zones and with advanced 
infrastructures (Wang, 2003; Dong, 1998). However, the opponents claimed that the old 
town should be continuously used as the city centre, but most outdated neighbourhoods 
and architecture (for example, the city wall), the symbols of the old era, should be 
eliminated through mass neighbourhood renewal projects so that they could soon be 
replaced by modern buildings, such as the high-rise office buildings, green spaces and 
broad streets (Beijing Urban Planning Committee, 1954; 1958). By this way, the 
Socialist “changes” could be more significant, and the costs and time would be less than 
the new developments on the outskirts of the city. Eventually the second option was 
approved by the officials and some Soviet consultants as a more “realistic” idea, and it 
was then confirmed by several later versions of the master plans. 
 
In the following years, the Chinese neighbourhood renewal initiatives were set up by 
the practice similar to that of the post-war era in many British and European cities. The 
public-led projects became dominant, and most of them were very ambitious, including 
mass slum clearance, the increase of decent urban housing stock, the modernisation of 
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urban infrastructures, as well as other approaches to promote industrial or 
administrative estates. In Beijing, for example, the neighbourhood renewal target was 
set thus: to demolish 1,000,000 m2 old dwellings per year and reconstruct 2,000,000 m2 
new dwellings per year. Thus, over a period of 10 years, all the old residential areas in 
the old town could be thoroughly improved. The other important renewal schemes also 
included (1) the construction of office buildings for new national government along the 
major roads; (2) the construction of some symbolic architecture, including the national 
museum, theatre, grand hall, new railway station, national stadium and others to show 
the achievements of the Socialist regime; (3) the demolition of the city wall and the 
on-site construction of the ring-road system (Beijing Urban Planning Committee, 1958). 
All the renewal projects were apparently given equal priority as the large-scale 
industrial estate development on the outskirts of the city. 
 
However, within the Chinese context then, in practice it was impossible for public 
agencies to undertake so many huge multi-dimensional objectives with equal priorities. 
Owing to limited public finance and resources, in practice only some of these objectives 
and projects were given priority. According to the national economic strategy,  the first 
priority in most cities was usually to establish the nationalised modern industrial system 
in a very short period of time. Most of the available resources were concentrated in such 
areas. Besides, the construction of offices for new urban administrative bureaux was 
seen as another priority for the new political system, which then needed to show its 
authority urgently to enhance its key roles in organising the national economy and other 
public affairs. On the contrary, only very limited financial support could be used to 
redevelop the old residential areas, public service facilities and other infrastructure of 
the inner-city area which had largely been constructed in the pre-industrial years (Zhang 
and Wang, 2001). As a result, the pace of urban neighbourhood renewal was still slow 
and the achievement was quite limited in the first three decades of the Socialist state 
(Fang, 2000; Sun, 2000). Compared with the newly-built peripheral industrial-led 
districts, the old towns became the inner-city neighbourhoods of the Socialist cities, 
where the majority of pre-industrial residential areas and traditional architecture were 
maintained, but becoming dilapidated year by year. In most inner-cities, the new 
multi-storey modern buildings were constructed separately, scattered in the low-rise old 
neighbourhoods here and there. Some traditional buildings beside the major roads were 
demolished or renovated to show the new facades. 
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In Beijing as the national capital, the renewal projects associated with the construction 
of new governmental offices and symbolic architecture certainly obtained more public 
financial support than any other schemes. Many projects were designed to provide more 
and better offices, as well as housing to some key employees of the “powerful” work 
units: the ministers of central government and their affiliated institutes. By 1959, central 
and local government departments had constructed over 200 residential complex and 
office buildings scattered in the old neighbourhoods. In the period 1956-1959, the 
construction of the “key” projects reached its peak, which was marked by the 
completion of “Ten Grand Architecture” 7. Meanwhile, the demolition of city walls, 
gates and some other historic architecture was almost on schedule, and the 2nd ring road 
was constructed on site (Wang, 2003). However, the renewal of residential areas was 
seriously behind schedule. Moreover, many private dwellings were gradually 
transferred to public ownership, and the housing maintenance was always very poor 
because of insufficient public finance support. During the period between 1949 and 
1979, the general living conditions of the households in inner-city neighbourhoods were 
hardly improved at all; on the contrary, the areas became more and more crowded and 
dilapidated. 
 
Some inner-city residential areas were involved in the public-led renewal schemes. 
From 1949 to the mid-1960s, for the construction of new government offices or road 
extension, about 52,000 dwellings were demolished in Beijing (Chen, 2005). In these 
cases, most of the original residents had to be relocated to the outskirts of the city. 
Normally, these residents were compensated by in-kind public housing distribution, but 
the standards of different cases could be very different. For the “key” projects such as 
the construction of the “Ten Great Buildings” (1956-1959), the expansion of the 
Tiananmen Square (1950-1959), and the expansion of Chang’an Street (1955), the 
public financial support was usually sufficient to provide better new public housing 
units for the relocated residents. Although their new homes were usually located in 
peripheral areas, the quality of the housing units and affiliated facilities was 
significantly higher than that of the traditional dwellings. Sometimes these people could 
get public-allocated new jobs, usually in the newly-established state-owned industrial 
sector nearby so they did not need to go to the inner city for work. However, for the 
                                                        
7
 Ten Great Buildings: The Great Hall of the People, China Revolutionary History Museum, The 
Nationalities Cultural Palace, The Beijing Railway Station, The Minzu Hotel, The Overseas Chinese 
Hotel, The Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, The Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Museum, The 
Workers’ Stadium, The National Agriculture Exhibition Hall. The total construction area of them is 
640,000 m2. With the exception of the last four, all are located in the old town. 
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residents relocated by the smaller renewal projects, usually initiated independently by 
some Work Units, the in-kind compensation was not satisfactory. The relocated 
residents had to be housed in low-standard flats “like the barracks” and far from their 
workplaces (Tan, 2002). There was no universal compensation policy for these projects, 
and the fragmented operation of these projects did produce great inequality, the result of 
the living conditions of the relocated households. 
 
After the 1960s, the pace of urban renewal in Beijing’s old town areas began to slow 
down because of the public financial difficulties and the turbulence among the national 
political leadership. Then the reuse and rehabilitation of old dwellings occurred more 
frequently when some Work Units declared that they would like to expand the size of 
their own estate. After years of tenure restructuring, the majority of properties in Beijing 
old town had become separately owned by the Work Units. The Work Units either 
reused the previous dwellings as offices, workshops or even warehouses, or 
redistributed the dwellings to house their own employees. Thus the public-owned old 
dwellings might need to accommodate more people than it used to. Some households 
had to share toilets, bathrooms and kitchens with others in the same courtyard. 
Sometimes, the Work Units might initiate the infill construction in order to explore fully 
the potential of containment of existing buildings in an easy and cheap way. Some 
low-standard flats were constructed by filling the courtyard between traditional 
dwellings to provide dormitories for the increasing employee population. Meanwhile, 
the small-scale projects to expand the size of existing dwellings, usually initiated by the 
residents themselves, were even more common. The residents usually did the work 
themselves, or enlisted the help of relatives and friends, and used very cheap materials 
such as timber, old bricks from the demolished city wall, or abandoned tiles collected 
from construction sites, to build their own toilets, bathrooms, kitchens and even 
bedrooms so that their homes could be a little more spacious. These self-help projects 
certainly made the inner-city neighbourhoods more crowded and that could be seen as 
going against the planning control (Figure 7-6, 7-7), while the local government usually 
‘turned a blind eye’ and even encouraged such initiatives, for they were regarded as an 
effective temporary approach to reducing the housing shortage in the old 
neighbourhoods (Sun, 2000). Such “informal” renewal projects continued to expand as 
an important supplement to the public-led projects in responding to the urban housing 
shortage. However, the unstoppable expansion of the informal buildings had destroyed 
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the micro-spatial structure of the traditional neighbourhoods and made the general local 
living conditions worse than ever. 
 
  
Figure 7-6 The courtyards filled with “informal” 
self-built buildings in Beijing old town (1980s) 
Figure 7-7 Self-built low standard housing 
building in Beijing old town 
Source: Liu and Tan, 2004, p. 4 Source: Zhang and Wang, 2001, p. 175 
 
Besides that, in some of the most deteriorated inner-city slums or very crowded 
neighbourhoods, the local government also organised public-funded slum clearances 
and public housing construction to help those people “living with difficulties”. Local 
housing authorities were required to carry out mass demolition of “unfit” old dwellings 
and reconstruct new flats on these sites. In order to provide more people with modern 
housing units, multi-storey flats were normally selected as the most popular design style, 
which was very similar to that of the post-war European social housing estates. Thus the 
housing floor space increased by three or four times that of before, so that nobody 
should be relocated elsewhere and there could be extra units to cover the requirements 
of future demand. In those projects, the local government, sometimes in cooperation 
with the work units of the original residents, undertook the redevelopment and provided 
financial support. New housing units were distributed to the people affected according 
to the egalitarian principles and without charge.  
 
In practice, the effects of the public-led renewal were far from the planners’ original 
expectations. They were constrained by poor public financial support. In earlier practice 
such as the project in Longxugou completed in 1955, the housing standard was very low. 
Residents still had to share toilets and kitchens, and the average floor space per head 
was only slightly larger than before. Because of this low standard, this area became the 
most dilapidated area again only about ten years later (Fang, 2000). In later practice, for 
example the projects in Qingnianhu started in 1973, the local housing authority raised 
the standard for new housing construction so that the returning residents would live in 
  165 
improved dwellings. The original proposal planned to demolish dilapidated houses used 
by 800 households and reconstruct 1600 new flats locally. Because of the lack of public 
investment, the project was seriously delayed and finally completed 10 years later. By 
that time, the local housing demand had become nearly 2000 units for the rapid increase 
in local population and new marriages, so several hundred people had to be put on the 
waiting list (Dong, 1998; Shao, 2003).  
 
The key features of the three modes of neighbourhood renewal practice in the 
planned-economy era are summarised in Table 7-1. 
 
Table 7-1 Main models of public-led renewal projects (1949-1978) 
 




Local authorities - 100% investment 
- Implementation 
- Improved physical 
environment  
- Released pressure of 
housing shortage 
Residents - Dilapidated houses - Improved living 
condition 
Construction of “key” 
projects 
Local authorities - 100% investment 
- Implementation 
- New public facilities 
and its potential 
benefits 
Residents - Original housing 
- Relocation 





Local authorities - Subsidy (very 
seldom) 
- Released pressure of 
housing shortage 
Residents - Original housing 
- Investment 
- Improved living 
condition 
 
Clearly, in the planned economy period, generally speaking the residents were very 
positive about becoming involved in the various types of public-led renewal initiatives, 
although sometimes the benefits they could gain were not very equal. But the renewal 
was often a great burden to the local authority, such that neither the physical size of the 
renewal projects nor the number of population benefited from them, because they had 
never reached the targets of the ambitious master plans. Although the physical changes 
produced by the renewal projects in the three decades were much greater than ever, 
these projects affected only a smaller area of the inner-city neighbourhoods; they did 
not alter the basic structure of the traditional urban landscape of Beijing old town. 
Figure 7-8 shows the large proportion of the non-reconstructed area in Beijing old town 
between 1949 and 1981. 
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Figure 7-8 Non-reconstructed area in Beijing old town (1949-1981) 
Data source: Liu and Tan, 2004 
 
At the end of the 1970s, the poor housing and infrastructure conditions in inner-city 
neighbourhoods had been a common feature, resulting from the imbalanced 
development strategy in most Chinese cities. The increase of housing stock was actually 
slower than the age increase of housing. In all large cities, the increasing urban 
population8 led to a greater housing shortage than that of the pre-communist period and 
made general living conditions in old neighbourhoods worse. Official statistics show 
                                                        
8
 From the 1950s to the 1970s, the fertility rate of Chinese families was very high. So the urban 
population in China increased significantly, although the migration from rural to urban areas was strictly 
restricted. 
  167 
that in Beijing old town housing floor space per capita declined from 4.75 m2 in 1949 to 
4.55m2 in 1976 (Tan, 2002). At the end of the 1970s, over 600,000 families were 
suffering housing shortages, which was 55.3% of the total. Meanwhile, the proportion 
of registered dangerous (dilapidated) houses increased from 5% or so (in the 1950s) to 
about 50% by 1980 (Beijing City Planning Institute, 1993). Many poor old houses had 
to be used continuously and intensively to accommodate the boomed urban population. 
Moreover, the self-help renewal projects emerged more and more commonly. The open 
spaces of the traditional courtyards were occupied by the informal structures. The 
increased housing density not only affected living conditions, but also produced 
potential threats to safety, for it was frequently found that the access for fire evacuation 
was blocked by these structures. In addition, some heritage architecture had been 
refurnished for residential or office use. 
 
7.3 Marketised Redevelopment Movement during the Reform Era 
 
From the early 1980s onwards, the urban renewal practice in Chinese cities began to 
experience another significant shift in its mechanism alongside the transitional journey 
from a planned to a market-oriented economy. After suffering years of slow growth of 
the public-dominated economy, investments from private and overseas sources were 
re-introduced and encouraged to increase economic outputs in industries. As a result, 
cities, especially those located in the coastal regions which are the favoured locations, 
advanced infrastructures and the concentration of highly-educated labourers,  attracted 
the majority of private investment and experienced faster growth in economic output. 
Together with the lasting economic prosperity, urban changes in these years were much 
greater than in any other period. New development emerged not only in the suburban 
districts, but also through the large-scale renewal and redevelopment projects in the old 
town areas. By the turn of the century, traditional urban forms had been entirely 
replaced by modern development in most Chinese cities.  
 
The market-led initiatives supported by private investment became more and more 
important in the renewal process. However, just like the progressive economic reform, 
this transitional process towards the marketised model of renewal practice comprises 
several steps. The discussion in the following sections divides the period into two 
phases: before the 1990s, the urban real estate market had not yet been formally 
established and the private investment was a supplement financial source for the 
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semi-marketised model which maintained many features of the public-led model of the 
previous period; after 1990, when the urban real estate market was more established, the 
urban renewal model soon became radically marketised and then prevailed as the 
mainstream model in almost all cities across China. 
 
7.3.1 Semi-marketised model 
 
In the 1980s, during the early stage of economic reform, the trade of development right 
of urban land was not yet permitted by law, which means that, unlike many other 
industries, in theory the urban estate development was not initiated by private 
developers nor supported by private investment. The government had hoped that all 
major urban construction projects would be undertaken by public agencies so that the 
planning control could be exercised effectively.  
 
In Beijing, a new version of the master plan proposed new targets for the future 
development of the capital city (Beijing City Planning Institute, 1982). Urban renewal 
projects - especially renewal projects for residential neighbourhoods - were for the first 
time given priority over industrial development. However, the initial implementation of 
the renewal schemes was still very conservative. Most planners worried that the 
large-scale “demolition-reconstruction” process might damage the well-preserved urban 
form which was seen as a very valuable historic heritage. They cautioned that the 
renewal projects in the old town should not be too hasty and should follow 
well-considered and integrated objectives (Beijing City Planning Institute, 1982; Urban 
Planning group of Department of Architecture, Tsinghua University, 1980; Dong, 1998). 
More important, the budget of Beijing Municipal Government in the early 1980s was 
still very small and it could provide financial support to only a limited number of 
public-led renewal projects. Thus without the involvement of private investment, the 
pressure of the inner-city housing shortage in Beijing, as well as in other large cities, 
became greater and greater in the face of the booming urban population and further 
decline of traditional neighbourhoods. In Beijing, a household survey in 1983 showed 
that in the old town, housing floor space in dangerous old dwellings reached 2 million 
square metres, about 30% of total traditional buildings (Dong, 1998). The municipal 
housing authority of Beijing also identified 29 of the “most dilapidated residential 
neighbourhoods” with a total floor space of 1.9 million m2. In each of them, the number 
of dangerous dwellings was more than 200 and occupied over 40% of total dwellings. 
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That means, if following the previous public-led renewal model and the same level of 
support from public finance, it would take approximately 172 years to complete the 
renewal of these “most dilapidated residential neighbourhoods” (Fan, 1985). Clearly, 
the public-led renewal model prevalent in the planned economy era could not cope with 
the huge renewal demands in the cities. That forced the government to look for 
alternative policies. 
 
As a result, some semi-market-oriented redevelopment projects were launched as 
“experimental” approaches in the inner-city neighbourhoods of some large cities in 
order to accelerate the local housing improvement process. In this new-generation of 
projects, apart from local government investment, private investments from local 
residents themselves and also from work units were encouraged. Other sources such as 
bank loans were also tested. The semi-independent public-owned development 
corporations were established to undertake urban renewal projects instead of housing 
authorities.  The corporations were given independent financial power so that projects 
could be carried out according to market principles, a more efficient way. Meanwhile, 
local governments provided some aid to the corporations to reduce the cost of the 
overall renewal projects. These included tax break and subsidies. They also restricted 
the development corporations’ profit at a low level. This arrangement aimed to control 
the total cost of the renewal projects and to ensure that they were “affordable” to all 
stakeholders – mainly the residents affected. As a reward to private family investment, 
after the new buildings were completed, these households who had invested in the 
scheme could move back and hold the shared ownership of their homes. Compared with 
the old models, it is obvious that the financial burden to local government will be 
reduced, and with the same level of public financial support, redevelopment projects can 
be operated on a much larger scale and at a faster speed than before. All the 
stakeholders share the input and output of the projects.  
 
In Beijing, three neighbourhoods (Jverhutong, Xiaohoucang and Dongnanyuan) were 
selected in 1987 as pioneers to implement the new model (Tan, 2002; Fang, 2000; Lv, 
1997). In these areas, most local residents were low-income people. After the renewal 
projects, residents could obtain a new housing unit (usually in multi-storey 
developments) without relocation. During the process, many innovative approaches 
were introduced in different projects to help local people, especially the poor families, 
in arranging the self-investment. Cross-subsidy was used. For example, in Xiaohoucang, 
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the developers were allowed to build some commodity housing for sale in the market to 
non-local residents. The income received was used to subsidise the construction of new 
houses for the local families. In Jverhutong, a “housing cooperative” was introduced as 
a non-profit organisation to help reduce the financial burdens of the original households. 
Local households could obtain low-interest loans from the housing cooperative (up to 
70% of the house price), and their work units acted as the warrantors (Wu, 1998; Lin, 
1990; Shao, 2003). Table 7-2 summarises the main features and the relationships among 
different sectors in the semi-marketised renewal practice.  
 
Table 7-2 Features of the semi-marketised renewal projects (1978-1990) 
 
Participator Contribution/cost Benefit/loss 
Local authorities - Reduced taxation 
- Subsidies to some poor 
residents 
- Partial investment 
- Improved physical environment and 
infrastructure 
- Reduced housing shortage  




- Being project operator 
- Partial investment 
- Restricted profits from sales or rent of 
surplus new housing after accommodating 
the original residents   
Work Unit - Financial or other aids (such 
as warranty of loans) 
- Higher living standard for their 
employees 
Residents - Original housing 
- Partial investment (some from 
mortgage or with other 
subsidies) 
- Partial ownership of their homes 
- Improved living standard 
 
This approach could be seen as part of the original attempts of the application of 
“partnership” based on the cooperation amongst local government, development 
corporations, work units, residents and other local financial institutions. However, in the 
Chinese context at that time, these experiments still maintained some essential features 
of the past socialist practice. In this model, the public sector (local government) in fact 
was in the dominant position over other sectors. The roles of local government in the 
operation of such “partnerships” were essentially as “instructors” rather than 
“coordinators” or “participants”. The projects were always undertaken by the 
public-owned development corporations who held the decision-making rights in 
drafting the scheme plans. Sometimes, these corporations were also very keen to 
develop extra buildings and facilities to the neighbourhood renewal projects for 
financial gains outside the original proposal. Other participants, especially the residents, 
were usually not fully informed about these decisions. Some local residents, particularly 
the poor ones, participated only passively in these schemes. However,, overall, these 
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experiments were seen as “win-win” cooperative approaches: residents acquired new 
and larger housing units and an improved living environment; the government was 
happy to see polished inner-city images and modernised infrastructure; development 
corporations gained  profit, though at a restricted level.  
 
The experimental idea with the involvement of market was seen as a successful attempt 
by governments for its much higher economic efficiency in practice. Nevertheless, 
owing to the limited benefits, public-owned developers did not have much desire to 
undertake this type of redevelopment project. In Beijing, up to the early 1990s, the 
renewal process was still very slow. The widely-praised successful projects were 
completed in a few small areas only, and no more than 1000 households in total 
benefited from them (0.2% of all households in the old town who were suffering from 
the housing shortage). Moreover, the progress of almost all of these projects was 
delayed seriously (Jing, 2004). 
 
7.3.2 Radical marketised model 
 
The experimental renewal projects in the late 1980s did demonstrate that the 
involvement of private investment and market forces could speed up the urban renewal 
process. However, in the face of the severe housing shortage and increasing housing 
demand in the old neighbourhoods, the semi-marketised model was not enough to 
address the problems. By the end of the 1980s, the number of dangerous dwellings in 
Beijing old town reached around 6.3 million m2, more than half of all dwellings, higher 
than that in the early 1980s (30%) and 1950s (5% or so). About 200,000 households 
with 800,000 residents lived in these areas (Meng, 2000). There is no doubt that a more 
efficient approach was urgently required to accelerate the renewal process. By drawing 
on the successful experience from experimental projects, almost all local governments 
decided to rely more on market forces in the renewal process.  In 1990, Beijing 
municipal government proposed the target (for the second time) to eliminate all the 
“inadequate” dwellings in ten years (before 2000) (Fang, 2000). 
 
Actually, the emergence of the new renewal model reflected the new steps of the 
economic reform. In 1991, the central government formally established the land and real 
estate market by law. Private developers were permitted to contribute to urban estate 
development and obtained profit from it. After 1994, the reform of the national taxation 
  172 
system gave local authorities more direct benefits from local GDP growth. Thus, the 
newly-established real estate market was seen as the industry with the greatest potential 
for success, replacing the traditional industry in local economic growth of the new 
period. Local governments approved a series of policies to encourage more private 
investment to initiate new real estate development, and in cities with limited land supply, 
large-scale redevelopment projects became attractive to many developers. One of the 
objectives of these projects was similar to those of the past, in expecting more provision 
of new housing, a nice city-image and modernised infrastructure. Nevertheless, besides 
that, the local governments also hoped to use opportunities of estate development 
associated with the redevelopment initiatives in old neighbourhoods as the most 
effective vehicle to attract more private investment and then create faster growth in 
GDP. Therefore, since the early 1990s, urban redevelopment projects have been carried 
out at a much higher speed and on a larger scale than ever in almost every city. 
Thousands of old neighbourhoods were demolished and the volume of new construction 
reached a record speed.  
 
A variety of private or joint venture developers began to play more active roles in the 
projects, and private developers were allowed to sell the new properties in the market, 
no longer with restriction. However, in China, the most populous country in the world, 
especially in the east coastal areas where most large cities are located, the land was 
always regarded as having very limited public resources. The government is always 
hoping to control the expansion of urban areas strictly and encourage new developments 
to locate in the existing urban neighbourhoods. Thus the redevelopment projects 
became very important in the booming real estate market. Many large-scale projects 
emerged in a very short time, and operated in a simplified way - demolishing the whole 
traditional urban area and reconstructing modern higher-rise buildings with greater 
density.  
 
In Beijing, private investment to the inner-city redevelopment projects was tremendous 
during the entire period of the 1990s. For the favourable location of some areas in the 
old town, the new real estate development projects brought great potential profits9, so 
much so that both the speed and scale of new projects reached a historic high. Most of 
                                                        
9
 For historic reasons, the requirement of new office and shopping buildings in Beijing old town was very 
high. In the half year since the commencement of the “Oriental plaza” (one of the largest redevelopment 
projects adjacent to Wangfujing, the most famous shopping area of Beijing old town) in 1999, 30% 
offices had been booked. Furthermore, in 2004 when the projects were completed, 90% offices had been 
rented and the rent rose by 20% (Gan, 2004). 
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them, with the intention to speed up the process and enlarge the construction volume, 
were planned without careful design, so the simplified “demolition-reconstruction” 
process became very common everywhere. In the ten years (1990-1999), renewal 
projects demolished about 5 million m2 of old houses and replaced them with 14.5 
million m2 floor spaces of new buildings in Beijing old town (Zhou, 2002). In total, 184 
thousand households were involved in the process (Huang, 2003), which is nearly 1/5 of 
the urban families. Figure 7-9 shows the comparison of the renewal/redevelopment 
speed in this decade and before. In some cases, the reconstruction projects were usually 
of much higher density (even 8 to 10 times) than before (Fang, 2000, p. 67). Many 
traditional residential neighbourhoods were entirely replaced by new high-rise buildings 
with complex usage, including residential buildings, shopping malls and offices. Apart 
from the historic conservation areas, open spaces, water ways and lakes and roads, 
about 72% of traditional residential areas in Beijing old town had already been cleared 
by the end of the 1990s (Figure 7-10). 
 
 
Figure 7-9 Demolition and reconstruction volume in Beijing inner-city (1949-1999) 
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Figure 7-10 Reconstructed and non-reconstructed areas of Beijing old town (2002) 
Source: Han et al., 2004 
 
In the new renewal model with radical changes towards marketisation, the 
redevelopment practice was no longer supported by substantial governmental subsidies, 
but local governments still gave extra aid to encourage private developers to accelerate 
their redevelopment initiatives. Compared with the aid to state-owned developer 
corporations in the past, the external aid to the private developers in the new period 
might be more: the profit limitation, the restriction of relocation or maximum 
construction density according to local plans were cancelled or neglected, while some 
other forms of aid from governments since the 1980s, such as the tax break or cheaper 
price of land acquisition, still existed. Thus the great advantages in market had become 
the main driving force to push the large-scale “demolition-reconstruction” movement 
rapidly ahead.  
 
Many developers expected easy and large profits. During the period between 1993 and 
1995, most redevelopment projects could bring profits of more than 60% and some even 
100% (Wang, 1996). Meanwhile, local governments were also delighted to witness the 
“great achievements” in physical changes. Thus the two sides with shared interests 
quickly formed a union and controlled the renewal decision-making process. The 
original objective of neighbourhood renewal to improve general living conditions for 
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local residents gradually became sidelined. The balanced partnership of the previous 
semi-marketised model based on multi-sector coordination, had been broken and local 
residents were placed in very disadvantaged position for their weak voice in 
decision-making and poor participating capability in the market. Table 7-3 summarises 
the features of this model of renewal. 
 
Table 7-3 Features of the radical marketised renewal projects (since 1990) 
 
Participator Contribution/cost Benefit/loss 
Local authorities - Land provision with reduced land 
use fee charges 
- Reduced taxation 
- Subsidies to builders 
- Support to relocation 
- Improved physical environment and 
infrastructure 
- Income from land letting 
- Increased tax and other income 
from new economic activities 
Developers (private 
companies) 
- Discounted compensation for land 
use and demolition 
- Investment of rebuilding 
- Implementation 
- Income for sale or rent the new 
property 
- Other income from new economic 
activities 
Residents - Original low-cost housing 
- Cost of relocation  
- Reduced compensation of 
demolition 
- Possible relocation to other 
peripheral areas 
- Loss of original community 
 
Obviously, both the local authorities and private developers who formed the union to 
control the decision-making were winners from this model. On the contrary, the 
residents and local communities - especially the low-income ones - were the losers, 
whose loss was almost always much greater than the gains. To seek higher profit, some 
traditional neighbourhoods or mixed-use areas were transformed into commercial use. 
Most local families lost their homes but received only limited monetary compensation. 
They had to choose the cheap peripheral housing units as their new homes rather than 
moving back (Tan, 1997; Fang, 2000; Li, 2000; Wu, 2004). In some cases, the pace of 
demolition has been so rapid that local residents were required to vacate their old 
housing before the high-rises being built for them on the outskirts of the city were 
completed (Gaubatz, 1999; Zhang, 2002b). Some of them had to wait for more than 
three years (Zhang and Fang, 2004). 
 
This process is more or less similar to the “property-led” redevelopment prevalent in 
Britain in the 1980s, by which the new projects were perceived as a very effective 
“growth machine” for high-speed GDP growth (Logan and Molotch, 1987). In Chinese 
cities, the legacy of the planned economy makes the local governments the largest 
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owner of urban land and estates, and also, the remaining state power can be used more 
frequently to facilitate the profitable redevelopment initiatives. That is why in such a 
short period both the local governments and private developers can accumulate such 




In the long period of pre-socialist China, generally the neighbourhood renewal was 
carried out at a very slow speed and in a limited scale. There was no universal way for 
the renewal practice. The private-led and public-led renewal initiatives co-existed, with 
diverse objectives. The private-led projects were usually brought some new industries in 
order to achieve returning profits while the public-led projects were to meet the 
requirements of state, including the update of infrastructures and beautification of city 
images. However the scales of both the private- and public-led projects were very 
limited and few of them were eventually completed. As the result, their impacts of 
Chinese traditional cities were really very little. In the socialist planned economy era, 
the speed of neighbourhood renewal became faster, especially in cities like Beijing 
which had high political importance. During this period, the public authorities had full 
control of the decision-making process, and took all responsibility for implementing the 
projects. Most of projects were proposed to help create a modernised equal urban 
society in the superior ideals of Socialism. However in practice only the projects 
associated with the developments of new industries and administrative systems were 
given priority to be completed, while most projects of slum clearance and infrastructure 
update were seriously delayed. In the reform era, the neighbourhood renewal was 
accelerated revolutionarily. More and more projects became private-initiated, and 
gaining considerable profit from the newly-established real estate market through 
property development was the prime driving force of the process. The property-led 
redevelopment process was usually supported by local authorities in order to achieve 
higher local GDP. However, many real public needs from local residents were sidelined, 
and these then formed the new “urban problems” to be tackled in most recent years. 
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Chapter 8 Lessons of Market-Oriented Redevelopment and Remaining 
Problems of Old Neighbourhoods in China: with Case Study of 
Shichahai 
 
Since the early 1990s, the market-oriented redevelopment movements have made a 
significant impact on old neighbourhoods in Chinese cities. Tremendous private 
investment was soon attracted to initiate the larger-scale redevelopment projects. Most 
of the projects were completed in a very short time in a simple “demolition and 
reconstruction” process. Compensation for most residents who had lived in the 
demolished dwellings was paid by cash, and a large number of local residents had to be 
relocated. This then resulted in the significant growth of the local GDP. However, more 
and more researchers and members of the general public have recognised some negative 
consequences of this process. Usually, the significant economic prosperity did not 
provide benefits to many local residents, especially the vulnerable groups. Also, most 
social, economic and physical problems still existed in the remaining old 
neighbourhoods which were never involved in the property-led redevelopment process. 
This chapter will explain the two problems in turn. Analysis and discussion are based on 
the primary data collected during the fieldwork. They will answer the questions:  
• What are the negative impacts of the market-oriented redevelopment projects on 
local residents?  
• What are the remaining problems of the unchanged old neighbourhoods?  
Shichahai in Beijing old town will be perceived as a typical case to provide quantitative 
evidences. The answers to the two questions will form the understanding of the most 
recent “urban problems” and potential “local needs” in the old neighbourhoods to be 
renewed after 2000. 
 
8.1 Lessons from the Marketised Redevelopment Practice 
 
8.1.1 Land speculation and limited scale of area-based promotion 
 
Some optimistic estimations have claimed that the market-oriented neighbourhood 
renewal campaign could be the most significant contributor to the continuous growth of 
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GDP since the early 1990s (Gu, 1998). However, more recent research has revealed that 
the real contribution of the market-oriented redevelopment projects to local economy 
was not as great as expected. Many signs show that the newly-established real estate 
market in Chinese cities was very immature. Inevitably, many market-oriented renewal 
initiatives tend to be speculative and hope to gain short-term profit only. Many local 
governments used strong interventional approaches to reduce the cost of redevelopment 
so that more private investment could be attracted for higher potential profit. This 
enables the developers to get considerable profit from applying for redevelopment rights 
for a discounted price, and then selling them to other developers. In this process, every 
developer may get considerable profit but there could be no construction on the site at 
all (Fang, 2000, p. 40; Yan, 1998; Zhang and Fang, 2004). In Beijing, it was very 
common to see many old neighbourhoods being entirely demolished, but new 
construction was delayed year after year. In 1999, the area of demolished old houses in 
Beijing reached 2379 ha, however, the reconstruction was only immediately initiated in 
1/18 of the demolished areas (Zhong and Wei, 1999). Within an overheated property 
market, some large scale renewal projects aimed for sudden profits rather than creating 
sustained long-term business opportunities. As a result, the short-term prosperity might 
produce great burdens for the city rather than assets in future which may weaken the 
future competitiveness in practice (Wu et al., 2007). 
 
Under such an immature market circumstance, though the market-led urban 
redevelopment projects in most Chinese large cities in the 1990s reached a record scale, 
they occurred in some specific geographic areas only. It was found later that the better 
neighbourhoods, where simple ownership structure, few households and lesser 
population density exist, were demolished. The majority of the worst neighbourhoods, 
with a concentration of poor quality and overcrowded houses, low income and poor 
people, remain unchanged. When areas of easy access and profitable have all been 
redeveloped, the private investors lost interest in continuing the urban renewal process. 
In Beijing, the campaign of renewal slowed down at the end of the 1990s. In 1999, the 
scale of the new redevelopment projects fell to the lowest level since 1990 (which 
affected only 8000 households and 210,000m2) (Shao, 2003, p. 101).  
 
According to the original plan drawn up by the Beijing Municipal Government in 1990, 
the authority hoped to use the property-led redevelopment projects to eliminate all 
“unfit” dwellings in the inner-city areas by 2000. But in fact the proposed 
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redevelopment projects were seriously delayed, and by 2000 the progress was far 
behind the initial expectation. During the 1990s, urban renewal projects demolished 
4.99 million m2 of old housing, which is much smaller than the total amount of “unfit” 
dwellings (7 million m2) identified by the housing survey carried out in 1991. 
Furthermore, many of the houses demolished did not belong to the “unfit” dwelling 
category. There were 279 officially defined “dilapidated areas” in Beijing in 1997. The 
renewal projects affected only 133 of these areas (44.1%). Only 33 (11.8%) of them 
have been completed (Wang, 2002; Fang, 2000; Zhang, 2002a; Zhou, 2002). Therefore, 
when the new century began, Beijing, like many Chinese cities, still had a very large old 
town area, consisting of many poor-quality old residential neighbourhoods. A housing 
survey in 2000 revealed that there were still 6.54 million m2 of “unfit” dwellings in 
Beijing old town (Beijing Daily, 2002). Although the figure reflects a change in the 
definition for ‘unfit housing’, it does show the slow progress of early renewal practice 
and the huge problems faced by the inner-city areas. 
 
8.1.2 Social impacts by the marketised approach: unfair compensation, forced 
relocation and its consequences 
 
In most of the market-oriented inner-city redevelopment projects in the 1990s, the old 
residential neighbourhoods were reconstructed into offices, luxury housing and 
commercial centres in order to meet the market demand. The demolition process 
accelerated the loss of public housing stock in the city. It was estimated that, in 1990, 
40% of the dwellings in the old neighbourhoods of Beijing were publicly owned (Tan, 
1997, p. 87). The redevelopment in the 1990s demolished about 2 million m2 of public 
housing. The great number of low-cost private rental and owner-occupied houses were 
also involved. Original local residents who had lost their homes could no longer get 
in-kind houses (a practice of the 1980s), but received money compensation instead. It 
was very common that this process was implemented with the aid of local government 
by using the “compulsory purchase” right, and the monetised compensation for the old 
buildings (not for the land, which is in state ownership) was much lower than the 
market price. The unfair compensation forced thousands of low income households to 
lose their affordable inner-city shelter.  
 
In Beijing, between 1990 and 1999, the redevelopment process was carried out in 150 
areas, and 48 of them were completed. Over 4 million m2 of old housing were 
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demolished and 12 million m2 floor space of new housing was built. The process 
affected 184 thousand households, of which 81.3 thousand had been re-located to 
peripheral housing estates and only 55.4 thousands moved back to new houses in 
inner-city neighbourhoods (either the original site or nearby neighbourhood) (Huang, 
2003; Shun, 2000). Most of the previous tenants of the demolished old houses were 
forced into being relocated. Some have moved to and concentrated in some peripheral 
suburban areas of poor quality new public housing or low price and low standard 
commodity housing. The locations of these replacement housing estates were usually in 
very far suburban areas with poor accessibility to amenities (Wang, 2004b; Zheng, 
2003). Some other original residents chose to accept the cash and move into the 
private-rental sector in the remaining old neighbourhoods nearby. With the sudden 
increase of demand, the competition for housing in the market became fiercer so that 
housing price inflation became serious. This group had to face much higher housing 
costs, even though their housing conditions might not improve much or get worse (Li, 
2005c; Hao and Zhu, 2005). Some very poor residents became “homeless” after the 
large-scale demolition. In theory, the households from demolished public housing 
would have qualified for buying subsidised housing (the so-called “economic and 
affordable housing”) units, but in practice the provision of the subsidised housing was 
far behind the real demand. The waiting list of the potential households of the economic 
and affordable housing was long. Most of these families had to stay in temporary 
dwellings or live with relatives for several years. By the end of 1998, the redevelopment 
schemes had produced 32,000 “homeless” households (with a population of 
approximately 100,000) and the number kept increasing in the following years (Fang, 
2000, p. 29).  
 
The forced relocation brought great inconvenience to almost all residents. In the 
redeveloped inner-city areas, newly-erected office blocks and modern shopping centres 
made a significant impact on the remaining traditional shop units in the old 
neighbourhoods. Many of them had to be closed because of low competitiveness in the 
market. The massive demolition also eliminated many small-scale collectively-owned 
enterprises. This accelerated the loss of low-level jobs in old neighbourhoods. At the 
same time, the large-scale redevelopment projects removed spaces for traditional 
small-scale street trading, and destroyed the basis for the informal economy which made 
a significant contribution to a large proportion of poor residents. 
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To those relocated to peripheral housing estates, the increase in distance between 
workplaces and homes did create some problems. According to the investigation 
conducted by Tan (1997), about two thirds of the original residents in Beijing inner-city 
neighbourhoods used to cycle to work, and the average distance between homes and 
works was less than 5 km. After being relocated to peripheral housing estates, 80% of 
them had to take the bus to work, and the average travelling time for them increased to 1 
hour. As a result, many people without good personal means of transport had to give up 
working. 
 
The delivery of social services to the poor residents was also affected by the large-scale 
redevelopment projects. For those staying in the remaining old neighbourhoods, the 
large-scale reconstruction would eliminate the service units within walking distance. 
For the relocated people, the troubles could be much greater. In the large-scale 
peripheral cheap commodity housing or “economic and affordable housing” estates, the 
accessibility to service provision was not given enough consideration at the planning 
stage. It normally takes many years for the relevant services to settle in.  A 
comprehensive survey was conducted to evaluate social service provision in new 
housing estates. This includes Tiantongyuan and Huilongguan, the two largest 
“economic and affordable housing” estates in the north suburbs of Beijing. The survey 
examined 5 major categories of service: food and restaurants, healthcare, education, 
entertainment, and child playing facilities. In every category the two areas were among 
the top 3 worst areas (Zhang et al., 2006).  
 
Many relocated families had to send their children to schools in the inner-city areas and 
elderly and sick people had to go to the inner-city general hospitals for treatments. The 
journeys cost a lot of time and money for these families. Tan (1997, p. 77) found that, 
because of bad accessibility or increased cost, 65% of relocated households had to 
reduce the time spent on recreation, especially for elderly and children; 53% of them 
had to reduce the frequency to see doctors; and 19% reduced their shopping time. A 
quarter of families also felt that public services in the relocation estates had become 
poorer than before. They were particularly dissatisfied with the poor public security, 
cleaning, waste collection and so on (Shao, 2003). 
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8.1.3 Impacts on the environment 
 
Large-scale redevelopment projects also generated a negative impact on the physical 
and environmental quality of urban spaces. Many developers increased the density of 
construction from the restriction of urban plans for higher profits. The designs of these 
areas were not good, and the projects produced extra pressure on the capacity of the 
infrastructure. In Beijing, for example, more than 50% of traffic flow and economic 
activities concentrated in the crowded city centre which occupied only 5% of the whole 
urban area (Wu, 1999; Zhang, 2002a). Another serious problem was the threats to the 
architectural heritage in old towns. The large-scale new buildings damaged the 
traditional small-scale, mixed-use urban fabric (Shu, 1998; Shan, 2006). Meanwhile, the 
natural environment in the centre areas was also polluted. The redevelopment projects 
produced illegal occupation of public green spaces, and caused more traffic congestion 
and air pollution (Fang, 2000).  
 
8.1.4 Undemocratic decision-making 
 
In the marketised property-led redevelopment process, decisions were often made 
without the participation of local residents. This is more or less similar to the 
property-led redevelopment in British cities during the Thatcher period. The most 
important feature of this process is that the decision-making mechanism is controlled by 
the union of the state power and the private capital. In China, because of the specific 
political and economic system, the “capital-state” union worked more effectively and 
with less resistance. The influence in public affairs by local communities has been weak 
in comparison with the previous redevelopment model of the 1980s. 
 
The Chinese government always has a stronger influence over economic development. 
Since the 1990s, local authorities have been empowered with more freedom to use 
interventionist approaches to promote local competitiveness and accelerate GDP growth. 
One of the common ways to develop local economy is to facilitate real estate 
development through large-scale urban redevelopment projects. Municipal governments, 
as the legal owners of all land, can easily provide the required support to attract private 
investment, and at the same time keep the cost of compensation of demolition at a low 
level. In some cases in Beijing in the mid-1990s, land and property compensations were 
only 1/3 or even 1/10 of the open market price. The developers, however, could sell 
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their property at market prices. They were also given some other aid, including tax 
reduction and priority of using public infrastructure (Fang, 2000). As a result, both sides 
of the union shared the redevelopment benefits: the government gained substantial 
income from releasing the land for development and achievements in local economic 
output, and developers reaped the shocking profits. 
 
Local communities and other small non-government organisations and enterprise did 
not gain much benefit from the redevelopment. Owing to the existence of the work unit 
during the planned economic era, the role of communities and voluntary organisations 
in neighbourhood affairs was very limited. It was the work unit which often undertook 
responsibility to collect public opinion in community management. Some 
community-based or voluntary organisations, such as Neighbourhood Committees, 
existed, but had little influence over economic development affairs. For very limited 
resources and power, Neighbourhood Committees were seen only as supplements to the 
work unit system. During the 1990s, this system began to change gradually. For various 
reasons, many residents from the old neighbourhoods had lost the relationship with their 
“work units”. This meant they had lost the formal channel to get information about local 
community development and management, and found it difficult to express their ideas. 
The government had hoped to establish a new community-based management system to 
replace the role played by work units, but the new system has not materialised. 
 
In these old neighbourhoods, because of the decline of the old community management 
system and the absence of the new system, there was no independent body to represent 
the “local community” in the decision making process to balance the powers of the 
government and developers. In many redevelopment areas in Beijing, regulations on 
compensation and the full project proposals were never formally made available to all 
local residents. According to the investigation from Shao (2003), the majority of 
residents obtained the information from newspapers (38.6%), TV (20.3%) and friends 
(20.3%). If any resident had queries about the project, they had to make the 
presentations personally. This individual approach was much less effective than if the 
views were to be presented by the work units.  As a result, the government and 
developers became the two main forces in urban redevelopment, while the voices of the 
local community were almost completely ignored (Zhang, 2001). Because of the almost 
non-participation by local residents, redevelopment decisions often have an 
inappropriate priority: 
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1) Economic growth 
2) Physical and environmental improvement of the area 
3) Social requirement of the local residents 
 
The ignorance of “local social needs” just reflected the weak position of the local 
community in the unbalanced decision-making mechanism. 
In recent years, the unfair compensation and forced relocation in the redevelopment 
projects have produced much social unrest in Chinese cities. Lacking a valid way for 
collecting public and community opinions, some local residents chose extreme ways to 
complain or protest about the unacceptable low compensation of the redevelopment 
schemes proposed by government and developers. Between January and August 2000, 
the Construction Ministry received 1350 complaint letters about unfair compensation; 
and 103 individuals or groups appealed to the ministry about problems related to 
demolition and relocation (Wang, 2004a). In some serious cases, the protests became 
even violent. That created great pressure on the government to find new ways to rethink 
the real problems and needs of the communities in old neighbourhoods, as well as the 
imbalanced participatory mechanism. 
 
8.2 Remaining Problems of the Old Neighbourhoods in the 21st Century  
 
In contrast to the areas having experienced the market-oriented redevelopment process, 
the remaining old neighbourhoods abandoned by the private developers kept declining 
after the 1990s. Recent socio-economic restructuring, the welfare reforms and the mass 
relocation caused by the property-led development campaign together led to significant 
demographic changes in these areas, and the declines were believed in wider aspects. 
Therefore the “urban problems” of the old neighbourhoods in this new era had to be 
measured from a new perspective. In the following sector, the problems will be 
examined by following a multi-dimensional framework, with the reference to the British 
“multiple deprivation indices”. All primary data collected by fieldwork in 2007 refer to 
one of the most typical cases of the remaining old neighbourhood in Beijing – Shichahai. 
The situation was a very good reflection of the problems existing in all remaining old 
neighbourhoods in Beijing (largely in the old town area). The discussion will also draw 
on some secondary data collected by other local researchers. All city-wide data, where 
necessary, are based on the official statistics from “Beijing Statistics Information Net” 
(http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/). 
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8.2.1 Residential history of Shichahai 
 
Shichahai was one of the oldest residential areas in Beijing old town. It is about 2.5 km 
away from the Forbidden City, the old palace of Chinese emperor, and adjacent to the 
man-made water system. In the 13th century, when the city of Beijing as the capital of 
Yuan Dynasty had just been constructed, the waterfront area was soon developed as the 
main port to receive grain shipping from the southern provinces. The surrounding 
neighbourhoods then became the largest commercial areas in Beijing (Xiong, 1983; 
Zhang, 1999). After the Ming Dynasty (early 15th century), following the change of 
Beijing’s water system, the port was closed and the city-wide commercial centre 
gradually moved to southern neighbourhoods. The waterfront areas, with their beautiful 
landscape, became high-standard residential areas. Many big courtyards were occupied 
by royal families, rich merchants or higher-level officials as their homes. Some 
commercial streets remained in order to provide services to the local rich population. 
Many local tea houses, restaurants and shops were very famous for a long time (Li, 
1995). 
 
In the early 20th century, following the civil wars and collapse of the monarchy, most of 
the big courtyards which used to be the homes of royal families were occupied by 
governmental and military bureaux or schools. Most of the remaining residential houses 
were sold to various buyers (Yuan, 1997, p. 85). After 1949, the majority of big 
courtyards were nationalised as public assets. Some of them were distributed to some 
work units for non-residential use, including the Jishuitan hospital, China Music 
College, Museum of Songqingling, No.13 Middle School and Shichahai Sports Institute, 
as well as some newly-established small enterprises (mostly collectively-owned). 
Another part was directly owned by the local housing authority, in order to house some 
newly-incoming urban population. Some other houses were still privately owned, but 
strict rent control was implemented. The tenants, level of rent and expiry time of the 
rental contract were all decided by the local housing authority, not the owners (Dong, 
1998). For the fast growth of urban population in the national capital city, a variety of 
households were constantly moving in. In particular, in the 1950s and 1960s, the growth 
of local population was most significant. More than half of (51.7%, data from survey by 
Tsinghua University in 2002) the current residents moved in during this period. The 
majority of the incoming population were working class and other poverty people who 
could not get welfare housing from their work units. Some old dilapidated dwellings 
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were then demolished to make way for the reconstruction of new offices and workshops. 
Most shops and restaurants were closed, and the commercial estates were re-used to 
accommodate the increasing urban population. Some others were redeveloped or 
renovated as new social service units, for example public bathrooms and grain shops. 
Because of the rising pressure of the housing shortage, every residential courtyard 
which used to accommodate one family became shared by several households. New 
construction to infill the courtyards to house more people was very common. Most local 
buildings, especially those that were publicly-owned, had become very dilapidated for 
the long-term lack of good maintenance. 
 
Following the economic reform, some houses which had previously been privately 
owned, and which were nationalised in previous decades but not distributed to any work 
units, were returned to private ownership. Rent control was removed as well so that the 
owners could decide the use of their properties. Under the market-oriented circumstance, 
the waterfront area of Shichahai again became very prosperous for new business. Most 
private houses alongside the main streets were renovated as new restaurants, bars, curio 
shops or night clubs. Their customers were international and domestic tourists, not local 
population. Meanwhile, for many reasons, the great number of public housing stock 
remained. Most of it was still poorly maintained. Some better-off households had 
purchased new houses and moved out of this area. Their homes were either empty or 
re-rent to others. But the very high proportion of low-income and vulnerable groups still 
stayed here (Fan, 2002). A detailed survey in 2002 found that, compared with the 
remaining residents, the outward movers had a significantly higher education level and 
better jobs, and most of them were of working age (Zhang, 2003, p. 62-63). After 2000, 
the demographic density in Shichahai was still more than twice that of the average level 
of Beijing city (Zhang, 2003, p. 85). Recent welfare reforms have created a major 
impact on this area, with a high concentration of low-income and vulnerable households 
which, it was believed, further affected their living conditions. 
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Figure 8-1 Shichahai from satellite 
Source: School of Architecture, Tsinghua University 
 
8.2.2 Demographic structure and employment problems 
 
Table 8-1 clearly shows the aging residential groups compared with the city-wide 
average (excluding the rural population). The population of retired age and elder 
working age groups was higher while the young population was smaller. The gap 
between local and city-wide data was extremely huge. During the interviews, many 
elderly admitted that their children had had to leave this area because of the low number 
of local job opportunities. Table 8-2 shows the general education level of the current 
residents (excluding the under-18 population). The current structure of Shichahai was 
very similar to the city-wide data 20 years ago, but certainly, as a result of the slow 
progress now, the rate of low-educated population was much higher than the city-wide 
average. It was learned from the interviews, that none of the more than 100 residents 
held a postgraduate degree. The low education level was certainly associated with the 
concentration of elderly people. During the interviews, it was discovered that all the 
illiterates are over 60 years old. They had all moved here in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
had always worked for state-owned or collective-owned enterprises. 
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Table 8-1 Age structure comparison (Shichahai and Beijing average) 
 
 Shichahai Beijing Average (urban only) 
0-18 (years) 8.9% 17.4% 
18-25 (years) 12.0% 9.9% 
25-40 (years) 19.9% 26.8% 
40-60 (years) 34.0% 31.3% 
Over 60 (years) 25.1% 14.6% 
 
Table 8-2 Education level comparison (Shichahai and Beijing average) 
 
 Shichahai Beijing Average (urban only) 
Below Junior Middle School 20.8% 14.1% 
Junior Middle School 28.3% 26.5% 
High School 24.2% 26.8% 
College/University or above 26.7% 32.5% 
 
Households in the old neighbourhoods also have a heavier burden because of their 
special family structure. Data from Shichahai show that as a result of the existence of 
many long-term residents, local households usually have larger family size. The average 
number of persons per household in Shichahai is 3.55, much higher than that of the 
city-wide data: 2.67 persons per household in urban districts of Beijing city in 2007. 
About 30.4% households have 5 or more family members (compared with the city-wide 
data at 9.4%). 
 
Many researchers have revealed that in specific geographic areas of Chinese cities the 
larger average family size may mean the existence of more vulnerable and low-income 
households (Li, 2005c; Li and Knight, 2002). Although there is no recent macro-scale 
data of the family size per household in Beijing10, some research reports have pointed 
out that since the economic reform the average number of persons in Chinese urban 
households has been constantly going down at the same pace of their growth of personal 
wealth. The “one-child” policy has been implemented for over three decades, resulting 
in fewer children in ordinary Chinese families. Meanwhile, as a response to the 
revolutionary socio-economic restructuring, there are fewer households with more than 
two generations sharing the same housing units. Most “core families” with three or four 
persons have become rich because the adult wage earners can have lighter burdens with 
                                                        
10
 According to the official statistics, it is not hard to calculate the number of persons per registered 
household. However, in practice, and for historic reasons, the official record for “Hukou” cannot reflect 
the real address and living conditions of a great number of urban populations. It is very common for one 
person to be “registered” officially in one address but live in another housing unit. In this research, the 
number of persons in every household was established from the face-to-face interviews which are about 
the real situation rather than the “official record” in theory. 
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fewer children and elderly relatives than in the traditional Chinese large families. Also, 
in recent years some rich families have purchased two or even more housing units 
which has also helped to further decrease the average number of persons living in one 
house. However, in old neighbourhoods like Shichahai, such changes have occurred in 
only a few households. It is very common to see several generations still living in the 
same dwelling, for it is the only way to save housing costs. This also allows the adult to 
care for elderly or disabled family members or those with long-term illness. Some of 
them may need 24-hour care, so that further affects the competitiveness of their adult 
family members in the labour market. 
 
The specific demographic structure has greatly affected the performance of local 
residents in the labour market. Table 8-3 summarises the overall employment status of 
local residents (excluding those before graduation) in Shichahai with four simplified 
categories. It is hard to find comparable city-wide data classified in the same categories. 
Nevertheless, obviously quite a proportion of local people have been excluded by the 
“formal” labour market in recent years. In 2007, the official urban unemployment rate 
in Beijing was 1.84%. Although this figure was believed to be far from the real situation, 
the average level must still be much lower than that of Shichahai.  
 




Long-term secure employment 34.8% 
Temporary unsecure employment 7.6% 
Long-term unemployment (more than half year) 15.2% 
 
Meanwhile, the new economic prosperity may present a considerable threat to the 
existence of traditional job opportunities in the old neighbourhoods. For example, the 
emergence of luxury shopping malls and cheap supermarkets chains have forced the 
closure of quite a proportion of the traditional retailing units which were scattered in the 
old neighbourhoods, which certainly accelerated the reduction of low-level local jobs in 
the old town areas. Also, the decline of the open spaces reduced the “appropriate” 
venues for the occurrence of some “informal” business, for example the street traders, 
self-employed manual workers (such as tailors) and waste collectors, etc. The informal 
economic activities were a major income source for many poor residents. In Shichahai, 
the proportion of families depending on the informal economy is at least 13%. 
Unfortunately, 65% of local people admitted that the informal job opportunities suitable 
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for the low-educated and unskilled people are going to disappear during the economic 
restructuring. 
 
The poor performance in the labour market has directly affected the general economic 
capability of the local households in Shichahai. According to the survey by Tsinghua 
University in 2002, in Shichahai the average household income was CNY 2302.09 per 
month, only 73.9% of the city-wide average (3115.98). Almost 3/4 of the monthly 
household income was lower than the average (Shao, 2005). In recent years, similar to 
the change of job opportunities, the growth of average personal income never did catch 
up with the speed of GDP growth (Cai, 2003). Also, the growth of the lowest-level 
income groups was much lower than that of the higher groups and their general 
consumption (Wang, 2004a; Li, 2005a, Li, 2005c, Sun and Qi, 2005). Unfortunately, in 
Shichahai, 50.9% of employed labourers are unskilled and at the bottom income level 
among their colleagues, which no doubt means that the general economic capability will 
be even poorer. 
 
In all, in the old neighbourhoods like Shichahai, a great number of residents are 
experiencing economic and employment exclusion: their potential incomes are 
shrinking while the maintenance costs remain high. Obviously, if there is no external 
aid, the declining trend will not stop. 
 
8.2.3 Housing problems 
 
Poor housing conditions have been a significant problem in Shichahai as well as other 
old neighbourhoods in Beijing for several decades. In the 1991 housing survey, 
Shichahai was marked as one of the neighbourhoods with the very highest number of 
“unfit” dwellings. Several rounds of ambitious renewal proposals have been prepared to 
use mass demolition and reconstruction to improve  local housing conditions 
comprehensively, but for many reasons, - for example the consideration to conserve 
historic architecture - the large-scale renewal projects were never put into practice. 
Local plans were refreshed very frequently to update the alternative priority between 
conservation and renewal. The uncertainty of future prospects for this area brought very 
negative impacts on the local housing conditions. In the face of the accelerated decline 
in housing conditions, most house-owners and tenants have held a very negative attitude: 
do nothing to prevent housing damage until the demolition-reconstruction project as the 
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terminal resolution finally comes. Both public and private owners, plus outside 
investors, are no longer enthusiastic about investment for the maintenance, 
rehabilitation and refurbishment of existing dwellings. In the last 20 years, only around 
2% and 10% public housing units have experienced thorough renovation and repairs 
(interview with Professor Bian in Tsinghua University). Progress in housing reform was 
also seriously delayed. The proportion of the damaged or “inadequate” housing units 
continued to increase. Normally the poor housing conditions comprised three major 
problems: the extreme crowded housing spaces; the lack or low standard of internal 
facilities; and the frequent damage without repair. Figure 8-2 shows the result of a local 
housing condition survey organised by Tsinghua University and local government in 
2002. 
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Figure 8-2 Housing quality classification in Shichahai (2002) 
Source: Survey by Tsinghua University and Xicheng District government, 2002 
 
Table 8-4 reveals the over-crowed housing space for current households in Shichahai. 
Figure 8-3 shows in detail the over-crowded problem in the east Shichahai area. In 2007, 
the average floor space per household in Beijing (urban only) was approximate 57.6 m2, 
which means in Shichahai at least 90% households were below this level. It is very 
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common to see several generations living in the same room: during the daytime the 
residents fold their beds to make room for the table and sofa, but at night the table and 
sofas are folded down to make room for the bed(s). Quite a large proportion of residents 
have to live in the self-built dwellings. Figure 8-4 shows the locations of every self-built 
building in the east Shichahai area. The “illegal” self-built dwellings have occupied 
27% of total land use in this area. 
 
Table 8-4 Housing floor space classification (Shichahai) 
 
 Proportion 
below 10 m2 1.8% 
10－20 m2 33.9% 
20－30 m2 28.6% 
30－50 m2 26.8% 
50－100 m2 5.4% 
Over 100 m2 3.6% 
 
 
Figure 8-3 Population density in east Shichahai area (2002) 
Source: Survey by Tsinghua University and Xicheng District government, 2002 
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Figure 8-4 Illegal self-built buildings in east Shichahai area (2002) 
Source: Survey by Tsinghua University and Xicheng District government, 2002 
 
Essential living facilities and household goods are important indications of the living 
standards. Table 8-5 shows the proportion of households in Shichahai which have 
access to or own necessary facilities and goods. The gap between local and city-wide 
data is also huge. It is clear that a large numbers of households in Shichahai lack the 
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Table 8-5 Availability of affiliated facilities (Shichahai and Beijing average) 
 
Have access to: Proportion Beijing Average (urban only) 
Private and exclusive use of a kitchen 87.5% No data 
Private and excusive use of toilet 19.6% 95.0% 
Private bathrooms or showers 48.2% 94.1% 
In-house water connection 71.4% 98.3% 
Central heating 7.1% 95.1% 
Self-provided heating 78.6% 4.9% 
Piped gas 0.0% 76.4% 
Canned gas 62.5% 22.6% 
Rubbish recycling facilities 30.4% No data 
Circuit TV 60.7% 99.9% 
Telephone 53.8% No data 
Internet connection 23.2% 61.7% 
Private computer(s) 35.7% 91.6% 
Air conditioning 44.6% 99.7% 
Private car(s) 5.4% No data 
 
Table 8-6 shows the very frequent structural problems of the housing stock in Shichahai. 
The most frequently mentioned problems include leaking roofs or walls, blocked 
sewage pipes, distorted windows or jumped doors, outdated/dangerous electric wires 
and circuits. Delayed repair was very common. Table 8-7 shows normally the extent to 
which the structural problems and other housing damage can be repaired in time. In the 
self-built “illegal” kitchens, toilets or bedrooms, the quality of construction was lower 
(Figure 8-5). They also used up almost all available land in the courtyards and blocked 
the fire evacuation exits, which may cause serious safety problems.  
 
Table 8-6 Housing structural problems frequency (Shichahai) 
 
 Proportion 
Very bad, damaged almost at any time 3.9% 
Bad, damaged frequently 26.9% 
Just so-so, damaged sometimes 32.7% 
Good, damaged few 25.0% 
Very good, nearly never damaged 11.5% 
 
Table 8-7 Maintenance and repair of public housing (Shichahai) 
 
Are repairs carried out on time? Proportion 
No, never on time 16.7% 
On very few occasions  19.1% 
Sometimes on time 23.8% 
Frequently on time 14.3% 
Always on time 26.2% 
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Figure 8-5 Images of poor housing quality in Shichahai 
Left: self-built kitchen; central; self-built bathroom; right: infilled courtyard 
 
For the large proportion of public-owned housing units, the public agencies are still 
responsible for the physical maintenance. Local government housing departments take 
responsibility for maintaining the houses owned by the housing authority; for those 
houses which belong to Work Units, each Work Unit has to use its own resources to 
cover the repairs. The economic capability of the house owners decides the service 
quality; that is why the satisfaction of housing maintenance is very diverse in Shichahai. 
In some very poorly maintained dwellings, tenants have had to do some repairs by 
themselves to keep their homes useable.  
 
8.2.4 Access to social service 
 
In Shichahai, since the majority of local residents used to be employed by public work 
units, their public services, including school education, healthcare, food supply and 
retailing and even entertainment services, were all provided by their work units and 
other public agencies in the long planned economy period. To most under-educated and 
unskilled employees, the quality of service provision was usually low, but the basic 
safety net always existed. Recent welfare reform with the introduction of the market has 
broken the linkage between most service provision and work units. To the old 
communities with more vulnerable groups, the service quality has become much lower 
than that of outsiders. Many of them have had to face the inter-generational service 
exclusion and find it hard to escape the “cycle of decline” in the future. 
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The equal education for all children could be the most crucial element to prevent the 
inter-generational inequality and exclusion, especially in a more marketised society full 
of competition. In China, the importance of education for younger generations is always 
emphasised in every family. For over 1000 years, the national examination system was 
almost the only vehicle by which the social elites could be selected from the public. The 
successful candidates could then become governmental officials who were guaranteed 
favourable social well-being in a hierarchical society. This tradition continues and it is 
now still very common that most highly-educated people are in the upper groups of the 
income pyramid. Therefore Chinese parents always try to find the opportunities for their 
children to receive longer or better quality education, but in the socialist work unit 
system, such opportunities are extremely rare, because of the institutional barriers.  
 
The recent reform for the 9-year compulsory education broke the old system and did 
benefit some of the residents in the old neighbourhoods. For historic reasons, in the 
inner-city areas just like Xicheng District in Beijing where Shichahai is, there are 
several of the former “key” schools, so the average quality of school education is 
relatively higher than the city-wide average. During the investigation, 41.7% 
households in Shichahai reported that their children received ‘above average’ public 
education. This was much higher than the city-wide satisfaction level. However, in 
these aging neighbourhoods (see Table 8-2), the number of children aged 6-15 was very 
small, so the high-quality basic education did not benefit many households in practice. 
On the contrary, many households said they felt much greater pressure to support their 
children for further education. In large Chinese cities like Beijing, people with only 
9-year compulsory education have almost no appeal in the labour market. Further 
education is crucial for every child’s personal development. The recent reform of the 
marketised university education did provide more opportunities for further education, 
but obviously only rich families could benefit and afford to pay the increased tuition 
fees. About 13.9% of the households in Shichahai said their children had to give up 
opportunities for further education or studying in a better school because the anticipated 
economic burdens for that could be too heavy for their family to bear. 
 
The restructured healthcare service system also brought significant impacts to the 
residents in the old neighbourhoods. The universal insurance system gradually replaced 
the Work Units to provide financial assistance to residents for medical costs. In theory, 
employees of Work Units with severe economic difficulties should get some benefits 
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from the new insurance system. Nevertheless, there are still some local residents 
without local “Hukou” who are excluded from the insurance system. Among them, 
some richer migrants have bought commercial health insurance, but many poor ones 
cannot afford it. In recent years, Beijing Municipal Government, as well as the local 
governments in some other Chinese cities, introduced the “medical aid” scheme to 
provide assistance to the poorest people who had no health insurance. Because of  the 
limited financial resources, there are very strict conditions for applicants and the 
subsidies are at a low level. Therefore, in the poor urban neighbourhoods, there are still 
some people having to pay the full medical costs which are usually hard for them to 
afford. Table 8-8 shows the coverage of health insurance in Shichahai. 
 
Table 8-8 Health insurance coverage (Shichahai) 
Payment of healthcare costs  Proportion 
100% self-financed 11.9% 
Covered partially by commercial health insurance 4.6% 
Assisted by “medical aid” scheme 0.7% 
Partially covered by national health insurance 82.8% 
 
About 21.3% households in Shichahai face difficulties in accessing the affordable 
health care. They often have to give up receiving necessary medical treatment because 
the costs have become too high. Even for those households covered under the national 
health insurance, many still felt considerable pressure because the payment from the 
insurance was very limited. In the current system, the financial help of the health 
insurance actually does not give priority to those who are in most need of the aid . In 
Shichahai, a quarter of the households have “unhealthy” family members who are either 
disabled or have a long-term illness, and almost all of them reported that the medical 
costs have become the largest cost for their families. The insufficiency of public health 
service clinics is another problem. In old neighbourhoods, the majority of medical 
services are provided by large hospitals, but the disabled or seriously ill people find it 
very inconvenient to go to hospitals which are located at a distance from their homes. 
Actually, the general hospitals are not ideal for residents who need daily local care 
service. Usually, general hospitals are very busy and crowded; every patient has to wait 
for hours even if they need only some very simple treatments. Beijing Municipal 
Government has drafted a detailed plan to establish the community-based healthcare 
network with a large number of smaller units, but, because of lack of public financial 
support, the plan is still at the proposal stage. In Shichahai, some old houses have now 
  199 
been turned into private clinics or pharmacies to provide a daily health service. 
However, to most residents, the national health insurance covers the spending in the 
government appointed general hospitals only. The customers of the private clinics and 
pharmacies, therefore, are limited, and include mainly the poor migrants who were 
excluded from the national healthcare system. The Shichahai case demonstrates that the 
current health service system is not very effective and not sufficiently efficient to use all 
available resources to promote its service delivery to all, especially those who need it 
most. 
 
8.2.5 Public security and loss of community cohesion 
 
The decline of public security and loss of community cohesion are other problems of 
the old neighbourhoods. Table 8-9 reveals the satisfaction level of local households in 
Shichahai compared with the city-wide data (Zhang et al., 2006, p. 100). 
 
Table 8-9 Satisfaction level on local public security (Shichahai and Beijing average) 
 
 Shichahai Beijing average 
Very unsatisfied 8.9% 3.7% 
Bad 37.8% 11.1% 
Neutral 11.1% 35.1% 
Good 22.2% 40.6% 
Very satisfied 20.0% 9.1% 
 
Clearly residents in Shichahai feel their living environments are much “unsafer” than 
the city-wide average level. However, in earlier over-crowded low-rise neighbourhoods, 
the problems of crimes and other anti-social behaviours were not so serious despite the 
local police force being under-staffed. Many neighbouring families were very close to 
each other and many of them shared toilets and kitchens in the same courtyard so 
everyone knew the neighbours very well. In their daily lives, neighbours often cooperate 
with each other in dealing with public affairs such as street cleaning and housing repairs. 
The frequent interaction reinforced the community cohesion. In every courtyard, an 
informal neighbourhood watch was carried out automatically every day, and the resident 
themselves sometimes organised the 24-hour neighbourhood watch in some areas which 
were experiencing problems. 
 
Recent changes did produce potential threats to local public security. Because of the 
physical decline, some better-off households moved out and were replaced by 
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unemployed or poorly-educated people. Some of them could be trouble makers. In some 
areas the concentration of the new-comers has destroyed the well-reserved traditional 
community cohesion. The neighbourhood watch schemes, whether formal or informal, 
can hardly be organised again. Also, many residents are quite unsatisfied about the 
increasing number of bars and small luxury restaurants scattered in the traditional 
neighbourhoods in recent years. The bars and restaurants may be open all night and 
attract a great number of outsiders. The local government initially encouraged the 
night-life venues in the hope that they would help to enhance local economy. As a result, 
local residents actually never get economic benefit from them and on the contrary, they 
have to suffer the unpredictable noise and even violent incidents at nights. Fortunately, 
the households who live far from the main streets still feel much safer and receive less 
negative effects from the outsiders. That is why there are still 20% (much higher than 
city-wide average) of local households who are “very satisfied” with local security. But 
they are still worrying that the further urban restructuring may lead to worse local 
security and continuous loss of community cohesion which will certainly threaten their 




Although the market-oriented redevelopment campaign prevalent in the 1990s had 
created significant growth of the local GDP, it also generated great negative impacts in 
many aspects. From the economic aspect, the immature urban real estate market with 
strong and inappropriate interventional support led to frequent land speculation. In 
practice, this market-oriented model was quite unsustainable. When almost all profitable 
projects had been completed, the large-scale renewal campaign could no longer 
continue, although most of the dilapidated old neighbourhoods were still unchanged. 
From the social aspect, the unfair cash compensation and forced relocation directly 
caused the downward change of social well-being for a great number of low-income 
original households from the renewed old neighbourhoods. Moreover, the negative 
attitude towards the natural environment and historical conservation has also been 
highlighted recently by many researchers. More critics have targeted the undemocratic 
decision-making mechanism prevalent in the 1990s. The union between private capital 
and state controlled the renewal process and paid too much attention to economic 
renaissance only, but local communities were strictly excluded from decision-making 
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and implementation of the process, so their social and other concerns were always 
seriously ignored. 
 
In the remaining old neighbourhoods, the problems became more complex for the recent 
socio-economic restructuring and welfare reforms. All of them may be explored through 
the survey in Shichahai as a typical case of the remaining old neighbourhoods in Beijing 
inner city. First of all, owing to recent demographic changes, the proportion of aging, 
under-educated households and those with larger family sizes was much higher than the 
city-wide average. This led to the majority of local population having very low 
competitiveness in the current freer labour market. Second, the housing and physical 
declines continued, including the problems of over-crowding, poor housing quality and 
lack of basic facilities and infrastructures. Third, a higher proportion of the local 
population found it difficult to access affordable education and healthcare services. In 
addition, the loss of community cohesion and decline of public security led to further 
deterioration in the living conditions of neighbourhoods like Shichahai.  
 
The lessons of previous practice and new findings of local problems together provided 
valuable targets to be overcome in the new round of renewal programmes in some large 
Chinese cities after 2000. 
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Chapter 9 New Policies and Projects after 2000 in Beijing City: with 
Case Study of Jinyuchi 
 
After the previous lessons of the over-marketised renewal campaign had been learned, 
and the new problems in the remaining old neighbourhoods in large Chinese cities 
re-assessed, the new policies and projects were launched with innovative ideas differing 
from those of previous practice. This chapter will give a detailed introduction and 
analysis of the most recent round of neighbourhood renewal policies and projects first 
applied in Beijing. It will answer the three main questions in turn:  
• What were the strategies of the new neighbourhood renewal projects?  
• What were the real outcomes/substantial changes the projects created?  
• What was the new mechanism that was applied to continue the renewal process in 
the remaining old neighbourhoods?  
The project in Jinyuchi in Beijing old town will be used as the case to be analysed with 
a series of primary data. 
 
9.1 New Renewal Strategies since 2000  
 
In 2000, another round of the neighbourhood renewal campaign started first in Beijing 
with the launch of a series of new policies and approaches. The new policies and 
projects reflected a significant strategic shift of the renewal campaign by Beijing 
Municipal Government. Because Beijing is the national capital, the strategic shift must 
overcome at least two urgent new problems. One is trying to eliminate the bad 
reputation of the renewal campaign with the frequent unfair compensation and forced 
relocation of the past. The other is to develop a realistic way to continue pushing the 
urban renewal process forward in the remaining old and dilapidated neighbourhoods 
after private investors have lost interest in these areas. As a result, the new projects are 
an attempt to make a balanced priority between economic, social and other objectives. 
In practice, after the new policies and approaches were applied in Beijing as 
experimental projects, they were then introduced to many other Chinese cities. 
 
In 2001, the Municipal Government proposed a new five-year-plan with the objective of 
renewing most of the remaining dilapidated residential areas before 2005. The 
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promotion of housing conditions and other aspects of social well-being of the target 
neighbourhoods were given equal or even higher priority to local economic renaissance. 
Many of the target neighbourhoods had been involved in the previous round of renewal 
plans, but because of the low potential profits, they were bypassed by the market-led 
redevelopment. In the new plan, it was expected that the renewal projects would be 
operated in more diverse ways according to different local contexts. Some projects were 
still implemented under the property-led model, but with strong economic concerns; 
however, new regulations were launched in an attempt to prevent unfair compensation 
and forced relocation, with the exception of projects in some specific situations. More 
commonly, the projects were initiated in a new model. Public financial support was 
provided by the municipal government so that the renewal projects with stronger social 
objectives could be initiated in the unprofitable areas. In practice, the projects operated 
by following the new model gradually became the mainstream, and a couple of flagship 
projects had been completed as demonstrations in a very short time. Some specific cases 
were also operated by combining the revised and new models. The following 
subsections will discuss the details of the models for new initiatives. 
 
9.1.1 Property-led renewal with fairer and flexible compensation 
 
Despite being launched in the face of rising controversy and critics, the property-led 
renewal model with cash compensation and relocation was still allowed in some 
“appropriate” areas. For the new changes of infrastructures, - especially the new major 
roads and subway lines - many old neighbourhoods which used to be in non-profitable 
locations were now attracting higher potential land prices in the market. Some of them 
had not too high residential density and not too many low-income households. These 
neighbourhoods soon become new targets for private developers to initiate new rounds 
of property-led renewal projects. In Beijing, the municipal government continued to 
give support to facilitate the property-led projects which relied on private investment in 
order to continue the growth of local GDP. However, a series of new regulations was 
issued to deal with the issue of unfair monetary compensation to the relocated 
households. The key document “The Regulations to Adjust the Compensation of Urban 
Housing Demolition in Beijing City” was issued by Beijing Municipal Government in 
2000 (referred to as No.60 Document). According to this new regulation, forced 
relocation could be implemented only when the developers paid the compensation at no 
less than a new standard. This standard of monetary compensation for housing 
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demolition no longer followed the fixed discounted price decided by governmental 
agencies, but was calculated using a new formula which reflected the market value of 
the property; it consists of two parts:  
 
Final compensation cost (C) = demolition compensation + relocation subsidy 
 
The two parts of costs are decided by the following elements: 
M: Average housing price in the local market (yuan per square metre) 
S: Floor space of the demolished dwelling (valid areas agreed for 
compensation) 
P: Current average price of affordable housing (Yuan per square metre) 
R: Relocation subsidy co-efficient, normally 0.711 
 
Thus the compensation formula would be: 
)()( RSPSMC ××+×=   
 
If a family lived in a property with less than 15 square metres of floor space, 15 is used 
as the minimum “S” for the calculation. 
 
Those households still living in the public rental housing were required to purchase their 
homes according to local housing reform regulations and then would receive the cash 
compensation calculated by the formula in No.60 Document.  
 
Initially, the local market housing price “M” was to be decided by the local housing 
authority by calculating the average housing price in the surrounding areas. Since 2001, 
this price has had to be assessed by a third party, normally an independent surveyor. 
From this formula it is clear that the location (the market price for housing varies 
greatly in different areas) and the floor space of the demolished dwellings are the two 
decisive elements in calculating the final compensation. These changes effectively 
respect and protect the residents’ property right and its market value in a market 
economy. By use of this formula, the monetary compensation for an inner-city dwelling 
should be enough to purchase a reasonably good-sized and good quality housing unit 
not too far from the areas demolished. It also significantly reduced the potential profits 
                                                        
11
 To the households with very dilapidated and crowded original dwellings, this co-efficient may be 
increased to 0.8 or 0.9 with the approval of district-level government. 
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of private developers. Therefore, after 2000, the number of renewal projects in Beijing 
following this model was actually very small. Developers were interested only in areas 
with fewer residents, very small dwellings and better potential business opportunities. 
As a result, after 2000 the property-led redevelopment has been on a smaller scale. 
From 2001 to 2005, it is estimated that only around 10% of old inner-city dwellings 
developed followed this marketised model in the city (Interviews in Chongwen Housing 
Renewal Office). 
 
9.1.2 Renewal with Housing Reform 
 
In most remaining old neighbourhoods with high residential density and very 
dilapidated housing conditions, a completely new model was introduced to initiate the 
renewal projects. Because usually these areas were not attractive to private capital, these 
projects were now initiated by public authorities or public-owned corporations. In the 
areas with a great number of overcrowded dwellings, local residents were still 
encouraged by the municipal government to relocate to peripheral housing estates after 
the renewal projects. Rather than being forced to move out, however, all residents were 
given more choices. Except in some very specific cases, such as the installation of 
essential public infrastructure, mass relocation was no longer compulsory. Residents 
could decide either to stay (or move back to the area after redevelopment) or not come 
back to the same area after the projects had been completed.  
 
Housing reform and privatisation of public and work unit owned housing have changed 
the urban housing provision system and improved general living conditions in other 
areas. These areas have fallen behind. A recent housing survey shows that in these 
remaining old neighbourhoods the progress of housing reform was fallen behind for 
many reasons, for example, the uncertainty of future renewal proposals. Thus the 
proportion of public-owned dwellings, which were either under the direct management 
of local housing authority or owned by Work Units, was still much higher than in any 
other areas. Most of the worst dwellings were in the public sectors. Certainly the poor 
financial capability of public house-owners was the major cause of the housing decline. 
Thus the forthcoming renewal projects could provide an opportunity for carrying out 
housing reform in the old town areas, and among this final group of public sector 
tenants.  
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Hence a new renewal model called “renewal with housing reform” was introduced by 
Beijing Municipal government after 2000. This model was first applied in several 
flagship public-led projects, and soon became regarded as successful deals to resolve 
current “urban problems” in the old neighbourhoods effectively. In the flagship projects, 
in order to achieve quick changes over a shorter time, physical renewal was still seen as 
the core of the process and it was usually operated by the most efficient way: to 
demolish as many old, dilapidated and over-crowded low-rise buildings as possible and 
then reconstruct new multi-floor flats with modern standards on the same site. During 
the process, the sitting tenants of the demolished public housing can opt： 
a) To move back to the area by purchasing the new flats at a discounted price as a 
compensation for losing their previous homes. (The details of the compensation 
rule will be explained in following sections.) The new flats were no longer 
available for rent. Residents who bought the new flat at the discounted price 
could trade it in the market without any restriction. 
b) To take the monetary compensation, and find their own housing in the market.  
 
By this way, all the “problematic” public-renting stocks would be transferred into 
privately-owned flats, usually of much higher quality and in a better physical 
environment. In the process, the tenants and government share the investment so that it 
would not be too heavy burdens to both sides. Actually, this model reflects the saying   
“to use one stone to kill two birds”: improving the general living condition and pushing 
the urban housing reform forward at the same time. Through this new attempt, the 
government expected that the returning rate of local households could be high and the 
original inner-city community could be kept. At the same time, it would preserve the 
established social networking between residents and some of the traditional cultural 
customs.  
 
In 2000, Beijing Municipal Government issued the document “The Way to Accelerate 
Urban Dilapidated Housing Renewal in Beijing City” (normally called No.19 
Document) as the key compensation rule for such projects. Some special regulations 
were launched in order to provide more benefits to the large number of tenants in public 
housing stock, whether they chose to receive in-kind or monetary compensation. 
 
According to the No.19 Document, if the original tenants of public rental housing 
choose to move back to the new flats after the completion of the local renewal project, 
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they should have the right to buy a “similar” sized new housing unit at a discounted 
price. “Similar” means with the same number of bedrooms as their previous homes. 
However, in the dilapidated housing areas, most households actually do not have 
self-contained house “units”12. So in these cases, some special rules were made (Table 
9-1). 
 
Table 9-1 Housing replacement standard of No.19 Document 
 
Original non-self contained 
housing used by household  
Size of new flat allowed to purchase under the discounted price  
a) Less than 20 m2  One bedroom flat 
b) 20-30 m2  Two bedroom flat 
c) 30-40 m2  Three bedroom flat 
d) More than 40 m2  Follow the rules of a), b) or c) for the floor space over 40 m2; e.g. a 
household with 50 m2 of non-self contained housing will have the right 
to buy one three bedroom flat and another one bedroom flat m2 
 
The qualified original tenants could then buy the new “similar” flats. The total cost to 
buy the new flats should be the sum of three parts of prices calculated by the following 
rules: 
    Part I = discounted construction cost per square metre×original floor area of 
previous home 
    Part II = real construction cost per square metre×subsidised floor area 
Here Subsidised floor area number = number of the persons of the household 15m2- 
original floor area of previous home 
    Part III = average price per square metre of current affordable housing×
additional floor area 
 
To the households with very crowded homes, if the original dwelling is less than 5m2 
per person, then the original floor area of previous home should be calculated as the 
number of persons of the household×5m2. 
 
                                                        
12
 Normally, the “self-contained housing unit” refers to the unit in which the household owns their living 
room, bedroom, (formal) toilet and kitchen as a whole privately. In the old residential areas in Chinese 
cities, a great number of dwellings could not reach such a standard to be “self-contained” as an 
independent unit. Many households had to share the toilets, kitchens or bathrooms with their neighbours 
or they built the informal rooms as the toilets, kitchens or bathrooms by themselves (usually by 
occupying the open space in the courtyards) but the informal construction is not approved by planning 
control and the households do not have the ownership of these self-built rooms in law. 
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For example, if there used to be a 3-person household living in a public rental unit with 
25m2, they would be allowed to buy a 2-bedroom flat after the renewal project. Suppose 
the 2-bedroom flat is 60m2, the discounted construction cost is 1800Yuan/m2; real 
construction cost is 2200 Yuan/m2; and average price of current affordable housing is 
Yuan/3000m2 (estimated price around 2001). Then the price for the new flat includes:  
Part I = 1800×25 = 45,000 (Yuan) 
Part II = 2200×(15×3-25) = 44,000 (Yuan) 
Part III = 3000×(60-15×3) = 45,000 (Yuan) 
In total, this household needs to pay 45,000+44,000+45,000=134,000 Yuan to get the 
full ownership of the new flat. This price was estimated to be just 1/3-1/4 of the market 
price then. 
 
If a tenant chooses not to move back after the renewal project, they can get monetary 
rather than in-kind compensation. A special calculation for compensation (C) is applied 
as the formula: )1( RSPC +××=  
 
In this formula, the deciding elements include: 
C: Final compensation 
P: Average price of current affordable housing (yuan/m2) 
S: Floor space of the demolished dwelling (m2) (valid areas agreed for 
compensation) 
R: Relocation subsidy co-efficient 
 
Here the relocation subsidy co-efficient is also normally 0.7.  
 
For the private house-owners of the demolished dwellings, they still have two choices. 
If they choose to stay, they would have the same right to buy the new flats with the 
discounted price calculated by the rules explained above. If they choose to accept 
monetary compensation, the cost would be calculated according to No. 60 Document 
(see the section above). 
 
Clearly, this compensation arrangement for the relocated tenants in public housing 
(mostly poor) is much lower than that for the house-owners (relatively richer). The 
Municipal Government hoped to use these different rules from No.19 and No.60 
Documents to encourage more tenants in previous public housing to move back and 
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“buy” the new flats in situ rather than moving away. Through this way it hoped to 
preserve the “local community” and avoid many social problems caused by mass 
relocation. At the same time, it could collect more investment from the original 
households so the renewal project could be run with less public financial support.  
 
In later regulations, for example “The Way of Urban Housing Demolition and 
Management in Beijing City” issued in 2001 (No. 87 Document), original households of 
demolished dwellings can also choose another way as compensation: to be rehoused in 
“similar” housing units. The “similar” housing unit means that the new home should be 
within the boundary of urban area; the floor space should be no less than the original 
house; there should be no additional charge for the same tenure. Tenants living in 
private properties could be “rehoused” in similar units elsewhere so the effect can be 
minimised. 
 
The new ways of calculation of compensation give not only more options, but also more 
chances for the poor original households to obtain benefits from the renewal process. 
Larger households with more spacious homes could get much more compensation than 
before. Also, for the first time tenants of public housing could get the same benefits to 
the homeowners through the renewal process. Between 2001 and 2005, this “renewal 
with housing reform” model was applied in all districts of Beijing. The resistance from 
residents to this renewal model was much smaller than before. 
 
9.1.3 Other special cases  
 
In more cases, the task of neighbourhood renewal was usually bound together with 
some public-led “key development projects”. Most of them were projects designed to 
improve the quality of urban infrastructure, including broadening and modernising 
major roads, development of new public and green spaces, the installation of 
underground or light railways, update of drainage and sewage systems and dredging up 
old waterway systems. In recent years, the infrastructure improvement has been seen as 
a very crucial step for many large Chinese cities to develop an international metropolis. 
The local governments then significantly increased public investment in these projects. 
In Beijing, most of them were located in old town areas. In addition, the key projects 
also included some special cases, such as the construction of new Olympic stadiums 
which received a large amount of public investment as well. In these cases, some old 
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dwellings adjacent to these key projects, especially along the narrow inner-city roads, 
had to be demolished before the new construction. Local residents had to lose their 
original homes and be relocated after that.  
 
Normally, for these public-led projects with the objective to reach public interests, the 
compulsory purchase rules were allowed to be used, but the residents would have at 
least two choices to get the compensation. One is the monetary compensation as usual. 
For these key projects, funding is not a problem. Original residents can usually receive 
sufficient cash compensation (according to the No.60 Document) to buy a better 
housing unit somewhere from the market. Alternatively, if they wish, they can also 
receive in-kind compensation (according to the No. 87 Document). Sometimes the key 
development projects include the construction of some new flats in nearby areas to 
rehouse a number of returning original households. The returning households have to 
buy the new flats at the discounted price, a practice similar to the “renewal with housing 
reform” (according to the No.19 Document). In most recent projects, the municipal 
government tried to avoid the mass relocation after the large-scale housing demolition. 
In some projects, the design of new road or other infrastructures is adjusted at the 
suggestions of local residents or expert consultants. On many occasions, the layout of 
new construction has to be changed a little to preserve valuable traditional dwellings, 
cultural heritage and aged trees. Though the people who can benefit directly from this 
type of neighbourhood renewal project are few, the update of urban infrastructures can 
bring positive changes of local economy and social well-being in the long term. 
 
In areas near the important historic heritage sites, the renewal practice has become very 
cautious in proposing physical changes. As the largest old town area in China, there are 
hundreds of valuable historic buildings and relics scattered in old neighbourhoods in 
Beijing. Many of them are surrounded by the dilapidated housing. In recent years, the 
municipal government has increased investment to historic conservation schemes. The 
rehabilitation or renovation project of heritage architecture or sites can affect a larger 
area. This may include the upgrade of some infrastructures and housing so that the 
historic buildings and their surrounding areas can be well protected and conserved. For 
the requirement of historic conservation, upgrading of infrastructures and housing 
should be done in a very cautious way. The dilapidated dwellings near the heritage sites 
can only be rehabilitated or repaired rather than demolished in order to keep the 
“traditional image”. Even in cases where the surrounding dwellings are in too bad 
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condition and have to be demolished and reconstructed, the new buildings had to follow 
the traditional style, in low-rise and courtyard format. That means the improvement of 
local living conditions may be limited. Nevertheless, at least for the support of public 
funding, the quality of new housing units could be improved and necessary modern 
facilities could be installed. Also in many areas, after the heritage rehabilitation project, 
the local tourist industry has developed significantly, which brings benefits to the local 
people. 
 
9.1.4 Partnership working and enhanced local participation 
 
In the projects following the new model, the renewal process is no longer dominated by 
private developers. More stakeholders, including public agencies and the local 
community, were involved through a partnership in the decision-making and 
implementation process. Rather than employing a top down approach, negotiation and 
cooperation became the main part of the decision making. In many flagship 
public-initiated projects, district-level housing authorities were in the leading position 
and took overall responsibility in organising all of the projects. Other public sector 
agencies, including the local planning bureau, traffic management bureau, cultural 
heritage bureau, civil engineering and infrastructure providers, were invited to attend 
the board meeting of the partnership and give their professional suggestions and advice 
so that the objectives of renewal projects would integrate the demands of different areas. 
Some independent experts and professionals were also invited as external consultants or 
assessors to give more suggestions to the project proposals. Private developers were 
also involved in these public-led schemes to undertake major practical work, including 
housing demolition, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and refurbishment. Sometimes they 
were allowed to play a more central role as project organisers. However, the profit for 
private developers was restricted to a low level because of the introduction of new 
compensation rules. 
 
The role of the local community was also modified through the partnership. After all, 
most original households would move back and contribute an important part of the 
financial investment into the renewal projects. As a legal requirement, the area renewal 
proposal had to be posted publicly in the areas so that all local residents could see the 
plans and have an opportunity to express their ideas to the decision-making body. Every 
household had to make an important decision: to be relocated or not, and how they 
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should receive the compensation for losing their original homes (for details, see next 
section). This model drew some lessons from the experimental semi-marketised 
redevelopment model of the 1980s in Beijing, which was based on multi-sector 
cooperation, but now there are more fixed regulations to clarify the exact loss and gain 
of every stakeholder. This new round of projects had wide-ranging objectives towards 
comprehensive improvement, and was on a much larger scale owing to the greatly 
enhanced public and personal financial capability in the new period. 
 
9.2 Renewal Process and Output: Case Study in Jinyuchi 
 
In Beijing’s new five-year-plan, in order to eliminate most of the remaining dilapidated 
old neighbourhoods before 2005, 130 “dilapidated areas” were marked as target 
neighbourhoods to be renewed. Most of them were in inner-city areas. It estimated that 
there were over 3 million m2 unfit dwellings to be demolished, involving 347 thousand 
households (Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, 2001). 
Another round of ambitious renewal projects began, with a scale almost as large as the 
peak-time property-led projects initiated in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the first year of the 
five year plan, 1.14 million m2 old dwellings were demolished, affecting 93,000 
households. Most of these new projects were completed over a short period of time: 
over 70,000 households whose homes were destroyed in 2001 had moved into new 
homes within one year (Wang, 2002). From 2001 to 2003, 127,600 households in the 
“real” dilapidated areas had moved into new homes. This is about three times that 
achieved during the previous period (Beijing Daily, 2002). At least half of the ongoing 
post 2000 renewal projects were public-led, and almost all the flagship projects in the 
most dilapidated areas followed the “renewal with housing reform” model. Jinyuchi is 
one of the typical flagship projects. 
 
9.2.1 Jinyuchi as a demonstrative project area 
 
After the 2001 plan, practical “flagship” projects were started in five old residential 
areas in the south part of Beijing old town. Jinyuchi is one of them. Jinyuchi is a 
historical residential area located in the heart of Chongwen District, the south-east part 
of Beijing old town. In the 15th century, it was a non-residential area outside the 
newly-constructed Beijing city, the national capital of the Ming Dynasty. Soil was taken 
away from the land and some small man-made lakes were created. Waterway 
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connections were made between these lakes and the water in the moat of the city. They 
formed the local water system so the scenery of this area was once very pleasant. Some 
temples and gardens were built around these lakes, and golden fish were raised in the 
fresh water. This gave the name of this area: Jinyuchi, in Chinese which means “the 
pool with golden fish”. 
 
From the middle of the Ming Dynasty (mid-16th century), Jinyuchi was enclosed within 
the walled city by the newly-built outer wall. The area was designated to accommodate 
the increasing number of poor people who were employed by the booming commercial 
and trade industries. Since the so-called “outer-city” area was relatively far away from 
emperor’s palaces and administrative areas in the early-built imperial city, buildings 
were erected in a more disorganised way, also with poor infrastructure. Gradually, the 
uncontrolled construction blocked all the waterways connecting the lakes in Jinyuchi to 
the external water system. By the end of the 19th century, the lakes in Jinyuchi were all 
pools of still water. The local environment degenerated quickly, but because of its 
location, quite near Qianmen and Dashila, one of the most prosperous commercial areas 
in Beijing, many people still chose to live here, and large-scale and over-crowded slums 
formed. Many residents were migrants from the poor countryside because of famine, 
flood or war. With a poor education, they could hardly find any good jobs. Many were   
involved in illegal business. The local living conditions became worse and worse 
because of not only increasing population and low-quality houses but also the dirty 
water poured into the lakes by the residents. By 1949, when the Communist Party came 
to power, Jinyuchi had become one of the most dilapidated residential areas in the city 




Figure 9-1, 9-2 Slums in Jinyuchi before the 1950s 
Source: http://www.cwi.gov.cn 
 
During the early 1950s, Jinyuchi was given the first round of urban renewal. As a 
flagship project to show the achievements of the contribution by the Community 
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government in urban modernisation, the municipal government tried its best to invest in 
the project, although the public finance situation then was very poor. The dirty pools 
with contaminants were cleaned and the areas around them were transformed into small 
public gardens. The municipal government also allocated jobs to many local 
unemployed working age people. Most of them were employed as unskilled workers in 
the new publicly-owned manufacturing or commercial enterprises nearby. These Work 
Units were usually much smaller and not as well equipped as the large “key” firms in 
the peripheral industrial estates or the big department stores in the city centre. Few of 
these Work Units had sufficient financial ability to build new public housing for their 
employees, so most of the original residents of Jinyuchi still stayed in the area. 
Although some poor residents in the dangerous or near-to-collapse buildings were 
accommodated contemporarily in free public dormitories provided by the district 
housing authority, most of the low-quality dwellings and poor infrastructures remained. 
 
In 1966, the environment in the area degenerated to such an extent, a second round of 
renewal was carried out in the area. A new drainage system was built and the pools 
were all filled up to create more building land for new housing to shelter the increasing 
local population. Over 50 public housing buildings were erected by the housing 
authority in a very short time (Figure 9-3). Most of the housing buildings were 
three-storey-flats, but the general living standard was still very low because at that time 
these flats were just designed as temporary dwellings to be used for less than ten years. 
In order to keep the investment low, the floor space of most housing units was smaller 
than the minimum standard of urban housing design at the time. Besides, there were still 
a great number of slum dwellings remaining in which the living conditions were quite 
poor. Compared with the general housing conditions in the city in previous years, 
Jinyuchi was certainly one of the extremely poor areas, despite two renewal efforts. 
 
In the early 1990s, this area was no doubt on the list of the most dilapidated areas to be 
redeveloped with some urgency. The municipal government made several 
redevelopment proposals for the area, aiming to attract private investment into this area, 
but in fact the renewal project had to be postponed indefinitely. The major difficulties 
for attracting private investment for the project were two: the high local housing and 
population density was the first one, and the compensation cost for housing demolition 
and resident relocation were much higher than in other areas. Also, this area was just at 
the north side of the Heaven Temple Park, the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site. 
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The requirement for historic conservation restricted the construction height of this 
neighbouring area, so any new buildings had to have limited construction density, 
which certainly affected the potential profit of the redevelopment project (Figure 9-4).  
 
 




Figure 9-4 Jinyuchi in the 1990s 
Source: http://www.cwi.gov.cn 
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During the 1990s, the poor physical environment and housing decline of Jinyuchi area 
became major problems for Beijing Municipal Government. It had affected the general 
living conditions in its own and the surrounding areas. In the housing buildings 
constructed in 1966, all families living on the same floor had to share the toilet, washing 
room and kitchen at the end of the corridors. In 56.1% of households, several 
generations had to live in the same small unit or even the same room. Most rooms were 
used as living rooms during the daytime and bedrooms at night. Housing conditions for 
the households living in the remaining traditional low-rise dwellings were even worse. 
The majority of families in Jinyuchi did not have central heating, piped gas supply or 
exclusive access to water taps.  Table 9-2 shows the housing floor space used by 
families, and Table 9-3 shows how few local households had the necessary internal 
facilities. 
 
Table 9-2 Housing floor space per household at Jinyuchi (before renewal) 
 
 Proportion 
10－20 m2 31.8% 
20－30 m2 29.6% 
30－50 m2 27.3% 
50－100 m2 6.8% 
Over 100 m2 4.6% 
 
Table 9-3 Affiliated facilities (Jinyuchi before renewal) 




In-house water connection 74.4% 
Central-provided heating 18.6% 
Self-provided heating 51.2% 
Piped gas supply 16.3% 
Canned gas 44.2% 
Rubbish collection facilities 37.2% 
Circuit TV 32.6% 
Telephone 44.2% 
Internet connection 7.0% 
 
For a very long period, all sorts of “temporary” structures were built and used as 
housing. Because of the lack of public funding, maintenance was very poor. By 2000, 
the local living conditions in Jinyuchi area remained poor, while the pace of the general 
living conditions in Beijing as a whole speeded up. Around 33% households reported 
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that their dwellings had very serious long-lasting problems; another 30% reported some 
periodical problems.  The most popular problems included leaning walls and roofs, 
and blocked sewage systems. Considering the living conditions in the area as a whole, 
the houses and other structures were too poor to be maintained or repaired; demolition 









9.2.2 Renewal objectives 
 
For the new round of renewal projects, attracting private investment and pursuing local 
GDP growth were no longer the prime aims. Instead, it focused more on the real 
problems faced by local people, with emphasis on the issues of social well-being. For 
Jinyuchi, this was the first time a renewal project had been concerned more about the 
severe housing poverty and its very poor outdoor physical environment. The municipal 
government wanted these experiments to gain visible achievements as quickly as 
possible, so the demonstration projects were given a very short time to be completed.  
 
Meanwhile, in the new round of renewal project, some social objectives other than the 
significant housing and physical promotion were involved in the renewal process. These 
included the approaches targeting the following problems: poor provision of 
infrastructures, scarcity of public and business service provision, and poor access to 
public transport facilities. All these factors had contributed to the multiple deprivation 
of the old housing areas. In some cases, when dealing with these multi-dimensional 
problems of the old areas, equal priority had to be given to each of these problems to 
ensure the long-term success of these renewal projects, and to avoid a very narrow 
approach which could often lead to new problems. In Jinyuchi, there were some 
  218 
distinctive local problems which differed from the problems in other old 
neighbourhoods for its special local context. In the renewal process, most of these were 
considered together with the housing and physical promotion to produce better-tailored 
responses. The detailed objectives included the following: 
 
• Creation of more leisure spaces and facilities: create more public spaces between 
housing buildings and provide more venues for outdoor leisure and 
neighbourhood activities. 
• Improvement in service provision: eliminate the unlicensed shops, restaurants 
and other local business; create new retailing units and other service provision 
facilities according to the master plan. 
• Update of the infrastructures: replace the outdated facilities with new ones, and 
introduce necessary modern facilities. 
• Wider use of clean energy: coal should no longer be used as the principal fuel 
for cooking and heating, and the use of piped gas will be introduced to all 
households. 
• Refurbishment of a local middle school: the refurbishment of the Beijing No.11 
Middle School would be an affiliated product of the new housing estates. This 
school was founded in 1950, and currently most classrooms were very crowded 
and many facilities were very outdated. 
 
9.2.3 The renewal process and output 
 
The renewal project in Jinyuchi, following the “renewal with housing reform” model, 
started in late 2000, when the first round of households moved out. The whole area was 
soon entirely demolished and reconstructed, following a blue-print master-plan. The 
whole area to be demolished was 10.27 ha, which included 55 publicly-owned buildings 
of multi-floor flats (most of them built in the 1960s) and 492 single-storey dwellings 
(103,000 m2 in total) (Figures 9-8, 9-9). In total, 3055 households with 7828 people 
moved out. The area also housed 19 institutes scattered in the residential area. The 
renewal project was completed over a very short period of time. On 18th April 2001, the 
first household moved out from its old home and the construction work started on 28th 
July. One year later, on the 18th April 2002, the first group of returning residents moved 
back to the newly-built flats. The whole project ended at the end of 2002 (Beijing 
Chongwen District Committee for the compilation of local history, 2002). 
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Figure 9-8 (left) The flats to be demolished 
Figure 9-9 (right) The single-storey dwellings to be demolished 
Source: http://www.cwi.gov.cn 
 
Following redevelopment, the area now consists of a total of 307,900 m2 of new floor 
space in 42 new multi-floor buildings of flats (all with 4-7 storeys, totally 198,500 m2), 
and some other buildings to accommodate local service facilities, community centres 
and retailing units (Figures 9-10, 9-11). Being adjacent to the Heaven Temple, the 
construction height was strictly controlled, so some public facilities, such as the food 
market and car parks, were constructed underground with a total area of 57,300 m2. The 
high-rise construction leaves sufficient public open space - about 25% of total land use. 
The project and landscape designers tried to reflect the traditional image of Jinyuchi in 
its golden age. In the centre of the estate, a new water feature has been created with a 
150-metre waterway containing 5 small pools. At both ends of the waterway, there are 
two fountains and golden fish pools. Sculptures were created in the public space to 
reflect on the traditional activities and life of old Beijingers. Trees and fences split the 
large public spaces into several small areas so that local residents can have more 




Figures 9-10, 9-11 New housing estate after the renewal project in Jinyuchi 
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Most of the local infrastructures, including power lines, water and gas pipes, were 
updated. Every household has a gas boiler and heating system so that the residents can 
control the use themselves. At the west side of the new housing estate, the new No.11 
Middle School was completed in 2003, with 29,000 m2 of construction floor space, 
double its previous size. With all its new equipment, it has become one of the best 
equipped schools in Beijing. 
 
An experimental partnership was established to operate the renewal process. The 
housing authority of Chongwen District is in the leading position as the major organiser. 
Beijing Huacheng Real Estate Development Corporation undertook most of the 
practical work for housing demolition and reconstruction. The investment for housing 
renewal came from three sources: 
 
• the original households who would like to move back, 
• the developer itself, and 
• public subsidy 
 
Apart from the new flats to accommodate the returning households, the developer was 
allowed to construct some additional housing units and sell them in the market in order 
to recover the investment and with limited profit. The municipal government waived 
most of the tax for housing redevelopment to reduce the financial burden of the 
developer. All of the updating of the local infrastructure was completed by public 
agencies and supported by municipal finance. 
 
In theory, the local housing authority has held the decision-making right of most affairs 
during the renewal process. However, participation by the local residents was much 
more active than before. Before the demolition, the master-plan for reconstruction was 
posted in the area, so every household was provided with an opportunity to express its 
views about it. Moreover, according to the No.19 and No.87 Documents in this project, 
all original households could have several options. In the end, 1573 households chose to 
move back by buying new flats at the discounted price; 180 households were 
re-accommodated somewhere else and most of them moved to another public housing 
estate approximately 4 km away; 1078 households received monetary compensation and 
moved away; another 224 households, through special application and negotiation, were 
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permitted to buy similar flats in other affordable housing estates, using the discount 




This Chapter gives a detailed introduction to the most recent neighbourhood renewal 
policy and practice in Chinese cities, Beijing in particular. After drawing on the lessons 
of previous over-marketised redevelopment projects, and re-thinking the current 
problems of the remaining old neighbourhoods, the most recent projects experienced a 
significant strategic shift. Economic concerns were no longer the only priority, and the 
importance of social objectives was emphasised. The new round of public-led projects 
replaced the market-oriented approaches and became the mainstream renewal process. 
Most new projects were operated by following the “renewal with housing reform” 
model. The “demolition-reconstruction” process was still a main approach of the 
renewal process, but local households were empowered with more personal choices to 
acquire their new homes, rather than the compulsory unfair monetary compensation and 
forced relocation. Through the new compensation rules, more tenants of demolished 
public housing could own modernised new flats and stay in the original communities. 
The public finance and local households shared the renewal costs. With this new 
mechanism, the target neighbourhoods of new renewal projects were the areas with 
most dilapidated dwellings and high residential density which had been abandoned by 
market-oriented projects in the past because of their low potential profits. 
 
These new ideas were first applied in several flagship projects in Beijing inner-city. 
Jinyuchi is one of the earliest and most typical cases of these. Although the housing 
promotion and improvement of physical environment were still seen as the main tasks, 
during the renewal process some other wider-ranging objectives were also involved. 
These included the improvement of leisure spaces and facilities, service, infrastructure, 
use of clean energy and the local school. In practice, the project was operated through a 
partnership with a wide involvement including public authority, the developer, local 
community and some other consultants. By this way, many stakeholders, especially the 
local community, achieved stronger influence in the decision making and 
implementation of the renewal process. This renewal project was completed in a very 
short time, and almost all objectives were reached. A great number of original 
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households finally returned, and benefited from the many social benefits of the project, 
although many others moved out for a variety of reasons. 
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Chapter 10 Evaluation of Recent Projects in China 
 
This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the most recent 
neighbourhood renewal policies and projects, showing the significant strategic shift in 
Beijing. The evaluation will follow the criteria proposed in Chapter 5 based on the 
British experience. In this research, because of the lack of city-wide data, all the results 
will be generated from the primary data collected from the Shichahai and Jinyuchi cases, 
which represented the declining neighbourhoods before and after the renewal projects 
respectively. By comparing the situation of the two case neighbourhoods before and 
after the renewal project, sufficient evidence will be provided to answer the following 
questions:  
• Did the decision-makers exactly understand the real “urban problems” of the target 
neighbourhood at the time of setting up the strategies and objectives of the 
projects?  
• Do the projects generate enough positive effects to resolve the problems?  
• Is there an ideal mechanism to better define the “urban problems” and achieve 
sustained positive changes in all aspects?  
All of these form part of most valuable findings of this research. 
 
10.1 Strategies and Objectives 
 
As chapter 9 indicated, , most of the new round of renewal projects, different from 
previous marketised redevelopment approaches which regarded the renewal projects as 
the vehicle to gain more local economic output only, followed the “people first” 
principle and placed more emphasis on social objectives. The low-income and 
vulnerable groups could be given more aid and opportunities to improve their general 
living conditions. The shift of objectives from “economic first” to “people first” 
required the renewal projects to have more integrated strategies and objectives across 
many aspects. The rapid growth of local GDP through private investment was still 
encouraged by all policy makers, but there had to be a premise that the benefits of the 
economic renaissance should be more equally distributed to all local residents, 
particularly those needing it most of all, and should also facilitate or at least not 
counteract the promotion of social service and community cohesion. This ideological 
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shift is more or less similar to what New Labour did in re-establishing the strategy for 
the most recent urban regeneration and neighbourhood renewal programmes in British 
cities.  
 
Such a comprehensive promotion process is, however, not easy to implement in some 
neighbourhoods which do not have enough attraction to private investment. That is why 
in Beijing, most of the very dilapidated residential neighbourhoods with high population 
density were excluded by the property-led redevelopment movement in the 1990s. No 
doubt, in the new round of renewal projects, the public financial aid must be used, 
though usually through a more flexible way, to help initiate such a process. Therefore 
Jinyuchi, as having the typical most dilapidated neighbourhoods with a huge amount of 
and highly-concentrated urban poverty, was selected to set up the flagship public-aided 
renewal project. In Jinyuchi, although there was not an official proposal to set out 
clearly the priorities and objectives of the project, it is not hard to see the issues that 
particularly concerned the municipal government through the policy practice. 
 
In almost all recent projects, the quick improvement of the general local housing 
conditions is the core target. In Jinyuchi, it was decided in 2000 that, because of the 
poor housing conditions, all old housing buildings should be demolished and replaced 
with modernised high-rise flats. Meanwhile, the beautification of “local images” and the 
update of most infrastructures were other key objectives of the project. Infrastructure 
upgrading and housing reconstruction were considered simultaneously from beginning. 
The other major renewal targets included the improvement of local education and 
service facilities. The old building of the No.11 Middle School was rebuilt with greatly 
enlarged floor space. New retailing and service units were constructed according to the 
blue-print plan: mainly on the ground floor of the new buildings or in the “shopping 
building” adjacent to the housing estate, although the latter has yet to be completed. 
 
Some comparative data have revealed that projects with “more integrated objectives” 
have addressed the “local problems” better than the previous narrow targeted practice. 
In Shichahai, a typical unchanged “problematic” traditional neighbourhood, the survey 
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1) Very poor housing quality and maintenance (43.8%);  
2) Shabby physical environment (43.8%);  
3) Fearful public security (39.6%); and  
4) Crowded housing space (27.1%).  
 
These could be regarded as being similar to the local problems in Jinyuchi in the past, 
before renewal. The objectives described above seem to have captured these problems 
very well. The first, second and fourth issues were all directly addressed, and the third 
was indirectly addressed through the improvement of the local physical and 
socio-economic environment. This is great progress in comparison with the 
widely-criticised over-marketised property-led practice. 
 
However, many signs show that the integration of different objectives is not strong 
enough. Still some of the important “local needs” of these neighbourhoods were ignored 
by the renewal practice. Some of these local needs were minor or “invisible”, and 
therefore not easy to identify unless by means of a thorough household survey. 
However, they do affect the local living conditions greatly. For example, in the practice 
in Jinyuchi, the redevelopment has not touched the long-standing problems of low rates 
of local employment and high concentration of low-level employees. Although not 
many local residents reported this as the “most urgent local disadvantages”, the analysis 
in Chapter 8 has revealed that this might be the most significant essential cause of the 
general economic difficulties for local households, and the starting point of the vicious 
“cycle of deprivation” among the poor and vulnerable households. There have been 
some innovative interventions in some other neighbourhoods in Beijing. Professional 
job training has been provided through the establishment of career centres, and 
subsidies have been provided to the self-employed and small private businesses. It is a 
pity that these approaches were not included in this “integrated approaches” in Jinyuchi 
during the renewal process. 
 
The absence of the effective response to “invisible local problems” has affected the 
satisfaction level among local residents about the renewal project in Jinyuchi. The result 
of field investigation proved that physical renewal and upgrading may not lead to 
sustained prosperity in the area. The “cycle of multi-dimensional decline” partially 
remains in the renewed housing estate in Jinyuchi (see the following sections). If 
compared with some well-praised British neighbourhood renewal programmes, the 
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policies and actions applied in the Jinyuchi project could be classified as passive 
approaches. Most of them focused on providing external aid to the declining area and 
trying to pull some local people out of the difficulties. Based on the British experience, 
positive approaches which place emphasis on the essential causes of decline should be 
adopted. Renewal projects should explore the internal potential capability of local 
communities and enable them to escape the cycle of decline through a more equal 
distribution of public resources. 
 
10.2 Impacts of Renewal: Essential Changes 
 
The real effects of all the approaches during the renewal projects have also been clear 
through the household investigation. In fact, although the strategy and targets of the 
projects cannot cover all aspects of the urban decline, the changes in one aspect may 
also affect the other issues; thus for the survey on the satisfaction towards local living 
conditions in Shichahai and Jinyuchi, all possible domains are still involved.  
 
In the questionnaire survey, the sampled households were asked to list three main 
advantages and three main disadvantages of living in the neighbourhood. The results of 
the two neighbourhoods – Shichahai and Jinyuchi, were compared. Broad differences 
exist between them, which clearly show the essential changes as a result of the renewal 
project in Jinyuchi. 
 








Housing space 0.0 68.0 68.0 
Housing quality and maintenance 13.0 24.0 11.0 
Outdoor physical environment 37.0 32.0 -5.0 
Employment and job opportunity 26.1 10.0 -16.1 
Education 37.0 16.0 -21.0 
Health care 41.3 38.0 -3.3 
Retailing, entertainment and other services 56.5 26.0 -30.5 
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Housing space 27.1 2.2 -24.9 
Housing quality and maintenance 43.8 64.4 20.6 
Outdoor physical environment 43.8 17.8 -26.0 
Employment and job opportunity 2.1 4.4 2.3 
Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Health care 4.2 2.2 -2.0 
Retailing, entertainment and other services 6.3 26.7 20.4 
Public security 39.6 35.6 -4.0 
 
Tables 10-1 and 10-2 clearly show the gains and losses caused by the new model of 
renewal. It is obvious that the improvement in housing space is the main achievement of 
the renewal project. In Shichahai, no one mentioned housing space as the area 
advantage, but after renewal in Jinyuchu, 68% households saw it as one of the main area 
advantages. On housing quality and maintenance, a mixed picture can be seen in 
Shchahai: 13% households saw them as an advantage, while 43.8% saw them as a 
disadvantage. This reflects the diversity of houses in the pre-renewal old neighbourhood 
areas. In Jinyuchi, again there are different views about it: 24% saw it as an area 
advantage, with 64.4% as a disadvantage. Theoretically speaking, the area is new and 
the residents should have a high opinion about the housing quality and maintenance. In 
reality, the nature of the residents in Jinyuchi after renewal is very different from that of 
Shichahai. Many very poor residents have been excluded, and some new and richer 
residents have moved in. Their expectations about housing quality differ from those of 
the traditional residents. The quality of new housing in neighbourhood renewal areas in 
general is poor because of the restriction of funding. In particular, when the residents 
have paid a high price to move in, complaints are very common. Similar arguments 
based on diversity and expectations can be made about the outdoor physical 
environment. Fewer households in Jinyuchi than in Shichahai saw it as an area 
advantage; at the same time, a much smaller proportion of households in Jinyuchi saw it 
as a main area disadvantage. For education, local job opportunities, healthcare facilities 
and convenience to shops and other retail facilities, fewer households in the renewed 
Jinyuchi than the pre-renewal Shichahai saw them as area advantages. Although the 
results might be affected by the distinctive local features of the two areas, they do raise 
questions about the wider contributions of this new round of renewal projects.  
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The following sectors will provide more detailed analysis on each of these aspects. 
 
10.2.1 Housing and physical changes 
 
There is no doubt that the objectives to improve the overall local housing conditions 
have been reached in Jinyuchi. The accommodation offered in the new flats is so 
spacious that previous local dwellings could never compare. In Shichahai, 91.1% 
households still have to live in houses with floor space of no more than 50 m2, and 
35.7% are smaller than 20 m2. In Jinyuchi before 2000, the situation was very similar: 
88.6% were below 50 m2 and 31.8% below 20 m2. After renewal, the crowded buildings 
have been totally eliminated and replaced with new buildings of spacious flats. Now 
96.2% households live in housing units with above 50 m2 of floor space and 17.3% over 
100 m2. This is higher than the average housing space per household (approximately 51 
m
2
, Beijing Statistical Bureau, 2007) in Beijing. Figure 10-1 shows the improvement of 





















Figure 10-1 Housing floor space per household in Shichahai and Jinyuchi (contrast of before and 
after the renewal project) 
 
Renewal projects involved the improvement of the outdoor and indoor infrastructures 
and upgrading of other facilities in the area. An investigation has been made to assess 
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Table 10-3 Access to facilities and internal features 
 




Private kitchen 87.5% 55.8% 100.0% 
Private toilet 19.6% 34.9% 100.0% 
Private bathrooms or showers 48.2% 23.3% 100.0% 
In-house water connection 71.4% 74.4% 100.0% 
Central heating 7.1% 18.6% 100.0% 
Self-provided heating 78.6% 51.2% 0.0% 
Piped gas 0.0% 16.3% 100.0% 
Canned gas 62.5% 44.2% 0.0% 
Rubbish recycling facilities 30.4% 37.2% 100.0% 
Circuit TV 60.7% 32.6% 90.0% 
Telephone 53.6% 44.2% 82.8% 
Internet connection 23.2% 7.0% 75.0% 
Private computer(s) 35.7% 19.4% 43.6% 
Air conditioning 44.6% 41.9% 72.7% 
Private car(s) 5.4% 6.5% 10.9% 
 
It is clear that the improvement of the “hardware” caused by the mass demolition and 
reconstruction is quite substantial. All the “unfit” and “over-crowded” old dwellings 
with outdated facilities such as self-provided heating, canned gas, have been eliminated 
and replaced by the uniform and standardised new flats with private kitchen, toilet, 
bathroom or showers and central heating. The mass redevelopment could be the only 
effective way to realise the vast improvement in such a short time. Meanwhile, the new 
outdoor physical environment with dedicated landscape design and new modern 
infrastructures are the most important by-products of the physical renewal of the 
traditional housing. The new man-made water systems with the “golden fish pools” are 
reminders of the local prosperity and the distinguished local image. These facilities can 
easily be seen by visitors. That is why the renewal project in Jinyuchi has been praised 
by the government as one of the most successful experimental cases of the “renewal 
with housing reform” model. 
 
Beyond these positive physical changes related to space and basic facilities, the renewal 
project has created some new problems. Table 10-4 summarises the problems related to 
the structures of the housing buildings. These problems include leaking roofs or walls, 
blocked sewage, distorted/jammed windows or doors, outdated electricity 
wiring/circuits and other unforeseen structural damages. Table 10-5 shows the extent to 
which the damage can normally be repaired on time. 
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Table 10-4 Frequency comparison of housing structural problems  
 Shichahai Jinyuchi (before) Jinyuchi (after) 
Very bad, damaged almost at any time 3.9% 20.0% 9.3% 
Bad, damaged frequently 26.9% 13.3% 14.8% 
So-so, damaged sometimes 32.7% 31.1% 37.0% 
Good, seldom damaged 25.0% 20.0% 22.2% 
Very good, nearly never damaged 11.5% 15.6% 16.7% 
 
Table 10-5 Maintenance and repair comparison 
Are repairs carried out on time? Shichahai Jinyuchi (before) Jinyuchi (after) 
No, never on time 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 
Few 19.1% 16.7% 14.9% 
Sometimes on time 23.8% 26.2% 22.9% 
Frequently on time 14.3% 23.8% 18.8% 
Always on time 26.2% 16.7% 27.1% 
 
These data show that, after the renewal project in Jinyuchi, the improvement of housing 
quality and maintenance/repair is very limited. During interviews, many residents 
pointed to countless design defects and problems of construction quality of the fast-built 
housing units. Owing to the too-fast construction speed required by the local housing 
authority, the master plan and housing design were completed in a very short time, and 
planners and designer focused on the “the creation of better image” of the area, while 
the invisible needs of the residents were not given enough attention. Careless and 
high-speed construction did leave many hazards for the users. In some flats, the walls 
began to leak within one year of completion. Another common problem is the poor 
performance of the heat preservation: there are many gaps between window and door 
frames, and the walls lost heat, creating additional heating costs for the residents during 
the winter. The poor quality construction, the mismatch of the new housing and the 
requirements of the residents repeated the similar problems of the mass high-rise public 
housing development in Western countries several decades ago. 
 
The local “housing maintenance and repair services” have experienced very complex 
changes. In the past, because of the existence of a high proportion of public-owned 
housing units, public agencies were the main service providers. Local government was 
responsible for maintaining the dwellings owned by the municipal housing authority; 
Work Units were responsible for the properties owned and managed by them. The 
economic capability of the property owners determined the service level. In some very 
poorly-maintained dwellings, residents had to do some DIY repair work themselves to 
keep their homes habitable. After the renewal, new flats became privately owned and 
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the responsibility of maintenance and repairs was transferred to the owners. Similar to 
all new housing estates built in Chinese cities, a private real estate management 
company was hired to manage and maintain the renewed area. This company provides 
maintenance and repair services for a charge on the households in Jinyuchi housing 
estate. According to local government regulations, the returning households should pay 
only a discounted and fixed real estate management fee decided by the local 
government, at 0.53 yuan per month per m2. Other residents (who moved into the area 
through the market) must pay the market price of the real estate management charge 
determined by the company, which is 3 times the fixed fee level. 
 
In practice, the dual price collection resulted in low maintenance fee collection for the 
management company, which led to unsatisfactory service provision. Delays in repairs 
and other maintenance were a common problem before the renewal. It is still a common 
problem after redevelopment. For technical reasons, it is no longer easy for local 
residents to do the DIY repair for their homes in the high-rise buildings. Some richer 
households can hire other housing service providers to do the work; the poor ones have 
to suffer from the problems and engage in endless negotiations with the real estate 
management team. 
 
Most of the residents in Jinyuchi, especially the returning households, have very mixed 
feelings about their new homes. Many of them enjoy the visible improvement in their 
housing, while from a comprehensive perspective, the achievements have been greatly 
affected by the problematic changes of the invisible factors. 
 
10.2.2 Accessibility to social services 
 
Although the renewal project in Jinyuchi did not include too many specific social 
objectives, the housing renewal process did have important implications for the 
provision of many social services in the area. This section reports the investigation 
about the changes in accessibility to some major social services, including education, 
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Education 
 
Earlier discussion has revealed the concentration of the lower-educated population in 
both Shichahai and Jinyuchi. Table 10-6 gives a general evaluation of education 
changes based on the judgement of some households on the performance of their 
children. 
 
Table 10-6 Public education quality comparison 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Above average 41.7% 35.7% 
Not better than average 58.3% 64.3% 
 
It is interesting to note that the proportion of children who achieved an above average 
performance in the renewed Jinyuchi is lower than in the pre-renewal area of Shichahai. 
Although this is a very crude evaluation, the result does reflect the local situations 
before and after redevelopment. The Xicheng District, in which Shichahai is situated, 
has better tradition in high quality public education service than Chongwen District, 
which hosted Jinyuchi. Although since the mid 1990s, Beijing Municipal Government 
has begun to reform public education service with the abolishing of “key schools” and 
district-wide random distribution of schooling children, the legacy of the past still 
remains. 
 
In the poor neighbourhoods like Jinyuchi, few parents can afford the fee for “choosing 
the school” to send their children. The majority of children in the poor neighbourhood - 
Jinyuchi - still receive below-standard education, and some clever children from 
low-income families have had to leave school early, although the opportunities for 
children in poor families have increased through recent reform. 
 
In fact, in the inner-city neighbourhoods, there are currently not many families with 
school age children, so the impact of the public education reform is very limited in these 
areas. Meanwhile, many households have reported that their living quality was heavily 
affected by the commercialisation of university education since the late 1990s. On one 
hand, the fast increasing number of university graduates did produce fiercer competition 
in the labour market, which greatly excludes young persons with only 9 years of 
standard compulsory education. On the other hand, the increasing tuition fees for 
university do block the way to higher education for many students in poor families. 
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Although the government has used several ways - such as personal loans and subsidies - 
to help the poor students, the impact is extremely limited. In Shichahai, 13.9% of 
families said their children had had to give up the opportunities for further education or 
studying in better schools because of the economic burdens on the family. In Jinyuchi, 
the number increased to 14.6%, which means the pressure of education cost has not 




Both Shichahai and Jinyuchi have recently experienced the reform of the health care 
system. Most of the local households were covered by the national health insurance, but 
there were still some who remained out of the system. Table 10-7 shows the coverage of 
health insurance in the two case neighbourhoods. 
 
Table 10-7 Health insurance coverage comparison 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Totally self-paid 11.9% 7.0% 
Commercial health insurance 4.6% 0.6% 
Funded by “medical aids” schemes 0.7% 0.6% 
Covered by national health insurance 82.8% 91.7% 
 
The comparison of the two areas shows a slight positive change in health insurance 
coverage. However, many residents reported that the difficulties in accessing health care 
still existed, particularly among the low-income households. There is the absence of 
national healthcare insurance coverage to the floating people (rural migrants), which 
made up quite a proportion of low-income residents in the inner-city neighbourhoods. 
Besides, in the two cases, even among those who are covered under the national health 
insurance, 21.3% find it very difficult to obtain affordable and decent health care. To 
some disabled or elderly people with long-term illnesses, the national health insurance 
can only provide limited financial help and they themselves still need to pay very high 
medical costs. Also, in Jinyuchi, disabled or ill people find it very inconvenient to get 
out of their high-rise flats without lifts. Sometimes they have to give up going to 
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Other services 
 
The accessibility to some other services also affects the general living conditions. This 
section examines the changes in shopping, civil service, and recreation. Tables 10-8, 
10-10 and 10-12 show the comparative evaluation of accessibility in these three areas, 
and Tables 10-9, 10-11 and 10-13 analyse the effects of the renewal projects in 
Jinyuchi. 
 
Table 10-8 Accessibility to retailing/shopping units  
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Very good 28.9% 7.7% 
Good 30.8% 19.2% 
Ordinary 11.5% 15.4% 
Bad 19.2% 26.9% 
Very bad 9.6% 30.8% 
 
Table 10-9 Effects of renewal project to the accessibility to retailing units in Jinyuchi 
Significantly increased 2.1% 
Increased 8.5% 
Nearly no change 34.0% 
Decreased 14.9% 
Significantly decreased 40.4% 
 
Local retailing and shopping units include food stores and markets, groceries, 
restaurants, bars, daily utility shops and so on. It is clear from the comparison that most 
residents felt that living in the newly-developed high-rise estate in Jinyuchi is not as 
convenient as in the traditional neighbourhoods. The mass demolition and 
reconstruction destroyed almost all the small traditional retailing units scattered in 
almost every street. Although some of them were unlicensed, these shops and retail 
outlets did contribute much to support the daily life of the residents in the old 
neighbourhoods. In the new estate at Jinyuchi, the master plan included sufficient 
retailing units, but they were located in the underground spaces or ground floor of the 
housing buildings. The underground food market has been closed since 2004, because 
residents living above them complained about the noise and the smell of rubbish. New 
retailing units on the main streets are still open, but most of them sell luxury goods 
rather than the commodities the low income people need for daily use. Almost all 
residents interviewed complained that there are no food stores or market within walking 
distance, and the food in the nearest modern supermarket is much more expensive than 
what had been sold in the street market in the past. In fact, according to the original 
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master plan, there should be another “shopping building” as the affiliated construction 
to contain all kinds of retailing units just near the housing estates. The building has 
recently been abandoned, owing to low local purchasing power. 
 
Table 10-10 Accessibility to civic services comparison 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Very good 34.6% 19.2% 
Good 44.2% 28.9% 
Ordinary 9.6% 34.6% 
Bad 9.6% 7.7% 
Very bad 1.9% 9.6% 
 
Table 10-11 Effects of renewal project on the accessibility to civic services in Jinyuchi 
Significantly decreased 4.4% 
Increased 17.4% 
Nearly no change 52.2% 
Decreased 17.4% 
Significantly decreased 8.7% 
 
The “civic services” such as post offices, banks and business facilities is another area 
evaluated. The differences in the neighbourhoods before and after the renewal project 
are actually very similar to the changes of retailing units. In the high-rise estate, several 
previous small service units have usually been replaced by a larger one, so the average 
distance from individual homes to the unit is much greater than before. Also, because of 
the increased rent, the owners of these services have had to reduce the number of staff, 
so most local residents feel they have to wait longer to be served. 
 
Table 10-12 Comparison of accessibility to entertainment venues 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Very good 43.1% 38.8% 
Good 35.3% 36.7% 
Ordinary 17.7% 16.3% 
Bad 3.9% 8.2% 
Very bad 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Table 10-13 Effects of renewal project on the accessibility to entertainment in Jinyuchi 
Significantly decreased 4.3% 
Increased 19.2% 
Nearly no change 57.5% 
Decreased 12.8% 
Significantly decreased 6.4% 
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The entertainment venues include cinemas, community centres, children’s playgrounds, 
sport facilities and so on. The result from the renewal project is also not very positive 
despite a lot of public funding having been used for these purposes. In Jinyuchi, the new 
construction has created more and better entertainment facilities, compared with the old 
crowded neighbourhoods; however many residents do not like them just because they 
are too good and too well maintained, and they have to pay fees to use them. For most 
of the low-income families, the renewed area has offered them fewer choices about how 
they can spend their spare time. For children and elderly people in particular, the change 
may reduce their happiness in everyday life. 
 
10.2.3 Public security and community cohesion 
 
Another important measure to evaluate local living conditions is the “safety feeling” 
among residents. In Western countries, there are many different indicators to measure 
such a feeling. They could include the local crime rate, the frequency of anti-social 
behaviour, incidents of drug and alcohol abuse, etc. It is still difficult to use such a 
comprehensive approach in China. Thus during the interviews in Beijing, three 
questions were asked in an attempt to obtain some idea about residents’ feelings about 
public security, neighbourhood interaction and the role of the neighbourhood committee 
or other community organisations. In fact, the last two issues were closely associated 
with some self-help activities to maintain public order in Chinese traditional urban 
neighbourhoods. The results are shown in Tables 10-14, 10-15, 10-16, and 10-17. 
 
Table 10-14 Satisfaction of local public security comparison 
 Shichahai Beijing average Jinyuchi 
Very dissatisfied 8.9% 3.7% 14.8% 
Bad 37.8% 11.1% 40.7% 
Neutral 11.1% 35.1% 22.2% 
Good 22.2% 40.6% 13.0% 
Very satisfied 20.0% 9.1% 9.3% 
 
Table 10-15 Effects of renewal project on general public security in Jinyuchi 
Much better 3.9% 
Better 25.5% 
Nearly no change 37.3% 
Worse 23.5% 
Much worse 9.8% 
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It is clear that most residents in both neighbourhoods feel their living environments are 
much more “unsafe” than the city-wide average, before and after the renewal project in 
the case of Jinyuchi. This is understandable, considering the high concentration of 
unemployed and poorly educated population. The detailed situation in different small 
areas within the scheme is, however, quite diverse. Shichahai is near several tourist 
attractions, and the great number of outsiders is sometimes a major safety concern. 
Many residents are quite dissatisfied about the existence of bars and luxury restaurants 
opening all night long. The local government initially encouraged the night-life and 
hoped that it would help to enhance the local economy. However, in practice, the local 
residents gained nearly no economic benefits or job opportunities from these night-time 
activities; on the contrary, they constantly produce unpredictable noise and sometimes 
violent incidents at night. Fortunately, those households who live far from the main 
streets feel much safer and receive less negative effects from the outsiders. Actually, in 
the over-crowded low-rise neighbourhoods, there are really not so many crimes and all 
kinds of anti-social behaviour as was thought, even though the local police offices are 
under-staffed. The homes of many families are very close to each other and they may 
have to share toilets and kitchens in the same courtyard, so that the neighbourhood 
watch could be automatically on 24 hours. Also, because of the lack of wealthy 
households, these areas are not attractive to the thieves and robbers.  
 
In Jinyuchi, after the mass demolition and reconstruction, the good tradition of 
“neighbourhood watch” was lost. The high-rise buildings provide more “invisible 
corners” as possible venues for crime and anti-social behaviour. Because of the 
increased diversity of the population, some wealthy new incomers have become the 
targets of criminals and the under-staffed local police force can provide very limited 
help to prevent the (potential) crimes. That is why many residents in the renewed area 
feel that the local public safety is getting worse, even when the local unemployment rate 
has been reduced by the process of gentrification and population replacement. 
 
Table 10-16 Comparison of frequency of neighbourhood interaction 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Almost daily 38.9% 10.9% 
Frequently 42.6% 26.1% 
Sometimes 13.0% 23.9% 
Seldom 1.9% 26.1% 
Nearly never 3.7% 13.0% 
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Table 10-17 Help from Neighbourhood Committee for public security comparison 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Always helpful 20.4% 3.9% 
Frequently helpful 30.6% 15.7% 
Sometimes helpful 20.4% 39.2% 
Seldom helpful 26.5% 21.6% 
Nearly never helpful 2.0% 19.6% 
 
Neighbourhood Committees are the lowest-level of (informal) governmental agencies in 
charge of some public affairs at neighbourhood level. For a long time, the 
Neighbourhood Committees in the inner-city areas maintained a very good tradition in 
organising and enhancing the “self-help neighbourhood watch (or warden) schemes” by 
local residents. Many facts show that these amateur wardens are actually more 
responsible and experienced than the policemen in keeping local safety, because they 
are familiar with the area through the frequent neighbourhood interaction. Traditional 
and established residents are always happy to share useful local information and to 
organise public events, which is important for enhancing community cohesion. In the 
renewed area of Jinyuchi, neighbourhood interaction has been reduced because of the 
new physical arrangement of flats and the changes in local population (Table 10-17). 
With less community cohesion, self-organised activities to promote local public security 
are no longer as effective as before. 
 
10.3 Unexpected Effects and New Problems 
 
The above analysis shows that the renewal project in Jinyuchi has achieved the 
objectives of housing and physical improvement, but some other consequences were 
problematic and unexpected. Those may form the “new challenges” for the future 
development of the neighbourhoods. This section looks at these problems in detail. 
 
The main unexpected consequence is the large-scale population replacement after the 
physical renewal. It was one of the objectives of the renewal project “to keep original 
communities”, and the housing authority produced the special compensation rules 
according to No.19 Documents in order to encourage more residents to return to the 
area. However, finally, the returning rate was just a little bit higher than 50%, which is 
of course much higher than the market-led projects in the 1990s with mass relocation. 
This is much lower than the expectation of the officials of the local housing authority 
(approximately 70%), (although this was not formally included in the strategy). As a 
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result, in these newly-renewed neighbourhoods like Jinyuchi, population structure has 
become more mixed. 
 
10.3.1 Changes of demographic structure 
 
Traditional neighbourhoods show some special demographic features. In both 
unchanged Shichahai and renewed Jinyuchi, the household size is bigger than that in 
other areas. The average number of persons in a household is 3.55 in Shichahai and 3.6 
in Jinyuchi. Both of these are much higher than that of the city-wide average: 2.67 
persons per household in urban districts of Beijing in 2007. The distribution of the 
household size in the two cases differs slightly (Table 10-18). The traditional large 
families of 5 persons or more declined in Jinyuchi, but the proportion of “core families” 
with 4 persons, couples with one or two children and one older generation member rose. 
Family size does indicate that the redevelopment has modernised the household 
structures in Jinyuchi, with a reduction of small and large families and an increase in the 
mainstream households of 3 to 4 persons. 
 
Table 10-18 Family size per household in Shichahai and Jinyuchi 
No. of family members Shichahai Jinyuchi 
1 5.4% 5.5% 
2 16.1% 10.9% 
3 39.3% 25.5% 
4 8.9% 38.2% 
5 and over 30.4% 20.0% 
 
The second common feature is that there is a higher proportion of old people living in 
the two neighbourhoods. Table 10-19 gives a comparison of the local and city-wide age 
structure. It is clear that both neighbourhoods have many more persons of retired age 
(over 6013) and fewer working-age persons (18-60) in comparison with the city average. 
In Jinyuchi, there are more working-age (25-40) people than in Jinyuchi, and most of 
these come from the newcomer households. The increase in the children and the 25-40 
age groups indicates the nature of the newcomers – young families. The decline in the 
40-60 group means the Cultural Revolution generation has lost out through the 
redevelopment process. The so-called 40-60 group comprised the red guards from the 
                                                        
13
 In China, the official retirement age is 60 for males and 55 for females, but in some cases some 
specific people - particularly senior governmental officials or high-level professional experts - can keep 
working beyond that age and retire later,. So here “over 60” represents just a general definition for the 
“pensioners”. 
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peak of the Cultural Revolution; they had missed the proper school education. They 
were sent to the countryside for re-education in the farms later. After the Cultural 
Revolution, they were allowed to return to the city, but were employed only by the 
unprofitable and poorly performing collective sector enterprises. During the industrial 
restructuring of the reform era, they were the first group who lost their jobs and become 
unemployed. It seems that they have become the victims again in the urban regeneration 
process. Because of their poor economic profile, they have been pushed out of the 
relatively advantageous centre location and relocated to the peripheral areas. The 
over-60 group has maintained its position. 
 
Table 10-19 Age structure (for all population) comparison 
Age span Shichahai Jinyuchi 
0-18 (years) 8.9% 10.2% 
18-25 (years) 12.0% 8.6% 
25-40 (years) 19.9% 28.9% 
40-60 (years) 34.0% 25.9% 
Over 60 (years) 25.1% 26.4% 
 
The data reveal that in the inner-city areas, more family members per household and 
more aging people mean the common existence of the multi-generation households. 
Normally, several generations living together is a forced choice. Some elderly, disabled 
or people with long-term illnesses, for example, have to be cared by other family 
members. The primary data show that in Shichahai 25% households have “unhealthy” 
members who require constant care. Other family members who may not live together 
also have to provide financial support. In the renewed Jinyuchi, the number of these 
types of households dropped significantly, to 12.7%. This could mean that the 
redevelopment has not provided sufficient support to those families which require 
special support; more of these families could have been forced out to other areas. 
 
Comparing the family size, age structure and proportion of the households with family 
members requiring care between Shichahai and Jinyuchi, it is clear that some positive 
changes have been made by the renewal project, but these positive changes are limited 
to the areas themselves. For the people who can afford to stay and buy back the newly 
constructed flats, there are significant improvements. Redevelopment has brought them 
the benefits of modernised living in a favourable location in a fast expanding city. But 
for these households who were unable to move back to the areas and have been forced 
out to other locations, the changes could be very negative. They have lost their original 
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homes, job opportunities, business promises, communities, and social networks. These 
groups tend to be poor, ill, and the unemployed 4050 group. These changes and 
consequences are very similar to the common problems of gentrification in all inner city 
regeneration projects. The evaluation of urban renewal projects should take a broad 
view to include the social factors of the original residents. The focus on simple 
economic or physical improvement indicators of the area concerned may tell only part 
of the story. 
 
10.3.2 Changed competitiveness in labour market 
 
The changed demographic structure could affect the local labour market as a whole. 
Tables 10-20, 10-21, 10-22 and 10-23 present the education level employment status 
and types among residents in Shichahai and Jinyuchi. 
 
Table 10-20 Education level comparison 
 Shichahai Beijing Average 
(urban only) 
Jinyuchi 
Below Junior Middle School 20.8% 14.1% 22.4% 
Junior Middle School 28.3% 26.5% 14.5% 
High School 24.2% 26.8% 29.0% 
College/University or above 26.7% 32.5% 34.2% 
 
It is clear that in Shichahai as an unchanged inner-city neighbourhood, the education 
level of local residents is far below the city average. This is closely associated with its 
aging demographic structure. However, the situation in the renewed Jinyuchi is more 
interesting. First, there is a clear improvement in the educational profile among the 
residents with a higher-than-average proportion of high school and university graduates. 
At the same time, the educational profile also reflects the population before 
redevelopment. Almost all the newcomers who purchased the housing units at market 
prices are much better educated than the original residents. Thus the combination of the 
returning households and new comers form a very strange structure of local education 
level. 
 
The most direct consequence of the concentration of low-educated population is the 
poor performance of local residents in the local labour market. Table 10-22 summarises 
the overall employment status of local residents (excluding those before graduation) in 
the two case neighbourhoods. 
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Table 10-21 Employment status comparison 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Retired 42.4% 37.7% 
Long-term secure employment 34.8% 47.7% 
Temporary unsecure employment 7.6% 5.9% 
Long-term unemployment 15.2% 8.8% 
 
It is hard to find comparable city-wide data on this issue, but it is obvious that there is 
quite a proportion of local people being excluded from the “formal” labour market in 
both cases. The very high proportion of retirement and unemployment rates are main 
features of many deprived areas in Western countries and in Chinese cities. In 2005, the 
official unemployment rate in Beijing was 2.5%. Although this figure is far from the 
real situation because migrants without local “Hukou” of Beijing are not included in the 
calculation, the average level must be much lower than that of Shichahai. Again, the 
data of Jinyuchi are relatively better, but the differences could have been caused by the 
contribution of the newcomers with good jobs. 
 
The primary data collected include details of jobs held by the local population in the 
two case neighbourhoods. Table 10-22 describes the roles of the employees in working. 
Table 10-23 summarises the distribution of their employers. Both tables include data for 
the current employment for working people and the last employment for retired people. 
Part-time jobs are not included. 
Table 10-22 Job type comparison 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Unskilled 50.9% 48.9% 
Lower level skilled 31.0% 22.6% 
Lower level managerial 15.5% 18.8% 
Higher/middle level skilled 2.6% 2.3% 
Higher/middle level managerial 0.0% 7.5% 
 
Table 10-23 Employer type comparison 
 Shichahai Jinyuchi 
Temporary job 8.0% 9.5% 
Collective enterprise 3.0% 18.3% 
State-owned enterprise 46.0% 35.0% 
Private enterprise 13.0% 14.6% 
Foreign invested enterprise 1.0% 0.7% 
Self-employed 5.0% 5.1% 
Governmental institutions 15.0% 7.3% 
Hospital/academic 6.0% 7.3% 
Others/NGO 3.0% 2.2% 
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Obviously, more people than average in Shichahai do the lower-level jobs. As discussed 
in chapter 6, the general workers of the public-owned enterprises (including both the 
State-owned and Collective enterprises) are the main losers of the macro-scale 
socio-economic restructuring towards marketisation. The staffs of most foreign invested 
enterprises (including the joint venture enterprises) and some governmental institutions 
are widely regarded as winners of the ongoing urban transformation. The higher-level 
managerial and skilled staffs in all organisations gain more in a market circumstance. 
The structures of the job and employer types are closely linked to the high retirement 
and unemployment rates. In many public-owned enterprises, redundant unskilled staff 
were forced to retire much earlier than the official retirement age (maybe 40 or 45). This 
is why there are more retired people than aged people here. Some others were even 
forced into unemployment. Usually, their previous employees were too poor to provide 
any help (e.g. training of professional skills) for them to find new jobs, and their 
monthly allowances were much lower than those of the retired people from other 
employers. 
 
The employment profile of residents in Jinyuchi is significant better than that in 
Shichahai. However, if excluding the newcomers, almost all returning people reported 
no changes in employment, or did not have any opportunities to improve jobs during the 
process. The housing renewal project was not associated with other measures to 
promote local employment. On the contrary, just as what happened during the 
market-oriented renewal process in the past, the mass redevelopment did affect the 
prosperous “informal” local business in the previous low-rise, crowded but small scaled 
neighbourhood. Before the demolition of old neighbourhoods, many local people could 
run small shops, do business in the “street market” and find part-time jobs or let one or 
two of their self-built rooms to increase their daily incomes. Although many of the 
businesses were unlicensed and not easy to be seen by outsiders, they did create 
significant contributions to support a basic living condition for many low-income 
households. The primary data show that in Shichahai, 12.5% households can get extra 
money from housing letting, 16% are involved in self-employed small business and 
8.7% have at least one part-time job associated with the “informal” business. However, 
in the newly-built high-rise housing estate in Jinyuchi, the “informal businesses” 
disappeared. 15.4% households can still get extra income from housing letting, which is 
slightly higher the than previous proportion of 12.5%, while none of the households can 
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engage in the self-employed small (unlicensed) businesses and part-time jobs. That 
means 5% - 20% of their previous income has probably gone. 
 
10.3.3 New problems caused by the population replacement 
 
The unexpected demographic changes in the renewed neighbourhoods like Jinyuchi 
may have created some new problems which affect the achievements of these projects. 
The benefits of local housing improvement cannot be distributed equally to all the 
original households. According to the rules of demolition compensation analysed in 
Chapter 9, the original households who choose to return could obtain more economic 
benefits than those who no longer lived in Jinyuchi after the project. Therefore, the 
government hopes that by this way more people would like choose to return, and that 
they will be financially able to contribute more to release the burdens of public finance. 
Also, all returning households can become house owners, and that could entirely 
eliminate the troubles in public housing management of previous periods. However, in 
fact only about half of the original households moved back after the completion of new 
high-rise estates.  
 
Most of the returning households were the better-off original households who used to 
live in relatively spacious dwellings and were not very poor. According to the 
application of the new compensation rule, they could pay less to buy the new flat units 
after the renewal project. On the contrary, most households with either smaller original 
housing space, or too poor financial capabilities, became losers. Although every original 
household had the opportunity to purchase a new flat at a very favourable price which 
was much lower than the market price, many of them still found it difficult to afford that 
because the new flats are usually much bigger. In Jinyuchi, quite a large proportion of 
the original households were hereby “forced” to be relocated elsewhere. 
 
The compensation rule also created inequality between different groups. For example, 
one household might be in a very dilapidated but larger dwelling, while the 
neighbouring one was in a better but smaller one. The market value of the second 
dwelling could be higher than the first one, while the compensation calculated following 
the rules might be higher for the first one. Also, one household may need to pay the 
same price to buy a new flat of the same size as that of the neighbouring household, 
even if one household has two retired and disabled elderly people only while the other 
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has two healthy working-age people without any dependents. Undoubtedly, the 
compensation rule failed to give equal treatment to every household, and also did not 
provide extra aid to those with most difficulties. 
 
It is difficult to trace the relocated residents and evaluate their life changes after the 
demolition, the fact that the relocated group is a relatively weaker and poorer group 
among all original residents. In this investigation, it is impossible to find information 
about the current living conditions of the relocated households who are actually 
excluded from the renewal project, but many of the returning households confirmed that 
the living conditions of their previous neighbours in other places are much worse than 
theirs in general. 
 
As a result, although unexpected, many of the poor households have been forced out of 
this area and replaced by a group of relatively wealthier households who bought the new 
housing units at the market price. The comparative data of social profiles in the two 
cases provide some direct evidence of this. Therefore, the general observations in some 
aspects should be seen in a different light. For example, access to education, healthcare 
and job opportunities in Jinyuchi is slightly better than in Shichahai at the general level, 
but the improvement could be the consequence of the population replacement, not the 
improvement of service delivery itself. To some low-income returning households, the 
access to services was reduced as a result of the massive physical changes. In old 
neighbourhoods like Shichahai, access to affordable education, medical or other 
services was not very bad. The convenient and cheap local services were crucial for 
many low-income people in their efforts to maintain basic living standards. After the 
mass reconstruction, access became worse, especially for the vulnerable groups who are 
weaker in personal mobility. That is why in Jinyuchi, inaccessibility to the retailing, 
entertainment and service units has become one of the most significant disadvantages. 
 
10.4 Partnership and Community Involvement 
 
Looking at the operation of the renewal practice could help reveal the reasons for some 
shortcomings: why the vision and objectives failed to capture fully the real local needs, 
and why the real effects failed to meet the original objectives. Although the vision and 
objectives have shifted since 2000 to achieve an integrated local improvement, and the 
multi-sectoral cooperation has been promoted by partnership working, the 
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organisational structure of decision-making and implementation bodies are still similar 
to the old style mechanism: the partnerships are too strongly dominated by public 
authorities; many fragmented participators worked separately and the local residents’ 
views were still sidelined. These shortcomings ensured the emergence of the unexpected 
failures in many aspects. 
 
In the renewal project at Jinyuchi, a simple, experimental partnership was established as 
the prime operator of the project, which involved various branches of public authorities, 
private developers and other stakeholders, including the local community. Nevertheless, 
the structure of this partnership continued the legacy of the top-down model: the 
housing authority of Chongwen District had the dominant power to make final decisions 
on renewal strategies and objectives, as well as allocation of most of the public funding 
or resources. The development corporation can influence the decision-making process 
significantly, because it has a close relationship with the local government (the 
corporation is partially supported by public finance), and it directly undertakes the task 
of implementation of the project. Frequent communication, negotiation and cooperation 
between the two sides went very well. However, other public agencies became 
“informal partners” within this organisation. Most of them are the agencies in charge of 
some “visible” affairs, for example the planning bureau, heritage conservation bureau 
and some infrastructure supporting agencies. These “informal partners” were sometimes 
“involved” in the decision-making and implementation process: normally being 
informed and consulted about the renewal proposal and getting more opportunities to 
send their feedbacks to the leaders of the partnership. However, in practice their ideas 
were never decisive and seldom influential because of their “unequal” involvement in 
the mechanism. 
 
Many other agencies associated with important “invisible” affairs, including the 
education bureau, health care bureau, police office and others, were still excluded from 
the partnership. In the face of urgent “local problems” in the inner-city old 
neighbourhoods, many of these agencies were proposing or applying their own policies 
and schemes to improve the services under their control, including providing assistance 
to the “households in difficulties”. The compulsory and equal right for education and 
the application of universal health insurance plus the “medical aids” schemes are 
examples of these good attempts. However, these individual attempts to create social 
well-being were never coordinated together in the redevelopment area. The simple 
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approach of one or two issues can contribute very little to stop or reverse the 
“multi-dimensional deprivation”. These un-coordinated schemes could affect each other, 
so the real positive effects could be less than the expectations. 
 
To local communities, compared with the previous model, the new approach does give 
them more information about changes in future, and also more options for their future 
living, but much more could be done to promote community involvement and local 
participation. The amount of information for local households was less than that for the 
public sectors, and because of the absence of community-based organisations or the 
election of community representatives, the voice of the community was always very 
difficult to be heard. Some active households tried to express their ideas, but these 
individual opinions were usually not supported by other households and the ideas varied 
or even contradicted each other. In the Jinyuchi case, one of the most significant 
consequences is that more than half of the returning households do not like the design of 
their new flat units. Many feel that the new house is too spacious and the gas central 
heating system too modern which could increase the cost for them. That is because, 
before the project started, the housing authority did not collect local opinions about 
future housing design, even though the master-plan layout had been publicised. The 
officials hoped that the mass reconstruction would make the housing improvement as 
revolutionary as possible, but they ignored the real affordability of local households 
who should have had a say about their living conditions in future. During the 
investigation, many returning households said that they have to switch the gas heating 
off in cold days to save money, or reduce the expenditure for food or leisure to support 
the costly heating fees, which means that, in a case without active community 
involvement, the expected elimination of housing poverty or exclusion could lead to 
severer poverty or exclusion in other services for many low-income households. 
Similarly, that is why the dedicatedly-designed retailing units failed to provide the 
appropriate or affordable services that the local residents really need. 
 
Furthermore, without sufficient involvement of local communities, the renewal practice 
lacks the flexibility to provide tailor-made assistance to households with special needs. 
Although the general evaluation on some issues was not bad in the renewed scheme, to 
some specific groups, the service delivery is much lower than average, which may cause 
great difficulties and affect their general living conditions. Face-to-face interviews 
discovered that the problems of the so-called ‘households with difficulties’ could be 
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very diverse. For example, some households became poor because of their low 
education achievement and failure to secure decent jobs, while others are poor because 
of their poor health, or they have too many elderly people to support. Each household 
may have very different “needs” from the household next door. Thus the area-based 
mass renewal project could bring very different effects on them: some households may 
benefit greatly, while others gain little but lose a lot; one resident is very happy to see 
the change in one issue but hate the change in another. That is another reason for so 
many final results being out with the original expectations of the policy-makers for the 
experimental practice. 
 
From the views of some low-level governmental officials who know the local 
community well, the diverse and “invisible” local needs had been recognised before the 
start of the project. However, as one of the pioneer experimental projects for the new 
round of renewal practice led by the municipal government, the project in Jinyuchi has 
to be completed as quickly as possible. Also, the achievements should be made as 
observable as possible in order to provide more positive evidence to convince the 
residents in other old neighbourhood areas. As a result, under the dominance of local 
housing authorities, all resources had to be concentrated on the most “visible” issues as 
the prime short-term targets. There were not enough resources and time to be spent on 
the “invisible” aspects and approaches to address the diverse local needs. 
 
Certainly, it is clear that the outdated current mechanism without sufficient community 
involvement should be the essential cause for the faulty vision, approaches and their 
implementation during the most recent renewal projects. In future, the organisation must 
be aware of the failure, and the new mechanism should try to enhance flexibility and 




This chapter provides a comprehensive and detailed evaluation of the most recent 
neighbourhood renewal projects in Beijing represented by the Jinyuchi case. With the 
“people first” principle, the overall strategy and detailed objectives of these projects has 
now become more integrated, and better capture the real local needs than before, but the 
coverage of these policies is still not deep and wide enough. They tend to concentrate on 
some of the most “visible” issues and lack in-depth local investigation and analysis. The 
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most successful effects of these projects are the revolutionary improvements of housing 
conditions and the physical environment, and the higher returning rate of local 
households who benefited from the redevelopment compared with earlier schemes. 
However, the new approach also has many problems: although the housing quality was 
improved in a short time, the quality of the new buildings and public facilities has not 
achieved the desired standard. Housing maintenance service in general was as bad as 
before; in some cases they became worse, especially for the low-income households 
who cannot afford the high cost of the maintenance service provided by private 
companies. Besides, the changes in local employment, education, healthcare and other 
services, as well as in public security, are not so positive and have become worse. 
Although many of these are not “visible” problems in the renewed neighbourhoods, 
they could lead to a further round of decline. Finally, there are serious defects in the 
organisational mechanism of the renewal process:  the simple structured partnership 
did provide more opportunities for community involvement, but the decision-making 
and implementation were still not balanced; therefore the outputs of the project 
inevitably missed some of the important local needs. 
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Chapter 11 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This study aims to provide answers to the following research questions: How are old 
and declining neighbourhoods renewed in Chinese cities and what are the main features 
of the urban renewal and regeneration process? Judging from the experiences and 
lessons learnt from the renewal and regeneration of declining neighbourhoods in British 
cities, what are the achievements and shortcomings of the recently completed renewal 
and regeneration projects in Chinese cities? The first question has been addressed in 
chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10. This final chapter will provide the answer to the second question 
through a comparative summary and evaluation of British and Chinese neighbourhood 
renewal/regeneration process. It will first contrast the social, economic, political and 
cultural contexts in both countries; this will be followed by a summary of the urban 
renewal/regeneration policies and practice in different periods of time. The 
achievements and problems will also be compared, before drawing together the 
recommendations. 
 
11.1 Comparison of the Context 
 
As a cross-national comparative research, the comprehensive understanding of the 
contexts in different countries should be the pre-condition in setting up the comparative 
analysis. In this research, the similarities and differences of the socio-economic and 
political contexts have been discussed in various places in previous chapters. The 
following section will summarise them in a systematic way.  
 
11.1.1 Economic context 
 
Britain is the earliest industrialised country in the world. After the Industrial Revolution, 
British cities were quickly modernised and quickly occupied dominant roles in the 
global economy. In later years, with the consequences of wars, loss of colonies and slow 
growth, Britain lost some of its leading position in the global economy; nevertheless, 
until the 21st century, it was still one of the wealthiest countries in the world and 
exercised significant influence over the global economy. The latest data show that 
current GDP (PPP) per capita in Britain (2008) is about 3.5 times that of the world 
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average14. The advanced economic development is reflected by the high standard of 
living. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in 2009 
Britain’s Human Development Index (HDI) is 0.939, ranked 23rd out of the 179 
member countries or regions on the list15. However, since the early 20th century, regular 
economic depression has occurred frequently and traditional industries have declined 
significantly, so the general growth speed of GDP has slowed down. After the industrial 
restructuring, when service industries, replacing manufacturing and mining, became the 
dominant sector of British economy, a new round of economic revival has emerged 
since the mid-1980s, but the growth speed has been much slower than that of most 
newly-industrialised countries. 
 
China is the largest developing country in the world. Over the last several centuries, as a 
result of the lack of industrialization, outdated productive technologies and the closed 
domestic economy, China had been marginalised from the global market. However, 
since the economic reform started in the early 1980s, this big country has been moving 
towards the central stage of the world economy system. In the last thirty years, the 
Chinese economy has experienced constant high-speed growth. The GDP (PPP) per 
capita increased from 2.9% (approximate 1/35) of the British in 1980 to 15.1% (more 
than 1/7) in 2007. This is still less than 60% of the world average16. The national HDI is 
0.787, ranked only 84 and far behind that of any European countries17. Economic 
development is very unequal between regions in China. In recent years, when the 
manufacturing industries were booming in most inland cities, some early industrialised 
large coastal cities were experiencing the de-industrialisation process. With the rapid 
growth of service industries, the modernisation pace in these cities was greatly outpaced. 
In Beijing City, the GDP (PPP) (2008) reached 1.7 times the world average and the 
city-wide HDI was 0.89318. This is almost at the same level as that of some European 
countries like Portugal, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. 
 
Clearly, as an early developed country with a long-term leading position in global 
economy, British society experienced a long and gradual process to accumulate national 
and personal wealth. The modernisation process of most cities was done step by step. In 
every specific period, the prior target of the concept of “development” was clear and 
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relatively simple. In the early capitalist and the neo-liberal eras, the major priority of 
“development” was to lift the economic competitiveness, with increase of productivity, 
technological innovations, booming of new industries and attraction of private 
investment; while in the social democratic and New Labour eras, more concerns were 
given to re-distribution of the national wealth to benefit more people. Also, in the early 
capitalist and social democratic eras, the development process was based largely on 
quantitative growth, while in the neo-liberal and New Labour eras, qualitative 
improvement became more important. The alternative shifts of British economic 
policies just reflected the changing requirements of modernisation in different periods. 
The development of British low-income households may be a very good example: in the 
19th century it emphasised the installation of basic sanitary facilities; in inter-war and 
immediate post-war years, the quantitative growth of new council housing supply 
became the core task; then the improvement of the quality of the existing houses 
became more important; and later more concern was given to local service provision 
and betterment of the environment. 
 
In China, a later-developed country trying to catch up with advanced Western countries 
like Britain, the modernisation process followed a different route and was concentrated 
over a shorter period. The rapid growth may, however, bring some more complex 
problems. In almost every historical era, the development process tried to meet the 
requirements, both to increase economic efficiency and promote equal distribution of 
national wealth. Also, in order to achieve high-speed modernisation, the requirements of 
both quantitative and qualitative growth are of great importance. Such tough 
requirements for modernisation and the wide-ranged targets were often proved to be 
unrealistic. The national economic policies were ambiguous or shifted frequently: in the 
early Socialist period, equality was high on the agenda through the application of 
economic development plans, but the policy-makers quickly adjusted the plans, so that 
investment was concentrated into some “key” areas only in order to ensure a rapid 
growth of the national economy and an increase in competitiveness. In the reform era, 
policy-makers also had to face the dilemma of balancing efficiency and equality. After 
over 30 years of rapid economic growth, policy makers still need to make choices 
between quantitative growth and qualitative improvement. For example, in order to 
provide more suitable houses for low-income groups, the requirements to increase new 
social housing stock and improve the quality of existing stock are matters of high 
urgency at the same time. 
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11.1.2 Political context 
 
The British political system is one of the classical models of the capitalist regime in the 
world. In this system, the majority of national wealth is owned and controlled by the 
private sector, and there is a long tradition of distrust of the public authorities. The 
modernisation process was largely reliant on the initiatives or approaches for the 
extraction of surplus value and returning profit from the free market, while the 
government responsibilities were supplementary: just to ensure the circumstances for 
free competition. The rapid growth of productivity was the major driving force to 
facilitate the modernisation process, and the improvement of social well-being was 
taken for granted as the consequences of the economic prosperity. However, since the 
early 20th - particularly in the post-war years, - social democrats questioned the basic 
capitalist ideology and expanded the responsibilities of the government. Interventional 
approaches were frequently applied in an attempt to achieve social justice in more direct 
ways. In most recent decades, the role of the market was re-emphasised, and 
interventional approaches became more “indirect” or flexible, with the aim of 
promoting cooperation between market and state, and to ensure the integrated and 
balanced economic and social development in the new era. Thus with the combination 
of more social concerns, nowadays the British political system has become quite 
different from the classical capitalist model, and operated by following a more 
pragmatic agenda in an effort to address the real needs of the people. 
 
The structure of British governments used to be very simple because of its limited 
power in the early capitalist era. In later years, with the enhanced power, more new 
branches were established, and each of these was charged with governmental 
responsibility in one aspect. Usually the branches were operated by following the 
top-down control and worked separately. Cooperation and coordination between the 
fragmented agencies were rare and very weak. In the New Labour years, the 
institutional system was reformed considerably. One change is that the decision-making 
right for many issues such as regeneration has been devolved to neighbourhood level. 
Another is the establishment of some multi-departmental units in central governments in 
order to break the institutional barriers between the public agencies. The local-based 
partnerships, involving not only central and local governments but also all related public 
and private agencies and local community, are empowered with the leadership of most 
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public affairs. This is a very innovative change which could help to tailor the responses 
to local problems. 
 
In Chinese history, there is a long tradition that the governmental power was strong to 
influence or even control national economic and social development. Since 1949 in 
particular, when the socialist state was established by following the Soviet model, the 
role of government was regarded as the only effective answer to accelerate the 
modernisation process. The majority of national wealth was publicly owned and 
economic development always followed the central controlled plans. The role of private 
capital and market was almost eliminated from the national economic system. Since the 
economic reform, the planned economy has gradually been rolled back. Private capital 
and market now form a large part of the national economy, and the desire for economic 
prosperity has been given increasing political importance. However, the power of 
government remained strong and interventional approaches were still frequently used to 
adjust the national economic and social development. Just similar to Britain, in most 
recent years the policy-making largely followed a pragmatic way, paying more attention 
to the real needs of the people but not necessarily following a particular political 
ideology. 
 
Institutional barriers between Chinese public agencies are a long-term problem, having 
existed at least since the establishment of the socialist state. In cities, because of the 
unique work unit system, the entire society ran in a very fragmented way. According to 
the economic plans, the majority of governmental responsibilities were undertaken by 
each work unit separately. The provision of social welfare was comprehensively 
considered by each work unit, but between different work units the service was 
provided in different ways and to varying standards. In the most recent welfare reforms, 
the relationship between service provision and work units was broken. Instead, local 
governments established the unitary agencies and charged for the services for all urban 
people. However, the reforms were just in the initial period and they did not proceed in 
the same way, in different aspects. In practice, cooperation and coordination of the 
service provisions were seldom considered up to now. 
 
Another obvious political difference between Britain and China is the party political 
systems. Britain has a multi-party democratic election system, while in Chinese regime 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the only party firmly in control. This difference 
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has important implications to any comparative social study. The analysis in this research, 
however, shows that the difference should not be over emphasised. Party stands hold 
important influence over policy shifts in Britain. In China, similar policy shifts 
(sometimes big changes) could be initiated by the internal differences of the CCP. A 
change of top party leaders or their ideas could bring in very different policies and 
actions which often reflect the general trend at international level. The economic reform 
and the reduction of economic planning power started at the beginning of the 1980s, and 
followed the neo-liberal approach fashionable at the time. The harmonious society 
debates and policies promoted by the current leaders is in line with the idea of good 
governance and the correction of mistakes made by the neo-liberal followers during the 
1990s. 
 
11.1.3 Social and cultural context 
 
Social structure of British cities changed in parallel with the modernisation process 
following the Industrial Revolution. In the early capitalist era, apart from the super rich, 
the majority of the urban population could be divided into two classes according to their 
employment: middle class and working class. The middle class took control of political 
power and ensured the dominant role of the free market in the national economic system 
so that they could obtain more wealth from rapid economic growth, while the working 
class hoped to gain more governmental and other non-market aids, but their desire was 
far from reality. Nevertheless, the political influence of the higher proportion of the 
working class of the urban population was greatly enhanced later, particularly when the 
social democrats finally came to central power in the post-war years. In the long term, 
the life style, income, education level and family structures of the unskilled working 
classes were highly homogenous, so the common social needs were very clear. In 
response to this, the post-war governments established the welfare state and frequently 
applied economic plans, trying to promote “full employment” of all and redistributing 
the national wealth in egalitarian ways to benefit the working class. Since the 1960s the 
social structure of British society has become more complex. Economic restructuring 
cut off the unskilled jobs so the homogenous working class then gradually disappeared. 
For younger generations, their job types, life styles, personal interests and family 
structures have diversified. The incoming immigrants from overseas created more new 
specific social groups with different cultural customs. Thus their social needs differ with 
each other significantly and can no longer be recognised in simplified ways. 
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Another feature of British society is its strong civic society. In the past, when the power 
of governments was very weak, there used to be many cases in which the bottom-up 
organisations took in charge of local public affairs. Even in the years when most public 
policies were eventually decided by the centrally controlled bureaucratic system, the 
voice of the local community was never ignored during elections and in public media. 
In the New Labour years, the participation of civic society was highly emphasised for 
local decision making. Many attempts were applied to enhance community cohesion so 
that the real local needs could be clearer. The long history of democracy ensured better 
communication, negotiation and coordination among different social groups, and was 
also helpful in balancing the individual, local and public interests on a larger scale. 
 
In China, the social structure changed much faster following the arrival of Western 
colonists. Before 1949, the majority of people were still farmers living in rural villages. 
In the cities, the urban social structure was highly fragmented. Neither the working class 
nor the middle class were well formed because of late industrialization. After the 1950s, 
the agrarian population was anchored in rural areas by the Hukou system, and almost all 
the urban social groups were re-organised. They were categorised by political status and 
their work units. Each category of people had a different role in economic plans and 
received different standards of social service. The mobility between categories was 
strictly restrained. Since most urban housing was provided by work units, social 
segregation was well reflected spatially. However, in every work unit or neighbourhood, 
the micro-scale social structure was highly homogenous. The colleagues usually shared 
the same incomes, family structures, life styles and even personal interests. Usually the 
work units had good channels of communication with their employees so that their 
social needs could be known by decision makers. 
 
Following the economic reform, Chinese urban society was greatly restructured again. 
People were re-categorised by their incomes. The new urban poverty and vulnerable 
groups were formed and expanded quickly; they were diverse, consisting not only 
unemployed or laid-off unskilled workers, but also pensioners, mass rural migrants and 
many other groups. The enlarging social inequality became a significant potential threat 
to social stability and sustainable economic development. Moreover, when urban 
housing was no longer provided by work units, in most urban neighbourhoods the 
demographic structure changed significantly and the loss of community cohesion was 
inevitable. The new vulnerable groups had to suffer much worse social well-being than 
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the richer groups. This was just like the polarisation process in neo-liberal Britain, but 
the difficulties faced by the newly-formed vulnerable groups in Chinese cities were 
harder to explore: the disadvantaged people did not usually trust each other, so the civic 
society for them was not formed to express the common social needs. Therefore, in 
Chinese cities, besides the long tradition of the top-down bureaucratic system, the lack 
of civic society was another important obstacle to realising sufficient community 
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Table 11-1 Comparison of British and Chinese context 
 




The earliest industrialised country in 
the world, high GDP per capita and 
high HDI 
A developing country with very late 
industrialisation, low GDP per capital 
and low HDI 
Used to dominate global economy 
and now still plays a significant role 
in world economy 
Used to be on the fringe of the world 
economic system but now moving 
towards the central stage in the global 
economy 
Slow economic growth in recent 
years 
Very fast and constant growth since the 
economic reform 
Long and gradual modernization 
process 
Concentrated modernisation process 
Quantitative growth first, qualitative 
improvement later 
Combined requirements for both 
quantitative and qualitative 
development in every period 
Economic policy shift but develop 
gradually 
Economic policy shift frequently with 
alternative priorities 
Market and state intervention 
dominate alternatively 




Long term capitalist regime, but 
recently political concerns 
becoming more mixed and 
pragmatic 
Long term Socialist regime, but 
recently political concerns becoming 
more mixed and pragmatic 
Weak tradition and distrust of 
central control 
Strong tradition of top-down central 
control 
Power devolution to local and 
neighbourhood level in recent years 
Central control reduced but still very 
strong in some cases 
Encouragement of multi-sector 
partnership working 
Strong state-capital union but 
excluding local community 
Social service provided through 
fragmented systems but the 
institutional barrier broken recently 
Multi-party democracy 
Social service provision experiments in 
reform and cooperation between 
institutions was very poor 




In early years categorized by middle 
class and working class 
Before 1949 urban population was few 
and highly fragmented 
Working class used to be a 
homogenous group but in recent 
decades its scale shrunk and became  
diversified 
Urban society was re-organised by 
economic plans and the work unit 
system 
In recent years social polarisation 
emerged 
In reform era the urban population was 
re-categorised by incomes and social 
polarisation emerged very fast 
Vulnerable groups booming recently 
with highly diverse social profiles 
and cultural customers 
New vulnerable groups were formed 
consisting of diverse sub-groups 
Strong tradition of civic society Very poor community cohesion 
especially for poverty, lack of civic 
society 
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11.2 Similarities and Differences of Neighbourhood Renewal Process 
 
Although the context of Britain and China differs in many ways, the development 
trajectories of the neighbourhood renewal in the two countries, however, share some 
common features. Both trajectories could be divided into four eras. In both countries in 
the 1st (laissez-faire Britain and pre-Socialist China) and 3rd era (neo-liberalist Britain 
and reformed China), the market was the decisive force in driving urban development - 
including neighbourhood renewal projects; while in the 2nd (Social Democratic Britain 
and Socialist China with planned economy) and 4th era (New Labour Britain and 
post-reform China towards “Harmonious Society”), the role of public or other 
stakeholders was reinforced and the prior objectives of the renewal projects were no 
longer profit-led, but to accommodate some “public interests”. Clearly, in both countries, 
the ideas which guided the neighbourhood renewal process developed progressively. 
The understanding of the “urban problems” and their causes, the renewal strategy and 
approaches, and the mechanism to operate the process in every era, will be compared in 
turn in the following sub-sections. 
 
11.2.1 Laissez-faire Britain and pre-Socialist China 
 
For British cities in the early capitalist era, the neighbourhoods targeted for renewal 
were the compact, low-rise medieval towns. These towns used to be prosperous because 
of their handicraft industries and local businesses, but fell behind in competition with 
the new industrial cities which had emerged from the Industrial Revolution. Thus the 
renewal projects occurred in order to overcome the problems of the inefficiency of land 
use, the insufficiency of housing for booming urban population and the lack of new 
industries with higher productivities. In fact, all the problems came from the same 
source: the lack of the market-oriented development mechanism in the old areas. Thus 
the neighbourhood renewal was essentially a process to capitalise the targeted areas. 
The old buildings were replaced by modern, industrialised and profitable properties. 
Private capital dominated the whole process and obtained considerable returns, while all 
non-market impacts were very weak. 
 
In China, before 1949, the urban renewal process was very slow and on a much smaller 
scale compared with the British practice. For very late industrialisation and long-term 
exclusion from global economy, the “urban problems” in old neighbourhoods were very 
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similar to those in British medieval towns under the Industrial Revolution. However, in 
practice, because of the lack of a unitary central government in power, the practice of 
neighbourhood renewal in Chinese cities differed in two regions. In some coastal large 
cities, especially the cities with concession territories directly governed by foreign 
colonists, private developers initiated some projects to develop new industries with 
higher productivity. The development process ran following a similar way to what had 
happened in Western countries in the early capitalist era, but these projects seldom made 
changes in old neighbourhoods. In most inland Chinese cities, the renewal projects still 
followed a very traditional way. Public authorities dominated the decision-making and 
implementation of the neighbourhood renewal process. But the targets of these projects 
were very limited: most aimed just to install or promote modern infrastructures or 
beautify the appearance of the key areas, but were seldom associated with the initiation 
of new industries or modern houses. 
 
Both of these two ways left a significant legacy to the following development trajectory 
of neighbourhood renewal in Chinese cities. The majority of urban areas were 
influenced by the public-led projects only, which reflected the inheritance of Chinese 
traditional culture on urban development: the respect of the central-controlled 
decision-making process. However, the influence of the Westernised model increased 
gradually. More and more Chinese people were impressed by the urban appearance of 
the new industrialised neighbourhoods. 
 
Table 11-2 Comparison of neighbourhood renewal in laissez-faire Britain and pre-socialist China 
 
 Britain China 
Urban problems Inefficiency of land use, limited 
urban containment and outdated 
urban functions without new 
industries 
Outdated urban functions, lack of 
modern infrastructure 
Causes Lack of the market-oriented 
development mechanism 
Lack of industrialised technological 




Increasing density, updated urban 
function and transport intervention 
Basic infrastructure improvement 
and city beautification 
Mechanism Private sector dominant, 
interventional approaches by 
authorities very few 
Publicly-led but very weak; private 
initiatives very few 
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11.2.2 Social Democratic Britain and Socialist China with planned economy 
 
In social democratic Britain, most of the residential slums and declining industrial 
estates, which were the typical products of the development and renewal projects in the 
early capitalist era, became the neighbourhoods targeted for renewal. The shortage of 
decent and affordable houses for the working classes; the dilapidated city image caused 
by the uncontrolled industrial boom and war damage; and the social unrest in some 
specific areas with concentrated poverty in later years were regarded as the new “urban 
problems”. In nature, all the problems came from one core reason: the long-term lack of 
effective state intervention, the demand and supply of non-for-profit public resources 
were very unbalanced. Thus the power of public authorities was enhanced, and most 
neighbourhood renewal projects became public-led and were regarded as an effective 
vehicle to reach the social objectives. In most projects, the physical change was 
regarded as the primary target in order to create more “visible” achievements of the 
projects in a shorter time. 
 
In China, when the Communist Party came to power after 1949, some old “urban 
problems” – dilapidated urban appearance and poor infrastructure – still existed; 
meanwhile, the establishment of modern industrial and administrative systems was 
given higher political importance. Thus many large-scale neighbourhood renewal 
projects were proposed through very ambitious city plans to overcome these problems. 
Because of the international political picture of the time, the newly-established 
Communist authority had to emphasise specifically its left wing political ideology 
against the Capitalist system. The left wing political ideologies were largely learnt from 
the Soviet Union, as well as many other European countries. Thus the market and 
private developers were seen as the only root of these “urban problems” at that time in 
Chinese cities. 
 
This made the neighbourhood renewal process in Chinese planned economy era quite 
similar to projects not only in the Soviet Union and the Socialist Eastern-European 
countries, but also in some Western European countries such as Britain: public agencies 
did almost everything in the renewal projects, while private investment and market 
forces were strictly excluded. The decision-making process was controlled by the 
top-down bureaucratic system, which emphasised the objectives of meeting the public 
or national interest but not profits. Industrialised construction technologies and the 
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European-style blue-print master plans were also imported, which helped in realizing 
the mass physical changes necessary to eliminate the unwanted old neighbourhoods 
entirely. 
 
Because of the difficulties of public finance in the following decades and the shifts of 
the central political power, the ambitious plans for a state-led neighbourhood renewal 
campaign for the macro-scale urban promotion was never turned into reality. The 
completed projects were smaller than the European projects in the same period, and a 
great number of them, having been proposed by the city plans, were seriously delayed. 
In particular, for the mass renewal schemes of traditional urban residential 
neighbourhoods, the pace of practice was seriously delayed behind schedule. Overall, in 
the Socialist planned economy era, the pace of neighbourhood renewal became faster 
than in previous periods, but was still far from the planned targets to solve the perceived 
“urban problems”. 
 
Table 11-3 Comparison of neighbourhood renewal in Social democratic Britain and Socialist China 
with a planned economy 
 
 Britain China 
Urban problems Shortage of decent housing for 
working class, dilapidated city 
image with war damage; social 
unrest in later decades 
Dilapidated urban appearance, poor 
infrastructure and very small urban 
industrial sector 
Causes Lack of state intervention to 
overcome the unbalanced demand 
and supply of non-for-profit public 
services 
Outdated productive technologies, 
poor urban investment, lack of state 
intervention to overcome 
unbalanced demand and supply of 
non-profit public resources 
Strategy and 
approaches 
Slum clearance through relocation, 
beautification and modernization of 
city centre, housing rehabilitation, 
positive discrimination in specific 
zones 
Public-led slum clearance and 
re-construction of city centres but 
often delayed because of short of 
funding 
Mechanism Public-led projects as the 
mainstream 
Public-led and dominant, minimum 
private initiatives  
 
 
11.2.3 Neo-liberalist Britain and reformed China 
 
Following the early 1980s, the vision and approaches of British neighbourhood renewal 
were re-designated by neo-liberalists. Most new projects were located in the very 
dilapidated inner-city or waterfront areas which used to be occupied by declining 
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industrial estates and warehouses, or were derelict. The shrinking local economic output 
and lack of investment in these areas were seen as the prime “urban problems”. This 
essentially reflected the failure of economic plans which had frequently been used and 
revised in previous decades under the impacts of economic globalisation and industrial 
restructuring. The inner-city areas, for their early industrialisation, were the areas 
suffering the heaviest impacts. Thus as the response, the role of private investment and 
market force was re-stimulated and in some specific zones, interventional approaches 
were applied in an attempt to increase local attraction to new investment. In practice, 
many projects were very successful, bringing not only physical improvement but also 
significant local economic renaissance, largely through the new property development. 
They were usually operated by public-private partnerships through which private 
investment formed a union directly with central financial aid. Local authorities and 
communities were usually excluded from the decision-making process, so that the 
“economic first” principle could be confirmed without major resistance. 
 
In China, many new changes brought forward by the economic reform were similar to 
the reforms made by the British neo-liberalists. After several decades of planned 
economy, private capital and market forces were introduced into urban development for 
the first time. The “urban problems” to be addressed were still in two areas: 1) the low 
local economic efficiency with the existence of outdated industries and lack of new 
industries; 2) the slow development of urban housing supply and infrastructures. They 
were not very different from the problems in the planned economy era, but for the 
acceleration of urbanisation and the requirements of economic globalisation, the 
problems became more and more acute. Economic plans were regarded as the cause of 
these problems, and the market was seen as the appropriate answer.  
 
In complying with the progressive economic reform in China, urban neighbourhood 
renewal projects took a step-by-step approach in the transition towards the market. In 
the first stage of the 1980s, when the real estate market had not yet been formally 
established in Chinese cities, only in some pioneer projects was the semi-market model 
introduced as an experimental model. The state, the work units, households and the 
private investment shared the financial burden and operated the process cooperatively. 
Many of these projects solved the two “urban problems” synchronically, so they were 
regarded as a successful way towards modernisation. In the second stage after 1990, the 
private capital and market force took more active roles, and the private-led 
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neighbourhood renewal projects were allowed by law in all Chinese cities. Public 
investment retreated from the renewal projects and a series of state interventional 
approaches was applied only to attract more private investment to initiate the urban 
changes. The pace of the private-led renewal campaign in the largest Chinese cities like 
Beijing reached its peak in the middle and late 1990s. The private capital and the state 
then formed a union to achieve rapid economic prosperity through property 
development, while the local communities were excluded from the decision making 
process. Therefore many local people - especially the vulnerable groups who had been 
the losers of the economic restructuring and welfare reforms - could not benefit from the 
renewal process, and many had to suffer lower living standards because of the 
redevelopment. Thus the over-marketised model was soon widely criticised by 
researchers and the public for its ignorance of social objectives. 
 
Table 11-4 Comparison of neighbourhood renewal in neo-liberalist Britain and reformed China 
 
 Britain China 
Urban problems Poor and problematic communities, 
economic decline and poor 
investment in inner-cities 
Poor and problematic 
neighbourhood, under funding for 
non-productive sector, low local 
economic output 
Causes Impact of economic restructuring 
and the failure of welfare state 




Deregulation and new deals to 
re-encourage private investment, 
property-led redevelopment 
Introduction of market and private 
capital, interventionist approaches to 
facilitate property-led and private 
funded redevelopment 
Mechanism Public-private partnerships, 
excluding local authorities and 
communities 





11.2.4 New Labour Britain and post-reform China towards “Harmonious Society” 
 
When New Labour came to power in Britain in 1997, the economic, social and cultural 
context of British neighbourhood renewal was changed again. As a result of economic 
globalisation and international competition from newly industrialised countries, the 
active role of a free market and private capital in the national economic system was 
recognised as a long-term strategy, but the cooperation and coordination between public 
and private sectors should also have been given an important role to play. Social 
structure changed radically. The traditional barriers between the working class and 
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middle class had been broken, but social inequality emerged in other ways. Emerging 
individualism led to more diverse and dynamic needs in social life. All of these created 
a new relationship amongst individuals, the state and the market in British cities, which 
was the cause of many new “urban problems”. Based on a thorough analysis of this new 
context, the Labour Party used ‘The Third Way’ as the core political ideology to 
understand the challenges in British cities in a new era. 
 
The Third Way thought combined many valuable legacies from both old left and new 
right political ideas in analysing the new “urban problems”. The importance of 
economic renaissance was still emphasised, while the concerns on social equity 
increased significantly. But the major social problem which needed to be dealt with was 
the “exclusion” rather than the “inequality”. This refers to those disadvantaged social 
groups who cannot have “equal opportunities” to access basic social resources to 
support individual development and decent living conditions. Also, the exclusion 
process existed in many aspects, usually reinforced by each other. In recent years in 
some specific deprived neighbourhoods, the vulnerable groups who were suffering 
multi-dimensional exclusion were more concentrated. 
 
In following years, a series of neighbourhood regeneration policies and programmes 
were launched to tackle the multi-dimensional exclusion in the deprived 
neighbourhoods. Central government launched official multiple deprivation indices to 
measure the extent of the deprivation. The major domains of the officially recognised 
multiple deprivation include the decline of local employment, education and health 
services, safety, physical environment and some others. Meanwhile, national strategies 
were published to set up the vision and targets to attack the deprivation in every domain. 
Compared with previous renewal/regeneration processes, the new initiatives had 
wider-ranging targets to ensure the integrated local improvement in the renewed 
neighbourhoods. In order to implement the new-style regeneration programmes 
smoothly, some innovative institutional changes were made. Through these changes, 
regeneration programmes could be run with enhanced vertical and parallel cooperation 
and stronger community engagement so that they could better meet the diverse and 
dynamic local needs. The positive effects of these changes have been confirmed by 
many recent research results.  
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Many recent changes in Chinese cities were very similar to what had happened in 
British cities. The CCP and Chinese central government proposed the vision of a 
“Harmonious Society” (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 2004; 2006), 
which is a milestone of the new changes of political priority, which emphasised more 
social objectives besides the economic concerns in public policy. This also has 
important implications for the neighbourhood renewal process. Nevertheless, before that 
another new cooperative neighbourhood renewal model had already been put into place 
as an experiment. In Beijing, the earliest projects were initiated in 2001 and in other 
cities the changes came later. For this new round of projects, the “urban problems” to be 
addressed became clearer: the concentration of the newly-formed urban poverty and 
vulnerable groups who had to suffer much worse living conditions and 
multi-dimensional exclusion from mainstream groups. The cause of the problems was 
also similar to the recent changes of the British context: continued economic and 
employment restructuring since the economic reform and radical welfare reforms since 
the 1990s. In addition, the forced relocation and selective property-led redevelopment 
brought more negative impacts on the vulnerable groups. Different from the British 
situation, urban poverty in Chinese cities was more serious. In British cities, the lives of 
most vulnerable groups had been covered by the safety net provided by authorities, 
while in Chinese cities, the problem was that the establishment of a basic safety net had 
not yet been completed, and many poor residents were not covered by the safety net at 
all. The campaign to tackle the social and economic exclusion in Chinese cities was still 
in its initial stage. This was, however, the first time that the target of neighbourhood 
renewal was turned to qualitative improvement for specific groups, not the general 
public who had benefited quite a lot from the market-oriented approaches. 
 
In the new experimental projects, public aid was re-used to address the social objectives, 
but the role of market force was maintained to ensure economic success. Meanwhile, 
the contribution of local communities became more important. By drawing on previous 
lessons, the newest projects placed greater emphasis on local improvement in wider 
aspects. Housing and physical upgrading were still the primary target of the projects, 
but better service provision was also considered. Detailed evidence can be found from 
the investigation into the case of Jinyuchi. Of course, compared with the British practice, 
the targets of the projects were still too narrow and the local participation was very 
limited. Nevertheless, these experimental projects have established a possible new 
model for neighbourhood renewal process in Chinese cities in the future. 
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Table 11-5 Comparison of neighbourhood renewal in New Labour Britain and post-reform China 
towards “Harmonious Society” 
 
 Britain China 
Urban problems Cycle of declines in multiple aspects 
in specific areas, social exclusion 
and multiple deprivation 
Concentration of new urban poor 
and underclass in specific areas 
Causes Continued economic and 
employment restructuring, welfare 
reform and selective redevelopment; 
Too low standard of safety-net 
Continued economic and 
employment restructuring and 
welfare reform, forced relocation 
and selective redevelopment; lack of 
a complete coverage of the social 




Integrated long-term actions with 
multiple targets, focusing on social 
investment 
Integrated actions with multiple 
targets, increased social concerns 
but physical upgrading still 
dominant 
Mechanism Community-based partnerships with 
wider involvement 
Experimental model of partnerships 
with improved community 
involvement but still far from ideal 
 
11.3 Achievements and Lessons 
 
The achievements and lessons of the neighbourhood renewal or regeneration process in 
every period in both British and Chinese cities have been evaluated in previous chapters. 
Key findings will be summarised in the following sub-sections. The evaluation process 
follows the same criteria proposed in Chapter 5, and focuses on the renewal and 
regeneration strategies, their outcomes and the effectiveness of the mechanisms. 
 
11.3.1 Laissez-faire Britain and pre-Socialist China 
 
In the early capitalist era, almost all British neighbourhood renewal projects had a very 
simple strategy: to create more economic output by eliminating the outdated buildings 
and developing new properties on site. The industrialisation progress played an 
important role in addressing the old “urban problems”, and successfully pulled the old 
neighbourhoods into the capitalist system. As a result, the newly-developed estates 
became great assets for British cities and supported the modernisation process of the 
nation. However, meanwhile, it also led to the emergence of the poverty problems of the 
mass working class, which became the major “urban problems” of the next era. The 
private-dominated renewal mechanism was proved to be the most effective way to 
address the problem of low industrialisation, but it was not effective in solving the new 
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problems caused by the market-oriented development itself. 
 
In the pre-socialist China, the overall evaluation of the neighbourhood renewal process 
was difficult for its too small scale. Public-led and private-led initiatives co-existed, and 
each of them captured a part of the “urban problems” at that time. The private property 
developers brought new industries to cities and gained returning profits, just like the 
process which had occurred in early capitalist Britain. But the projects’ needs of decent 
housing, health service and other social services expanded so much that the provision 
from the market could not be adequate. This led to new social problems. Some 
public-led renewal projects targeted the social needs, but were limited in a very narrow 
aspect: focusing on basic infrastructures or beautifying the city landscape but missing 
the housing needs. These projects were operated in traditional top-down ways. Although 
the detailed outcomes were diverse case by case, in general the renewal projects 
produced only very limited positive changes in the traditional neighbourhoods. The 
public-led projects were controlled by the top-down central control model which could 
be perceived as the continuity of the way to initiate urban development in a long 
agrarian society. The private-led projects just directly copied the model, learning from 
the West. Both were applied without careful consideration of the context and real local 
needs of the renewed neighbourhoods. 
 
Table 11-6 Evaluation of neighbourhood renewal in Laissez-faire Britain and pre-Socialist China  
 
 Britain China 
Strategy vs 
“urban problems” 
Strategy addressed the requirements 
of industrialisation and property 
development in a market-oriented 
circumstance 
No clearly defined strategies; partial 
actions, very weak impacts to 
traditional Chinese cities 
Outcomes Created great assets by 
market-oriented projects; but 
significant imbalance between 
demand and supply 




Suitable to development but not 
effective to newly-emerging social 
problems 
Ad hoc, empirical decision-making 
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11.3.2 Social Democratic Britain and Socialist China with planned economy 
 
The main objective of the British renewal projects during this period was to eliminate 
physically the dilapidated neighbourhoods, especially the slums and other 
non-profitable estates, and also to increase social housing supply quantitatively. Within 
decades, the public-led renewal projects had brought a significant increase of housing 
provision to eliminate housing shortage, the improvement of urban infrastructure and 
modernisation of many public facilities. These projects were all public-led and 
conducted directly under the control of the top-down bureaucratic system, so that the 
changes could be achieved in a shorter time. As a result, the majority of the working 
classes have benefited from these changes. This addressed the most urgent “urban 
problems” in the post-war British cities. However, the short-term achievements soon 
became problematic in later years. The increase in social housing and other service 
provisions was either of too low quality, or did not match the dynamic and diverse 
social needs of individuals. The public-led model was no longer suitable for tackling the 
newly-emerging economic declines in inner-city areas. 
 
In China in the socialist planned economy era, neighbourhood renewal projects had very 
wide targets, including the schemes of mass slum clearance, the improvement of urban 
infrastructures and beautification of the built environment of the dilapidated areas. 
Some other projects also aimed at establishing new public-owned industrial enterprises 
to improve local productivity. Strategies in proposals often addressed all “urban 
problems”, but it is noted that the ideas were seldom put into practice. The projects to 
realise rapid industrialisation were given priority, while most other projects with social 
objectives were restrained or seriously delayed in order to save limited public 
expenditure. Thus the advantages and shortcomings of the top-down system were both 
significant: it could complete the projects in the most efficient way, but it usually give 
unbalanced priority between different targets and distributed the benefits of the new 
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Table 11-7 Evaluation of neighbourhood renewal in Social Democratic Britain and Socialist China 
with planned economy 
 
 Britain China 
Strategy vs 
“urban problems” 
Well targeted at the urgent post-war 
problems 
Aimed at urban problems at the time 
in proposals but lack of 
implementation 
Outcomes Great achievements as quantitative 
growth but not enough qualitative 
improvement 
Industrialisation first, livelihood 
later; most projects with social 
objectives seriously delayed 
Mechanism Suitable in the immediate post-war 
years but ineffective in new context 
Effective in achieving efficient 
outputs but benefiting the better-off 
and ignoring others 
 
 
11.3.3 Neo-liberalist Britain and reformed China 
 
In the 1980s, the property-led redevelopment in British cities, initiated by private 
developers in collaboration with central government, replaced the public-led renewal 
model as the mainstream. The “redevelopment” initiatives placed economic renaissance 
as the prime target. This is the first time that the lack of investment and depression of 
local economy, perceived as the “invisible problems” behind the physical decay, had 
been recognised as the core of “urban problems” at that time. In practice, a series of 
projects did successfully create a new round of economic revival after the mid-1980s in 
the renewed areas. However, the positive changes took place in some selected locations 
only, providing more benefits to the places rather than to the local people. Meanwhile, 
for the local gentrification, many disadvantaged groups suffering from previous 
economic decline had to be relocated, so the urban problems still existed. The most 
valuable institutional feature of these redevelopment projects was the wide application 
of “public-private partnership”. The new-style interventionist approaches could offer aid 
to the market in both supply and demand, which prevented the failure of either the 
classical-capitalist or the social democratic models. However, this mechanism with the 
exclusion of local communities usually led to unbalanced distribution of the benefits, so 
that the most disadvantaged groups were excluded from receiving them. Thus social 
inequality increased together with the growth of local wealth. Associated with the 
radical welfare reform, was the situation in which the disadvantaged people inevitably 
fell into a cycle of multiple deprivations which were more complex and could not be 
solved by the projects initiated by the two-way partnerships.  
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In China, following the economic reform, the acceleration of the neighbourhood 
renewal practice was quite radical. Many ambitious projects of slum clearance and 
infrastructure improvement, which had frequently been proposed in city plans in the 
past, were finally put into practice with the support of private capital. The new projects 
also brought new industries to replace the outdated urban functions of the old 
neighbourhoods. This effectively targeted the most urgent “urban problems” in Chinese 
context then: the insufficient investment, lack of marketing strategy and the outdated 
industrial structure. This new model was very similar to the neo-liberal approaches in 
Britain prevalent in the 1980s. The outcomes of them were also similar: it resulted in 
significant economic prosperity in some specific cases, but failed to make the prosperity 
widespread. Moreover, since the city marketing strategy in China had stronger 
government support, “forced relocation” and “unfair monetary compensation” were 
very common. As a result, more vulnerable groups were excluded from the local 
upgrading but had to suffer more living difficulties than before. Many signs have shown 
that, in most cases, the rapid economic growth and increasing gap of living conditions 
between social groups co-existed after the over-marketised renewal projects. Thus for 
this over-marketised model, its effectiveness for short-term, unbalanced economic 
growth and the shortcomings for its unsustainability in long-term development, have 
become the new problems. 
 
Table 11-8 Evaluation of neighbourhood renewal in neo-liberal Britain and reformed China 
 
 Britain China 
Strategy vs 
“urban problems” 
Effectively meet the economic 
declines as the most urgent problem, 
first time to focus on the invisible 
problems but still too narrow 
Accelerating industrial 
modernization, put many delayed 
projects into practice but still missed 
many, very similar to neo-liberal 
approaches 
Outcomes Partially successful, but only on a 
limited scale and just “removes” the 
problems for most people 
Partially successful, but only on a 
limited scale and just “relocated” the 
problems for most people; worsened 
the living conditions for vulnerable 
groups 
Mechanism Effective in the short term but 
unbalanced and unsustainable 
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11.3.4 New Labour Britain and post-reform China with most recent changes 
 
In the New Labour era, the “urban problems” were de-fined by a multi-dimensional 
framework, usually including exclusions across economic and employment, social 
services, safety and some others. The launch of the nation-wide multi-deprivation 
indices provided the way to measure quantitatively the extent of the problem in every 
domain. According to this, the renewal/regeneration strategies could be decided in more 
rational and pragmatic ways, and captured not only the urgent problems but also the 
essential causes of them: the “equal opportunities” for the deprived communities to 
access necessary public resources to support normal-level living conditions. 
 
The outcomes can also be easily measured through the official “deprivation indices” and 
other household statistics. In most cases, whether national or local, the positive changes 
have constantly occurred in almost every domain, although some progress was not as 
fast as the initial expectation. More disadvantaged groups are escaping from social 
exclusion and the cycle of multiple deprivations, and obtaining more equal 
opportunities for their individual development in a society with a market economy. 
 
Nowadays, more and more neighbourhood regeneration programmes are operated by 
the multi-sectoral partnerships. This mechanism was inherited from the application of 
“public-private partnerships” in the neo-liberal redevelopment projects, but the 
involvement of the stakeholders was enlarged. Local communities were involved and 
their role was emphasised. This new mechanism, though with a very complex structure, 
was definitely more flexible in responding to the diverse local contexts, and also the 
dynamic changes in the longer term. Of course, the structure and operation of the 
partnership working were still developing in order to improve both effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
 
In China, the neighbourhood renewal campaign is just experiencing some new changes 
through the launch of the experimental projects after 2000. Drawing on the criticism on 
the over-marketised approaches in the 1990s, the experimental projects re-emphasised 
the comprehensive and balanced local improvement. The importance of social 
objectives was promoted and the new projects aimed to seek more positive changes 
within local communities rather than the places to be renewed. The objectives were 
much wider than before: not only the improvement of housing conditions and the 
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physical environment, but also some affiliated infrastructures, education and retailing 
facilities and even the conservation work of historic architecture in some cases. 
However, the investigation, based on primary data from fieldwork, indicated that the 
objectives were still very narrow in comparison with the British practice and the real 
local requirements. Many serious problems were ignored. 
 
More local people have benefited from some positive changes effected by the projects. 
Most of them were “visible”, such as the modernised housing conditions, enlarged 
housing spaces, beautified outdoor environment and the updated infrastructures. 
However, because of some “invisible” problems, such as the poor quality of housing 
management, inequality of education and healthcare for some specific groups and the 
public safety, improvements have been small or even negative. There were also some 
unexpected outcomes caused by the population replacement through the redevelopment 
process. In all, although the strategies of the experimental projects did better address the 
real “urban problems”, in practice their real efforts were compromised by the problems. 
 
The new projects were based on more cooperation and negotiation amongst public and 
private agencies and local communities. This institutional innovation towards the 
multi-sector partnership should signal significant progress, but many signs have 
revealed that the partnership was still operated in a very unbalanced way. The legacy of 
the strong bureaucratic system still existed, and community participation was 
insufficient. This could be the most significant shortcoming of the experimental renewal 
process, since the lack of wide-ranging involvement could be the real cause of the 
un-integrated strategy and unsatisfactory outcomes. 
 
Table 11-9 Evaluation of neighbourhood renewal in New Labour Britain and post-reform China 
towards “Harmonious Society” 
 
 Britain China 
Strategy vs 
“urban problems” 
More integrated, comprehensive and 
pragmatic way to cover the nature of 
“urban problems”, despite some 
details still being controversial 
More integrated and comprehensive 
than before, but the coverage is still 
not wide enough; many “invisible” 
problems were ignored 
Outcomes Constant positive changes in most 
cases 
Some significant positive changes 
but the negative outcomes are 
significant as well 
Mechanism More suitable to meet the 
requirement of the dynamic and 
diverse local needs but the structure 
is still evolving.  
Some progress but far from ideal 
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11.4 Explanations for the Similarities and Differences 
 
All of the above evidence indicates that the developments of neighbourhood renewal 
ideas, strategies, approaches and mechanism in British and Chinese cities are both very 
complex evolutions. However, from a perspective at macro-level, the historical 
developments in the two countries are still comparable. 
 
From the years of earliest industrialisation to the present day, the development 
trajectories of British and Chinese neighbourhood renewal/regeneration share a similar 
trend, which can be divided into four progressive stages/eras. Moreover, the turning 
points between the historic eras in both countries seem to correspond to each other. In 
Britain, the key milestone of the first turning point was the General Election of 1945 
when the power of the state rose dramatically. After that, the dominant role of public 
authorities in urban reconstruction was finally confirmed, although in practice many 
publicly-led renewal projects had already occurred before that in some industrial cities. 
In China, the first shift occurred a little later than 1949, when the Communist Party 
established the new republic and completed the socialisation of the national economy. 
The second era in Britain ended when the top-down controlled public expenditure fell 
into serious difficulties and Margaret Thatcher came to office after the General Election 
of 1979. In China, the economic reform started at almost the same time, but the changes 
were more progressive – after experiencing several years of experiments until 1990 the 
real estate market was formally established and the market-led renewal initiatives with 
government support finally emerged. This model was then questioned and criticised by 
more and more researchers and the public in both countries, because these property-led 
projects had led to a wider gap in living conditions between the disadvantaged and other 
social groups, despite the local economic renaissance. Here came the third strategic shift. 
In Britain, the victory of New Labour in the General Election of 1997 could be regarded 
as another milestone, but in practice the changes emerged more smoothly than before: 
the essential changes in practical projects started in the mid-1990s and the new national 
strategies were finally proposed in 2001. In China, the third shift also experienced a 
quite long period: in some cities the experimental projects to seek more achievements in 
social well-being were initiated in the early 2000s; the vision of a “Harmonious 
Society” proposed in following years confirmed this trend, but there is not yet an 
official strategy for the new style neighbourhood renewal projects. Thus from a 
historical view, once the British development trajectory was restructured, the 
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corresponding similar changes occurred in the Chinese context several years later. 
 
However, the effects of British and Chinese neighbourhood renewal/regeneration 
practice, although following a similar development trend, had significant differences. In 
every historical era, the British renewal processes were proposed to target directly the 
most urgent “urban problems” at the time: in the early capitalist era, the private-led 
projects accelerated the industrialisation process and profitable urban property 
development; in the social democratic era, the public-led projects contributed 
significantly to solving the shortage of affordable modern housing for the working 
classes and some other social problems; in the neo-liberal era, the property-led projects 
initiated economic renaissance in inner-city areas; and in the New Labour years, the 
community-based programmes have begun to reduce multi-dimensional exclusion and 
deprivation. All these policies and practice have led to significant successes, at least for 
a short term. The common shortcoming of them was that the strategies, approaches and 
mechanism could be unsuitable once the “urban problems” changed together with 
external contexts. Thus the products of the renewal practice in an earlier era – for 
example, the back-to-back houses prevalent in Victorian cities and the high-rise council 
housing in immediate post-war years – could become the targets for renewal or 
regeneration again in the future. Fortunately, in most recent years - particularly when 
New Labour came to power, - the sustainability of the renewal process was emphasised, 
and many new attempts were applied in order to increase the flexibility and dynamics of 
the decision-making and implementation mechanism.  
 
In contrast, the effects of Chinese neighbourhood renewal in every era were relatively 
unsatisfactory. Usually, the renewal process could make progress in overcoming only 
some of the “urban problems” at the time, but leave others unsolved: in the pre-socialist 
era, some projects improved urban infrastructures but contributed little to initiate 
industrialization; in the planned economy era, the projects made significant progress to 
develop modern industries, but the housing and infrastructure development was 
seriously lagging behind; in the reformed era, the development of new industries, 
housing and infrastructures were all accelerated, but the positive changes benefited 
selective areas and people only; after 2000, the new round of projects began to follow 
the “people first” principles, but the strategies were still not sufficiently integrated to 
meet all needs for all people, especially the poor. Also, the products of earlier renewal 
projects could also create new (unexpected) problems for later years; for example, the 
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forced relocation in the 1990s and unexpected population replacement in most recent 
projects actually led to further social segregation, which will need to be resolved in the 
future. Moreover, in most recent years, the unbalanced structure of current renewal 
mechanisms in decision-making and implementation has still been unable to capture the 
diverse and dynamic local needs, even though some progress has already been made. 
Here comes a new question: why do the neighbourhood renewal/regeneration processes 
in British and Chinese cities share great similarities but their effects are quite different? 
The explanation lies in the different national and local contexts in which cities are 
formed, which we have compared in the section 11.1. Britain, as a typical representative 
of early-industrialised Western countries, is very different in almost all aspects from 
China, as a typical representative of newly-industrialised developing countries. In each 
of the four historic eras, the national economic, political, social and cultural 
development of the two countries faced different problems and had different 
development goals. However, for the impacts of globalisation, the neighbourhood 
renewal process, as an important issue of public policy in less developed countries, was 
strongly influenced directly by the development of Western theories and practical 
experiences, regardless of the context. Many Western ideas and approaches in 
neighbourhood renewal were often copied without careful consideration of the contexts, 
so the attempts inevitably mismatched the real local needs. The Chinese case well 
reflects this phenomenon. 
 
Before 1949, almost all ideas to develop modern Chinese cities and neighbourhoods 
came from the Western colonists. In the territories directly governed by Western people, 
the Western-style urban development model was imported with nearly no revision. 
These ideas were soon learnt by Chinese policy-makers. Although few of them were put 
into practice and had a significant impact on changing the traditional Chinese cities, the 
fast development of the modernised new neighbourhoods had important demonstrative 
effects. More Chinese people began to trust the Western experience with greater 
confidence. 
 
When the Communist authority was established after 1949, Chinese policy-makers 
realised the importance of modernising Chinese cities and the more valuable 
experiences from the “Soviet state-led model” which proved to be the most successful 
“international experience” to accelerate the growth of national economy at that time. In 
the area of urban reconstruction, many experts from the Soviet Union were invited to 
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give suggestions in decision making and help with the training of Chinese practitioners. 
There were also some elite Chinese intellectuals who received professional education in 
British, French, German or American universities, and returned to China to establish 
schools to teach the Western-style knowledge and techniques for urban planning and 
neighbourhood renewal. Both the Soviet experts and returning Chinese intellectuals 
emphasised the leadership of public authorities and the restraint of private developers in 
the neighbourhood renewal process. That resulted in the city plans, in which almost all 
features of the neighbourhood renewal products in Western countries like Britain were 
copied, such as the blue-print master plans, the high-rise housing estates, the broadened 
road system to facilitate car traffic and so on. However, in practice, the ambitious plans 
were quickly proved to be unrealistic. With very poor public finance, most investment 
had to concentrate on the development of modern industry only. Most of the proposed 
public-led neighbourhood renewal projects were not completed, and failed to achieve 
the social success that had happened in Western countries. 
 
Following the economic reform, the development of Chinese cities experienced even 
stronger global influence. Especially after the establishment of the urban real estate 
market, the increasing amount of foreign investment was attracted to create 
extraordinary prosperity in old neighbourhoods through a property-led process. For 
some reasons, the public authorities still held quite strong power to intervene in the 
market whenever the officials thought it necessary. Thus in the mid-1990s, the private 
developers and local governments formed a strong union to achieve greater boons for 
both sides through the application of the public-aided marketised model to initiate 
neighbourhood renewal projects. In this way, the neo-liberal ideas gradually became 
dominant in the new Chinese renewal model: the ideological shift was initiated first in 
the projects invested by Western capital, but then it restructured the whole system. In 
the 1990s, the majority of neighbourhood renewal projects in Chinese cities followed 
the model, which could be also seen as an extreme type of public-private partnership 
encouraged by neo-liberalists in Britain. However, in the British context, the new shift 
was initiated, with the aim of changing the egalitarian urban society without enough 
competitiveness, but still maintaining the basic safety net for vulnerable groups; while 
in China, the changes meant the withdrawal of the basic social safety net for vulnerable 
groups, and the too-strong state intervention made the sudden economic prosperity 
unsustainable. Therefore, for another time, the application of Western experience in a 
quite different Chinese context was not as successful as expected. 
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After years of reform, the gap in economic development between Chinese and Western 
countries has been reduced significantly. Moreover, Chinese society has become more 
westernised in many aspects. This makes the Chinese and British contexts more similar 
than before. For neighbourhood renewal projects, the policy-makers now need to face 
some similar challenges: they must achieve longer-term and wider-ranging betterment 
to promote the real living conditions for all local people, especially the vulnerable 
groups, and economic success must be maintained in a more sustainable way. In Britain, 
the challenges had been well understood and analysed in depth by a great number of 
researchers from various perspectives, and the New Labour government had made the 
clear response to them from both an ideological and a practical level. However, in China 
this progress was still in its initial stage. In the experimental projects, the renewal 
strategies came more integrated than before, but they were still not wide enough, nor 
were they clearly defined. Therefore, in the face of many similar challenges, including 
the economic and employment restructuring and the negative impacts of welfare 
reforms, the British-based theories and experience in neighbourhood renewal could be 
more valuable references for Chinese researchers and policy-makers.  
 
To be remarkable, some differences of the contexts in the two countries should still not 
be ignored. Many historical lessons of inappropriate copying of Western ideas and 
approaches should be learned. Therefore, the most valuable British experiences should 
be understood in a more strategic way: Chinese researchers and policy-makers should 
better understand the analytical framework based on a long historical analysis in Britain, 
rather than the short-term detailed policies and actions. This framework provides a 
theoretical contribution towards finding the real “urban problems” to be solved, and 
how to launch a real effective and efficient response, which will be helpful in generating 
an “appropriate” renewal strategy and mechanism to respond to the changing “urban 
problems” in the longer term. 
 
11.5 Recommendations: What Can China Learn from the British Experiences? 
 
Although there are too many differences in the neighbourhood renewal processes in 
Britain and China, it is still possible, through systematic and comprehensive 
comparisons, for Chinese policy-makers to benefit from the British experience. In 
recent years, Western influence over development in China has increased significantly, 
and many Chinese cities - especially the large metropolises like Beijing - have been 
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gradually integrated into the global economy. Modernisation and industrial restructuring 
have posed new challenges in neighbourhood renewal. The British experiences and 
lessons - especially those from the New Labour era - could provide useful guidelines 
and resources for policy makers in China. 
 
11.5.1 Being aware of the “invisible” problems 
 
Current neighbourhood renewal in Chinese cities is a difficult job. The investigation in 
Beijing in this research shows that the social, economic, and environmental problems in 
old neighbourhoods are very complicated. They are much more difficult problems than 
had been expected by the policy-makers. In declining old neighbourhoods like 
Shichahai and Jinyuchi, the dilapidated housing and living conditions and the poor 
outdoor environment were no doubt the most significant “local problems”; however, 
they were just some of the difficulties that local residents had to face. Many local 
households had to suffer poverty, long-term unemployment, inconvenience in accessing 
essential social services, and they had to endure other difficulties in daily life. These 
problems were usually “invisible” to outsiders. Both local officials and residents 
indicated, during interviews, that these “invisible” problems are extremely serious and 
adversely affect the quality of life. The poor housing conditions were actually the 
consequences rather than the causes of their economic and social difficulties. This 
means that the multi-dimensional exclusion across physical, economic and social 
aspects and the “cycle of local declines” observed in British cities are now emerging in 
the disadvantaged Chinese urban neighbourhoods. To Chinese policy-makers, the 
challenges from these “invisible” problems may be fresh, but the British practice - 
especially in the New Labour years – has provided a very good example and framework 
by which one can understand the nature of these complex problems. In this research, 
local problems in Shichahai and Jinyuchi were explored in 8 domains, with reference to 
the British experiences and lessons. This framework was very simple for the limited 
availabilities of data in many aspects. In future research and practice, this framework 
could be further developed to include more detailed indicators. 
 
11.5.2 Integrated and longer-term strategies and approaches 
 
In the one-off projects like Jinyuchi which were completed in a very short period, the 
outcomes were restricted to very narrow aspects. The increase of housing space and 
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promotion of indoor and outdoor facilities were extremely significant and easy to be 
recognised by outsiders, but through the investigation, the significantly positive impacts 
to local residents were limited, and most of them were short-term gains. The decline in 
local employment, education, healthcare, personal safety and others were not all 
effectively addressed during the renewal process. The vulnerable groups have to suffer 
the unexpected negative outcomes of the renewal project with its unbalanced priorities. 
This means current strategies and approaches are effective in addressing the superficial 
and short term, physical problems only, but not the multi-dimensional and integrated 
problems and the causes behind them. In fact, the problems across housing, employment, 
education, health, safety and others are closely related to each other. Many of them 
could be caused by historical reasons, for example, unemployment, the unequal spatial 
distribution of high-quality education and health services. That means the effective 
solutions to these problems must follow an integrated and long-term approach, rather 
than the “one-off” actions focusing on one or two aspects. In recent years, Chinese 
governments have launched a series of new policies trying to reduce the negative social 
impacts of the radical housing, education and healthcare reforms, but most of the 
vulnerable groups living in the old neighbourhoods were still excluded. Thus the 
multi-dimensional and longer term approaches should be explored to stop the 
chorological “cycle of declines”. 
 
11.5.3 Institutional changes 
 
The most significant obstacle to realising the integrated strategies and approaches for 
neighbourhood renewal was the fragmentation between public agencies. As the legacy 
of the planned economy system, most public agencies in China, including those in 
charge of social service delivery, are run following a top-down model. Each agency is in 
charge of a special action plan and its implementation in its own area. 
Cross-departmental coordination and cooperation are very difficult. Traditionally, the 
initiation and management of neighbourhood renewal projects were seen as the duty of 
local housing authorities only, which is why until very recently the renewal approaches 
focused on physical changes. In most recent renewal projects, the institutional barrier 
has begun to be broken down. In Jinyuchi, some other governmental branches, 
including the local planning bureau, traffic management bureau, cultural heritage bureau, 
civil engineering and infrastructure providers, have been involved in planning and 
negotiation over the renewal strategies and approaches. However, this change has 
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contributed only very slightly to improving the very fragmented system. The long-term 
partnerships in British neighbourhood renewal projects provide valuable lessons for 
institutional changes. First, the cross-departmental cooperation should have wider 
involvement. It should include agencies in charge of social services such as education, 
healthcare and police. Second, more participants should have equal rights to influence 
the renewal process so that the strategy and approaches can be more integrated and 
balanced. Third, there should be an overall cross-departmental strategy or regulations to 
confirm the duty and role of every government branch in the renewal process, so that 
every participant can have enthusiasm to work for this process. Through the interviews, 
many local officials indicated the necessity of the institutional changes. However, 
because of the slow progress of reform in Chinese political and administrative systems, 
it could be a long time before a well-coordinated institution system is achieved. 
 
11.5.4 Enhancement of civic society 
 
Many findings have indicated that the lack of community engagement and local 
participation is a big problem related to the neighbourhood renewal mechanism. 
Compared with British practice, the voice from local communities has always been 
weaker or nearly non-existant in some cases. This is partly because of the unbalanced 
structure of the decision-making process, but, more important, owing to the traditional 
weak role of civic society in China. For a very long time, the central-controlled 
administrative system was so strong that almost all neighbourhood-level public affairs 
were also charged by the top-down system rather than community-based organisations. 
In the planned economy era, work units took charge of the social service provision and 
decided the living conditions for most urban residents. Neighbourhood committees were 
also established to help in managing local communities. The staff of the committees was 
elected from local households every one or three years. Nevertheless, compared with 
those of government agencies, the responsibilities of the committees were very limited, 
just to organise some social activities, but made little contribution towards changing 
local living conditions. Also, the finance of the neighbourhood committees was 
provided by local government so the staff essentially worked for the top-down 
bureaucratic system, rather than the local public. This resulted in a situation whereby, 
even in the most recent neighbourhood renewal projects like the one in Jinyuchi, when 
the importance of public participation has already been emphasised in the 
decision-making process, it was still difficult to find an effective channel to collect 
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public opinions democratically from the local community. The main duty of the 
neighbourhood committee in the renewal process was to explain the details of the 
official compensation policies and regulations to individual households on behalf of the 
government and developers, rather than to represent the residents in negotiation and 
bargaining on their behalf. 
 
In future renewal projects, the duties of neighbourhood committees should be expanded, 
and the central control of them should be relaxed so that the committees can become the 
real community-based organisations. Their roles in decision making for local public 
affairs - including renewal strategy and approaches - should be adjusted. In Chinese 
urban society, although there is not a tradition that the local management was influenced 
by the community-based organisations, the new mechanism to encourage community 
engagement can be promoted first through the neighbourhood renewal process. 
 
11.5.5 More investigation and research 
 
Through this research, it has become clear that in Britain the decision-making process 
and implementation of neighbourhood renewal/regeneration programmes in recent years 
have become more and more complex than before. In order to make effective and 
efficient responses to the diverse and dynamic “urban problems”, all policies, strategies, 
action plans and approaches were based on careful investigations and research. The 
research findings have contributed to many aspects of policy making. They have 
brought a comprehensive understanding of the nationwide challenges in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, and provided the foundation for national policies and strategies. They 
have also provided the analysis of local contexts for specific areas, such as the 
pre-conditions to decide action plans for single programmes. They have offered 
theoretical frameworks on structural features of macro- or micro-scale partnerships 
working in decision making and implementation as the evidence to promote better 
regeneration mechanisms. They have pointed the ways to measure regeneration 
outcomes so that the effects of the programmes can be evaluated rationally. In every 
single topic area, there are rich research resources and outcomes. The researchers also 
come from many different disciplines, including urban planning, housing studies, 
geography, sociology, politics, economics and so on. Their findings and contributions 
also come from different perspectives. UK research on urban renewal and regeneration 
has accumulated vast knowledge on this huge topic, and provides very valuable 
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references to researchers in other countries. 
 
Investigations and researchers on neighbourhood renewal in China are limited in 
comparison with those in the UK. Although the neighbourhood renewal practice in 
Chinese cities is developing at a dramatic speed, most projects have been initiated and 
completed without careful consideration and evaluation. During this research, the 
scarcity of existing research findings, either from official or academic researchers’ 
points of view, posed a great challenge. Most available publications and materials 
focused on housing policies and spatial changes only, and were produced by urban 
planners and architects. Theoretical analysis about the neighbourhood renewal process 
and practice was very limited. Thus in this research the British-style analytical 
framework was ‘borrowed’. This is the first attempt to analyse Chinese neighbourhood 
renewal development in a systematic, comparative and integrated way. As a 
one-person-based study, it does have some limitations; e.g. it focused on only one case 
study city and two case study areas. The data collection in the field has been limited by 
time and resources. Nevertheless, through this comprehensive cross-national 
comparison, this research has provided an overall picture of the neighbourhood renewal 
process and practice in Chinese cities; it has highlighted some of the major problems 
and made some important recommendations. The study and the analytical framework 
followed by this research will pave the way for future research in China on this very 
important topic. 
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(不包括长期在外地的学生和有自己住所的亲人)     
______人 



















60 以上  













另有住处的父母、岳父母等)    














男性 □ 女性 □ 
1-09 被访者的年龄 ______周岁 
1-10 被访者的工作单位（已退休的按照退休前最
后职务） 
临时工作/打工 □ 城镇集体企业 □ 
个体户/自由职业 □ 国营工厂企业 □ 














 临时工  
中低层管理人员/
干部 
 家庭妇女  
高级技术人员  自由职业者  
普通技术人员  军人  
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2-03 您家现在的住房类型为 




搭建房为主 □ 现代低层住宅 □ 
其他 □   
2-04 您现在住房的面积大约是 ____ 平米? 
2-05 您的现在的住房有______ 个卧室? 
2-06 现在住房拥有的设施有（多选）： 
自用厨房 □ 自用厕所 □ 
自用浴缸或淋浴 □ 自来水 □ 
集中供暖 □ 自备供暖 □ 
管道燃气/煤气 □ 罐装燃气/煤气 □ 
垃圾收集回收 □ 闭路电视 □ 
电话 □ 网络连接 □ 








□ 比较低，基本满意 □ 















家用电脑 □ 私人汽车 □ 
空调 








租住的公房 □ 租住的私房 □ 
其他 □ 请注明： 
2-11 您家现在是否还有其他住房？ 














很划算 □ 较为划算 □ 
一般 □ 不大划算 □ 















□ 租给别人居住或用于经商等 □ 
















































□ 自己摆摊或做小生意 □ 
兼职打工 □ 无 □ 
其他 □   
其他请注明____________________________ 
3-05 如果有，这部分收入占家庭收入比例为 
低于 5％ □ 5％－10％ □ 
10％－20％ □ 20％－50％ □ 











































非常严重 □ 较为严重 □ 
一般严重 □ 不大严重 □ 




























□ 较为安全，不大担心 □ 
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影响很大 □ 影响较大 □ 
影响一般 □ 影响不大 □ 



























很便利，很满意 □ 较便利，较满意 □ 
一般，还凑合 □ 不好，不大满意 □ 




很便利，很满意 □ 较便利，较满意 □ 
一般，还凑合 □ 不好，不大满意 □ 




很便利，很满意 □ 较便利，较满意 □ 
一般，还凑合 □ 不好，不大满意 □ 














总体帮助很大 □ 总体帮助较大 □ 
总体帮助不明显 □ 有些负面影响 □ 
负面影响较大 □   
8-03 您觉得现在居委会和其他社区组织的工
作对您家生活水准的提高 
帮助很大 □ 帮助较大 □ 
帮助和影响一般 □ 很少有帮助 □ 
毫无帮助 □   
8-04 您对现在居委会和其他社区组织 
非常信任和满意 □ 比较信任和满意 □ 































有 □ 无 □ 
看情况，没想好 □   

























□ 比较支持和期待 □ 
无所谓 
□ 不大支持，比较怀疑 □ 






















几乎完全没机会 □ 偶尔会有机会 □ 
有一些机会 □ 有较多机会 □ 
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Part I Basic Information of Interviewees 
1-01 Who many long-stay residents are in this household? ______ 
1-02 The residents here includes (please input the number of each): 
The interviewee  Mother-in-law of the interviewee  
Spouse of the interviewee  Grandparents of the interviewee  
Father of the interviewee  Son(s) or daughter(s) of the interviewee  
Mother of the interviewee  Son(s) or daughter(s)’s spouse of the interviewee  
Father-in-law of the interviewee  Grandson(s) or grand daughter(s) of the interviewee  
Others    
1-03 The age structure of the residents here (please input the number of each): 
0－18  18－25  
25－40  40－60  
60 +    
1-04 The status of the residents here (please input the number of each): 
How many have long-term jobs?  How many are retired?  
How many have temporary jobs?  How many are studying (before graduation)?  
How many are unemployed?  How many are disabled or with long-term disease?  
1-05 Do you have extra dependent to support financially? 
1-06 Do you have extra support from outsiders financially? 
1-07 The gender of the interviewee is: Male/Female 
1-08 The age of the interviewee is: ______ 
 
Part II Housing Conditions 
2-01 In which year did you start to live in this community? ______ 
2-02 The type of your housing is: 
The traditional style (Siheyuan) □ High or middle-rise flats □ 
Separated rooms in one yard □ Low-rise flats □ 
Self-constructed informal rooms □ Newly-built houses □ 
others □   
2-03 Current floor space of your home is ______? 
2-04 How many bedrooms does your home have? ______ 
2-05 Do you have the following facilities in your home? 
Private kitchen □ Private toilet □ 
Private bathroom □ In-house water connection □ 
Central-provided heating □ Self-provided heating □ 
Piped gas □ Canned gas □ 
Rubbish collection □ Circuit TV □ 
Telephone □ Internet connection □ 
Private parking space □ Shared parking space □ 
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2-06 What is the frequency of housing damages (including roof leaking, hidden troubles of 
structure, jam of sewage etc.)? 
Very frequently □ Often □ 
Just so so □ Seldom □ 
Nearly never □   
2-07 What is the level of housing maintenance service? 
Worse, very unsatisfied □ Bad, unsatisfied □ 
Neutral, just so so □ Good, satisfied □ 
Perfect, very satisfied □   
2-08 Do you have the following items? 
Computer □ Air conditioning □ 
Private car □   
2-09 What is the owner-type of your home? 
Private owned □ Shared ownership □ 
Public owned □ Private renting □ 
Others □   
2-10 Do you have other dwelling house(s)?  Yes/No 
2-11 How much is your average cost for this home? (Including the mortgage or monthly rent, 
together with others such as fees for heating)  
______ per month or per year 
2-12 If you have other house(s), how much is the average cost for it/them? 
______ per month or per year 
2-13 The total cost for your housing is______ per month or per year 
It is ______ % of your total family income. 
2-14 If you have bought the housing here, now you think it is 
Very unworthy  □ Unworthy □ 
Just so so □ Worthy □ 
Very worthy □   
2-15 If you don’t buy the housing here, that is because 
It is not for sale  □ We just live here temporarily □ 
Not enough money □ Don’t like the housing here □ 
Having owned other properties □ Other reasons □ 
2-16 If you have other housing, it is now 
Self used  □ To let □ 
Used by relatives or friends □ Empty □ 
 
Part III Employments 
3-01 How many of your family members working in the following sectors (please input the 
number of each)? 
Collective enterprise(s)  State-owned enterprise(s)  
Private-owned enterprise(s)  Foreign-capital enterprise (s)  
Self-employed  Governmental institution(s)  
Other public institution(s) (such as hospitals, schools etc.)  Others  
Military and the affiliated institution(s)    
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3-02 How many of your family members working in following category: 
Higher/middle-level management  Lower-level skilled  
Higher/middle-level skilled  Unskilled  
Lower-level management    
3-03 How many of your family members are 
Unemployed for more than 6 months  
Never have long-term jobs  
Ever get helps such training  of professional skills or job inf
ormation delivery or others 
 
Ever find jobs through the help of governments or other publ
ic organisations 
 
3-04 Are there any other stable income of your family besides salaries? Yes/No 
If Yes, is it from the following ways? 
Housing to let  □ Part-time jobs □ 
Street shops □ Others □ 
And if Yes, it is approximately ______ % of the total income? 
 
Part IV Education 
4-01 How many of your children are studying at 
Nursery or kindergarten(s)  
Primary school  
Junior middle school  
High school  
Secondary specialized or technical school (中专、职高、技校)  
College(s) or university and higher  
4-02 How many of your children are studying in 
“Key” schools (重点学校)  
Ordinary schools  
Informal schools  
Out of schools  
4-03 Are there child(ren) of your family ever forced to give up the opportunities for further 
education due to financial difficulties?  Yes/No 
 
Part V Medical and Health Care 
5-01 For medical and health care, how many of your family members are  
Covered by national health insurance  
Covered by commercial health insurance  
Medical aids  
Totally self-paid  
5-02 Are there frequently difficulties for family members to access public health service? 
Almost always □ Usually □ 
Sometimes □ Few □ 
Nearly no □   
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5-03 If there are difficulties, they are: 
Not covered by health insurance 
□ Lack of information of health servi
ce 
□ 
Hospitals are too far □ Hospitals are too crowded and the 
waiting lists are too long 
□ 
Some cost not covered by health  insura
nce 
□ Others □ 
 
Part VI Public Security and Social Orders 
6-01 Do you feel satisfied to public security and social orders of this community? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
6-02 What are the major causes to threat public security and social orders? 
Most residents are low-educated □ Some residents are low-educated  □ 
Too many outsiders (sightseers) □ Not enough police care □ 
Not enough facilities (e.g. CCTV) □ Not enough neighbourhood watch □ 
Not enough training and management □ Others □ 
 
Part VII Retailing and Social Facilities 
7-01 Are you satisfied to retailing service nearby (including food shops, grocery, restaurant 
etc.)? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
7-02 Are you satisfied to civic service facilities nearby (including post office, banks etc.) ? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
7-03 Are you satisfied to entertainment facilities nearby (including sports facilities, cinemas 
and cultural etc.)? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
 
Part VIII Community Cohesion 
8-01 How do you feel the communication with neighbours?  
Very unhappy, with many problems □ Unhappy, sometimes with problems □ 
Neutral □ Joyful and harmonious □ 
Very joyful and harmonious □   
8-02 How do you think the effects of the communications with neighbours? 
Almost always negative □ Usually negative  □ 
Neutral □ Usually positive and beneficial □ 
Almost always positive and beneficial □   
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8-03 How do you think the work done by current community committee? 
Totally non-helpful to my family □ Seldom helpful to my family  □ 
Sometimes helpful to my family □ Frequently helpful to my family □ 
Always very helpful to my family □   
8-04 Do you trust current community committee? 
No, not at all □ Usually not  □ 
Just so so □ Normally yes □ 
Yes, very much □   
 
Part IX General Evaluations 
9-01 Generally speaking, you think which of the following items are the major ADVANTAGES 
of living here? (multiple selection) 
 
Housing floor space  
Housing quality  
Housing maintenance service  
(Physical) environment surrounded  
Accessibility to jobs  
Accessibility to education  
Accessibility to public healthcare service  
Accessibility to retailing and social facilities  
Public security and social orders  
Community cohesion  
9-02 Generally speaking, which of the following items you think are the major 
DISADVANTAGES of living here? (multiple selection) 
Housing floor space  
Housing quality  
Housing maintenance service  
(Physical) environment surrounded  
Accessibility to jobs  
Accessibility to education  
Accessibility to public healthcare service  
Accessibility to retailing and social facilities  
Public security and social orders  
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亲人)     ______人 























60 以上  













子女，另有住处的父母、岳父母等）    











男性 □ 女性 □ 
1-10 被访者的年龄 ______周岁 
1-11 被访者的工作单位（已退休的按照退休前
最后职务） 
临时工作/打工 □ 城镇集体企业 □ 
个体户/自由职业 □ 国营工厂企业 □ 














 临时工  
中低层管理人员/
干部 
 家庭妇女  
高级技术人员  自由职业者  
普通技术人员  军人  




















其他 □   
2-04 您现在住房的面积大约是 ____ 平米(不
包含公摊面积)? 








□ 比较低，基本满意 □ 















家用电脑 □ 私人汽车 □ 
空调 □   
2-11 您家现在是否还有其他住房？ 




























□ 租给别人居住或用于经商等 □ 





平房、搭建房 □ 多层单元住宅 □ 
较完整的院落 □ 高层带电梯住宅 □ 
简易楼房 □ 现代低层住宅 □ 
宿舍或与人合住 □ 其他 □ 
3-02 迁入前您家原来的住房（不是指过渡房）
为______ 居室？ 
3-03 原来住房的面积是______ 平方米？ 
3-04 迁入前您家的住房设施有（多选） 
自用厨房 □ 自用厕所 □ 
自用浴缸或淋浴 □ 自来水 □ 
集中供暖 □ 自备供暖 □ 
管道燃气/煤气 □ 罐装燃气/煤气 □ 
垃圾收集回收 □ 闭路电视 □ 
电话 □ 网络连接 □ 
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3-07 迁入前您家是否还拥有下列设施？ 
家用电脑 □ 私人汽车 □ 
空调 
□ 燃气/太阳能热水器 □ 
3-08 迁入前您家的住房属于哪种产权 
自家拥有产权 □ 拥有部分产权 □ 
租住的公房 □ 租住的私房 □ 
其他 □   
3-09 迁入前您家是否还有其他住房？ 















□ 租给别人居住或用于经商等创收 □ 






临时工作/打工  城镇集体企业  
个体经营/自由
职业 









 其他  


















































低于 5％ □ 5％－10％ □ 
10％－20％ □ 20％－50％ □ 
50％以上 □   
4-09 迁入前您家是否还有其他较为稳定的收
入?（比如出租房屋、做小生意、兼职打工等等） 
是 □ 否 □ 
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4-10 如果有，这部分收入约占当时家庭收入的
比例为 
低于 5％ □ 5％－10％ □ 
10％－20％ □ 20％－50％ □ 
50％以上 □   
4-11 和迁入前相比，现在这部分的收入 
显著增加 □ 略有增加 □ 
基本持平 □ 略有减少 □ 


































































非常严重 □ 较为严重 □ 
一般严重 □ 不大严重 □ 





























□ 较为安全，不大担心 □ 



















差很多 □ 略差一些 □ 
基本差不多 □ 略好一些 □ 
好很多 □   
7-05 您觉得导致社区治安问题的主要原因是
（可多选） 





















很便利，很满意 □ 较便利，较满意 □ 
一般，还凑合 □ 不好，不大满意 □ 
很差，很不满意 □   
8-02 对比迁入前，现在的上述设施便利和满意
度 
明显提高 □ 略有提高 □ 
相差不多 □ 略有下降 □ 
明显下降 □   
8-03 您家人去日常其他服务设施（比如邮局、
银行、自行车修理、电器维修、废品回收等） 
很便利，很满意 □ 较便利，较满意 □ 
一般，还凑合 □ 不好，不大满意 □ 
很差，很不满意 □   
8-04 对比迁入前，上述服务设施的便利和满意
度 
明显提高 □ 略有提高 □ 
相差不多 □ 略有下降 □ 




很便利，很满意 □ 较便利，较满意 □ 
一般，还凑合 □ 不好，不大满意 □ 
很差，很不满意 □   
8-06 对比迁入前，上述文体娱乐设施的便利和
满意度 
明显提高 □ 略有提高 □ 
相差不多 □ 略有下降 □ 








一般，有时来往 □ 较少，偶尔来往 □ 
几乎从不来往 □   
9-01 与迁入前相比，您在社区里认识的人和经
常来往的人（比如串门、聊天、一起购物等） 
明显增加 □ 略有增加 □ 
相差不多 □ 略有减少 □ 
明显减少 □   
9-04 您觉得街坊邻居的交往、互助、协作、信
息沟通等对您家的生活影响 
总体帮助很大 □ 总体帮助较大 □ 
总体帮助不明显 □ 有些负面影响 □ 
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9-06 您觉得现在居委会和其他社区组织的工
作对您家生活水准的提高 
帮助很大 □ 帮助较大 □ 
帮助和影响一般 □ 很少有帮助 □ 
毫无帮助 □   
9-07 和迁入前相比，这样的帮助和影响力 
明显增加 □ 略有增加 □ 
相差不多 □ 略有减少 □ 






































有 □ 无 □ 
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Part I Basic Information of Interviewees 
1-01 Who many long-stay residents are in this household? ______ 
1-02 The residents here includes (please input the number of each): 
The interviewee  Mother-in-law of the interviewee  
Spouse of the interviewee  Grandparents of the interviewee  
Father of the interviewee  Son(s) or daughter(s) of the interviewee  
Mother of the interviewee  Son(s) or daughter(s)’s spouse of the interviewee  
Father-in-law of the interviewee  Grandson(s) or grand daughter(s) of the interviewee  
Others    
1-03 The age structure of the residents here (please input the number of each): 
0－18  18－25  
25－40  40－60  
60 +    
1-04 The status of the residents here (please input the number of each): 
How many have long-term jobs?  How many are retired?  
How many have temporary jobs?  How many are studying (before graduation)?  
How many are unemployed?  How many are disabled or with long-term disease?  
1-05 Do you have extra dependent to support financially? 
1-05 Do you have extra support from outsiders financially? 
1-06 1-07 The gender of the interviewee is: Male/Female 
1-08 The age of the interviewee is: ______ 
 
Part II Housing Conditions (Current and Past) 
2-01 In which year did you start to live in this community? ______ 
2-01a Did you live in this community before the redevelopment project? Yes/No 
2-02 The type of your housing is: 
The traditional style (Siheyuan) □ High or middle-rise flats □ 
Separated rooms in one yard □ Low-rise flats □ 
Self-constructed informal rooms □ Newly-built houses □ 
others □   
2-02a The type of your last housing was: 
The traditional style (Siheyuan) □ High or middle-rise flats □ 
Separated rooms in one yard □ Low-rise flats □ 
Self-constructed informal rooms □ Newly-built houses □ 
others □   
2-03 Current floor space of your home is ______? 
2-03a The floor space of your last home was ______?2-04 How many bedrooms does your home 
have? ______ 
2-04a How many bedrooms did your last home have? ______ 
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2-05 Do you have the following facilities in your home? 
Private kitchen □ Private toilet □ 
Private bathroom □ In-house water connection □ 
Central-provided heating □ Self-provided heating □ 
Piped gas □ Canned gas □ 
Rubbish collection □ Circuit TV □ 
Telephone □ Internet connection □ 
Private parking space □ Shared parking space □ 
2-05a Did you have the following facilities in your last home? 
Private kitchen □ Private toilet □ 
Private bathroom □ In-house water connection □ 
Central-provided heating □ Self-provided heating □ 
Piped gas □ Canned gas □ 
Rubbish collection □ Circuit TV □ 
Telephone □ Internet connection □ 
Private parking space □ Shared parking space □ 
2-06 What is the frequency of housing damages (including roof leaking, hidden troubles of 
structure, jam of sewage etc.)? 
Very frequently □ Often □ 
Just so so □ Seldom □ 
Nearly never □   
2-06a What was the frequency of last housing’s damages? 
Very frequently □ Often □ 
Just so so □ Seldom □ 
Nearly never □   
2-07 What is the level of housing maintenance service? 
Worse, very unsatisfied □ Bad, unsatisfied □ 
Neutral, just so so □ Good, satisfied □ 
Perfect, very satisfied □   
2-07a What was the level of last housing’s maintenance service? 
Worse, very unsatisfied □ Bad, unsatisfied □ 
Neutral, just so so □ Good, satisfied □ 
Perfect, very satisfied □   
2-08 Do you have the following items now? 
Computer □ Air conditioning □ 
Private car □   
2-08a Did you have the following items when living at the last home? 
Computer □ Air conditioning □ 
Private car □   
2-09 What is the owner-type of your home? 
Private owned □ Shared ownership □ 
Public owned □ Private renting □ 
Others □   
2-09a What was the owner-type of your last home? 
Private owned □ Shared ownership □ 
Public owned □ Private renting □ 
Others □   
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2-10 Do you have other dwelling house(s)?  Yes/No 
2-10a Did you have other dwelling house(s) when living at last home? Yes/No 
2-11 How much is your average cost for this home? (including the mortgage or monthly rent, 
together with others such as fees for heating)  
______ per month or per year 
2-11a How much was your average cost for last home? (including the mortgage or monthly 
rent, together with others such as fees for heating)  
______ per month or per year 
2-12 If you have other house(s), how much is the average cost for it/them? 
______ per month or per year 
2-12a If you had other house(s), how much was the average cost for it/them? 
______ per month or per year 
2-13 The total cost for your housing is______ per month or per year 
It is ______ % of your total family income. 
2-13a The total cost for your housing was______ per month or per year 
It is ______ % of your total family income. 
2-14 If you have bought the housing here, now you think it is 
Very unworthy  □ Unworthy □ 
Just so so □ Worthy □ 
Very worthy □   
2-15 If you don’t buy the housing here, that is because 
It is not for sale  □ We just live here temporarily □ 
Not enough money □ Don’t like the housing here □ 
Having owned other properties □ Other reasons □ 
2-16 If you have other housing, it is now 
Self used  □ To let □ 
Used by relatives or friends □ Empty □ 
2-16a If you had other housing before living at this home, it was then 
Self used  □ To let □ 
Used by relatives or friends □ Empty □ 
 
Part III Employment 
3-01 How many of your family members working in following sectors (please input the number 
of each)? 
Collective enterprise(s)  Self-employed  
State-owned enterprise(s)   Governmental institution(s)  
Private-owned enterprise(s)  Military and the affiliated institution(s)  
Foreign-capital enterprise (s)  Others  
Other public institution(s) (such as hospitals, schools etc.)    
3-02 How many of your family members working in following category: 
Higher/middle-level management  
Higher/middle-level skilled  
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Lower-level management  
Lower-level skilled  
Unskilled  
3-03 How many of your family members are 
Unemployed for more than 6 months  
Never have long-term jobs  
Ever get helps such training  of professional skills or job information delivery or others  
Ever find jobs through the help of governments or other public organisations  
3-03a Compared to before the project, current local job opportunities are 
Much fewer than before □ Slightly fewer than before □ 
Almost as same as before □ Slightly more than before □ 
Much more than before □   
3-04 Are there any other stable income of your family besides salaries? Yes/No 
If Yes, is it from the following ways? 
Housing to let  □ Part-time jobs □ 
Street shops □ Others □ 
And if Yes,  it is approximately ______ % of the total income?  
3-04a Were there any other stable income of your family besides salaries before redevelopment? 
Yes/No 
If Yes, was it from the following ways? 
Housing to let  □ Part-time jobs □ 
Street shops □ Others □ 
And if Yes,  it was approximately ______ % of the total income then? 
3-04b After the project, the income besides salaries is now 
Much fewer than before □ Slightly fewer than before □ 
Almost as same as before □ Slightly more than before □ 
Much more than before □   
 
Part IV Education 
4-01 How many of your children are studying at 
Nursery or kindergarten(s)  
Primary school  
Junior middle school  
High school  
Secondary specialized or technical school (中专、职高、技校)  
College(s) or university and higher  
4-02 How many of your children are studying in 
“Key” schools (重点学校)  Informal schools  
Ordinary schools  Out of schools  
4-03 Are there child(ren) of your family ever forced to give up the opportunities for further 
education due to financial difficulties?  Yes/No 
4-03a After the project, do your children still study at the same school(s)? Yes/No 
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4-03b If no, do they go to study at: 
Much worse school(s) □ Slightly worse school(s) □ 
Almost same level school(s) □ Slightly better school(s) □ 
Much better school(s) □   
 
Part V Medical and Health Care 
5-01 For medical and health care, how many of your family members are  
Covered by national health insurance  Medical aids  
Covered by commercial health insurance  Totally self-paid  
5-02 Are there frequently difficulties for family members to access public health service? 
Almost always □ Usually □ 
Sometimes □ Few □ 
Nearly no □   
5-02a Compared to before the project, the difficulties become 
Much more □ Slightly more □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly less □ 
Much less □   
5-03 If there are difficulties, they are: 
Not covered by health insurance □ Some cost not covered by health  insurance □ 
Hospitals are too far □ Crowded hospitals and long waiting lists  □ 
Lack of information of health service □ Others □ 
 
Part VI Public Security and Social Orders 
6-01 Do you feel satisfied to public security and social orders of this community? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
6-01a Compared to before the projects, the public security and social orders of this community 
become 
Much worse □ Slightly worse □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly better □ 
Much better □   
6-02 What are the major causes to threat public security and social orders? 
Most residents are low-educated □ Some residents are low-educated  □ 
Too many outsiders (sightseers) □ Not enough police care □ 
Not enough facilities (e.g. CCTV) □ Not enough neighbourhood watch □ 
Not enough training and management □ Others □ 
 
Part VII Retailing and Social Facilities 
7-01 Are you satisfied to retailing service nearby (including food shops, grocery, restaurant 
etc.)? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
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7-01a Compared to before the projects, the retailing service nearby become 
Much worse □ Slightly worse □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly better □ 
Much better □   
 
7-02 Are you satisfied to civic service facilities nearby (including post office, banks etc.) ? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
7-02a Compared to before the projects, the civic service facilities nearby become 
Much worse □ Slightly worse □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly better □ 
Much better □   
7-03 Are you satisfied to entertainment facilities nearby (including sports facilities, cinemas 
and cultural etc.)? 
Very unsatisfied □ Unsatisfied □ 
Neutral □ Satisfied □ 
Very satisfied □   
7-03a Compared to before the projects, the entertainment facilities nearby become 
Much worse □ Slightly worse □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly better □ 
Much better □   
 
Part VIII Community Cohesion 
8-01 How do you feel the communication with neighbours?  
Very unhappy, with many problems □ Unhappy, sometimes with problems □ 
Neutral □ Joyful and harmonious □ 
Very joyful and harmonious □   
8-01a Compared to before the project, the communication opportunities become 
Much less □ Slightly less □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly more □ 
Much more □   
8-02 How do you think the effects of the communications with neighbours? 
Almost always negative □ Usually negative  □ 
Neutral □ Usually positive and beneficial □ 
Almost always positive and beneficial □   
8-02a Compared to before the project, the effects of the communications with neighbours 
become 
Much more negative □ Slightly more negative □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly more positive □ 
Much more positive □   
8-03 How do you think the work done by current community committee? 
Totally non-helpful to my family □ Seldom helpful to my family  □ 
Sometimes helpful to my family □ Frequently helpful to my family □ 
Always very helpful to my family □   
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8-03a Compared to before the project, the help from community committee become 
Much less □ Slightly less □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly more □ 
Much more □   
8-04 Do you trust current community committee? 
No, not at all □ Usually not  □ 
Just so so □ Normally yes □ 
Yes, very much □   
8-04a Compared to before the project, your trust to community committee become 
Much less □ Slightly less □ 
Almost same to the past □ Slightly more □ 
Much more □   
 
Part IX General Evaluation 
9-01 Generally speaking, you think which of the following items are the major ADVANTAGES 
of living here? (multiple selection) 
Housing floor space  
Housing quality  
Housing maintenance service  
(Physical) environment surrounded  
Accessibility to jobs  
Accessibility to education  
Accessibility to public healthcare service  
Accessibility to retailing and social facilities  
Public security and social orders  
Community cohesion  
9-02 Generally speaking, you think which of the following items are the major 
DISADVANTAGES of living here? (multiple selection) 
Housing floor space  
Housing quality  
Housing maintenance service  
(Physical) environment surrounded  
Accessibility to jobs  
Accessibility to education  
Accessibility to public healthcare service  
Accessibility to retailing and social facilities  
Public security and social orders  
Community cohesion  
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Appendix C: Questions for the In-Depth Individual Interviews 
I. 政府官员和职员 (Staff of local government) 
 
1. 请问北京市目前旧城改造的主要对象、方式和目标是什么？ 
What are the main targets and objectives of current neighbourhood renewal in Beijing? 
 
2. 这些方式和目标是如何确定的？ 
How did the targets and ways to be decided? 
 
3. 以金鱼池为代表的新一批危改项目的选点有哪些依据？ 
How did we choose the target neighbourhoods like Jinyuchi to be renewal in the new 
round of projects? 
 
4. 这批项目从开始论证、动工到完成的时间? 








What are the main targets of the renewal projects? What are the outputs? 
 
7. 项目参与的建设方（甲方）、投资方和其他参与方分别是什么单位？ 
Who is the main investor of the projects? Who are the other participants of the process? 
 
8. 项目拆迁的规模是多大？共涉及了多少住户和多少单位？ 




What is the key policy to decide the demolition compensation for every one? 
 
10. 其中回迁居民户数是多少？ 





When did your company start to undertake redevelopment projects in old 
neighbourhoods? What were the projects completed by your company? 
 
2. 为什么要参与旧城改造项目呢？ 
Why do you want to take part in the renewal/redevelopment projects? 
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3. 在参与过的旧城改造项目中，贵公司的主要角色和职能是什么？ 
During the process, what was the role and duties of your company? 
 
4. 跟政府、当地居民是否经常交流合作？采取什么方式？ 
Did you communicate or cooperate frequently with local government and communities? 
In what way did you do that? 
 
5. 现在的改造模式和过去有何不同？对贵公司有何影响？ 
What are the main differences of the renewal policy and practice between current and 
previous projects? What was the impact to your company? 
 
6. 您认为现行改造政策和实践哪些方面应进一步改进？ 
What is your suggestion to improve the renewal policy and practice in future? 
 
 
III. 规划师和研究人员（Planners and local researchers） 
 
1. 中国旧城更新改造的研究目前主要集中在哪些方面？ 
What are the main areas that the existing research findings on Chinese neighbourhood 
renewal concentrate in? 
 
2. 中国旧城更新改造的政策与实践发展经历了怎样的历史进程？ 








What do you think the main driven force of the development of neighbourhood renewal 
policy and practice? 
 
5. 您认为最新的变化是对过去的反思吗？ 




Do you think the development of Chinese neighbourhood renewal policy and practice 
influenced by Western theories and experiences? Do you think the changes are repeating 
the developing way of Western countries? 
 
7. 您认为现行政策与实践的主要成就和不足在哪些方面？ 
What do you think are the main achievements and shortcomings of current renewal 
policy and its implementation? 
 
8. 您对这些政策和项目实践未来发展有什么建议和推荐？ 
What are your suggestions and recommendations for the future development of Chinese 
neighbourhood renewal policy, practice or mechanism? 
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Appendix D: List of Interviewees of the In-Depth Individual 
Interviews 
 
Name Title Institute Time of interview 
Government Officials (10) 
Dr. Cheng Vice 
Director 
Beijing Municipal Construction 
Committee 
Oct. 2007 
Mr. Wang Secretary Beijing Municipal Construction 
Committee 
Nov. 2007 
Ms He Director Office of Neighbourhood Renewal, 
Chongwen District 
Dec. 2007 
Mr. Yan Staff Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban 
Planning 
Nov. 2007 
Ms. Xu Staff Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban 
Planning 
Nov. 2007 
Ms. Jin Staff Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban 
Planning, Chongwen Division 
Dec. 2007 
Mr. Jing Secretary Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban 
Planning, Chaoyang Division 
Oct. 2007 
Ms. Wang Vice 
Director 
Beijing Municipal Construction 
Committee, Xicheng Division 
Dec. 2007 
Ms.Zhang Staff Neighbourhood Committee of Shichahai Nov. 2007 
Ms. Gao Staff Neighbourhood Committee of Shichahai Nov. 2007 
Developers (5) 






Vanke Co. Ltd Aug. 2006 
Mr. Wang Staff Office of Research and Design, Vanke Co. Ltd Aug. 2006 
Mr. Wu Staff R & F Properties Aug. 2006 
Mr. Wang Assistant Manager 
Wantong Real Estate Development 
Company 
Aug. 2006; Dec. 
2007 
    
    
  310 
 
Planners and local researchers (13) 




School of Urban and Environment, 
Peking University 
Nov. 2007 
Prof. Bian Professor 
(Urban 
Planning) 
School of Architecture, Tsinghua 
University 
Nov. 2007 Dec. 
2007 




School of Architecture, Tsinghua 
University 
Nov. 2007 Dec. 
2007 
Prof. Jin Director Institute of Housing Studies, Urban 
Planning and Design Institute of 
Tsinghua University (THUPDI) 
Jul. 2006  Nov. 
2007 
Mr. Wang Senior 
Planner 
Urban Planning and Design Institute of 
Tsinghua University (THUPDI) 
Nov. 2007 
Mr. Quan Planner Urban Planning and Design Institute of 







School of Architecture, Tsinghua 
University 
Jul. 2006  Dec. 
2007 




School of Architecture, Tsinghua 
University 
Jul. 2006 
Dr. Liu Research 
Associate 
(Sociology) 
Department of Sociology, Tsinghua 
University 
Jul. 2006  Dec. 
2007 
Mr. Sheng Planner China Academy of Urban Planning and 
Design (CAUPD) 
Dec. 2007 
Mr. Yang Planner Beijing Municipal Institute of City 
Planning and Design (BMICPD) 
Aug. 2006   
Mr. 
Zhang 
Planner Beijing Municipal Institute of City 
Planning and Design (BMICPD) 
Dec. 2007   
Prof. Gao Professor Institute of Geographic Science and 
Natural Resources Research, China 
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